¹⁸⁶⁶⁰ Wednesday, 1 February 2012

(Open session)

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning to everybody in and around the courtroom. Before the witness will be brought in, I would like to deal with one matter left over from yesterday.

We discussed the document D341. This document we postponed a decision about admission into evidence. We decided, in the meantime, to mark it for identification pending translation of the entire document. Only 15 pages are translated yet, and therefore it will be received after translation of the whole document.

The witness should be brought in, please.

[The witness takes the stand]

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning, Mr. Skrbic. Welcome back to the courtroom. I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell the truth still applies today.

Mr. Tolimir is continuing his examination-in-chief. But before you start, Mr. Tolimir, can you give us an estimation, any indication how many hours you will need today so that we can plan the cross-examination and the length of the testimony of Mr. Skrbic?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Greetings to everyone present. May the Lord bring peace upon this courtroom, and may the outcome of this trial be decided by providence and not according to my wishes. According to the estimate that the Defence team has made, we ¹⁸⁶⁶¹ believe that we are going to conclude the direct examination of today's witness, Mr. Skrbic.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. That means you will conclude today. Thank you.

We have to aware that, according to the estimation of the Prosecution, the testimony of Mr. Skrbic will go into the next week. Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

WITNESS: PETAR SKRBIC [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter] Examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] Greetings to Mr. Skrbic, and I would like him to have a pleasant stay among us.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have in e-court 1D111, the one that we saw yesterday on our screens. I apologise. It should be 1D1111, four 1s.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Mr. McCloskey.

MR. McCLOSKEY: And good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours, everyone. There is certainly a chance I can finish in one day. I certainly hope to, so I just want -- there is a chance I can, so I will try to, in fact. But, you know, sometimes I tend to talk, but we hope we'll get done in a day.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much for this encouragement of the Chamber. That is appreciated. ¹⁸⁶⁶² Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Witness, yesterday we saw this document but since you didn't have your glasses, I am going to repeat one question that I put to you yesterday. Did you amend in any way whatsoever those notes after you had compiled them? Did you remove or delete any portions or add any portions to it? Thank you.

A. No, I didn't change anything.

Q. Thank you. Mr. Skrbic, please, can you tell us where did you keep this document from the moment you created it until the moment you handed it over to Mr. Aleksandar Gajic, the Defence legal advisor? Thank you.

A. Mr. Tolimir, initially it was on a floppy disk, and then I copied it to my laptop computer and this is where I kept it.

Q. Thank you. You kept it just like any other electronic file or did you provide some specific protection for it? In other words, my question is: How did you manage to save it from being destroyed?

A. Unfortunately, I have lost a lot of files. I didn't save this document as a special document, and I didn't attach any special importance to it. It was among other documents that I kept with its own annotation, and I think I explained that to the Trial Chamber. The letter O indicated that this was beyond my scope of responsibility but, rather, within the scope of responsibility that were not part of my ¹⁸⁶⁶³ purview. Therefore, I did not keep it as a particular important document.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Now, let us look at the first entry, dated 18th March, 1995, and I am going to read:

"Izetbegovic managed in America to have humanitarian aid provided by air-drops, but he will actually receive weapons. The Muslims are planning offensive operations from Bjelasnica towards Gorazde in order to link up the enclave with Sarajevo. All the preparations at the 1st Muslim Corps have been finalised and they have 10.000 troops allocated for that operation."

Now, Mr. Skrbic, can you please comment this note and what is its significance? Thank you.

A. That was one among the first pieces of information that indicated that preparations were underway for large-scale operations directed against the Army of Republika Srpska. That is probably the reason why I became interested in following this kind of information. That was the route which indicated that preparations would start against Army of Republika Srpska by the BH Army.

And this first sentence, which speaks about air-drops, humanitarian air-drops that will, in fact, supply weapons, was subsequently confirmed as true in practice. As I said yesterday, it was also confirmed by a diplomat from the Ukraine when he spoke to General Mladic. After that, I don't know which year it was in, but a few helicopters crashed that were carrying weapons for Zepa.

Q. Mr. Skrbic, can you please look at the second entry dated the ¹⁸⁶⁶⁴ 19th of March, 1995, and I would like you to focus on paragraph 3, and I am going to read it.

"The Muslims are moving and regrouping nearly on all lines of contact. The soldiers finished school during the war and have been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonels. They established a professional brigade in Tesanj, and in Bugojno they are starting producing electric fuses for mines."

Can you tell us the meaning of what you say here, "moving and regrouping"?

A. When you have moving and regrouping in a war, every officer in the army realises that large-scale operations were in offing, and it's up to them to estimate whether these movements and these regrouping were on a large-scale, and if that is the case, then it would entail large-scale combat operations. Due to that, every army in the world is watching and monitoring the movement and the regrouping of their enemies.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Let us now look at entry dated 21st January, 1995. Can you please tell us, since the first one is dated the 18th of March and we have now this date, can you tell us is that maybe a mistake that you made in the date?

A. No, this was not intentionally written. I think that's an error.

Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what the correct date would be?

A. It should read the 21st of March, 1995, which is confirmed by paragraph 3 in chapter 03, which reads: "On the 20th of March, 1995, in the early morning hours ..." and so on and so forth.

Q. Thank you. Let us now take a look at the second paragraph of ¹⁸⁶⁶⁵ this entry which reads, and I quote:

"In the forthcoming offensive, America is going to provide intelligence reports to the Muslims. They are going to engage unmanned aircraft to take off from the island of Brac. The training of the Muslims in Zelina and Varazdin is being carried out from mercenaries from Austria and Germany that had come from the Foreign Legion. Via Slovenia, the Muslims are being sent to Bosnia in order to cut off the corridor near Orasje."

My question is: Can you please comment on this note. Do you know anything about these unmanned aircraft as a means of collecting intelligence? Thank you.

A. Your Honour, this information turned out to be true. Since I, myself, saw the flights by unmanned aircraft, will you allow me to describe that briefly for your benefit?

JUDGE FLUEGGE: This was part of the question. Please carry on.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I experienced this in the western part of Republika Srpska during the attack launched by the Croatian army launched against the Army of Republika Srpska. Similar things occurred throughout the territory of Republika Srpska. At about 5.00 in the morning, there would be artillery preparations. They would shell the settlements and units of the VRS. This would be done from 5.00 to 10.00 in the morning, and then at 10.00, a drone would fly over the area to carry out reconnaissance and to take photographs. Some of these drones were targeted by the air defence of Republika Srpska. In some other parts of the Republika Srpska, some of the drones were hit. But the one ¹⁸⁶⁶⁶ I was looking at was not hit. When the drone returned from where it had taken off, at around 1400 hours artillery fire would be opened again, and then around 1500 hours or just before night fell, aircraft would take off. On one occasion I could recognise fighter planes above Mrkonjic Grad.

As someone from the anti-aircraft defence, I could recognise these planes to be NATO pact planes. I could recognise MIGs that the Croatian army also had in their possession, as well as the JNA. Sometimes they would target the relay stations on Kozara. I won't go into that, but unfortunately they would also target columns of refugees. In this manner, the drones carried out reconnaissance throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the information gathered was provided to the Croatian army and to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you. We will now have a look at the last paragraph on page 1 of this document, dated the 21st of March.

"The Muslims have bought 15 surface-to-surface missiles which were taken over into Croatia via Hungary in humanitarian aid convoys. Croatia retained five of the missiles."

My question is as follows: At the time when you made this entry, did you have any information of trafficking in weapons by using humanitarian aid convoys, and do you know anything about the routes via which Muslims managed to obtain weapons? Thank you.

A. With regard to the process of bringing weapons as a whole for the needs of the ABiH, well, we were familiar with that, but with regard to ¹⁸⁶⁶⁷ this particular case, I found out about it from an intelligence report. Not this one.

Mr. Tolimir, every entry here is something I can tell you about in relation to the general situation and the general way in which weapons were brought in. So perhaps I couldn't remember all the rifles, every rifle, every piece of weapons that were brought in, but there were some Luna missiles that were brought in from Hungary. There were multiple rocket-launchers that were brought in and other equipment as well, including ammunition. And this was the general process followed by the ABiH when it came to obtaining weapons from abroad.

I had information according to which in Maribor, in Slovenia, the police accidentally found 150.000 rifles. They then took those rifles to Bosnia and Herzegovina via Croatia, but they would always keep some for themselves. They would always retain 30 per cent of these weapons, regardless of what kind of weapons they were.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Given your military speciality, what is a surface-to-surface missile? What does that mean?

A. Your Honours, a surface-to-surface missile has a large warhead on the missile and it uses solid fuel in its engine. It is launched from the surface and targets troops or facilities on land. Anti-aircraft missiles, on the other hand, have a different type of warhead because these warheads fragment in the air without directly hitting the plane. When a plane is hit by these fragments, it is then destroyed. But in these cases there are also two types of missiles used for different purposes. There are missiles that are used for anti-aircraft ¹⁸⁶⁶⁸ defence of troops, that's a so-called anti-aircraft troop defence missile, and the anti-aircraft missiles that are used to defend the territory.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Let's now have a look at the note on page 2, paragraph 3, where it says the following. You can see it. It's on this page, second line:

"Muslims are fortifying themselves in the vicinity of Gorazde, around Gorazde, because they are expecting an attack on the enclave after the attack of the Muslim army in the direction of Trnovo." My question is as follows: Where is Trnovo, which part of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Republika Srpska, and how far is it from Gorazde?

A. Trnovo is a place closer to Sarajevo than Gorazde, but I don't know how far it is from Gorazde exactly.

Q. Thank you. Is the territory of the municipality of Trnovo -- or the territory of the municipality of Trnovo and of Gorazde, are they -- do they border on each other?

A. Your Honours, in the pre-war situation, given the pre-war divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these municipalities were not the same -- or, rather, they were the same. But in the post-war situation, well, I don't know how these things were organised.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Could you tell us whether you know Gorazde had the same status of a protected and demilitarised zone, as was the case for Srebrenica and Zepa? Thank you.

A. Yes, it was a protected zone. General Michael Rose - and this is ¹⁸⁶⁶⁹ something I found out through hearsay - warned General Mladic that Gorazde should not be attacked, even though General Rose admitted that there were attacks from other enclaves launched against the Army of Republika Srpska. And other places were also attacked in the direction of Trnovo, as stated in this document here.

Q. Thank you. Mr. Skrbic, let's please have a look at the entry 0.4, dated the 22nd of March, 1995. I am interested in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. As there is no translation, I'll read it out. And I quote:

"NATO is preparing a special corps with about 40.000 men, the purpose of which will be to evacuate UNPROFOR forces when the conflict escalates, as expected, because the Muslims have already been forced to do that. The Muslims in the enclaves are blocking UNPROFOR forces with the purpose of trying to force them to withdraw."

Third paragraph. "Schools and nurseries are being closed in Tuzla, which is a reliable indicator that the Muslims offensive is quite certain." My question is as follows: Do you know anything about a plan to evacuate the UNPROFOR forces as stated here?

A. Well, there was a general tendency. We became aware of it through information from UNPROFOR itself. Lieutenant-Colonel Dudnjik spoke about this at the meeting in Vlasenica. He said that UNPROFOR had no choice but to withdraw from the entire territory to make it possible to use the air force on the battle-field. They didn't say to use force against the VRS. That wasn't stated, but when the air force was used, it ¹⁸⁶⁷⁰ was always against the VRS. So the members of UNPROFOR themselves were afraid. They feared for their security. They were afraid of all the sides in the party.

Your Honours, I know that even in Tuzla the ABiH members blocked UNPROFOR forces in Bihac. When I was in the 2nd Krajina Corps, a major from the French army, who was an UNPROFOR member, complained to us about an inappropriate relationship that the Muslim army in Bihac had towards them. Colonel Vojisavljevic [phoen] from the 2nd Krajina Corps was also present, and he didn't know how to help them.

Q. Thank you. My question is as follows: The entries I have just quoted, do they concern all the enclaves in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Is that what is shown by the entries you made? Thank you.

A. Yes. These entries concern all the enclaves.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. In the following paragraph, paragraph 5, entry 04, it says: "Schools and nurseries are being closed in Tuzla, and this is a reliable indicator that the Muslim offensive is quite certain." My question is: Why is closing schools and nurseries a reliable indicator that the Muslim offensive is quite certain? Could you answer that question.

A. Your Honours, in the course of the war Tuzla was under the control of the ABiH. Given that the population could see that they were preparing an attack as part of a general offensive, it's quite logical to ¹⁸⁶⁷¹ expect that the VRS army will respond, and that is the reason for which the schools were being closed in Tuzla.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Could we now please see the last paragraph of entry 0.5, 0.5. That's the following entry, the next entry. Thank you. I quote:

"In agreement with UNPROFOR representatives, the Muslims want to protect the enclaves and to have UN forces on their side. They want to amend their mandate and carry out a spring offensive without encountering any obstacles."

Mr. Skrbic, do you know which offensive is being referred to here? Thank you. Which spring offensive is being referred to here?

A. This offensive was planned as early as the beginning of January. I say this with some reservations. I didn't examine the documents. I don't know when it was planned, and I haven't seen documents from the ABiH, from the Muslim side. But given certain events on the ground, it was possible to see that this offensive had already been launched because, in April, there was intense fighting in the direction of Trnovo and Vlasic and other places, and there was fighting from the direction of Bihac as well, but they gave up because of the bad conditions. So the contents of this report were, in fact, confirmed by events on the ground.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. What enclaves does this refer to in the RS? I am talking about this entry. Thank you.

A. Mr. Tolimir, I must say that there were no enclaves in the RS.

Q. Thank you. But were there Muslim enclaves in the territory of the RS that were given the status of protected zones? Thank you. ¹⁸⁶⁷²

A. Now I understand. Those were enclaves in the east of Bosnia and Herzegovina or in the present-day Republika Srpska. They were Srebrenica and Zepa.

Q. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 3 of these notes. I am interested in entry 0.6. I would like to focus on paragraphs 2 and 3.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. I quote paragraph 2, and the date is 24 March 1995: "The Muslims are preparing an attack on Brcko, Teslic, and Trnovo. The Muslims have not reorganised their army for such an extensive task and yet will carry out offensive actions in a synchronised manner.

"In Gorazde, the Muslims are forcing UNPROFOR to withdraw because they have the intention to attack Serbian positions from there, too." These were paragraphs 2 and 3 of the entry dated 24 March 1995. Here is my question: Mr. Skrbic, please explain to the Trial Chamber in which parts of the Republika Srpska Brcko, Teslic, and Trnovo are? Is it one region or are they located in different regions? Thank you.

A. Your Honours, Brcko is in the north-eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is on the river Sava, on the right bank. Teslic is some 100 or 120 kilometres from Brcko towards the central part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And Trnovo is quite a different place altogether. It's to the north-west of Sarajevo, not far from the city. All these places are ¹⁸⁶⁷³ in different locations so that this information that attacks on these places are being prepared is a reliable indicator of an imminent general offensive.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Let us deal with entry 0.7 now. I am interested in paragraph 1, and the date is 25 March 1995. I quote: "The Muslim offensive is meant to be a means of pressurising Western diplomacy to open talks about the acceptance of the plan of the contact group and the legalisation of the results of the Muslim army achieved during the cessation of hostilities as well as preventing Serbian responses, especially against the enclaves." Here is my question. What does this phrase mean: "The legalisation of the results of the Muslim army achieved during the cessation of hostilities"? Thank you.

A. In the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslims were taking significant portions of territory. The results overall were not overwhelming, but they wanted their successes to be legalised. However, not these results to be used as a means of pressurising the contact group but, instead, to exert pressure on foreign diplomacy which in turn would influence the contact group. But the plans of the contact group were not favorable for the Republika Srpska.

So there was an agreement reached, eventually, to keep the territories controlled by the three parties, the VRS, the BH Army, and the HVO, as they were. That would have been acceptable for the RS, but the contact group changed that thoroughly. That's why there had to be pressure exerted on the contact group and the VRS, and I talked about ¹⁸⁶⁷⁴ that yesterday when I paraphrased the words of General Wesley Clark.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Let us look at entry 0.8, which is on page 4 of your document. We can see that this entry is dated 26 March 1995. I quote:

"Muslims are pressurising UNPROFOR to bring about a change of its mandate in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are probing the reactions with regard to the protection of the enclaves, and they got assurances by NATO that the enclaves will be protected by the air force. The preparations for an attack on Teslic are nearing their end. The Muslims are pressurising the HVO to support them with artillery which they will probably accept. And when they use up the artillery, then the Muslims will attack them." Remark by PS.

What do these initials PS stand for? I mentioned them at the end of my quote. Thank you.

A. PS are the initials of Petar Skrbic; in other words, me. This kind of making remarks is part of the scholarly procedure, so when you enter a comment of your own you must clearly mark it as such.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Here is my question: Did you have any other information about the assurances that NATO gave the Muslims to the effect that they would protect the enclaves by the air force? Thank you.

A. Your Honours, let me first inform you, because this is reliable information, that in 1993, in Brussels, it was agreed that the NATO air force units would be used, but it was not defined against whom they would be used. Initially, this agreement was neutral. They wanted to protect UNPROFOR in the territory of the whole former SFRY. ¹⁸⁶⁷⁵ Later that changed. NATO was always saying that they were protecting UNPROFOR and the enclaves, but in late 1995, they totally sided with the Croatian and Muslim armies in their air-strikes. The book written by Mr. Richard Holbrooke clearly shows how the mandate was changed, the mandate of the NATO forces. Since in 1995, according to his own words, he was asking President Clinton daily to bomb Serbian positions, and I am going to paraphrase one of his sentences. He was saying, Mr. President, there is no talking with them. They must be hit. And he was always sending such messages to the president that there is no other solution, that air-strikes against the Serbian positions must be carried out.

In his book "Modern Warfare," Mr. Wesley Clark wrote about the bombing of the FRY. Yesterday, I couldn't answer Mr. Tolimir's question because he asked me where did they go in 1996. I don't know about Leighton Smith even today, but I know that Wesley Clark became the commander of NATO forces. And in his book "Modern Warfare," Clark wrote, among others, about the bombing of the RS.

Your Honours, NATO once threatened the Muslims to bomb them, but that never happened. They threatened because of the provocations from the enclaves directed against the VRS. So we can conclude from that that the positions of the VRS, the territory and the population of the RS were the only ones to be bombed by NATO air force. Nobody else. Not even -- there weren't even collateral -- there wasn't even collateral damage on anybody else's part.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Let us now look at paragraph 6 of this ¹⁸⁶⁷⁶ entry, dated 26 March 1995. I quote:

"The Muslims are illegally moving out because they think that the offensive against the VRS began with insufficient preparations and that the VRS will respond."

Since this is not translated, please explain to us what illegal -- what this phrase means, "illegally moving out." To which enclaves does this apply? Thank you.

A. Your Honours, in a number of towns and in some territories in the RS, Muslims lived during the war normally. I cannot list them all but I'll give you some examples, Sanski Most, Mrkonjic Grad, Brcko, and some other places which I cannot remember now. They lived normally there so that this process of moving out has been labeled illegal because nobody forced those Muslims to move away. And, Your Honours, nobody is so susceptible to the effects of war than the population. They sometimes know more about it than military officers, and they react in an almost natural way when they are afraid, irrespective of the combat activities -- or their nature, I mean. When there is armed conflict, the population is afraid and, logically, flees.

Q. Thank you. Now let us look at the last paragraph on page 5. Thank you. Yes, here it is. It's entry 0.11, dated 1 April 1995. I quote:

"The NATO air forces in Italy are preparing for offensive actions, but no higher level of alert has been declared for their units. Some transport equipment has been transported to Split, allegedly in order to pull out UNPROFOR." ¹⁸⁶⁷⁷ The last words are on the following page. Thank you. Mr. Skrbic, please explain to us, what does this mean, "preparation for offensive actions without a higher level of alert being declared"? Thank you.

A. Yes, I can explain. That was my speciality for a long time, anti-aircraft defence. In all countries, when you declare a higher level of alert, then all personnel, pilots, and engineers must be at the airfield. And there are three levels of combat readiness. Level three is when the planes are armed, the pilots are at the airfield, but they are still in the barracks, to put it that way. Level two means that the pilots have to be on the apron but do not board the planes yet. And level one means when the pilots must be in the cockpits, the planes are armed, and only waiting for the signal to take off.

So this information means that none of these three levels was ordered, but they are -- but readiness is heightened anyway. However, these three higher levels have not been declared.

Did you ask about anything else?

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. That will suffice with regard to my question. Let us now look at the entry dated the 2nd of April, 1995. Thank you. This is enough. Since we don't have a translation I am going to quote the first two paragraphs. Quote:

"NATO aircraft are preventing flights by the Muslim and Croatian --"

I'm sorry, I made a mistake and it should read as follows: "NATO aircraft are not preventing flights by Muslim and Croatian ¹⁸⁶⁷⁸ helicopters."

The next paragraph: "UNPROFOR is exploring the intentions of the Serbs towards the enclaves. Only in that area do they wish to exert pressure to have the cessation of hostilities honoured."

Can you tell us which particular areas are they talking about when they speak about the cessation of hostilities? Was it the whole of Bosnia or which specific areas did you have in mind? Can you explain that to us.

A. In the area of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. I'm sorry, in Bihac as well.

Q. Thank you. My next question is: Was UNPROFOR or NATO, for that matter, obliged to prevent all flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina and any hostilities that were in breach of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities? Thank you.

A. Your Honours, I would like to remind you, because I am very well informed and knowledgeable about this area thanks to my research, that the UN Assembly - I don't know what number it was - but it adopted a resolution which was called "No-fly zone," which pertained to the air-space above the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words, as from that year and throughout the war, no one except NATO aircraft was allowed to fly in that air-space. I saw it with my own eyes that they projected and ejected infrared protection, which is actually anti-missile defence because a rocket always follows a stronger infrared beam. This information testifies to the fact that they were acting ¹⁸⁶⁷⁹ partially, that some sides were prevented from flying, some sides were not. The reaction and the speed of NATO actions was not equal to everyone. According to this resolution, these flights should have been forbidden and it was up to NATO to do that.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Let's move now to page 7 so that we can take a look at the next entry. It's at the very top of the page, and I quote:

"The Croats are mobilising new soldiers across Slavonia and rotating units towards Grahovo and Glamoc. They are using enormous resources in order to clear up the roads."

My question is: Do you have any personal knowledge about this? Thank you. I am talking about the activities of the Croatian army.

A. Yes, I do. I was particularly interested in following the events involving Glamoc because that was my birthplace. Later on it turned out that this information was completely true.

Q. Thank you. Now, please, let's look at entry 0.13, paragraph 7.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll up -- actually, scroll down so that we can see the bottom of the page. Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, look at the fifth paragraph from the bottom, which reads: "Forcible mobilisations among Muslims in nearly all major towns. They are calling up even those hadn't been called up before." My question is: What does "forcible mobilisation" mean and what does it indicate? ¹⁸⁶⁸⁰

JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is the fourth paragraph from the bottom, not the fifth.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, since we already discussed various types of mobilisation in my testimony, I would just like to focus on the term "forcible mobilisation." Since in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by their army general mobilisation was declared, and just like in Republika Srpska this was pretty exhausting for the population for the federation. The conscripts were reluctant to respond to the call up. Forcible means that physical force and not only physical force was used, but also they were threatened with weapons should they fail to respond. So it was no longer an issue of responding voluntarily. They had to respond. And when I say "they," I am talking about the Muslims, because here we are talking specifically about this ethnic group.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Can we now have page 8 of this document, paragraphs 2 and 3. Now, let's look at paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 on this page, and I quote:

"They are offloading equipment from the US army ships. They are being transported to the NDH," which is an abbreviation for the independent state of Croatia, "purportedly for the intention of pulling out UNPROFOR."

Next paragraph. "The Muslims are being supplied by US aircraft via Dubrave airfield and the costs are covered by Libya, Iran, and Kuwait. Through ¹⁸⁶⁸¹ offensive operations Muslims are endeavouring to take control of Teslic, Doboj, and Vozuca, and then together with the Croats they would advance towards Posavina."

Mr. Skrbic, can you tell us what do -- does this information that you recorded here suggest?

A. Mr. Tolimir, there are three kinds of events described here. First of all, the pulling out of UNPROFOR from Croatia. That never materialised, but it is true that they indeed offloaded equipment about which I spoke yesterday when I said that I found shell casings with NATO marks on it near Mrkonjic Grad, and they had been used on the positions held by the Croatian army whilst attacking Republika Srpska. Now, the second paragraph deals with the financing. The costs of this operation involving the landing of aircraft on Dubrave airfield or, rather, the fact that they landed there was not difficult to notice. We noticed that there were at least 30 sorties, and one could only assume that they were carrying military equipment because such a huge number of sorties are never used when you are carrying humanitarian aid. These costs were covered by these three countries that I already mentioned, and I would like to add that Saudi Arabia extensively financed the Muslim army.

And paragraph 3, speaking about the taking control of Teslic, Doboj, and Vozuca, pertained to the information about joint offensive operations with the Croats in general.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. When you commented the first paragraph, you said that UNPROFOR was not actually pulled out because it says here ¹⁸⁶⁸² "purportedly." Can you explain what you meant by the word "purportedly"? In the Serbian the word is "navodno"? Does that indicate an intention or an excuse?

A. Your Honours, the word "navodno" in the Serbian language means that it's not true. That this was not intended for the pullout operation of UNPROFOR. I would like to draw your attention to the inverted commas that we have in the word "pulling-out," which really indicates a big question mark over the whole operation. Actually, a true and real terminology is not being used and that's only to be expected. Nobody is going to say openly that this was used to bomb the Serb army and the Serb positions. That's why the word "allegedly" or "purportedly," "navodno," was used.

Q. Can we now look at 0.15, your entry 0.15. It's dated the 7th of April, 1995. I am going to read paragraph 2. Second, third, and fourth, and fifth:

"The West estimates that the Muslims have not had any significant successes in the most recent offensive and they are still incapable of defeating the Serbs."

The next paragraph: "They are preparing their public for air-strikes because they claim that the Serbs are attacking safe havens, and they are causing incidents involving UNPROFOR. The Muslim population is anxious because they are anticipating an attack towards Vozuca and Teslic. The losses incurred on Majevica they are trying to play down by launching a propaganda about the Serb attacks on the protected areas. They are ¹⁸⁶⁸³ preparing their population for attacks on Trebava and Gradacac." Mr. Skrbic, can you please explain what this is all about and what were the consequences of this kind of estimate that the West had made about the Muslims incapability to defeat the Serbs?

A. The Western estimates about the balance of power were confirmed by Admiral Leighton Smith, General Clark, and General Walker at the meetings that you, Mr. Tolimir, attended yourself. This balance of power had not been achieved. Before that time, as we all saw, they were providing support to the Muslims in all shape and form. But in view of the amount of the assistance that they received, the Muslims failed to achieve a proportionate level of success. That's why the West assessed that they should launch a -- stronger attacks on the Serbs. But, Your Honours, it is common knowledge that the West said at that time, "We don't have reason, as yet, to engage major air force. You Muslims have to give us some substantial reason that we can use as a justification for the use of aircraft." So this was reflected on what the Muslims did in the enclave by provoking UNPROFOR, blocking UNPROFOR, attacking during a cease-fire, et cetera. It was extensively discussed in the public that the US President Clinton had told President Alija Izetbegovic: "Until you reach the number of casualties of 5.000, the air force will not be used against the Serbs."

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Please now have a look at the third paragraph, where it says:

"They are preparing the public from strikes from the air." Please, could you tell us who is preparing the public for strikes ¹⁸⁶⁸⁴ from the air? I'm referring to this entry that you made here. Thank you.

A. All countries that are NATO pact members are preparing the public, the international public. It's necessary to create a situation -- it's necessary to show that using NATO air-strikes is justified. So they had to show what the Serbs were doing. They had to show that they were doing certain things that they shouldn't be doing. They wouldn't withdraw the artillery from Sarajevo. They had to show that they wouldn't listen, that they were attacking enclaves. But they were provoked from the enclaves. In fact, the Muslims would launch an attack, and then they would say that this was the Serbs' fault. So that's the sense in which they were preparing public opinion for air-strikes carried out by NATO.

Forces for rapid intervention were prepared. They were located in Split. So the purpose was for the public to believe that, in fact, it really was necessary to bomb the Serbs. So this was the propaganda that was at stake, the preparation of the -- so that the public would be able to accept such action.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 9 of Mr. Skrbic's notes now. Could we see what was entered on the 17th of April, 1995 -- rather, the 10th of April, 1995.

THE INTERPRETER: Correction.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. We can see that entry, and I'll read out the first sentence: "The NATO pact air force is carrying out intensive reconnaissance ¹⁸⁶⁸⁵ of the protected zones. They are gathering information on Serbian facilities in case these areas should be bombed."

My question is as follows: Did you have any information about these events referred to in this entry, or were you perhaps an eye-witness and how was this information gathered?

A. Mr. Tolimir, carrying out reconnaissance from the air -- carrying out reconnaissance of not only protected areas but the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was something that was done on a daily basis and it was done continually. It was done by drones and particularly by aircraft that were involved in reconnaissance. As I am an officer from that domain, I assume that reconnaissance was also carried out from AWACS reconnaissance planes. This was electronic surveillance. I couldn't see this myself, naturally, but there is such a manner of carrying out reconnaissance as well.

As far as protected zones are concerned, Your Honours, I can claim with much certainty that NATO has photographs that show what was going on in the protected zones, and this involves movements of the Serbian and the Muslim forces. They had such daily information, and on each photograph you have information that shows when the photograph was taken, at what time, and which territory was photographed or which stretch of territory was photographed.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Could you please tell us what preparing for bombing involves?

A. Mr. Tolimir, this question requires a lengthy answer, but I will try to be brief, Your Honours. Apart from preparing the public to accept ¹⁸⁶⁸⁶ such action, when the army receives an order to bomb a certain area they have to receive information telling them which targets and which locations to target. They have to be told what sort of bombs to use because they have bombs of various weights and calibres. Then you have to know what the situation is in the territory. You have to know whether the UNPROFOR forces in the territory are protected, whether they are safe. And there is -- there are other things that have to be done before the bombing starts. And once you start bombing, you can't stop it. It's a military and a technical process that isn't easily stopped. I am referring to process of bombing itself. You can call back planes, but once the planes start bombing, this can't be stopped.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think it would be better to have a break now rather than move on to my next series of questions. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed, we should have our first break now, and we will resume at 11.00.

--- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

[The witness stands down]

[The witness takes the stand]

--- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you have up to now used more than seven hours for your examination-in-chief, and I note that you have dealt extensively with the war notebook of the witness, for the time ¹⁸⁶⁸⁷ 18th of March until 10th of April. If you are continuing at this pace, it will take much time. And I have no idea about your intentions how to go ahead, but you should be aware of the time you use with this specific document. But now you have the floor again, and please proceed.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. We'll conclude with this matter today, and I'll bear in mind what you have said. Thank you.

Could we please see page 10 now. I am interested in the entries made on the 13th of April, 1995. And I quote ... could we please see the following page? I made a mistake. The next page.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Skrbic, let's have a look at the third paragraph on this page. It says:

"The Muslims are massing their troops in the direction of Han Pijesak and Vlasenica and Sekovici. They are focussing their action on Vlasic in the direction of Galici."

The following line: "The 16th Division is preparing to launch an attack on the Nis plateau. They are intensifying attacks from enclaves, from protected zones."

My question is as follows: What does the massing of forces in a certain area or on a certain axis indicate, in fact? Thank you.

A. Massing forces in a given area in the direction of a given axis is a reliable indicator of preparations that are underway for combat operations. ¹⁸⁶⁸⁸

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see P2369, which is a Prosecution exhibit. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, may I ask you about your intentions in relation to the document 1D1111?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll go back to it after we have had a look at this document. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. Please go ahead.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Here we can see that there is a document from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's from their Supreme Command Staff of the armed forces of the RBH. The date, the 9th of November, 1994. It's a basic plan for the execution of the task. That is the title of this document. Have a look at item 1, at that paragraph. I'll read it out: "The plan is: Liberate in active combat action parts of the temporarily seized territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the municipality of Bratunac, Vlasenica, Sekovici, Zvornik, and Kalesija, and link the free territories of Zepa and Srebrenica with the free territories of Zvornik, Kalesija and Zivinice, in order to create a permanent free corridor for the supply of the population and logistics support to the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a basis for the further liberation of North-Eastern Bosnia as a whole."

My question is as follows: In your entries in the previous document mention was made of mass -- of the massing of Muslim forces in the direction of Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, and Sekovici. In that entry ¹⁸⁶⁸⁹ that we had a look at a minute ago is there information that indicates that the plan was carried out, the one mentioned in the document, and does it confirm what is mentioned in this document?

A. Well, these two documents, if we compare them, they are completely compatible with each other. In this ABiH document, half of the territory is even more extended. It includes Kalesija as well. I won't repeat the names of all the places, but it concerns the entire Podrinje area, from the south right up to Bijeljina, as far as Bijeljina, and this confirms the intention that was referred to in my notes. The intention to launch an offensive.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you. Please tell us if the Main Staff of the VRS knew of the BH Army preparations and of their intention to link the territories of the enclaves Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde with the territory controlled by the 2nd Corps of the BH Army?

A. Yes, the Main Staff was aware of that. And I am certain that such information can be found in the intelligence from which -- or, rather, based on which I made my notes, too.

Q. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now again see 1D1111. These are General Skrbic's notes. Thank you.

We can see them. Let us go to page 12, paragraph 3. Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Let us now focus on the third paragraph from the top. I quote: ¹⁸⁶⁹⁰ "In all sections of the front line, the Muslims are resting their units, mobilising new ones, and preparing for new offensive actions to make up for their failure so far, especially in the Stolice (Majevica) area."

If we skip one paragraph now and focus on the fifth paragraph on this page, it reads:

"They are launching activities from Sarajevo and from the enclaves to provoke the Serbs and bring about air-strikes of NATO forces."

How did the Muslims try to bring about NATO air-strikes against VRS positions, as far as you know? Thank you.

A. The Muslims -- or, rather, I apologise, the members of the BH Army who were Muslims were very clear about NATO's unwillingness to act if they don't have a justification for that. And the justification for air-strikes would be actions taken by the VRS, and these actions can be brought about by provocations from the enclaves to which the VRS would have responded.

It is clear from what is stated here that cease-fires are useless. When either side ceases fire, there are no NATO air-strikes. But when the Muslims launch military actions from protected zones, that was a breach of the mandate of UNPROFOR, and then the public and NATO had an excuse to intervene if the Serbs respond to such provocations. That is why they always tried to present these provocations in such a manner as to give NATO a pretext for acting.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Please take a look at your entry marked ¹⁸⁶⁹¹ 0.23, dated 16 April 1995. We can see it right on our screens. I am interested in the first paragraph, which reads, I quote: "The West openly advocates the continuation of the war in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina and sides with the Muslims who they consider not yet capable enough to be a full match for the Serbs. Until the Muslims become one, the war will continue and the West will insist on political means. It is in their interest for the contact group to fade away as soon as they make sure that AVNOJ borders are recognised."

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat the part of his question after the quotation.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please repeat your question after the quotation. The interpreters didn't catch it. It was too fast. Once again, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Skrbic, can you explain this part of the text about the Muslims who are not yet up to the Serbs in terms of military strength? Why does it say that they are not yet a full match for the Serbs? Thank you.

A. The information available was also about the process described in this paragraph. The facts concerning these processes - and I'm not referring to single event but a process - were corroborated by General Clark and Admiral Leighton Smith in their statements. Let me remind you that General Clark said that the balance of forces had not yet been achieved, that the Serbs had the upper hand. But he warned the VRS ¹⁸⁶⁹² and General Mladic not to fool themselves, that the balance will be brought about, and that then, the Serbian army will be in an inferior position. And that was also confirmed by Admiral Leighton Smith. I don't need to repeat that.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 13 of General Skrbic's notes. I mean entry 0.25. The date of that entry is 5 May 1995.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. I quote. The first paragraph reads: "NATO is preparing sophisticated support to the withdrawal of UN forces. Two American vessels with German and American soldiers are in the Adriatic.

"The Croats are moving planes from Pleso airfield to Pula and Split. They are preparing to achieve radical objectives." And the next sentence:

"About 2.000 Serbs were killed in Western Slavonia." Mr. Skrbic, please explain what this is about and which events are referred to in this entry?

A. Mr. Tolimir, the first sentence states that NATO is preparing support. It is not difficult to learn about movements of vessels by using electronic means and other means. These vessels were in the Adriatic.

The second sentence is also true. In the air force and anti-aircraft defence of the VRS, there were pilots who used to fly their ¹⁸⁶⁹³ planes from Pleso airfield, which is right outside of Zagreb, and they were also trained at Pula airfield, which was a military airfield, and at Split airfield, which is a combined civilian and military airfield. So plane movements were also easy to observe.

In Western Slavonia it is stated that about 2.000 Serbs were killed. That's an estimate. The exact number is something I cannot confirm now.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Let us go to page 14 now, entry 0.27. I am interested in paragraph 6, and I quote:

"One Muslim helicopter was shot down and fell in the Zepa area." Here is my question: Do you know why helicopters flew to and from Zepa in spite of the ban on flights? Thank you.

A. Mr. Tolimir, we can only speculate about the reasons for their flights, but the question arises, Your Honours, how come they were allowed to fly when there was a no-fly zone in force, that was declared pursuant to a resolution. That is the question.

What that helicopter which was shot down was transporting? Well, most probably weapons.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Could we please go to page 16 now, entries 0.31. Thank you. We now see the entry dated 11 May 1995. I am quoting from the first paragraph:

"America and Germany are trying to turn UNPROFOR into a tool for support to the Croats and Muslims. An obvious proof of that is the fact -- is Western Slavonia where they want to legalise what the Croats took by aggression. They are trying to bring about legal air-strikes ¹⁸⁶⁹⁴ carried out by NATO around Sarajevo."

Let us go to page 19 now. I am interested in entry 0.32. I apologise, actually it's 0.35. Thank you. The date is 15 May 1995, and in paragraph one you wrote:

"The American General Dzon Sauel [phoen] is inspecting Croatian-Muslim regiment in order to create a joint federation army. He is engaged in talks with the Muslim and the Croatian political leaderships. Turkish representatives are on a similar task." At the time, did you have either information indicating the creation of a Muslim-Croatian coalition?

A. Mr. Tolimir, Your Honours, the Croatian president, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, and the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, met in Washington in 1992, and agreed to establish a joint military committee. Later, in 1995, Minister Haris Silajdzic [Realtime transcript read in error "Horace"], and I think that his counterpart was Boban, also went to Washington to reach a specific agreement about an alliance of their armies. They did not establish a military committee, but they initiated processes that enabled them to act jointly in an offensive on Republika Srpska. The 5th Corps of the Muslim army in Bihac assisted the Croatian army in the offensive against the Republic of Serbian Krajina. That is Lika and Kordun.

Q. Thank you. Let us go to page 20 in this document.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I interrupt you for a moment. Before we go to the other page, I just want to clarify one matter. ¹⁸⁶⁹⁵ Sir, you said:

"Later, in 1995, Minister Horace," and there is something missing, "with his counterpart Boban went to Washington." Can you repeat the name of this minister, please?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the minister's name is Haris, H-a-r-i-s, Silajdzic.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Mindua has a question.

JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness Skrbic, on page 35 of the transcript, line 2, Minister Boban, which country was he from before 1995? I was sure he was a minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you should switch off your microphone when you are talking to your legal advisor. Mr. Skrbic.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Minister Boban - I assume his name was Mate Boban - he was a representative of the Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He wasn't from Croatia. As for who participated from Croatia, I can't remember that.

JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] That's exactly the reason for which I put that question to you because you mentioned President Alija Izetbegovic from Bosnia and Herzegovina and President Franjo Tudjman from Croatia, and you made a parallel between the two. I thought you were going to do the same with regard to minister -- with the Croatian minister and the minister from Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, very well, you have told us which side he was from. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on. ¹⁸⁶⁹⁶

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Can we please now see page 20, entry 0.36, paragraph 5 in Mr. Skrbic's notes. Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. "Units of the 2nd Muslim Corps continue reconnaissance and sabotage actions against Sekovici, Vlasenica, and Han Pijesak." My question is as follows: Can you tell us whether this information can be seen as an indicator of Muslim plans for linking up territories in Eastern Bosnia with the main territory controlled by the ABH?

A. Yes, this information provides quite reliable indicators of their intentions to link up the enclaves.

Q. Does that then also involve the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica? And I'm sorry that I didn't point this out to you when I initially asked the question.

A. Mr. Tolimir, not only Zepa and Srebrenica, but also Gorazde.

Q. Thank you.

[Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask Trial Chamber to allow me to tender 1D1111 to be admitted into evidence.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, how many pages does this document encompass?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This document has 22 pages.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey. ¹⁸⁶⁹⁷

MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. Prior to our taking a position on this document, I think there is some more information we -- it would be appreciated whether or not this is a partial document that was taken out of a larger document. For example, I believe it stops in May of 1995. So if it's -- if there is June and July and it's part of a bigger document, I think it should come in with the bigger document. If it -- all it is is what it is, then that's the situation, then I would know that. But I can't tell if this has been pulled out of a bigger document or it is what it is, and I think it's incumbent upon anyone offering a document such as this that we received a day or two ago just to let us know so I can make a position on that.

I could also give my position after cross-examination as well, and I could ask him about it.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, can you give us some more information about that or ask the witness about the full context and the background of the document. We have heard something about it, but is it the complete document or is it a partial document of a bigger one? Please clarify that with the witness.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Skrbic, is that the whole document that you drafted based on -- is it the document in its entirety, as we see it?

A. Your Honours, this kind of context and this kind of information constitutes a complete document. You see that the last date was the 25th of May. Otherwise, I was engaged in other matters after that date. ¹⁸⁶⁹⁸ I was on the front. I didn't have my computer with me. I wasn't taking any notes, et cetera.

Now, concerning this specific topic and these matters, there are no other documents that are relevant.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. My next question is: If anyone doubts the authenticity of that document, is it possible for them to look at the document that created the foundation for it and could they see these entries that you highlighted?

A. Mr. Tolimir, this is a compilation. In some instances that was rewritten verbatim, some are not, but basically the substance of information was consistent with either written or oral intelligence reports received by the Main Staff and General Mladic.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

MR. McCLOSKEY: I have no objection to this -- admissibility of this document.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. I would first like to see the first page and then the last page of this document. I take it that there is no cover page, and the first entry is dated the 18th of March, 1995. And now let's go to the last page, please. Can we go back to the penultimate page. There we can see the last entry is from the 22nd of May, 1995. It's number 0.42. The text itself is on the next page.

The document will be marked for identification, pending translation. ¹⁸⁶⁹⁹

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D1111 shall be assigned Exhibit D350, marked for identification pending translation. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Mr. Tolimir, please proceed.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Can we please now have in e-court -- no, I'm sorry. On yesterday's page of the transcript 18655, lines 17 and 18, there is a record which I am going now to quote.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. "I attended the meetings of collegium or meetings of Main Staff commanders of the Army of Republika Srpska ..."

We have here the word "commanders" in plural in the record. Can you tell us when collegium meetings were held of the Main Staff, how many commanders were present? Thank you.

A. Eight commanders, Mr. Tolimir.

Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us which specific commanders you have in mind, commanders of which units?

A. Those were commander of the Main Staff of the VRS and corps commanders. The 1st and the 2nd Krajina Corps, the Eastern Bosnia Corps, the Drina Corps, the Herzegovina Corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and the commander of air force and anti-aircraft defence. Occasionally in attendance was the commander of the Guards Brigade, and I did not include him in this number.

Q. Mr. Skrbic, speaking about the collegium of the commander of the ¹⁸⁷⁰⁰ Main Staff, can you tell us whether there were any discussions at these meetings relating to POWs and the treatment of prisoners of war?

A. Yes, there were debates of that nature.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please repeat your --

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. If you recall, can you tell us what was being discussed? Can you please tell us, if you remember, what was being discussed?

A. Your Honours, I'm sorry I have to mention my name as well, but General Tolimir, General Gvero, and myself particularly insisted in those meetings not only to adhere to the general attitude towards POWs, but that orders should be issued -- specific orders should be issued to each and every unit on how to treat the prisoners of war and to impart on them the precise stipulations from the international humanitarian law. I remember that clearly.

Some documents of that nature were, indeed, written, and I saw them when I testified here before. However, I don't know how many of them were drafted, and I cannot tell you the exact number at the moment.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. My next question is: Do you have any knowledge whether -- Zdravko Tolimir, from late July 1995 until November 1995, where he was in that period?

A. I have partial [as interpreted] knowledge about that.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Stop. You are overlapping again. We want to have everything on the record, and therefore please pause between question and answer. ¹⁸⁷⁰¹ Your answer is recorded as, "I have partial knowledge." Is that all of what you said, or was there something more?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I said that I have reliable knowledge.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Can you describe for us the circumstances that the VRS found themselves towards the end of July 1995? Or, more specifically, what kind of problems did they encounter, because you made an indication to this effect in one of your previous answers?

A. Your Honours, we saw from the analysis of the information contained in my notes what was happening on the front line. However, when Glamoc, Grahovo, Knin, and other places were occupied by the Croatian army and due to intensive NATO air-strikes in that area, all the generals from the Main Staff of the VRS went to that particular section of the front but at different times.

General Djukic and General Tolimir left in late July 1995. I was busy, so I left later in August. I don't know exactly when General Mladic arrived, but he came there at approximately that time as well, and General Milovanovic was already there. And we never went anywhere from there until the end of the war.

Initially, we were billeted at the Kula forward command post above Mrkonjic Grad, and then because of fire coming from the Croatian Muslim army, we relocated our command post in Baraci where we stayed only ¹⁸⁷⁰² for two days, and then we have to relocate the forward command post of the Main Staff of the VRS to Banja Luka.

Your Honours, in Banja Luka we held several meetings of the collegium of the Main Staff, and we had a number of meetings with the president of the republic. General Tolimir attended almost all of these meetings.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let me put a question in relation to these meetings to you. You mentioned four assistant commanders, if I understood you correctly; General Gvero, General Djukic, General Tolimir, and yourself. Can I take from that that all assistant commanders were formally member of this collegium of commanders?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, not only formally, all the assistants were, in fact, members of the collegium of the Main Staff. All assistant commanders.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. My next question is: During NATO air-strikes and artillery fire coming from rapid reaction forces, were only VRS targets hit and whether there were some civilian casualties as well?

A. Not only military facilities such as relay stations were targeted. Civilian facilities, inhabited places were also targeted. Your Honours, I was in Baraci, a village, when that village was bombed. And then columns of refugees were also targeted. I know for sure that in ¹⁸⁷⁰³ the vicinity of Petrovac, a Croatian MIG-21 targeted a column of refugees. I believe there is a video recording of that event. I am also an eye-witness to NATO aircraft targeting a column of refugees in Mrkonjic Grad. Your Honours, I arrived three hours after that strike, and there was blood that had been spilt on the road. There were horses that had remained half alive there and they were suffering. I had to leave that sight, that terrible sight rapidly. And then several seconds after that, a few NATO planes with these -- they had these distinctive wings so I could recognise them, these planes targeted a relay station on Kula. When I arrived there and asked General Milovanovic about what had happened, he said they had killed two of our soldiers. General Tolimir said that the rapid intervention force artillery had opened fire and the Croatian artillery had open fire. They used heavy artillery, multiple rocket-launchers, and mortars.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic. Could you please tell the Trial Chamber whether during that period of time Tolimir exercised a command role? Thank you.

A. No.

Q. Thank you. Could you tell us whether during that period of time Tolimir stayed at the basic command post in Crna Rijeka or in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps? Thank you.

A. No. As I have said, General Tolimir, towards the end of July, went to the western part of Republika Srpska, and he remained there until the end of the war.

Q. Thank you. Since you have -- or, rather, could you tell the ¹⁸⁷⁰⁴ Chamber where the forward command post of the Main Staff was located during that period of time? Thank you.

A. Your Honour, I've already provided that information but I will repeat it for the sake of the transcript with your leave. The forward command post of the VRS Main Staff was located at a place called Kula, above Mrkonjic Grad. And then for a short period of time it was located in Baraci, which is in the direction of Glamoc, Livno. Afterwards, it was transferred or it relocated to Banja Luka, and we remained there until the end of the war.

All the places that I have mentioned are in the western part of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was also called Krajina before the war. And for those reasons, you can yourself draw the conclusion that that has nothing to do with Crna Rijeka, which is in Romanija, in the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Nyambe has a question.

JUDGE NYAMBE: Yes, my question is directed to General Tolimir. Starting from page 44 in your questions you have been referring to "that period of time" in line 3, and then you refer again in line 6, "during that period of time," again in line 14, "during that period of time." Could you be more specific about exactly what period of time you are talking about, please?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Judge. From the end of July until the end of November 1995 is the period of time I have in mind. I was asking the witness about that period of time. Thank you.

JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you very much for your answer. ¹⁸⁷⁰⁵

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you, Mr. Skrbic, for having agreed to testify in these proceedings instituted against me at this Tribunal. Thank you for everything. I wish you a safe return home. May God bless you and may you live a long life.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have put a series of questions to this witness as part of my Defence, and the Defence -- my Defence case has no need to put any further questions to this witness. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. Mr. McCloskey, do you want to proceed with your

cross-examination? You have the floor.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I was told they would go the full day, and I know that doesn't happen always, so I have a few questions based on some of the things I just heard, but I do have a binder of materials and other things. So if I can get through just the few questions, if we could then take an early break and I will try to get myself organised.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, please go ahead. Cross-examination by Mr. McCloskey:

Q. General, good afternoon.

A. Good afternoon, Mr. McCloskey.

Q. I guess it's been since, I think, 2005, when we first met and I interviewed you about this case. Do you recall that? ¹⁸⁷⁰⁶

A. Yes.

Q. And do you stand by your statements to me in that -- in that interview?

A. Mr. McCloskey, I have only changed the date that related to leaving for the VRS army. The 17th of December is the correct date, not the 17th of November. That is the only thing that I changed, and I informed the Chamber of the fact.

Q. Okay. And you've also told us that you testified for the Prosecution in the Popovic case. And do you stand by your testimony in that case?

A. Mr. McCloskey, I downloaded part of the transcript from those proceedings from the internet. I had access to the Tribunal's web site and that's what I did, but I am not sure I saw the entire transcript. But there is nothing that I would amend in relation to that testimony, either.

Q. Okay. And you just spoke briefly of what was going on in Knin and Glamoc and Grahovo, your hometown area, in the end of July and August, and I think you know that many Serb civilians left their home area at that time, and it's been the position of the Prosecution that they were driven out and forcibly removed by the Croatian forces. Do you agree with that, that these Serb civilians were forced to flee from their homes?

A. Yes, Mr. McCloskey. I fully agree with what you have said. If you like, I could describe the refugee column for you. There were hundreds of thousands of people on the road from Bijeljina via Banja Luka ¹⁸⁷⁰⁷ to Petrovac. That is a distance of 600 kilometres. The refugees first started coming from Krajina and then from the western part of Republika Srpska. I apologise for going into these details.

Q. Yes, and I don't want to go into the details either. I think there is a good record in the Gotovina case. But you'll agree with me, I think, how horrible this was for the civilians. You, yourself, lost your home, people were killed, and these people really had no choice but to flee from this policy that -- and this attack of the Croatians? The Croatian government forces, not the Croatian people. So do you agree with me about that?

A. Yes, yes. Yes, I fully agree with you.

Q. And when you said earlier that many times in war, populations are the most aware of what's going on, many times -- and many times they just have to flee armed conflict. And I think I would agree with that, as would the UNHCR. But you've also now agreed with me that sometimes there is a policy to drive civilians away, that is wrong, as in the case of Croatian forces, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. When all the generals that you've talked about were in the area of the Krajina dealing with this massive threat and, as we now know, the eventual loss of some territory, and there was a threat of air force -- or actual use of air force, was General Jovo Maric, the head of the administration for the air force and air defence, with you guys?

A. Yes, but it was called the air force and aircraft defence. The term "war" wasn't used or "military" wasn't used. ¹⁸⁷⁰⁸

Q. Okay. We might have had a little translation issue, but you've -- you've said that you and General Mladic, General Tolimir, that you were all there from the end of July through November -- or I think you said through the end of the war. Did that apply to General Maric as well, was he there with you the entire time?

A. Mr. McCloskey, I am sure that Mr. -- or, rather, General Jovo Maric left earlier than all of us. He was with General Milovanovic a lot earlier, but I cannot remember when he left. But it was earlier.

Q. Well, was he there in September 1995?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. General Milovanovic has told this courtroom that Maric was with him throughout September. Does that meet your recollection as well?

A. Mr. McCloskey, I am trying to give you a precise answer, so I cannot claim that they were together. Sometimes I would see General Maric in Drvar and he was on his own, without General Milovanovic. But on the whole, they would be together. But I cannot really claim that they were together all the time.

Q. All right. I didn't mean to try to -- your answer whether they were actually together, but it was whether or not General Maric was with you people. I know there wasn't a lot of space from the descriptions of where you were billeted and the command -- forward command post there was small, so that was my question: Was -- Maric was there in September as far as you can recall?

A. My answer is yes. ¹⁸⁷⁰⁹

Q. And you also just told us that you were at meetings of the Main Staff where the Geneva Conventions and the treatment of prisoners were mentioned, and that you and others, including General Tolimir, supported those conventions. As far as you know, were over -- were many thousands of Muslim able-bodied men summarily executed by Bosnian Serb forces after the fall of Srebrenica?

A. Your Honours, there is so much information in the media about this question. I can't say that I haven't heard over the media various pieces of information. Some would increase the number, some would reduce the number, but I heard about this event from the media. That is what I can claim.

Q. Are you saying you've only heard of the murders from the media?

A. Yes.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, it might be a good time. You see, I've just gotten some binders delivered, and I think if I can study them, I may be able to go through this a little bit more thoroughly or efficiently.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: I personally have a small problem with that because I was asked to have a meeting with a visitors group between 12.30 and 1.00. If you are able to at least go ahead for ten more minutes, then we may have a break until 1.00.

MR. McCLOSKEY: I think I can do that. Yes, Mr. President. No problem.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Let me just take a bit of a moment. ¹⁸⁷¹⁰

Q. General, you have just gone over with us very carefully these periods of April, May -- March, April, May, from your notes, and you told us you didn't go to the Krajina until the end of July. Where were you working in July 1995? And I'll help you a little bit. You told us you were there, I believe, July 11th, 12th, 13th, and then you went and saw President Karadzic on the 14th. But aside from that period that you've already talked about -- in fact, let's say from 14 July, what did you do? Where were you?

A. From the 14th of July until the 27th of July, I was in Han Pijesak at the rear command post. On the 27th of July, I went to Belgrade to attend the promotion of a lieutenant-colonel or lieutenant-colonels who had completed military academy in Republika Srpska. Glamoc fell, that's what I heard. It was on the 28th of July. On the 29th of July, after this promotion of these second-lieutenants --

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- I returned to Zvornik. I apologise, am I giving you an answer that is too long?

MR. McCLOSKEY:

Q. I think you have got me through the end of July and that's really my question. So is it fair to say that from -- from May, June, until the end of July you were mostly at your desk in and around Han Pijesak doing your duty as an assistant -- one of the six assistant commanders for General Mladic?

A. Yes, on the whole that was the case, as you, yourself, have said. ¹⁸⁷¹¹

Q. And we've heard about the morning meetings that were held each day of the senior assistant commanders with -- with the commanders. Did you go to those meetings?

A. General Djukic and myself did not attend those meetings held in the morning.

Q. Never?

A. It's not possible to define "never." When we have a meeting of the commanders and when we arrive in Crna Rijeka, well, on such occasions we also attend the meetings. But it wasn't our regular duty to attend regular meetings when these daily briefings would be given.

Q. But the afternoon meetings that we heard about from General Milovanovic. He set out the daily routine for us and normally the people that had to come. The same thing happens here. Every morning, 9.00, senior trial attorneys have to get together with the Prosecutor. Normal. You had to go to those meetings too, didn't you? One of six assistant commanders for the whole army?

A. I made a distinction with regard to that information from General Milovanovic. He knew what was happening. But I'll repeat what I said: General Djukic and General Petar Skrbic did not attend the regular morning briefings. We only attended briefings and meetings of commanders when called by the commander of the VRS Main Staff, when asked by that commander to do so.

Q. You did say you went to the going-away party for General Zivanovic at the Jela restaurant which occurred on 20 July there, not far from Han Pijesak. You also said there was never a mention of ¹⁸⁷¹² Srebrenica at that -- at that occasion. Do you recall testifying about that?

A. Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

Q. Well, do you remember seeing that -- part of that celebration being filmed by the VRS or a cameraman of some sort?

A. Yes, I remember.

Q. Have you had a chance to see that film of that party that you were at?

A. I haven't had the opportunity of viewing that video recording.

Q. Well, would you be surprised if I told you that the Court has that video recording, that General Mladic spoke about Srebrenica, and that -- the great victory there and -- both for General Zivanovic and General Krstic. We counted at least four times, and that was just in the speeches, not to mention what the commanders and the officers --

MR. McCLOSKEY: That's P2231.

Q. -- would have said to themselves on such an auspicious day, 20 July. So having that in mind, knowing there is that video out there, do you want to think about that question again? Do you recall Srebrenica being spoken of by the officers and men at General Zivanovic's party?

A. Mr. McCloskey, on 12 May 2005, I told you that I did not remember whether that was spoken about. If I could see the video recording, that might jog my memory. But, Your Honours, am I really obliged to remember everything after 20 years? That is why what I said, that I didn't remember what is spoken about, is valid.

Q. Yeah, maybe we had a translation issue, because -- and I'll take ¹⁸⁷¹³ a look at the transcript, but I don't remember memory being a part of your answer, but we'll take a look at that.

But now, as I've reminded you of this, going back in your mind now, do you remember any discussions about Srebrenica, the events, the attack, the fall, the prisoners, the successes, the failures, the dead?

A. As far as I remember, I do not remember that topic. Whether there was propaganda talk or political talk, in inverted commas, I wouldn't want to go into that. Sometimes commanders boast about things they never did.

Q. When did you first hear about the attack by VRS forces on the enclave of Srebrenica?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Do you remember what you said in the Popovic case?

A. No, I do not.

Q. I'll get the exact --

A. Can you remind me?

Q. Well, I'll get the exact wording, but my recollection is you said you found out from the media after the war.

A. Yes, that is what I said.

Q. Okay. So when you said that at the Popovic trial under oath, were you mistaken? People can make mistakes, even under oath.

A. Of course it's a mistake, Mr. McCloskey. The media as early as 25 July, or whichever date it was in July, reported about it. I don't mean the media after the war, because the war ended with the Dayton Accord. That's too along a period for me not to have heard ¹⁸⁷¹⁴ anything about it. That would have been very weird indeed. On RS TV, but I suppose on Federation TV too, although I didn't watch that, there was such information. I didn't have a TV set in my office, though. I didn't need one. I went to the neighbouring office and that is probably when I heard that information.

Q. So we are talking about the information about the attack on the enclave. Are you saying you heard it from the neighbouring office on the media or through a military colleague?

A. In the office next door, I heard it on television. I did not hear it from a colleague.

Q. Okay. And so you first heard about the attack on Srebrenica from the media. You -- never from any military colleague, report -- military meeting or report; is that right?

A. Your Honours, I do not understand this question.

Q. It wasn't very well stated. Let me try again. I just want to clarify: You first heard about the attack on Srebrenica through the media sources?

A. Well, Mr. McCloskey, I heard about the possibility of an attack on the enclaves because of the military actions launched from those enclaves. And I've already mentioned that. General Mladic told the Ukrainian representative Alexander Alexandrovich that we wouldn't be able to take those provocations launched by the Muslims from the enclaves. You shouldn't think that I'm obfuscating and pretending I don't understand the question. There were provocations almost daily. I apologise. General Mladic spoke to General Rose, too. He ¹⁸⁷¹⁵ said, "General, you were in nine countries waging war, but never in Britain. I am waging war in my country. Please don't let the Muslims from Gorazde shoot at us."

That is why this question is far too broad for me be able to explain. Do not place me in such a position. Please be fair and don't -- you -- don't attack my credibility. How could I say that I haven't heard of the attacks from the enclaves and the response by the VRS? That would really be too naive. But if the Prosecutor is trying to make me remember details and the circumstances under which I heard them, that is, the exact time and place, well, Your Honours, these are things I really cannot remember.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey --

MR. McCLOSKEY: Could I have one clarifying question?

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, please.

MR. McCLOSKEY:

Q. General, my question was not, "When did you hear about the possibility of an attack on Srebrenica?" as you've stated. My question was very clear. It was: Did you first hear about the attack on Srebrenica from the media, which you told me in your interview and you testified under oath. So it's a very simple question. And in fairness to you, general, when I interviewed you, you first told me you first heard about it in, I think, July 20th or 26th, so I was wondering why you testified under oath that you heard it afterward. And now I'm trying to clarify: The attack, July 6th, that's when it happened, did you first hear about that attack from the media? ¹⁸⁷¹⁶

A. I do not remember. I don't think that the media reported about it. At least to the extent I follow the media. And I didn't even know that an attack had been launched on the 6th of July.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. I know you've got to go.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: We must have our second break now, and we will resume at 1.00.

--- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

[The witness stands down]

[The witness takes the stand]

--- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. McCloskey. Please continue.

MR. McCLOSKEY:

Q. General, I want to go back to my questions about the Jela restaurant and your testimony about that so you can actually see what you said.

MR. McCLOSKEY: And that was from the testimony from page 18624.

Q. And it's in the middle of the page. And General Tolimir asked you:

"Q. Thank you. Now, at the farewell reception for General Zivanovic, was there any discussion, did anyone talk about the events in Srebrenica?"

And your answer is: "As far as I can recall, there was no mention of it." Now that we have talked, is it fair to say that you do recall ¹⁸⁷¹⁷ Srebrenica being mentioned?

A. Mr. McCloskey, I said as far as I remember no, and I stand by that statement.

Q. All right. Let's just go to the transcript of that just to --

MR. McCLOSKEY: It's P2231. In the English. And I --

Q. It starts off with General Zivanovic saying some things, General Gvero, and then Mladic gets up and talks for a long time, as he does.

MR. McCLOSKEY: And I want to go to page 3 in the English and page 3 in the B/C/S.

Q. And he says: "Thank you, General, and thank all of your fellows for not letting the Serbs disappear."

Let's hope that we'll find that. But before they do, can you tell us what is this concept that he's referring to about Serbs disappearing?

A. That's not a concept. It was an assessment that the Serbs could re-experience the year 1941 and, as a consequence, disappear not only from that area but beyond. In 1991 and -- or, actually, since 1991, many Serbs have been killed, especially in the western part but also in the east of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But I don't need to bother you with the figures.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, can you help us to find it in the transcript. I see Ms. Stewart working hard on it.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Yeah, we'll just talk about this concept of ¹⁸⁷¹⁸ disappearing folks for a while, and hopefully we'll find it. Page 8 in the English. Again, I don't seem to have at the e-court pages, and I'll correct that tonight so I can get that done properly. Okay. We can see it up at the top, where it's about five lines down in the English on the right.

"Thank you, General. You and your --"

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please move your microphone further to you, or use the other one.

MR. McCLOSKEY: And it's at page 7 in the B/C/S, lower down.

Q. And it says: "Thank you, General, you and your colleagues for not allowing our people to disappear. It was just the other day, triumphantly and with pride, as a commander, you handed over the duty to the commander of the corps, General Krstic, who, together with you, gave the liberated Srebrenica and Zepa to the Serbian people."

And then he goes on. That's one of a few references that is made to Srebrenica right there in General Mladic's speech. But I -- I want to go back and ask you about this disappearance. You mentioned 1941.

A. Yes, what is your question?

Q. And I think we'll agree, very briefly, that you're referring to World War II and the large number of Serbs who were murdered by forces acting with the Nazis or the Nazis themselves; is that right?

A. Yes, they were killed in the Second World War in 1941. That is correct. Many of them were killed by Ustashas.

Q. And you're meaning by that Croatian forces of some sort? I don't ¹⁸⁷¹⁹ want to get into the details of 1941.

A. Yes, I meant that type of armed forces that belonged to the independent state of Croatia which was a fascist entity in the Balkans. Those units, the Ustashas, also comprised Muslims. They were also called Ustashas.

Q. And when Mladic says this to his assembled corps commanders and others, did you truly believe that the Muslim forces were coming to commit genocide on Serbs?

A. Not only the Muslim forces but the Croatian forces, too.

Q. And this was a common theme, that they are coming to kill us all - the Muslims and the Croats - that was passed not just among the generals but it was passed down to the soldier on the ground, by the morale officers and the commanders, wasn't it?

A. I am not sure that they spoke about that all the time, but it is true that they were indicating a potential danger, especially with regard to the fact that we came to harm several times. During the First World War, almost the entire Serbian people moved across the mountains, through Albania, and went to Corfu. And then came the Second World War, so that these are essential, historical elements indicating the existence of a real threat.

You don't need to go into moralising our deep historical research. You only need to be reminded of Bosanska Dubica where thousands of people were killed. And then there was the camp of Jasenovac where seven hundred thousands Serbs were killed, although that figure has been disputed, but no estimate goes below 500.000. So there ¹⁸⁷²⁰ was a real threat that the Serbian people might disappear. The Serbian people disappeared from Croatia in 1995. They disappeared totally. They either fled, became refugees, or were killed. You heard the information that in Western Slavonia about 2.000 people were killed. I was not sure that was accurate, so that's why I expressed my reservations. But one hundred per cent of the population - and I mean the Serbian population - were driven out of Croatia. And that's an event that corroborates that the possibility of the disappearance of the Serbs from these areas, including the Republika Srpska, was realistic. Your Honours, I must tell you that even now there is strong pressure to abolish the Republika Srpska.

Q. Do you find a difference between a commander telling his troops, "The enemy is a threat and they are coming to kill you," and the commander telling his troops and his officers, "The enemy is coming to kill you all and coming to commit genocide on you"?

A. Yes, there is a difference.

Q. And it's the position of the Prosecution, general, that that second position, when General Mladic and General Krstic and the other commanders say to their troops and say to their people that "the Croats and the Muslims are coming to commit genocide on you," that that was done for the purpose of to vilify the Muslim people and engender hatred against them. And that it's this kind of propaganda and politicising war that can lead and does lead and did lead to mass execution. Do you agree?

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, what is your question? ¹⁸⁷²¹

MR. McCLOSKEY: I asked him if he agreed with the position of the Prosecution. I don't mean just to be philosophising.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: No, I didn't hear the question, "Do you agree?" Thank you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, words have a very precise meaning to me, and if they don't, I cannot interpret them. It was interpreted to me that Mr. McCloskey said that the Muslims were coming. That is a -- that is an action which takes place at a moment in time. The moment -- but that wasn't so. The Muslims were coming to uproot the Serbs. However, it never happened that we were told, "The Muslims are coming to kill you." This instantaneous action, here they are. No, that never happened. Apart from that, the analysis of combat readiness from 1992 is a document at the disposal of this Tribunal, too. And it says in that document that genocide against the Serbian people is a possibility.

MR. McCLOSKEY:

Q. Yes, and I won't spend too long with this. General Mladic in that 1992 analysis says several times, as I think others do, that the Serbs are threatened with genocide which is more than uprooting, of course. It can include uprooting but implies murder. And so my point is: Do you agree with me that that is a propaganda statement to rally the troops to hatred, to kill the enemy, and that can lead to mass executions and war crimes?

A. From the point of view of science, propaganda could not be successful if it were not founded at least partly on truth, and probably ¹⁸⁷²² an element is also motivating people to fight. In the Serbian language, however, there is a difference between uprooting and genocide. Genocide is the total destruction of a nation, whereas uprooting is driving them out of their native area. In other words, that the people can no longer be found where they were born, where their home was.

Q. Thank you. We'll go to something a little more specific now. Do you recall in your interview with me on the 12th of July in 2005 my question where I ask you: "Who were Mladic's closest generals? Who was he closest to?" Do you remember your response?

A. Yes, I do, Mr. McCloskey.

Q. And if I asked you that question again, what would your answer be?

A. I think -- or, rather, I don't think but let me put it this way: He most often spoke with General Tolimir. Then you asked me a follow-up question and I said that he most trusted General Tolimir and that he spent most of the time in private conversations with General Tolimir. Now, if you would be kind enough to confirm whether I am right in what I remember?

Q. You are. That's pretty much as I see it, and so that ... now were you -- do you recall - and I know this is going back - there was a New Year's Eve celebration in 1996 that a lot of the senior officers got together with -- and their wives and their friends and family and there were speeches given. Do you remember being present at that event?

A. Yes, I do. Your Honours, let me explain. I was asked whether I remember being at this celebration. The question was not whether I was ¹⁸⁷²³ there. I just said that I remember. But what do I remember? I'm sorry, Mr. McCloskey. Maybe the translation is not correct. And I highly appreciate the interpreters, but I would really like to have all the words clear, that based on them I can draw proper conclusions on the basis of which I can give you a proper answer.

Q. Were you at the 1996 celebration with the other senior generals?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. I am going to play a -- I hope I am going to play, I am going to try to play a bit of the video.

MR. McCLOSKEY: We're -- sorry, we're not going to be able to do that now. We are not set up for that and that's my fault. And I know the Defence has this video. They have a transcript. So I just want to read one little section from that, and I'll go slowly.

Q. And just ask you --

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can you give us the exhibit number of the transcript.

MR. McCLOSKEY: It should be P01029.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

MR. McCLOSKEY: And I have noted that I am going to page 5 in the B/C/S and looks like page 6 on my copy. Though I can't guarantee that's the same e-court at this point. It actually is. So --

Q. General Mladic says --

MR. McCLOSKEY: We'll give it a try on the video. I think it would be better, especially for the witness.

Yes, we can start that first paragraph -- or the middle paragraph ¹⁸⁷²⁴ at page 6 at 1.19.12 to 1.22.16. It in the -- it's in the middle of one of General Mladic's speeches at the -- at this function.

[Video-clip played]

MR. McCLOSKEY: We must have two different timings. So I'll go ahead and just read this.

Q. We'll, if we need to -- general, I apologise for the miscue. If you need to see this, we'll have that ready for you tomorrow and get it. But this is not a very controversial item. I just want to ask you if you agree with what General Mladic is saying. And in the English in the middle of that paragraph he says:

"I was able to do so only thanks to all of you, irrespective of when each of you joined the Main Staff, and thanks to the exceptional fighting spirit of our people and our army, those who helped me, most definitely my closest associates. And now I can tell you only part of it, as a part of it, it can't be told yet. The most important decisions were taken by a group of five people. This was the inner core of the Main Staff which, in addition to myself, included General Milovanovic, my deputy and the Chief of Staff, and Generals Djukic, Gvero, and Tolimir. This was the inner core. The other generals also participated in very difficult and very often in all decision-making, General Jovo Maric, General Tomic, General Grubor at that time, and General Skrbic." What I wanted to ask you about is, as Mladic says "inner core," to your understanding was there an inner core of the Main Staff?

A. That's what we used the call the inner circle of the collegium of the Main Staff. There was no formal and official term "inner core." It ¹⁸⁷²⁵ is just a metaphor, and this is what I said, Your Honours, and I also showed that to you in a chart presented to all of you by the Defence team.

Q. So do you agree with Mladic here when he says that the most important decisions were taken by a group of five people, and then he lists the five people I mentioned?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. All right.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we go to the first page of the -- of this. And in both languages -- I'm sorry.

Q. And in both languages, we see Mladic saying: "Ladies, dear guests, colleagues, officers, and generals, General Gvero has encouraged me to say a few things. It was long ago in 1992, a difficult year, when it was even difficult to look at this area on a map. Fortunately, there are witnesses. One of them is my wife and several associates and comrades-in-arms from the Knin Corps. But I am saddened that the most important among them, General Tolimir, and his wife are not with us tonight. As you know, he is on assignment, battling the dragons of the world in Vienna on behalf of the Serbian nation." So from what you could see in your experience working as an assistant commander during the war and especially in 1995, in the summer of 1995, could you agree with General Mladic that General Tolimir was so important to him?

A. Your Honours, I cannot tell you what Tolimir meant to General Mladic. All I can do is to confirm that this is what ¹⁸⁷²⁶ General Mladic stated.

Q. But you did answer me in the interview, and you said what you said about General Tolimir and General Mladic, and you stand by that.

A. Yes, Mr. McCloskey. But there is a distinction there as well, but I am not willing to try and elaborate on that now.

Q. Okay, well, we have got to go question by question as you know, but if you need to explain an answer, you are always free to do so, and as you know General Tolimir can always ask -- will have chance, if he'd like to, to ask you questions.

MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to P2520. And that should be the document from 12 July that you spoke about with General Tolimir.

Q. And we see that, as you've stated, it's from your sector, in your name. The chart that we had on the screen the other day, there is a transportation unit in the Main Staff, isn't there?

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness kindly lower the sound in his headphones because the French booth hears the B/C/S from the witness's headphones very loudly. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: With the assistance of the Court Usher, please. Mr. McCloskey.

MR. McCLOSKEY: All right.

Q. Was there a transportation unit administration? I'm sorry, I have forgotten the formal name of it.

A. A transportation unit did not exist as an independent one in the Main Staff.

Q. Was there a transportation unit in the Main Staff? ¹⁸⁷²⁷

A. I answered that question, Your Honours.

Q. You said something about --

JUDGE FLUEGGE: No. No, you didn't answer it. It was the question about if there was a transportation unit. The question was not if there was an independent transportation unit. Was there any transportation unit, was the question. Please answer it.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there was a transportation service within the logistics sector of the Main Staff of the VRS. It was in charge of transportation, but there was no single unit dealing with that, either as a staff unit or as a -- an integral part of the Main Staff.

MR. McCLOSKEY:

Q. And, general, that's all I was asking, and thank you for telling us it was within the logistics branch. And did you know an officer named Kerkez?

A. Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

Q. And who was he and what was his position?

A. He was at the head of the transportation service within the logistics of the VRS Main Staff, and he had the rank of colonel.

Q. And in July 1995, can you remind me what your rank was?

A. Mr. McCloskey, in July 1995 I had the rank of a major-general.

Q. And can you explain to me what -- why are you involved in this request to the Ministry of Defence for vehicles and not the logistics people? Or are they?

A. Mr. McCloskey, they - and when I say "they," I mean the ¹⁸⁷²⁸ logistics - can make use only of the means that the army doesn't have at its disposal. Everything else that is beyond the army was within the charge and the responsibilities of my sector. Therefore, they were not entitled to request mobilisation. It was my sector who had to do it.

Q. Okay. So the kind of mobilisation of actual vehicles that you are requesting here is the kind of mobilisation -- one kind of mobilisation that is part of your job definition?

A. Yes.

Q. And what I'm getting to is that I know at many times we think of mobilising men for troops, but it obviously includes materiel as well; is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. And I won't go over all of them, but we saw that your request to the ministry was taken rather seriously, was turned into an order by the ministry to their own people, and it was giving very strict follow-up orders on reporting. And actually one of the documents said that this was really hurting public transport or something to that effect. So my question is: Your request, was that normal for a request like this to be taken so seriously and acted upon so strictly in conformance with your request?

A. Completely normal.

Q. And did the ministry understand that this wasn't just coming from General Skrbic but that General Skrbic couldn't act like this without the authority of General Mladic?

A. Of course, Mr. McCloskey. ¹⁸⁷²⁹

Q. All right.

MR. McCLOSKEY: I see that it's a good time to break, and thank you, everyone. I will do my best to try to finish tomorrow, and if -- hopefully give the general some -- the last time in the day for a possible redirect. I will reorganise and endeavour to do that, and I'll have a better estimate in the morning.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much for that. We have to adjourn for the day. We will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this courtroom, again.

And please be reminded, again, that you shouldn't have any contact with the parties during this break.

We adjourn.

[The witness stands down]

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the

2nd day of February, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.