⁴⁶³⁰ Tuesday, 31 August 2010

(Open session)

[The accused entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 2.27 p.m.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom and outside the courtroom. Everybody will have noticed that we had to start later than usual because of technical problems, and I hope they will be resolved. Some people are still working on it.

Before the witness is being brought in, we should deal with three matters raised by the parties yesterday and I would like to start with the remark of Mr. Tolimir he made yesterday about the nightly monitoring. It was very late yesterday and the other trial had to postpone its commencement because we were running overtime so that we couldn't discuss it yesterday. In the meantime, Mr. Tolimir, you will have received, as the Chamber and the Prosecution did, a submission by the Registry, so-called Rule 33(B) submission. We would like to take the opportunity to ask both parties for their oral submissions on that matter. The Chamber is dealing with that problem and would like to render a decision as soon as possible so that we will not ask both parties for written submissions, but if you are in the position to tell the Chamber about your position we would appreciate that.

Mr. Tolimir wants to hear the Prosecution first. Are you prepared to comment on that? Mr. McCloskey.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I read that and I was frankly shocked by it, that they did not follow your order. And I don't ⁴⁶³¹ see any justification in requiring an accused to see a psychiatrist for something this simple, and I don't understand their resistance to it. And we would fully support your original order and have this waking up stop as soon as possible. I think it's -- as you know the Prosecution position, we have seen how this affects people, and I can't imagine any medical excuse for it and I don't understand their response, not following your order. And I better stop there because I -- the whole issue I find shocking.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, Mr. McCloskey. Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May the Lord bless this house and may the divine providence bring justice not according to my wishes but according to God's will. I would like to greet everyone and I would like to thank Mr. McCloskey for his words. I believe he spoke from the heart. I wanted to say that I wrote a number of occasions about this problem. This is not only the fact that they keep waking me up, but this is harassment which goes on round the clock. I want to make a public statement since they keep sending me to the physician, but they never abide by the physician's opinion. Therefore, I would like to state the following. In keeping with the decision of the Chamber of the 25th of August, 2010, I, Zdravko Tolimir, refuse to be under the treatment of waking me up during night-time because this is in violation of my human rights. I also refuse to be submitted to this way of treatment, to which I protested a number of times.

Given that the Chamber ruled against this practice and wanted to ⁴⁶³² take appropriate statements for those -- from those involved, I would like to have this handled in public hearing.

Signed by me, Mr. Zdravko Tolimir, and my counsel, Mr. Gajic. I believe after everything I have said there was basically no need for it, especially in view of Mr. McCloskey's words because I believe he said everything that needed to be said.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much for your submissions. Mr. Gajic.

MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I would just kindly ask the usher to take the document, which is the statement read out by Mr. Tolimir.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: And if the usher takes it, is it then part of the record or what is your intention?

MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] We wanted to treat this as a submission, a statement that would be tendered as much as any other submission would be if submitted by this Defence.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: In principle, there is no problem with that. But, Mr. Gajic, we have it already on the record, in the transcript, if Mr. Tolimir read out the whole text and I think now we have it on the record. We don't need the hard copy, if you would agree with that.

MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I perfectly agree, but we also invested an additional effort to benefit not only the transcript but the Chamber and anyone else who may be interested in these proceedings so as to enable everyone to have access to this public statement.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Would it be possible to file it electronically so that then it will be distributed to all the usual recipients? I think ⁴⁶³³ it's more practical.

MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we are doing precisely that. We make submissions by having Mr. Tolimir sign it, and then I handed it over to the Registrar. Or Mr. Tolimir gives that to the -- in the Detention Unit to the appropriate services. Therefore, we handle our submissions in this way and if we are sitting in a courtroom we simply hand over our submissions to the Registrar.

[Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please give it to the Court Usher. If it's signed by Mr. Tolimir it's fine, and then it will be distributed to all other recipients. Let's have a short look on it. Thank you.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be distributed to all relevant parties. We have heard the oral submissions by both parties and will render a decision as soon as possible.

Now I would like to turn to the matters raised by the Prosecution yesterday. The first is the Prosecution's ongoing compliance with the Chamber's 92 ter bis decision rendered on the 7th of July. Yesterday the Prosecution stated that it has been taking a lot longer time than it anticipated when they asked for the additional 30 days in July to compile lists of exhibits in relation to the Rule 92 bis decision. For this reason, the Prosecution proposes that it provide the Chamber and Registry lists of exhibits concerning a minimum of five witnesses per week. The Prosecution envisages that it will require about another four months to complete the entire task. I have to say the ⁴⁶³⁴ Chamber expresses its concern over the delay of the Prosecution's compliance. The Chamber would like to ask the Prosecution to provide more detailed explanations as to why it is taking time in compiling the lists. We are really not satisfied with the information we got yesterday because we can't understand why it is so time-consuming to compile the exhibits in a -- just in another way as the Prosecution has done before. Mr. Thayer.

MR. THAYER: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Yes, the lack of detail was owing to the lack of time yesterday, and I'm happy to provide that now. The primary reason is that the task initially rests, as many tasks do, on Ms. Stewart's shoulders as well as that of another member of the trial team. If it were a simple matter of just listing all the exhibits, we wouldn't have this problem, but what we have to do in dividing everything up into the categories and compiling everything physically requires a lot of time by Ms. Stewart to go back and track through sometimes these exhibits through several cases so that we can figure out the route that some of these exhibits took; for example, from Krstic to Blagojevic to Popovic to here, particularly for not only the exhibits that form part of the witness's testimony, that is, that were introduced through the witness, but exhibits which were shown to the witness but were not admitted through the witness, or documents and exhibits that were shown to the witness but never admitted. Those categories additionally become very time-consuming. The only method we have available to us rests with Ms. Stewart, who is frankly the only person at this stage, after 15 years since Krstic - other than ⁴⁶³⁵ Mr. McCloskey - who has the technical knowledge and I think she's unique in that respect on how to navigate through the various databases and indices that we have set up to ensure that these exhibits are being categorised adequately. And that is the first stage of the review in order to create these lists in the proper categories that we have been doing, for example, for the 92 ter witnesses.

From there, the task then falls on the attorneys to go through the transcripts of these witnesses, whether it's a trial transcript or just an OTP witness statement, and make sure that we are capturing all of the documents correctly. The only reason why we're able now to have a sense of what the documents were that were simply shown to a witness but not introduced, because e-court doesn't catch those, is that Ms. Stewart during the Popovic trial was maintaining her own list. But what we have to do to make sure that we're catching them all is have the attorneys go through the volumes of testimony to make sure when somebody's shown a document, determine whether it came in; maybe they were shown the document but it wasn't tendered. In which case, for e-court purposes, it's almost like it doesn't exist. So again, there's a second layer of review that becomes very time-consuming, and it's something that in order to have any meaning at the end of the day -- I mean, what we're trying to do is produce lists that everybody can rely on. And believe me, I've been involved in projects where we hurry things along to comply with a dead-line and then you wind up with a product that no one can use and it doesn't make sense and it's so riddled with mistakes that no one touches it again. What we are trying to do is produce lists that everybody can ⁴⁶³⁶ rely on, that you can go back to and if you're looking at a document you can count on it being showing at a particular page on a transcript. But the second stage relies on us attorneys to go through. Some of that stuff, some of that task we've been able to task to, for example, some new interns that we just got on our team, but fundamentally some of these witnesses are so critical that it's important for the trial attorneys themselves to be on top of this, particularly for the 92 bis with cross witnesses who are coming. Because in essence what we're doing is we're creating the 92 ter exhibit lists. For these 92 bis with cross witnesses, we anticipate that there may be a brief summary that we want to provide to the Trial Chamber. For all we know, there may be some additional discussion with the witness ahead of time. So the attorney who has been assigned to that witness is accountable for going through Ms. Stewart's list, having that in hand, going through the transcript, double-checking, and adding any additional exhibits that kick out. That's the explanation for why it's so time-consuming. And just to give you an idea, when we're getting ready for the 92 ter witnesses, it saves a lot of court time but the process is one that is very, we've found already, time consuming and we're experienced with that, but there's no way to get around it, there's no shortcut we can take unfortunately, otherwise we're going to wind up with exhibits that have been lost, frankly.

So I hope that's sufficient detail. I'm sorry to sort of show you how the sausage is made, but that's how it's made.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much, Mr. Thayer. ⁴⁶³⁷ Mr. Tolimir, do you want to respond to this request by the Prosecution?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We are familiar with this problem because it took us four submissions to respond to their submission according to Rule 92. We want them to be as prepared as possible. We want them to come up with whatever there is in this courtroom, and it is to our benefit. Ultimately, it is up to you to decide.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. The Chamber will consider this situation and the submission by the Prosecution and we will come back to both parties. It is more clear now what you are talking about, but we have to consider if there are -- you are talking about a shortcut and there is no shortcut in your opinion, but perhaps we can -- before we decide on this topic, we should take into account if there's any possibility that the staff of the Chamber, the Registry, and the staff of the Prosecution and the Defence could liaise for the best practical way to find out and for -- yeah, for closer time to finish this duty of the Prosecution in fact for the sake of the whole proceedings and the preparation of every court day, including the cross-examination for Mr. Tolimir. We will come back to that topic very soon after having reviewed your oral submission.

The third question should be dealt with in private session. We are going into private session.

(Private session)

(1 lines redacted) ⁴⁶³⁸

(21 lines redacted)

(Open session)

THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: If there is nothing else to discuss, the witness should be brought in. ⁴⁶³⁹

[The witness takes the stand]

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon, sir. Welcome to the courtroom again after a long time --

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues]... examination. I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell the truth still applies, and Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.

WITNESS: HAMDIJA TORLAK [Resumed]

[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to greet the witness. We will continue where we left it off yesterday.

We had document 1D261. We were in the process of discussing it, so I would like to re-call it now, please.

Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

Q. [Interpretation] If you recall, it was drafted by General Gobillard's assistant based on the report of the Ukrainian Battalion's commander. First of all, let's look at the document. Following page 1, could we please move to page 2 in both versions, in particular paragraph 8. Thank you. We can see paragraph 8. Underlined just above that it says:

"The CO Ukrainian Battalion joins the meeting and adds the following points after a discussion with his company commander in Zepa." So he wasn't at the meeting but he informed -- passed on the ⁴⁶⁴⁰ information. Paragraph 8:

"The CO of the Rogatica Brigade accompanied by General Tolimir and local Bosnian authorities met at Ukrainian check-point 2 at noon today. The Serbs asked the Bosnians in the Zepa pocket to drop their weapons, after which the civilian population may either leave or stay. The Bosnian authorities were due to meet immediately after in the village to discuss their options. The Serbs gave them until 1530 to decide. At 1830 an answer was still awaited. The Bosnians indicated they needed until noon tomorrow."

We can see here what was written by Mr. Gobillard's assistant based on the information by the battalion commander. It was rather unusual for something of that nature to have happened in a demilitarised zone. My question is this: Given that this was forwarded by the Ukrainian Battalion commander, who had received his information from Dudnjik, can you please comment on this, particularly in view of the fact that I also referred to it in my report.

A. Very well. Yesterday in my testimony, I told you I don't remember this, but if one looks at it logically, the first document, your report, you forwarded to your superiors as well as the agreement I signed, both these documents basically reflect what you said at check-point number 2 at Boksanica.

Q. Thank you. We will move on to my next question. It is still in this document. We see paragraph 9 which reads in its last sentence: "The Serbs want to capture the pocket without a fight if possible." ⁴⁶⁴¹ My question is this: Based on this sentence, which is also based on the information forwarded by the Ukrainian Battalion commander, my question to you is this: At the meeting with me and Colonel Dudnjik, did you -- were you under an impression that the Serb army wanted to capture the enclave without fighting?

A. Not at that time. We focused on other things in our discussions.

Q. Thank you. At the time on that day, could you have arranged a meeting with me at any time of day if you wanted to or did you have to go through Dudnjik alone?

A. Well, that contact could have been established through Colonel Dudnjik, I believe; however, once the meeting was over we went back to Zepa and we spent all of our time there at the meeting of the War Presidency of Zepa. And I believe Dudnjik went back to Zepa as well at that moment. So we could have been in contact.

Q. Let's move on to the next document.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But before that I would like to ask for 1D261 to be admitted into evidence.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: We have seen earlier part of this document, I think, if I'm not mistaken. Can you tell us how many pages does this document have or are you only tendering this page?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document contains two pages and it was translated. We would like to tender this page alone, but if you want to admit the whole document that may well be.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: No, I thought it would be a big book or something like that, but only two pages no problem. It will be received. ⁴⁶⁴²

THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D101.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please now have Exhibit P491 in e-court.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. While we are waiting I'm going to tell you that this is a document dated the 13th of July, 1995, entitled: "The situation in the Zepa enclave" that I, Zdravko Tolimir, sent to the Main Staff, my superior command, of the sector of the Drina Corps to which I belonged and its zone of responsibility and the forward command post where General Krstic was. His superior Kust [phoen] was at this meeting. Can we please go through this document paragraph by paragraph. We can see both pages and I quote:

"On the 13th of July, 1995, at 1200 hours we contacted Hamdija Torlak, the president of the Zepa Executive Committee and Mujo Omanovic a member of the Zepa War Presidency regarding the demilitarisation of the enclave and free movement for the civilians in accordance with the Geneva Conventions from the 12th of August, 1949." This is what I'm writing to my superior command. Now I'm asking you: Did we ask explicitly for military -- for able-bodied men to surrender their arms?

A. Based on my recollection I'm going to repeat what I said in my previous evidence, when asked whether everybody was allowed to leave including those who were 35 years of age and you said: Yes, of course. Now, while I'm reading this document --

Q. Let us go paragraph by paragraph, and I would like to discuss ⁴⁶⁴³ this document with you in that way in order to refresh both our memories. Thank you.

A. Shall I repeat what I already answered? So as far as I can remember, I know that I asked you whether those fit for military service were also allowed to go. You said: Yes, of course. And this is carved in my memory as something very characteristic and I repeat that in all my testimonies.

Q. Thank you. We were discussing the freedom of movement for the civilian population, and I can cite here what you said and it goes as follows. On page 5629 I'm going to read your exact words. I cannot find this page. I'll get back to it later.

So we are talking about the freedom of movement, and it is true that I told you: Yes, of course, even those 30 years of age can go.

A. Yes.

Q. So when we spoke about the freedom of movement, we understood by that that it included soldiers as well; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Let us now look at paragraph 2. In the original document it's on page 2 and it reads as follows. Paragraph 2 reads as follows: "The Muslim representatives said that they were authorised to solve the problem of Zepa in a peaceful manner by providing the following guarantees:

"1. To enable them within three days to consult with the population of Zepa and the leadership in Sarajevo about the decision to leave Zepa and move to the destination of their own choosing. ⁴⁶⁴⁴ "2. To enable them to relocate all civilians and able-bodied population.

"3. To carry out the evacuation" --

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you are again really much too fast. The interpreters have really a problem to interpret you correctly.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise to the interpreters. I'm going to repeat.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Number 2 reads -- or maybe I can repeat number 1 if that was too fast to avoid mistakes. So your first request was:

"To enable them within three days to consult with the population of Zepa and the leadership in Sarajevo about the decision to leave Zepa and to move to the desired destination ..."

So while we are at this first paragraph, is it something that was discussed at this meeting, that you want to consult the population?

A. Yes, that's correct, and that was the key issue.

Q. Thank you: "2. To enable them to relocate all civilians and able-bodied population."

Does that mean you didn't want to separate the two; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. "3. To carry out the evacuation from Zepa in the presence of UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ICRC and military observers."

Is this correct? ⁴⁶⁴⁵

A. Yes, these are the guarantees that we asked for.

Q. "4. To have guarantees from the RS and Main Staff of the VRS leadership for the safe transportation across RS territory." Was that one of your requests?

A. Yes, however, the previous requests were more important to us.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I stop you again. You are not only too fast while reading but you are overlapping. Both speakers should be reminded just to wait. You can follow the transcript and then you can see when it is not finished recording. Please, it is very difficult for everyone to follow.

Go ahead, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I have a problem because it's impossible for me to look and follow the transcript. I want to look at the document. That's how it works.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is very simple that you just read more slowly. You don't -- must have a look at the transcript.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'm going to repeat item 4.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. "To have guarantees from the Republika Srpska and the Main Staff of the VRS for the safe transportation across the RS territory ..." That had to be conveyed to the population and that what happened?

A. Yes, that was one of the guarantees, and I remember that you mentioned before that UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ICRC, et cetera -- however, the main guarantee in the whole process was provided by the Main Staff and ⁴⁶⁴⁶ the political and military leadership of Republika Srpska.

Q. And number 5: "To enable them to stay in the territory - meaning those who choose to do so."

Do you remember that?

A. Yes, although I don't remember too many details, but it only makes sense that that was one of the requests.

Q. Thank you. So therefore can we conclude that those were the preconditions that you asked for and that I included in my report?

A. Generally speaking, yes. As I said, I don't remember all the details and how it was all phrased, but basically that was it.

Q. Thank you. Can we please now look at the following paragraph. In English these are paragraphs 2 and 3 and in B/C/S 3 and 4. This is what I reported to my command:

"We rejected their first request and made a condition that all necessary consultations be completed by 1500 hours and that the evacuation commence at that time. We have conditioned this with an alternative solution - military force. We guaranteed the evacuation of all the civilian population and military-aged men who surrender their weapons, as well as the safety for the civilians who decide to stay and accept the RS authority."

I have undertaken all these obligations, and therefore I had to inform my command about the undertakings that I made. Would you say that this is correct?

A. Yes, that's one of the conditions, but yes. This is all correct. ⁴⁶⁴⁷ I didn't know that the dead-line was 1500 hours, but I know that it was on that particular date.

Q. Thank you. Now look at the next paragraph, which begins by: "We have also requested that all able-bodied men be registered and exchanged for our prisoners of war in the Muslim prisons. This was a tactical move so that during the follow-up discussions, which they conditioned with consultations with their leadership in Sarajevo, we could turn down any possible counter-argument. We promised to fulfil all other requests."

Is it consistent with what you and I agreed at this meeting on the 13th of July?

A. Well, probably yes, but this has not been particularly emphasised in your statement but it is highlighted in a way.

Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us whether I had accepted all your conditions and whether I promised you the fulfilment of all your requests?

A. Yes, that's what you promised -- or rather, you offered this. Now, I cannot remember whether we came up with these requests or whether all these requests were finalised during the meeting.

Q. Now, in order to refresh your memory tell me, for example, did you ask for UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ICRC, and military observers?

A. Yes.

Q. Did I comply with that request?

A. Yes, you did.

Q. Later after the agreement was implemented, were all these ⁴⁶⁴⁸ international organisations included?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. Did I put any prerequisite forward for the stay of population because I remembered that there were ten families who wanted to stay behind?

A. No, you never treated this as a problem.

Q. Yes. We said whoever wants to stay only has to accept our authority and our government. Now, whether one of my requests was to compile records of able-bodied men for exchange?

A. I already said that. Yes, but this complex matter was dealt with at the very end because at the beginning - how to put it? - we dealt with some more pleasant issues about people being allowed to leave, et cetera. But I think this came at the very end.

Q. I also reported to my command to the effect that all refugees in Zepa and part of the local population agreed to move out. Was that correctly reported to my staff?

A. I don't remember that because I don't know whether at that stage we were without the required additional consultations with Sarajevo. Please let me read the document.

Can you help me locate this particular section?

Q. It's the last paragraph. The last sentence which says that: "All the refugees in Zepa chose to move out as well as part of the local population. We accept that some Muslim soldiers will abandon the defence line in order to prepare their families for moving out." This was my assessment. ⁴⁶⁴⁹

A. I cannot either remember or confirm that at that stage we said that. I believe that since it was the 13th we were probably able to confirm that on the 19th. I don't remember this being said precisely like this by our side.

Q. If you look at the last paragraph, I started by saying "we believe ..." I didn't say that that was an accurate assessment.

A. I'm sorry. I didn't notice that that is how you began your sentence.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, Judge Mindua would like to put a question to the witness and we should go back in the English version to the previous page, please.

Judge Mindua.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Judge.

JUDGE MINDUA: [No interpretation]

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot hear Judge Mindua. Just a second, please.

JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] I would like to ask you to tell us about the fact that people had to move, and please correct me if I'm wrong. The first paragraph speaks about the delay that's given to the leadership of the Zepa population and also to the leadership of Sarajevo to give a quick response within three days and it talks about the evacuation of the population. So when I read this paragraph I'm under the impression that it's the people who are the leaders of the community, that it's up to them to decide whether these people should leave all together. However, when I read paragraph 5 we can see that it says that ⁴⁶⁵⁰ those who wish to stay - and we're talking about the Muslim population, so the persons who choose to stay - they can do so within and on the territory, and I suppose that they're talking about the Zepa territory. So I'm under the impression here that the Muslim people did not really have the obligation to leave the territory. And in response to one of the questions put by the Defence, you confirmed, indeed, that there were ten Muslim families who had decided to stay and there was no problem at that point with regard to their decision. So let me try to understand one thing.

Were they compelled to go? Did they have to leave? Or did they decide on their own to leave? Could they just simply decide whether they could stay or leave at that moment, at that point in time?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, look. My answer to this question means that this document refers to a meeting held on the 13th of July. This was the first meeting between representatives of Zepa and representatives of the Army of Republika Srpska. In this paragraph 5 an offer is being defined, so to say, which was expounded and clarified during talks with Mr. Tolimir, because that was what the Serbian side was offering us at that point. Now, these ten families mentioned by General Tolimir were discussed later at a meeting held on the 19th of July which was attended by Mr. Benjamin Kulovac and myself, and it was he who told this, I think, to General Mladic. So that was -- let's call it an offer that was worked out together by General Tolimir. The later developments, as I explained in my previous testimony, the reasons for that not happening and I also explained the arguments and the reasons for ⁴⁶⁵¹ everybody leaving the Zepa enclave eventually.

JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. I will have to deal with your answer. Thank you very much for now. Thanks.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you to Judge Mindua.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. I would now like to clarify this issue completely. Now, did you, Witness, or anyone from the War Presidency contact the civilian population in order to find out whether they wanted to remain in Zepa or whether they wanted to leave Zepa once they surrendered their weapons? Thank you.

A. I don't know if I've already said this before during my testimony here, but I was an outsider, as it were, in Zepa, I was a newcomer. So I did not really have close contacts with the local people. As far as I can remember, after the discussion at the War Presidency which followed on the same day, these conditions were, I believe, conveyed in this same shape and form, they were sent on. And as for the contacts with the population, I don't know whether Mr. Kulovac who was a local man or some other people did anything in that direction and whether there were any discussions with the locals about whether they wanted to stay there or leave. I really don't know, so I can't say either way. I can't confirm it but I can also not deny it. In any case, the situation was such that everyone really had to think about their own lives and their own situation, so I don't know if there was anything that came from elsewhere ⁴⁶⁵² but I -- and I can't recall any activities to that effect by members of the War Presidency.

Q. Thank you. Now we shall move to another topic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please pull up P734.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. That is General Hadzihasanovic's reply that he sent to the command of the 275th Light Infantry Brigade in Zepa at -- on the 13th of July at 1000 hours. Could you please just enlarge this a little bit so that the witness can see it.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1050 hours.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, we see the first paragraph of this document which was also drafted on the 13th, where the Chief of Staff of the BH Army, General Hadzihasanovic, writing to the commander of the Zepa Brigade says the following:

"In response to the message sent to the Prime Minister of the Republic Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the president of the War Presidency of Zepa, we received the following reply from the president of the Presidency ..."

In other words, from Alija Izetbegovic. "We hereby inform the president of the War Presidency of Zepa that there should be no negotiations with the aggressor." That's the first paragraph. Second paragraph:

"You can expect unconditional ultimatums and requests for surrender from the aggressor." ⁴⁶⁵³ Third paragraph:

"The people and fighters of Zepa should continue preparations for an organised resistance against the aggressor and prevent any emerges of panic by their resolute conduct convincing the people of the possibility of success in resisting the aggressor."

And the last paragraph: "The Presidency and the government of BH are investing the utmost effort at international military and political level." Signed Chief of Staff Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic. Thank you.

Now, my question is this: Did you have occasion to see this letter before you headed for the negotiations, although you said you hadn't although it had been sent at 1050 hours?

A. Well, I can just repeat that I hadn't seen it. I may have seen it during my testimony here, but I did hear of this document. However, before I set off for Boksanica for my talks with you, I did not see this document.

Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, in the third paragraph, as we could see, he was demanding that you organise armed resistance. My question is this: Was the Zepa army at the time capable, in terms of weapons and personnel, to actually resist the Army of Republika Srpska without some additional assistance from the BH Army or some international factors, as he mentioned here? Thank you.

A. Well, look, I've already said this a number of times during my testimony here. There was a number of troops there, there were some ⁴⁶⁵⁴ weapons too; but in everyone's view, that was not even close to what we really needed in order to defend the enclave successfully. And this document actually is a recommendation or an order, you can read it the way you please. There was -- there had been an order that we should organise. This was the 265th --

THE INTERPRETER: 285th, interpreter's correction.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- Brigade. These were armed people. And I believe that we saw a document yesterday that was drafted by, I think, Indjic, an officer of the Serb army, where he said that there were some 300 weapons. I'm not sure that that was true, but in any case the assessment of most members of the War Presidency, in view of the overall situation at that time and in view of the fact that the Srebrenica enclave had fallen, although it had been six times as large as the Zepa enclave in terms of the number of inhabitants, it was clear to us that we would not get any assistance from anyone and that we could not defend ourselves. We could maybe put up a defence, but in the end we would be defeated. And that was the position of the majority of the members of the War Presidency. Because, as I said, Srebrenica had, I believe, some five brigades, whereas we only had one. And the territory that we had to defend was approximately or about the same. In other words, it was not possible. And we could not really expect assistance from anyone outside because it was clear to us that no one would really want to get involved. It was clear.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you. [Microphone not activated] ⁴⁶⁵⁵

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Now, based on this document which probably had some sway and some influence on the situation in Zepa, could you tell us how did they try to persuade the population that they could successfully defend themselves and that they should arm themselves while we were trying to resolve this in peaceful negotiations?

A. Well, I remember a session of the War Presidency where Colonel Palic said that we should organise a defence and that surrender was out of the question and surrender of weapons and troops and so on, and I think that that was it, that there was no more talk on this issue at the War Presidency.

Q. Thank you. Now please tell us, is this letter from the command of the BH Army and his Chief of Staff, did that actually have an influence on the position taken by Colonel Avdo Palic and generally, overall, did it actually affect the decision on whether to proceed with a peaceful -- with seeking a peaceful solution or not?

A. Well, you see, Colonel Palic probably had this document already on the 13th of July, in the afternoon. He was probably aware of its content and it's possible that that too had an impact on his position on the further developments and attempts to resolve the situation in Zepa.

Q. Thank you. Tell us, please, on the 13th you actually postponed this whole issue and you received -- you sent us a letter on the 14th of July, saying that it was decided to postpone this whole. So tell us, did the War Presidency take any particular decision on this issue, bearing in ⁴⁶⁵⁶ mind also the letter that was sent by Hadzihasanovic because he represented and spoke for the government?

A. Well, as far as I can remember, the answer that was sent - and I can't recall the wording - was handed over -- was handed to Dudnjik on the 13th, late in the afternoon, maybe at 6.00 or 7.00 p.m. I don't know exactly when Dudnjik reached check-point 2, but as far as I can remember there were no decisions taken as to what to do next, at least not at that time. I believe that we had another meeting on the next day where we decided who was to do what, but as for any strategic decisions taken on that same day, whether we should fight to the last man or something to that effect, as far as I can recall there were no such decisions.

Q. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 1D269.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. While we're waiting, let me ask you this: The general mobilisation that was proclaimed, was that something that was within the competence of the Zepa War Presidency? Thank you.

A. Well, you see, in view of the way things worked, how large that community was and so on, as far as I can remember the War Presidency did not -- was not involved in that. I think all of that was really within the powers of Colonel Palic. Because as I've already said, this was a small community and the entire developments, the organisation, all of that was spontaneous in a way so that I don't remember the War Presidency taking any such decisions.

Q. Here we can see this document. You can take a look too. It's ⁴⁶⁵⁷ not very legible, but I'm sure you can make it out. This is a document sent from - as we see in the heading - the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, war time Presidency, dated -- the date is not really clear.

A. 14th July 1995.

Q. Yes, we see the number of document above the date and then the date 14 July. And then it says:

"At the session of the War Presidency of Zepa municipality held on the 14th of July, 1995, it was decided as follows ..." And then under I we see:

"General mobilisation shall be declared on the territory of Zepa municipality."

Can you see it?

A. Yes.

Q. "II. All available assets shall be put at the disposal of the defence.

"III. All able-bodied people shall be placed at the disposal of the Zepa War Presidency.

"IV. All military and able-bodied men shall be placed at the disposal of the 85th Light Infantry Brigade, except members of the War Presidency of Zepa who shall remain to carry out their normal duties and other workers as decided by the War Presidency Zepa. "V. Members of the Zepa" --

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's request: Could the witness -- could the accused please repeat point number 5.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, could you please repeat number 5, it ⁴⁶⁵⁸ was not heard by the interpreter.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. "V. Members of the CSB of Zepa shall act upon orders for the defence of the free territory."

In other words, the -- they are placed under the command of the brigade.

"VI. The population owning any fire-arms shall put them at the disposal of the brigade or they are at risk of being prosecuted. "VII. This decision shall come into force immediately." Signed the Presidency of the War Presidency of Zepa municipality Mehmed Hajric.

Thank you. Now, my next question: This decision was adopted on the 14th of July, 1995, as we see above, after the negotiations on the 13th of July, 1995, and following receipt of the letter from Enver Hadzihasanovic which he conveyed as the position of the president's, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. My question is this: Was this decision taken on orders from Sarajevo, pursuant to the letter we saw a moment ago, or was it taken by the War Presidency on its own initiative?

A. Well, I can only repeat what I've already just said. I really don't remember this decision being taken, but if there is a valid document to that effect and whether this document was drafted by some of the members of the War Presidency, maybe the president of the War Presidency or some others, I don't know. But I -- because I don't remember it. I do remember the meeting of the 14th, that was on the next day, where we discussed what we were to do next. That's what I do ⁴⁶⁵⁹ remember, but I do not remember the document from Sarajevo but it's possible that it did have an effect and that it actually contributed to this kind of decision being taken, mobilisation, and so on and so forth.

Q. Thank you. Does this document reflect what was being discussed at the War Presidency because it was constantly in session?

A. Well, I have to stress again that the role in organising the defence was taken by Colonel Palic and whoever drafted this document, it's possible that it was the president of the War Presidency with someone else, I really don't remember. But what I can confirm is that it was on the 14th and that was following very intense attacks on the night before, the 13th in the evening, so that the situation was extraordinary and everything was directed at defending ourselves and organising our own defence.

Q. When we take a closer look at the document we see that this document was sent to Sarajevo and Zepa, and we can see the initials of Alija Izetbegovic confirming the fact that he was acquainted with this information. Can you recognise that?

A. Could we please scroll up so that we can see the bottom of the page. That is sufficient. Thank you. I think these are the initials of President Alija Izetbegovic and I believe I recognise his handwriting.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now go back to the top of the document because it seems that it was sent to him for information purposes.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. It says: "Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." ⁴⁶⁶⁰ Can you see it?

A. Yes, I can. In the second paragraph, I believe.

Q. Thank you. We can see here that it is clearly stated that all military-aged men and people who can perform work duties should be included in this. Can you tell us what the difference is? That is paragraph 4.

A. This includes the people who were within certain age limits who could serve the army but who could also do other things, not necessarily fight. For example, they should help in the organisation and distribution of humanitarian aid and civil protection, et cetera. They could be assigned certain work tasks. It was called work duty. The other category were the fighters.

Q. [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Tolimir, please.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Thank you. In the category of those of military age, does this only include military conscripts or can somebody else be included in this category once the general call-up has been issued?

A. Military-aged people can be engaged for the needs of the army but need not necessarily be.

Q. Thank you. The president of the War Presidency in this decision refers to certain sanctions. Were such sanctions envisaged and were they actually carried out against anyone who did not abide by these provisions or refused the call-up?

A. I don't remember any sanctions being levied. It's a small ⁴⁶⁶¹ environment and it was otherwise difficult to implement such sanctions. I can only tell you that I do not recall any.

Q. Thank you. As the president of the Executive Board, were you familiar with the then-regulation about general call-ups, whether the Presidency actually had such sanctions in mind? What sanctions were there in the existing legislation at the time?

A. Well, this paragraph of that decision invokes the then-regulation which also included certain sanctions for refusing draft calls or conscription with the army in case of war time activities. I believe this is what they had in mind.

Q. Thank you. They probably had in mind the legislation in the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. I presume as much.

Q. Thank you. We see that he also made a decision that the War Presidency remain in permanent session. What did he mean by that? What did it mean to you, for example, as a member of the War Presidency?

A. As far as I remember, we were in permanent session anyhow. Out of the standing members, perhaps I was the one who was present the most. Colonel Palic for the most part did not attend such meetings because I believe he was in the communications centre or at least I believe it to be the case. We split the two functions, and I was in charge of UNPROFOR relations in case there were any further talks. Most of my time was spent in the building in the centre of Zepa where I had been before as well. In the course of those few days, there was a lot of heavy shelling and intensive military activities. I believe I went to see some people ⁴⁶⁶² in UNPROFOR a couple of times and I believe I was in touch to the extent possible with the communications centre of the army. Civilian police were also engaged in the defence of the town, but I'm afraid that is as much as I can tell you speaking from memory.

Q. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think it is time for the first break. Is that convenient for you?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I will have only two more questions concerning this topic, but I can put them after the break as well.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Then continue your questions through this topic.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Did the War Presidency, when the general call-up was put in place, receive a new role and did the president of the Presidency receive any additional competence or authority vis-a-vis other organs in the municipality?

A. Well, it should have been like that because a war time situation should mean switching to a different mode of operation.

Q. Thank you. Does that mean that the War Presidency was the only body authorised to decide on, say, trying to break out or to evacuate the population or any other such activities within the demilitarised zone?

A. Well, they had that competence before as well. There were no changes in that regard when the situation changed. That was the main body authorised to make such decisions. This was the case earlier as ⁴⁶⁶³ well, and in that situation the War Presidency was the body to make such calls.

Q. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to thank all those who assisted us. I am finished with this topic and I am about to move to the next one.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. We have to adjourn now and we will resume 20 minutes past 4.00.

--- Recess taken at 3.50 p.m.

--- On resuming at 4.24 p.m.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. In order to move to the next topic, I would like to have 1D269 admitted into evidence. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be -- Mr. Thayer, would you comment on this? Yes, please.

MR. THAYER: I do have a question, Mr. President. I'll say at the outset, we have no objection to the admission of the document. It just doesn't have any ERNs on it. It very well may have been disclosed to the accused by the Office of the Prosecutor, but I don't see any ERNs. It doesn't look familiar to me. There's some writing, as we can see, that goes diagonally across the document which is unusual in my experience. So my question is if we can have a little bit foundation as to the source of the document. Again, no objection, but just some ⁴⁶⁶⁴ foundation, because I don't recognise it, frankly. And as I said, we could have disclosed it, and it's just not ringing a bell. But there's no ERN, for example, on it.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Mr. Thayer [sic], can you help the Chamber and the Prosecution -- oh, I misspoke again. Very sorry. I shouldn't mix up Mr. Thayer. Mr. Tolimir. Mr. Tolimir, have you additional information for us?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do. This document was collected during a court investigation of Mr. Mehmed Hajric before national courts. It was admitted into evidence in the proceedings before a domestic court. It was collected by domestic organs. This is the origin of the document.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: And was it given to the Prosecution earlier?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My assistant is telling me that the document is a public document. It was the result of an investigation. If this does not suffice, we can ask for an official confirmation of this, although I don't think it should be necessary since the document seems to have been signed by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and the witness recognised his signature as such.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer, one point I would like to mention is it has number 1D269. Does that mean it was used by the Defence in another case?

Mr. Thayer.

MR. THAYER: No, Mr. President. 1D269 is the Defence 65 ter number assigned to it in this matter. This, as far as I know, was never ⁴⁶⁶⁵ used in a prior case, otherwise we would see an ERN on it. We would see other markings that would identify it as such. Again, I'm curious as to which national jurisdiction we're talking about, what kind of proceeding we're talking about, because I think the evidence is -- strongly suggests that Mr. Hajric is dead as of August 1995. So I'm not sure what proceedings we're talking about, this document being collected in connection with this. If we could have just some information as to whether we're talking about national proceedings in Serbia, in Bosnia, you know, what -- we have no idea. Allegedly it's a public document, but I have no idea in what forum or in what matter.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's a very important document, Mr. Tolimir, and in order to understand it more properly and the context of this document I would suggest that we mark it for identification and you could provide the other party and the Chamber with more details about the source and the background of this document. That would be helpful, especially because we don't have a translation.

Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We will forward all detail about the document. If you look at the document it says Semir Halilovic across the page, and it also says state secret, which attaches great importance to it. This document was part of an investigation conducted against Semir Halilovic. We can ask the witness perhaps if he's familiar with that name.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I truly don't know who this Semir Halilovic is. The last name, Halilovic, is a last name one ⁴⁶⁶⁶ encounters in Zepa, but Semir Halilovic is somebody I'm not familiar with.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document will be marked for identification and we will decide about the admission after having received additional information from the Defence.

THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 1D269 will be Exhibit D102 marked for identification.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Could we please have 1D275 on the screens. It is dated the 15th of July, 1995, the title is: "Situation in Zepa." It was sent by Mehmed Hajric to the president of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The document reads:

"The War Presidency of the municipality of Zepa sent to the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina personally the president."

I would like to ask the witness to have a look at the document. We can see here that there is a direct link established between the War Presidency in Zepa and Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. It is stated: "Today, as in the course of the previous few days, the aggressor carried out artillery and infantry attacks."

The second paragraph: "The aggressor keeps amassing manpower and equipment." The third paragraph states that:

"There were contacts with Sarajevo UNPROFOR representatives ⁴⁶⁶⁷ probably by packet radio."

The fourth paragraph: "All human and technical resources are put at the disposal of the defence."

The fifth paragraph: "Work obligation and civil protection are at the disposal of the Zepa Brigade."

Here it seems to be referring to the decision of the general call-up. The next paragraph:

"Members of the public security station are placed at the front lines together with the brigade."

We have a reference here of the police. Next it says:

"We are carrying out a comprehensive operation of gathering quality food for the fighters as well as blankets, et cetera." Next he seems to be referring to the morale.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. My question is this: Did Mr. Hajric as president of the War Presidency send such daily reports on a regular basis to Mr. Alija Izetbegovic once the general call-up was declared after the Presidency assumed the wider scope of authority in which it had powers to decide on a number of extended issues?

A. This report was sent by the president of the War Presidency of Zepa. This is the first time I see this document. For a while Mr. Hajric was not present in the centre of Zepa. I think he was up in ⁴⁶⁶⁸ the mountains where the communications centre was. I have no specific comment to this. He probably put on paper what he was going through at the time as well as the information he had at the time. When I look at it, it doesn't seem to reflect the overall situation in full, but it's just a report sent from Zepa to the president of the B&H Presidency, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, personally.

Q. Thank you. Can you please look at paragraph 3 where he says that he had established contact by mediation of UNPROFOR and its Sarajevo sector and that he informed them about the situation. Can you tell us, did you have frequent contacts with Sarajevo sector via UNPROFOR or was that just occasioned by a specific need?

A. I think that in my previous testimony I said that I personally had one meeting with -- I believe it was the commander of UNPROFOR for Sarajevo sector. I know that he was a French officer, whether he was a general or a person with a lower rank I don't know. So we communicated through UNPROFOR communications system in Zepa, that was a radio communications system, and I recall that I received a reply that this general was only interested in UNPROFOR troops and that the solution relating to Zepa was in the sphere of political decisions and that he wouldn't want to become involved in that. This report is dated the 15th of July and maybe he's confirming this contact with me, but I can here confirm that I did have contact with this general in Sarajevo, or rather, UNPROFOR commander for Sarajevo sector. This probably refers to this communication that I have, and in this document it has been communicated to the president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic. ⁴⁶⁶⁹

Q. Can you please explain us in more detail about this contact. Who initiated it and what was the contents of this communication?

A. I believe that this contact was initiated by our side, possibly by someone from the military command in Sarajevo, or rather, Kakanj to the effect that we were asking for assistance or something like that. As far as I can remember, that is what I already told you. We asked for help in thwarting the Serbian attacks and the response I received, as I said earlier, was that Sarajevo UNPROFOR was only interested in the security and safety of UNPROFOR troops, whereas the solving of the problem of Zepa was a political matter. This is as far as I can remember as being highlighted in this conversation.

Q. Thank you. Can you please look at the next paragraph, which says:

"All manpower and materiel have been engaged for the defence and the work obligation and the civilian protection were placed at the disposal of the brigade."

My question is: Does that mean that all the people who were capable of working were obliged to perform work on orders by the army within the enclave?

A. Look, I don't remember all the details. I think that the limiting factor for someone to be engaged by the army was weapons. Therefore, it couldn't have applied to all the residents as potential members of the army. So under such circumstances one should bear that in mind. We have reports written by the president of the War Presidency, and of course it has a certain form which as I said did not fully reflect ⁴⁶⁷⁰ the true situation in Zepa but that was what was characteristic of such a situation, and that's the nature of things. I have no special comment on this. I know that members of the public security, that is to say the civilian police, were manning the front lines and they were all armed.

Q. Thank you. The War Presidency says here that through its members and its commissioners distributed to the people with --

THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat what he said.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you know who these representatives and commissioners were and who was in charge of directing them?

A. I said that Mr. Hajric, during that period between the 15th and the 20th, he -- we were not together for most of the time. I believe that he was the one who organised this, but I don't know any details as to how this was organised. I remember that after the meeting of the 13th and the 14th, I saw Mr. Hajric perhaps once on the 20th, and I don't remember seeing him later -- yes, I did see him on the 25th as well when the evacuation started. But for the rest of the time, we were not together. What I can read here is something that I don't remember and I'm not even sure if I knew anything about that because at that time we did not have any communications means. We were 4 to 5 kilometres apart.

Q. Thank you. Please, can you tell us what you were doing. You were a member of the Executive Board. Did you have any specific assignment after the call-up was declared and which activities you were engaged in? Thank you.

A. I spent most of my time in the centre of Zepa, and I was in ⁴⁶⁷¹ charge of liaising with UNPROFOR. I remember that at times other members of the War Presidency would come over and I received certain information from them. For example, the chief of police told me about the situation on the front lines that were under his control. Then Mr. Benjamin -- I think he was the one with whom I talked most often, he spoke about the wounded people, and since he was a local man he probably had a better insight and more connections with the local population. And thanks to that we discussed all these issues. But I don't remember any specific things from that period, apart from the fact that I was in the centre of Zepa and that I occasionally contacted with UNPROFOR and other members of the War Presidency. This is what I can remember.

Q. Thank you. Please, you will certainly remember this. You may have noticed that he's talking here about good-quality food and blankets and things. Was the Executive Committee involved in any activities relating to this and how these problems were solved on the front line?

A. No, I definitely wasn't involved in these activities. This was probably taken care of by Mr. Hajric, if at all. In the centre of Zepa, it was very dangerous for people to stay because it was constantly being shelled, so if any such activities were being conducted that was organised by Mr. Hajric. He probably had contacts with Colonel Palic, who was stationed on the mountain, whereas I was down in the centre of Zepa. And as I said, we did not have any means of communication so we just heard stories by people who came to see us. That is what I can tell you about providing materiel and other items to members of the military.

Q. Thank you. ⁴⁶⁷²

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to offer this document, 1D275, into evidence and then I would like document P124 to be called up.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer.

MR. THAYER: No objection, Mr. President.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received -- no, sorry, it will be marked for identification pending translation.

THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 1D275 will be Exhibit D103 marked for identification.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please now have Exhibit P124. Thank you. Here it is on our screens. This is a document which speaks about the situation in Zepa. It was sent at 1045 in the morning from Zepa by myself, and it says "assistant commander Major-General Zdravko Tolimir." It was sent to the Main Staff of the Drina Corps command, forward command post of the Drina Corps and to the command of the 65th Protection Motorised Regiment. So I am the author of this document and it reads in paragraph 1, and I quote:

"On the 14th of July, 1995, at 0800 hours, a meeting was held with Lieutenant-Colonel Dudnjik, commander of the Ukrainian unit in Zepa. He informed us that the Muslim side had refused to come to a meeting scheduled for 0900 hours. The reason they refused to come is that the leadership from Sarajevo had not approved the evacuation from Zepa."

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. So I've read this first paragraph to you and my question is: ⁴⁶⁷³ This information that in the morning hours was the reason for you not to come to these negotiations and it has to do with the information that you passed on to UNPROFOR?

A. I think that it was somebody else, whether the president of the War Presidency or Colonel Palic, I don't remember. But we said maybe that we were afraid, that we didn't feel safe, or maybe there was some other reason, perhaps the one stated herein. I have no reason to suspect that, but I would like to emphasise again that as far as I can remember this information, which was called refusal of the conditions that had been put forward for the evacuation of Zepa, were conveyed to Dudnjik on the afternoon of the 13th. So maybe this was passed on to you on the 14th of July in the morning hours. I honestly don't remember which reason was cited because I did not take part in drafting this final response.

Q. Thank you. In paragraph 2 you can see that it says the following:

"According to UNPROFOR information, the Muslim troops are at the front line and the population took a refuge outside the inhabited places. They are probably expecting our combat activities."

This was according to what UNPROFOR knew. My question is: Was the information conveyed here correct and did you already know in the morning that the population was outside of the inhabited place?

A. First of all, I don't know whether it is true or not that the population immediately took refuge somewhere. I can confirm that later on when combat activities became more fierce and when Zepa was attacked, ⁴⁶⁷⁴ I know that the population living on the right-hand bank of the Zepa river took to the mountains. But quite simply, I don't have enough information. I don't know whether this happened specifically on the 14th or in the days that followed.

Q. Please, can you tell us, was it easy to find these people who took refuge from the right-hand river-bank, as you said, later on after the 14th and can you briefly describe for the Trial Chamber how these refugee places looked like, what was the terrain like, and what you know about that?

A. As far as I know, the people from the right river-bank mainly went to the Zepa mountain which is to the north of the centre of Zepa. Whether up there they had some shelters or any other facilities I don't know because I didn't go there at the time. It is possible that somebody had some shelters, but apart from very few houses or small houses up there, there was nothing else where people could be accommodated and living normally. I assume that the majority of the population initially, if they had relatives on the other side, went there first, and then right before the fall of the Zepa they went to the mountain.

Q. I'm going to remind you of paragraph 6 in the statement you gave, in which you say the following in line 2:

"In the spring of 1993, the local peasant provided shelter to refugees. Later on, we were able to build wooden houses for those who didn't have any places of residence. This was done in the area which used to be an urban zone before the war."

If you remember your statement, I would like you to confirm ⁴⁶⁷⁵ whether it's correct or not.

A. Yes, it's correct.

Q. Did you build these kind of houses on the Zepa mountain?

A. I cannot say that generally yes we did. There may have been some facilities that were built, but most of them were built in the urban quarters of Zepa, or rather, in the areas where there were already settlements or farm-houses. I cannot say because I cannot remember whether there were any such facilities, but, as I said, as far as I can remember, most of these houses were built in the built-up part of Zepa.

Q. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer -- okay. Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Witness, please tell us: What were the characteristic features of the terrain in the area? Were there any natural features or any elevations or anything of that sort?

A. As far as I can remember, that was a mountain plateau and some areas were wooded where there were tall trees and there was also a portion barren without any vegetation used by the people of Zepa to work the land, or rather, they cut the grass there so that this mountain plateau which was at an altitude of perhaps some or almost 1.000 metres from the centre of Zepa. It was very rugged terrain and difficult to reach. There was a road but people could not use their cars because there was no fuel at the time to get there. They actually used mountain ⁴⁶⁷⁶ paths and they walked up there. It was not very far in geographic terms, but it was difficult to actually climb up to the plateau.

Q. [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. For the record, my question was: How long would it take you to get from the centre of Zepa to the plateau?

A. Well, I think it was probably at about an hour that you needed. Of course for a person who was fit, physically fit, because it was rather steep terrain, maybe it would take you a bit shorter. But approximately it would take about an hour of very arduous climbing.

Q. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 1D258 in e-court, 1D258. This is a document that we hope to get. Now we have it.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. This is a document sent to Zepa War Presidency, Mr. Mehmed Hajric, by Brigadier-General Fikret Muslimovic. He was one of the chiefs of departments in the Main Staff of the BH army. We see it says there Brigadier-General Fikret Muslimovic, the press centre of the BH army and he title of the document is: "Suggestions for radio interview with international journalists in Germany." Could we please now pull the document up a little bit. We see that it is entitled "Suggestions." Now, if you would care to peruse this document so I can put some questions to you. It says: "In the free Zepa area today there is no house or apartment where ⁴⁶⁷⁷ Serbs lived up to the war, and therefore there are no Serbs living here. The aggressor's army cannot justify its actions as being aimed at liberating somebody. Its military operation aims exclusively at destroying the Bosniak Muslims.

"2. The UN and NATO cannot justify their inaction by claiming that their UNPROFOR soldiers are under threat, since they are among our people and have no physical contact with ...

"3. Ask for NATO strikes at specific targets of the aggressor - the artillery and armoured equipment with an indication of specific types and locations.

"4. Ask for deliveries by air of food, medicines, medical supplies, clothes, and footwear."

And now could we move to page 2. Thank you. Thank you. We see now page 2 and I won't read it. Perhaps you can read it to yourself. I just want to refer you to the portion where he says what is to be avoided.

Could we also pull up page 2 in English, please.

[Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. We see a subtitle where it says: "Things that should be avoided at all costs."

And then under 1: "Do not mention the military formations in Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde ..." ⁴⁶⁷⁸ Under number 2:

"Claim that everything that is done in the area by the army is done by the people."

And 3: "Do not mention any kind of evacuation under any circumstances." I will stop here and my question is: These instructions, were they bounding for all those who had contacts with representatives of the international community or the press and who communicated with the media because this is -- this has the form of instructions?

A. As far as I can recall, there were no official instructions relating to those contacts, and in any case we did not really have occasion to be in contact with anyone much. This is the first time that I see this document, I'm not familiar with it, and I really can't comment really on it. This was at about the time at hand the situation -- the overall situation was as represented here. Mr. Hajric was probably instructed what to say and these were bullet points which he was supposed to used for those interviews. I don't know exactly when that was supposed to be. And really, I can't comment on it. These three points that are particularly stressed that should be avoided at all costs, generally speaking as I explained during my testimony, the level of military organisation and whether you could actually call it true military organisation, at least what we had in Zepa, from this second paragraph the suggestion here is that we shouldn't use the word "army," but that the people are mounting a defence. As for the third one, I really can't say anything. I understand the first two because I know ⁴⁶⁷⁹ what the situation was like at the time.

Q. Thank you. As a person who was the liaison person for UNPROFOR, were you supposed to -- were you bound by these instructions and were you supposed to act in accordance with them?

A. Well, I can't really recall that there were any special instructions, that there was anything we should specifically bear in mind because the UNPROFOR was on the ground and they were aware of the situation. And as far as they were concerned, these instructions were really quite unnecessary.

Q. Thank you. Could you tell us then why the army commands here suggest that you should actually cover up the activities that are conducted within the enclaves that were supposed to be demilitarised?

A. Well, yes, that's what that is a reference to.

Q. Thank you. Could you tell us whether in reality the War Presidency and others did, in fact, conceal the fact that there was military presence in Zepa from the media?

A. Well, I can't really recall. Most of this communication -- most of these communications were actually done by the people at the top, and whether they described the situation as it -- really it was or not, I really don't know. We didn't have any communications with the CNN or the BBC or whatever. We had no means of communication, so that I don't remember that there were any such interviews. So these instructions probably were meant for those who had the technical facilities to actually convey the information about the situation in Zepa, but we did not have them. ⁴⁶⁸⁰

Q. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document so that we can move on to document 1D260. Thank you.

[Trial Chamber confers]

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you know the procedure of this Chamber. The witness didn't identify this document. He was not in the position to comment on the content, even not about similar orders from the centre in Sarajevo, about presence of journalists in Zepa. So that I think for this witness this document can't be admitted. We will mark it for identification and you should think about tendering it with another witness. It will be marked for identification.

THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D258 would be Exhibit D104 marked for identification.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please carry on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Could we now please pull up 1D260. Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. This is a letter sent from Avdo Palic, the commander of the Zepa Brigade, and we see now the English version, sent to Brigadier Asim Dzambasovic on the 16th of July, 1995. I would like to refer you to line 10 where it says "UNPROFOR":

"We are disarming UNPROFOR in accordance with the directive received earlier."

What directives is Avdo Palic referring here to and who was it who issued those directives to disarm UNPROFOR? ⁴⁶⁸¹

A. I think I've already mentioned this in my earlier testimony because it was mentioned in one of the other documents that were put to me. As you know - and I've said this on numerous occasions - I did not have access to any of these documents, so I can neither confirm nor deny that there were indeed some activities undertaken. I don't know. But -- so I can only speculate whether Avdo Palic was the one who actually developed that plan to disarm UNPROFOR, but in any case I don't know that it ever actually happened that anything was -- any steps were taken to disarm UNPROFOR that were later then taken over by the BH Army. That's all I can say about this document.

Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us who this document was sent to. It says:

"Please forward this urgently to Dr. Heljic!!" Do you know, and perhaps you can tell us who Dr. Heljic was and did the directive perhaps come from him because he was communicating with him?

A. Well, officially this document was sent to Brigadier Asim Dzambasovic personal, and then there is the remark and the request to forward it to Dr. Heljic. Dr. Heljic was a man from Zepa, a local man who lived and worked in Sarajevo and he organised the activities to help Zepa in Sarajevo. So in a way he was the Zepa point man in Sarajevo. So that's about it. I believe that Dr. Heljic still resides in Sarajevo. He is a professor at the medical school of the Sarajevo University, and Avdo, I know that, had direct contacts with Becir. That's all I can say. ⁴⁶⁸²

Q. Thank you. Since military questions are discussed here, did Becir have any military role in the Sarajevo government or within the Presidency?

A. As far as I know, he did not have any official functions, either in the government or the Presidency of the then-Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Q. Thank you. Was there a club or a caucus -- a Zepa caucus or a club within the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo and did he have any role in that?

A. Yes, I do -- it does seem to ring a bell. I think there was something called a club of people from Zepa, and it was actually a club where people from Zepa came. They conducted certain activities in order to try and collect some aid for Zepa and they were actually trying to organise assistance for Zepa. Now, whether this was some -- whether the work entailed publishing information about the situation in Zepa in the press or some other activities -- but in any case the president of that -- the club of the people from Zepa was the professor, the university professor, Dr. Heljic that we were discussing.

Q. I'm waiting for the transcript. Let's move to the next group of questions.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, before you do that, I would like to ask the witness if he has any explanation what the following sentence in this document we have on the screen means. Just a moment. The third paragraph from the bottom:

"I received certain instructions earlier from you ... everything ⁴⁶⁸³ is going according to plan."

Have you any explanation for such a sentence which should be forwarded to Dr. Heljic?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Obviously -- well, I will try to put together an explanation. Obviously this was not their first contact between the two men. There is mention made here of certain instructions I'm not familiar with, but apparently Avdo was supposed to follow the plan. I don't know how though. It seems that there had been earlier contacts where Avdo or Colonel Palic received certain instructions and he is now saying that everything is going according to plan.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Mr. Tolimir.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Whatever that means.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have D260 admitted into evidence.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before we do that --

JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] I would like to ask the Defence to -- I would like to ask the Defence to give me just a few minutes to figure something out. Before the document is admitted into file, I would like to ask a question.

Sir, this document seems to be a telegram. There is no signature. We don't know if it's an original or a copy. What can you tell us about it? Is it normal to have a document without a signature? Was this something that was regular practice at the time?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All documents which were sent or ⁴⁶⁸⁴ received by the communications centre in Zepa do not have a signature. None of them could have a signature because they used the following principle in terms of that communication. A text is typed out as if in a computer, and then it is encrypted and sent by radio communication to reception point where they print out the received encrypted message without the code. So this is not an original, hence it cannot be signed. No sent or received document by the centre in Zepa can have an original signature.

JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document will be received.

THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D105.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Q. In the transcript of the 24th of August, this year, at page 4343, line 19, to page 4344, line 5, you said the following, and I quote: "The attack continued. The lines of defence did not move. As far as I recall, as long as the 19th of July, 1995, the situation remained as such. On that day the Serb attack ceased. There was a lull. What followed was a new imitation through UNPROFOR to conduct talks at check-point 2 in Boksanica. I want to point out another thing. At that time, we had frequent contacts with the military and political leadership in Sarajevo. We never received a clear answer as to what needed to be done to preserve Zepa. That is why we realised that it was all up to us and that we were left to our own devices. There was no other way out, no other possibility. There was no one we could expect help from." ⁴⁶⁸⁵ First of all, have I quoted you correctly?

A. Yes, you have.

Q. Based on what I have just read out, can you tell us who you were in contact with when you say the political and military leadership and what answers or responses did you receive in Zepa from Sarajevo and Kakanj?

A. What I said has to do with the information I received verbally from individual members of the War Presidency. This did not happen frequently, though. Until or before the 19th of July, I never directly communicated with either Sarajevo or Kakanj. What I said here is based on the information I received from other War Presidency members which I occasionally received either by directly contacting them or by way of information which eventually reached me. Before the 19th I was never in direct contact with Sarajevo.

Q. Thank you. The next question: In the quote you say that you never received a clear answer of Sarajevo. Can you clarify this for us?

A. In such a situation a clear answer to us would mean knowing what was supposed to have been done either to defend Zepa to avoid its fall or what the people were supposed to have been doing once Zepa fell. So whether Zepa could be assisted militarily so as to avoid its fall, whether it would be done by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina doing some specific things, or another response could have been: The army's unable to help you but NATO will intervene in order to stop the Serbs from carrying out their attacks. This could have been one of the answers we expected, although we were quite aware that both these outcomes were ⁴⁶⁸⁶ unrealistic at the time; hence, the question of what needed to be done after Zepa fell remained. For example, that the civilians be brought to the centre of Zepa and what had to be done with the soldiers. That would have been a clear answer which we had not received.

Q. Thank you. [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Given that an order arrived from Sarajevo to the War Presidency to put up resistance and to defend Zepa at any cost and that the War Presidency also carried out the general mobilisation, did you not expect an answer from them on how exactly to put up your defence, given that there was a disbalance of forces? Was that also an answer you awaited?

A. Well, most probably. I don't know whether it was openly discussed with the military leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it was clear to all of us - and I seem to be repeating myself - that in military terms it was only a matter of time when Zepa would fall. It was only a matter of time for how long we could defend ourselves because it was clear to all of us that it was impossible to defend it for a lengthy period. As for the rest of the communication with the military leadership, some of it I wasn't aware of, for example these documents I see for the first time. They seem to have this standard non-committal approach of: Yes, do go on fighting, et cetera. But it was clear to us that in military terms we could not defend ourselves without help from elsewhere. ⁴⁶⁸⁷

Q. In the transcript of the 24th of August, at page 2021 --

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 2010.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. -- to page 6352, line 2, you say the following -- it is page 4351, line 24, actually. I quote:

"I wanted to stress yet again that in Zepa at that time, especially after the 20th, staying in Zepa was not a realistic option and no one took it seriously. We were all aware that Zepa had to be evacuated."

Based on what you said, please clarify, did you consider the issue of remaining in Zepa before the 20th or after the 20th at any level, be it inside the enclave or in Sarajevo where the central authorities were, and was it considered as a realistic option?

A. You quoted my words. Concerning the activities in Zepa, I repeat, I was not familiar with that. Perhaps I was in the margins when it came to that. I am also unaware of any instructions by the political authorities in Sarajevo. In any case, on the 19th and the 20th, the situation was very tense, difficult, it was a war time situation. And as far as I know - and I stand by what I said previously - the situation was such that no one considered the possibility of remaining in Zepa any longer.

Q. Thank you. In your statement and in your testimony today and earlier, you said on a number of occasions the following. I quote: "The only true support we could have hoped for was that the international community ordered the Serbs to stop. It was only a matter ⁴⁶⁸⁸ of time when Zepa would fall. We wanted to have a decision made on how to resolve the situation."

This is directly connected to my previous question. Did Sarajevo have in mind such a realistic assessment of the situation as you did, and did you ever discuss that with anyone from the army or the state leadership?

A. I did not attend any such discussions where this was said. Whether it was clear to those in the political and military circles in Sarajevo is something that is difficult to say, but logically speaking it should have occurred to me, especially after the fall of Srebrenica which had six times more inhabitants as well as fighters. From the military point of view, Zepa could not defend itself. Such discussions where I was present, for example, with Mr. Alija Izetbegovic on two occasions, did not have that on the agenda. We discussed operational things which had to do with the current situation. When I say that, I have in mind the discussions after the 19th and the 24th of July. We discussed then if we surrendered what the Serbs would do, et cetera. I believe I referred to some such documents in my previous testimony.

Q. Thank you. Were you ever promised any assistance? You were told to defend yourselves, but were you ever promised any assistance by the state leadership which told you to put up a fight?

A. I'm not certain whether Mr. Palic received some instructions or promises of help, and even if he had, I don't know what those promises could have entailed. At least in the direct contacts I had, which was rather late, I never had anything promised to me on what would be done to ⁴⁶⁸⁹ help Zepa. Although, as I say, I don't know whether Colonel Palic did have some promises made to him. This is a military matter.

Q. Thank you. Why did you interrupt the talks between the 13th and the 19th, when they were again picked up by Mladic over the phone? Was it because you received some other instructions from Sarajevo or were you hoping for some international assistance? Did you interrupt the talks we initiated on the 13th for that reason?

A. All I can say is that that was not a sole reason. It might be a combination of two things. One was a negative reply from Sarajevo on the one hand, and on the other, there was fear of whether everything was going to happen as it had been presented in the document that you have shown us, that is, the report of the 13th of July from Boksanica. I believe from that point on the 13th, these two issues were combined. As I said, there was fear and it was further enhanced by the document that came from Sarajevo. So this is how I perceived the situation in Zepa on the 13th.

Q. Thank you. Can we please have on our screens your statement. Can I have the number, please. It's 1D248. And let's go to page 6, paragraph 4, lines 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13th, that is to say from line 8 through to line 13th. So page 6, fourth paragraph, and that's actually the end of that paragraph, the last five lines.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think this document should not be broadcast for the sake of the safety of the witness.

Please carry on. ⁴⁶⁹⁰

THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. But on this specific page there is no mention of the witness's name or any activities that he was involved.

Can we please look at page 6, paragraph 4, and we have seen this page before.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: There seems to be no reason not to broadcast it. Please carry on.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Can you please look at the fourth paragraph which begins: "At that time ..."

And I'm going to read the last sentences: "The only support that we could have hoped was for the international community to order the Serbs to stop. It was only a matter of time when the fall would occur. We wanted to have enough time on the decision how to resolve the situation."

That's the next page in English. "Our concern was how to have the population get out from the area alive. I was very much aware that Zepa would fall."

Thank you. Have I cited this correctly, what you said on page 6?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, my next question is: Did you know about this or did the War Presidency have this kind of assessment prior to the talks with ⁴⁶⁹¹ General Mladic that would follow at Boksanica?

A. Yes, we did. Yes. My answer is: Yes.

Q. Thank you. At the time, was the only concern of the War Presidency how to get the population out alive?

A. Let me just add that when I say "the population" in this specific context, I include the able-bodied persons as well.

Q. So the entire population?

A. Yes, the entire population.

Q. Let us now move to the topic of the talks with Mladic that you and Palic conducted over the phone. You remember that, that you talked with General Mladic on the phone?

A. That was erased from my memory, but after I have seen the footage provided by the Prosecution, I remember that Avdo and I were there. And I also think that Dr. Benjamin Kulovac was present too. So at least the three of us were there. There may have been someone from the War Presidency as well, but I can confirm that in the communications centre of UNPROFOR in Zepa the three of us were present there.

Q. Thank you. I'm not going to ask you about the contents of the talks because it is hard to remember. All I'm asking you is: How did it come about that an agreement was reached and that you came for a new round of talks again? Was that decision made by the War Presidency?

A. I believe so. I think that the majority of War Presidency members came who were physically able to come, and we contemplated this idea even before, that is to say what to do under the circumstances. And I would say that that is a follow-up of the answer that I gave in the ⁴⁶⁹² statement that you quoted. If my memory serves me well, suddenly the stops and the shelling stopped on the 19th, and a kind of eerie silence set in. This was followed by an invitation of UNPROFOR to come and hold talks. I don't know whether General Mladic or you or some other officers from the Army of Republika Srpska were mentioned in that context.

Q. Thank you. Please, can you tell us, before you arrived at Boksanica to have talks with Mladic, did the War Presidency authorise you to negotiate the evacuation of the entire population and the entire army?

A. I clearly remember that as far as the civilian population was concerned, we already knew at that point that there was no other way out. However, as far as the military is concerned I would like to say that at that time there was no authority capable of, for example, ordering every single soldier to go and surrender themselves to UNPROFOR, and least of all to the Army of Republika Srpska. I'm talking about any authority, not in Zepa alone, but in Bosnia in general because that was a struggle to survive because people believed once they surrendered themselves to the Serbs they wouldn't survive. That is how it was. We had already agreed to try and to make arrangements for the civilian population to get out and then to see how to resolve the issue of able-bodied men. I don't know and I don't remember whether before the 19th any talks were being held with Sarajevo concerning the exchange which later featured in all these talks that involved the exchange of all captured Serbian soldier for the able-bodied men of Zepa or if that idea maybe came up after the talks held on the 19th of July. So on the 19th, we already had an agreement among ourselves to try and reach an agreement with the other ⁴⁶⁹³ side concerning the evacuation of civilians. And as for the military, we wanted to wait to see how the Serbian side perceived that matter. And I would like to say that on that day when we went to attend these negotiations, the defence lines in Zepa were still stable, that is to say that none of the key points had fallen.

Q. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now look at the footage that we saw on the 24th of July of this year, this is 06417, page 13.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before we do that, Judge Nyambe would like to put a question to the witness.

JUDGE NYAMBE: I think in view of the question that the accused wants to put, maybe I better wait. I might have my answer in the footage.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think that would take some time to deal with this footage. We must have our second break now and come back to that topic.

We adjourn and resume quarter past 6.00.

--- Recess taken at 5.47 p.m.

--- On resuming at 6.18 p.m.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Since we have little time left, I would like this video footage to be played immediately. There are two segments in it, and then based on that I'm going to ask the witness a number of questions. Therefore, can we please ⁴⁶⁹⁴ have the transcript of the video that we saw on the 24th of July, this year, that's 65 ter 06417, page 3 -- 13, and this conversation took place at a meeting of the 19th of July, 1995, in Zepa. Thank you. Can we please play the video.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The booths do not have the transcript of the audio recording that accompanies the video.

[Video-clip played]

JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I ask you, Mr. Tolimir, what is the purpose to see that again? We have seen it with this witness already and we know about that. I think it -- my question is only how to use the court time. What is the purpose of this?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to see the original statements by those who participated in this conversation, and then I'm going to ask some questions regarding that.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: But you can't hear any original statement on that video. This is a problem. If you want to see the transcript, you should call up the transcript rather than the video.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Last time we saw this video. This is Prosecutor's number 06417, but there is no sound. I don't know what the problem is.

Because when we saw this footage before, there was sound. No sound.

Obviously this is worthless because we have these technical problems. We're going to show this material tomorrow. I'm going to ask the questions now and I hope that the witness will be able to see it ⁴⁶⁹⁵ tomorrow if we cannot see it now.

MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, all these video-clips are perfectly operable on all the computers, especially this one. So last night I spent nearly an hour checking each and every frame. Obviously there is something wrong with the sound system in this courtroom.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: That may be the case, especially because we had some technical problems at the outset of today's hearing, but it's not worth to continue with this video without sound, I think. Please discuss the problem with your client.

[Defence counsel confer]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I have already proposed that we postpone the viewing for tomorrow. I will put a few questions to the witness, hoping that he will be able to recall some of the things in the footage, and by tomorrow we hope to have it right.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before you do that, Mr. Thayer.

MR. THAYER: Mr. President, we can throw the dice a little bit and try to play it off of the CD that we had to resort to in the Prosecution's examination-in-chief. We encountered some similar audibility problems and then we regained it when we ran it off the CD. So if we have the times or if someone can give us the times, Ms. Stewart can try to run it off the CD right now and see how that works.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: I recall that at the beginning of your -- or during your examination-in-chief, we had really the same problems.

MR. THAYER: Precisely. ⁴⁶⁹⁶

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, Mr. Gajic, would you accept this proposal by Mr. Thayer?

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. If we could go straight ahead, then that is fine. Otherwise I'll be left with less than 30 minutes. Perhaps I may be allowed to continue with the questions and once we have it in court, we'll view the footage.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues]... proposal you should proceed like that.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Do you recall the beginning of the conversation when you and Kulovac arrived at the location to General Mladic, escorted by the man with a moustache?

A. Yes. It refreshed my memory to see the footage a few days ago.

Q. Kulovac said that you were his senior. I don't know whether this should be broadcast publicly, but were you indeed Kulovac's senior in terms of position?

A. Well, I'm trying to recall what his position was. He was also a War Presidency member. In terms of hierarchy at that moment, it was so; however, one must bear in mind that Mr. Kulovac was a local and he had more influence over the local population, irrespective of my position which may have seemed senior.

Q. Thank you. When you viewed the footage, do you recall Kulovac saying first, and I quote:

"We decided that the entire population leave Zepa." That was at the very beginning. ⁴⁶⁹⁷

A. Well, looking at the subtitles, you seem to be right.

Q. Then in the 26th minute of the footage, following his remark about hierarchy, you say that you had agreed that the entire population should leave Zepa?

A. I think that's what it says. If I did say that, then that's the case.

Q. Following that, when you said that, General Mladic slowly, without any pressure, addressed you. He was explaining the sequence of the evacuation. Do you recall that from the footage?

A. Yes. Whatever's in the footage is what happened. There's nothing to add or take away. You can hear it clearly.

Q. I'm only interested in this: Did both you and Kulovac arrive there with the position accorded to you by the War Presidency?

A. Yes, this was arranged before our departure from Zepa and it refreshed my memory to see the footage and remember all the details.

Q. Can we take this decision as a serious one, since you presented it as the people representing their population in the talks, or was it just a ploy or a tactical move?

A. This was no tactical move when we're discussing civilians. We were, however, interested in the other category, which is the able-bodied men. Our position was that the evacuation of civilians should take place. As for the surrender of the army, I think I saw Benjamin say that we had agreed on something, although I think that at that point in time the situation of surrender was not clearly decided upon.

Q. Can you tell the Chamber what it was that Benjamin said that you ⁴⁶⁹⁸ referred to?

A. As far as I could read the English subtitles -- well, of course this can be checked. I think General Mladic asked that the army surrender, and I think Benjamin said something to the effect, "Yes, they will." But before I comment on anything further, I want to see the footage with the audio, so as to be able to recognise the voices.

Q. Could we next have 1D273, which is the transcript of the video, since it is of importance.

[Video-clip played]

THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated] [Interpretation] Could we please have the transcript 1D273. We have it now.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Since we don't have it in English, I will read out the Serb version. Ratko Mladic is asking those present:

"Is there anyone who wishes to stay?" Benjamin Kulovac says:

"This is what I wanted to tell you, there are some interested in staying."

Benjamin Kulovac says: "What we know for now is that this includes about ten whole families; however, I personally think that that number could be even greater."

Ratko Mladic says: "Are you ready to surrender your weapons?" ⁴⁶⁹⁹ Benjamin Kulovac says:

"Yes, we are."

[Microphone not activated]

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. I think this was the part of the conversation you wanted to see to comment. Could you please now comment on Benjamin's statement when he says "yes, we are," he obviously meant both the civilians and the army.

A. The first part of the conversation between General Ratko Mladic and Mr. Benjamin Kulovac about those who wished to stay -- well, I don't know whether Benjamin told me anything about that before the meeting, but obviously an option was considered for some to stay. As for the surrender of weapons, to tell you the truth I do remember that, or rather, I recall that following the footage being shown last week. I cannot remember, though, that anything was specifically arranged in Zepa about the army being willing to surrender their weapons. This could not have been decided upon without Colonel Palic. Otherwise, whatever we said would be worthless.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I was told that the video would now be ready to be played with audio, but perhaps it's too late now to start with that.

Mr. Gajic.

[Defence counsel confer]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. My assistant is telling me that it will only take half a minute or a minute, ⁴⁷⁰⁰ but before that, I have another question of the witness.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. Given that this was uttered by one of those participating in the talks when he answered Mladic's question, he said, "Yes, we are ready." Then was it not reasonable of Mladic to ask later on that the weapons be surrendered in the sequence of events?

A. Well, one would think so.

Q. Thank you, sir. We will now see the footage.

[Video-clip played]

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. We heard Benjamin say, "Yes, we are ready." Based on what we saw and what we heard from the transcript, was it not a clear indication to the other side, to Mr. Mladic, of the willingness of your Presidency to surrender weapons?

A. Yes, although, as I tell you, I don't remember having made that decision back in Zepa prior to meeting. Of course I speak from memory, but if one of the people officially participating in the talks said that, then that must have been the position.

Q. Tomorrow, since we'll have more time, we'll see the rest of that footage and we will see that General Mladic calmly - at times even quietly - speaks of the plan for the surrender of weapons and departure of civilians. He was addressing the sequence of the procedure which was then put into the agreement; is that correct?

A. Yes, it is -- well, perhaps we should wait to see the sequence ⁴⁷⁰¹ tomorrow, but as far as I remember and from what I could see in the footage, this was so.

Q. Thank you. Was Benjamin pressured in any way to say that it was decided that everyone should leave and that the army should surrender their weapons or was it simply not an answer of his to a very simple question?

A. As regards the civilian population, there was a clear arrangement and a clear decision. As for the weapons, I have to put a hedge. As I said, I don't remember any prior arrangements for the surrender of weapons. To tell you yet again, there was no authority in Zepa which could have secured the implementation of such a decision.

Q. Thank you. We still see the footage and General Mladic asked, "Are you ready to surrender your weapons?"

And Benjamin Kulovac said: "Yes, we are."

Was there any pressure put on Mr. Kulovac or was he completely free to say that?

A. Well, you can all see it in the footage. There's nothing for me to say. It is as it is. What does it mean, "pressure"? The whole situation is -- amounts to pressure.

Q. Well, I did not have that in mind. During examination-in-chief, there were implications that you had to sign the agreement under pressure, but here we see him saying that the army was ready to hand-over weapons. It means that they were accepting the conditions of surrender and it was only logical that Mladic would spell out the sequence of ⁴⁷⁰² events following that and the movement through the territory of the RS.

A. Well, yes, that was the basis for what followed.

Q. Thank you. Could we please have in e-court your statement which is 1D248, page 8, paragraph 1, lines 4 and 5. Paragraph 1, lines 4 and 5, page 8 of your statement in the Serbian. This is the English one. I will quote:

"Then I returned to Zepa where we agreed that we should start with the evacuation of civilians."

That is in the first paragraph. "Then we returned to Zepa where we agreed that we should start the evacuation. In the meantime, the Serbs attacked again," et cetera, et cetera.

"However, we were unable to contact them any further through UNPROFOR."

A. What paragraph?

Q. The first paragraph. "Then I returned to Zepa, where we agreed that we should start with the evacuation."

The same is in the English version.

A. I found it. I read it.

Q. Yes. "At the check-point, the Serbs had asked me to get in touch with Avdo Palic to stop our alleged provocations. However, I could not make contact with him with the UNPROFOR communication." ⁴⁷⁰³ Have I quoted this correctly?

A. You have.

Q. My question is this then: Did anyone among the members of the War Presidency object to the plan of evacuation? You, yourself, say that on your return you agreed to start the evacuation the next day. Was there anyone in the War Presidency who was against it?

A. No. I do have a remark, though. May I continue? The footage and this part of my statement do not correspond. The footage reflects the first meeting with General Mladic on the 19th of July, whereas this part of the statement is about the meeting I attended alone, when the agreement was signed on the 24th. I don't know whether you're making a direct link between the two or are these two things completely apart? So the footage is the meeting of the 19th of July where Benjamin Kulovac was present as well on the Bosnian side. And this part of the statement you quoted has to do with the events following my arrival at the meeting alone when the agreement was signed on the 24th, that is to say five days later. This is just what I wanted to tell you.

Q. This is exactly what I wanted to ask you. Both on the 19th and on the 24th, you on the War Presidency had this decision ready made that you mention in the statement, that is to say that we had agreed to start evacuation; is that correct?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. So was there any pressure on both meetings vis-a-vis evacuation if you already had adopted that position?

A. I'm talking about the evacuation of the civilian population, and ⁴⁷⁰⁴ we reached a decision on that only. And in that respect there was no pressure. I mean, the whole situation was totally clear to us and that is what we agreed in Zepa.

Q. Thank you. We are going to talk about this issue of civilian population. In paragraph 2, line 2, you say:

"During the night of the 24th and 25th July, we informed the population about the agreement that we had reached. As the hospital with those who were seriously wounded were not in the centre of Zepa, we went to prepare them for the evacuation. On the morning of the 25th of July, the Serb representatives, headed by Tolimir, came to the centre of Zepa. He was accompanied by some low-ranking officers. I do remember that ICRC representatives also arrived at Zepa to monitor the evacuation. I believe there were some French UNPROFOR officers arriving as well. At the meeting that morning we agreed on the technical issues regarding the evacuation."

Have I quoted this correctly?

A. Yes, you have.

Q. Tell me, was there any resistance on the part of the population when you informed them on the night between the 24th and the 25th about the evacuation and how they reacted?

A. I personally did not take part in this process, therefore I cannot offer you any details. All I can tell you is I can describe the atmosphere that prevailed and I testified to that earlier. People were afraid, bordering on panic, and I believe that the first day of evacuation, the number -- or actually, this began rather cautiously, ⁴⁷⁰⁵ which means that a relatively small number of the inhabitants of Zepa were evacuated on that day. Later, after we had received some feedback information to the effect that the convoys had reached their destination without any problems, on the second day the majority of the population came to the centre of Zepa.

Q. Thank you. You already answered the question that I wanted to ask you. So once the wounded had arrived, the certainty became stronger and it demonstrated that the Serbian side had fulfilled their obligation concerning the wounded?

A. Yes. I already responded to that question. As I told you, the following day, that is, on the 26th of July, a large number of Zepa residents arrived.

Q. On the 26th of July, the inhabitants gathered in Zepa, whereas the soldiers were leaving Zepa and going to Mount Zepa. Is that correct interpretation of the situation?

A. Yes, precisely. Quite a few members of the military also came to the centre of Zepa to see their families off.

Q. Thank you. Speaking about this particular issue, was this evacuation organised and were the lists compiled by members of the War Presidency and others who were helping Zepa without any interference from the Army of Republika Srpska? They were only there to guarantee with their presence their safety; is that correct?

A. Yes, these lists were compiled by representatives of Zepa. I don't know. Mehmed Hajric was involved in that process for a period of time, if I remember correctly. ⁴⁷⁰⁶

Q. Yes, you remember correctly. There was Mehmed Hajric and there was civilian defence representative Mr. Imamovic. Now, was anyone removed from the bus transporting the civilians from Zepa to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that included the wounded? Was anyone taken off the buses?

A. Not up until that time, and there was no harassment either. And the last bus had about 40 people on board.

Q. Thank you. Can you please look at page 8 now, the fifth paragraph, line 5.

A. Paragraph 5, line 5.

Q. We can see it now. Can you read it? This is in this long paragraph which begins: "In Zepa ...," and it says here Mladic was quite benevolent towards me. Do you see that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Is that how you felt about Mladic's attitude towards you throughout your stay?

A. Well, I mentioned that on several occasions and in a number of my testimonies.

Q. Does that mean that he did not exert any pressure on you, as was stated in examination-in-chief? Was he fair?

A. I explained that all the way through to the afternoon of the 27th of July, his attitude was fair, there was no pressure in terms of surrender of the military and the like.

Q. Thank you. We are going to continue tomorrow our conversation about this subject that you mentioned involving these buses and your ⁴⁷⁰⁷ arrest. I would only like to accentuate what was relevant.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see 1D277. It's a letter written by Alija Izetbegovic to Efendi Mehmed Hajric. Thank you.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Q. We shall have enough time just to look at this document, and this is what he says Mehmed Hajric, the president of the War Presidency, in this letter. And I quote:

"After today's letter signed by Hajric and Palic, I believe that we must prepare a plan for the withdrawal from Zepa. The plan shall be a reserve option. The first option is to continue the resistance, and the moment when this is going to be implemented will depend on the development of the situation, but nevertheless the plan has to be in place. We must try to save the people and the army if possible. The withdrawal should be conducted in an organised manner and the only way is to use the paths through the forest that we used before for communications. The pullout plan, pending your approval, shall be made by Commander Palic. There should be several groups. Elements of the army should remain on positions and some should accompany the column. Dr. Heljic believes that about 10 per cent of the population will stay behind because they did not want or were unable to leave. I propose that UNPROFOR remains with them as a sort of protection. From our side, from the direction of Kladanj, they should be met by elements of the military equalling a brigade, the 1st Podrinje Brigade, if possible. We would need good guides for both sides."

And they are mentioning here Nuno Krluc and Cardakovic on our ⁴⁷⁰⁸ side, and Palic will know who to choose from their side. But we would need a number of them.

"It seems that this is a matter of hours, not days, unless this is an issue of psychology, please tell me urgent what you think. "The people of Zepa, Dr. Heljic and others, are offering to come there to help you with the implementation of the plan. I think that they can be of assistance, particularly with receiving about 5- to 6.000 people.

"I pray to God that we will manage to defend Zepa and that this plan will not remain on paper only."

My next question based on this letter is: Does this letter speak about a peaceful solution or does this describe a plan for the breakthrough to be made by the army and about the army securing the column? And were you familiar and aware of this letter at the time when all of this was happening?

A. As I see this letter, it reflects total ignorance about the situation that prevailed in Zepa at the moment. Secondly, I heard about this letter from the president of the Presidency, which means that I didn't have an opportunity to actually read it. And I think that the joint position of the War Presidency was that this was unfeasible, that this plan could not be implemented, and that we shouldn't do any -- anything further along the lines of these instructions or whatever you prefer to call them. Because to try to make a breakthrough and to pullout people from Zepa, I think that was an impossible mission at that point in time. ⁴⁷⁰⁹

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Thayer, before you get the floor, this letter seems to be from the 18th of July, 1995, what we can see on this document on the bottom.

Mr. Thayer.

MR. THAYER: Just a quick clarification, Mr. President. At line 12 of page 79, the transcript reflects the following in the answer: "Secondly, I heard about this letter from the president of the Presidency, which means that I didn't have an opportunity to actually read it."

I just want to make sure we're using the precise terms. We have the president of the Presidency, Mr. Izetbegovic, sitting in Sarajevo; we have the president of the War Presidency, Mr. Hajric, in Zepa. I just want to make sure we understand which president we're talking about here. That's all.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Would you please clarify.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I wasn't precise. I was referring to the president of the War Presidency of Zepa, Mr. Mehmed Hajric. So this is what I heard from him, that there was some kind of instruction that came from Sarajevo to try and breakthrough along side women and children, et cetera.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. Mr. Tolimir.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.

MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] ⁴⁷¹⁰

Q. This was written on the 18th of July at the time when meetings were being held at the Boksanica check-point; is that correct?

A. The meeting was held on the 19th and this was written on the day before. I don't know when Mr. Mehmed Hajric received it, whether on the same day, the 18th of July, or maybe the next day. But anyway, the document is dated the 18th of July, which is one day before the meeting, the first meeting, with General Mladic.

Q. My question is: You knew -- or did you know about this document that was held on the 20th of July --

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are not sure which date was said.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot be very precise. I cannot rely on my memory because I don't remember having any contacts before the 19th. I know that on the evening of the 19th, after the meeting, just like all the other members of the War Presidency, we all met with the War Presidency president, Mr. Hajric. But obviously this document and the instructions contained therein have not been taken seriously by anyone in Zepa.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, could you perhaps continue tomorrow morning? We have reached the end of today's sitting.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please have 1D277 admitted into evidence, and then later we are going to look at another document which confirms the activities described in this letter.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document will be received -- will be marked ⁴⁷¹¹ for identification pending translation.

THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D106 marked for identification.

THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to thank the witness and the interpreters and everybody who helped, including the Prosecution. The Defence will continue tomorrow and will try to be more efficient. Thank you.

JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. We have to adjourn now, and again you have to come back. But I think more and more we are approaching the end of your evidence. We adjourn and resume tomorrow at 9.00 in Courtroom III.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 1st day of

September, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.