2794 Thursday, 27 May 2010
[The accused entered court]
[The witness takes the stand]
--- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Shall we begin, Mr. Karadzic?
THE ACCUSED: Excuse me, I didn't hear.
JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: Thank you. Thank you.
WITNESS: COLM DOYLE [Resumed]
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning Your Excellencies. Good morning to everybody.
Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
Q. [Interpretation] And good morning to you, too, Colonel.
A. [Interpretation] Good morning.
Q. I wanted to go through some documents speedily and efficaciously, I hope, which the Prosecution offered up and which you provided -- well, into the list. So may I have 65 ter 11036, please, to start off. While we're waiting for that to come up, Colonel, did you have any instructions to be completely unbiased and show respect for all three sides? Was that your brief and the position of your bosses?
A. Well, part of the principle of service with the European Union was always to remain impartial and not to show any bias. So the answer would be yes. 2795
Q. Thank you. Now, we have here your report. Was it written in your own hand?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Thank you. It's dated October, the 15th to the 23rd, 1991; right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. We see here that your team visited Banja Luka, Doboj, Gracanica, Derventa, Srbac, Bosanski Kobas, Slavonski Kobas, Bosanski Brod and Slavonski Brod; right?
Q. May we zoom into the last sentence on the first page, please, where it says it became apparent that the Croatian authorities are using -- well, could you continue reading that, please? It's difficult for me to read your handwriting, and it goes on to the next page. So beginning with "It became apparent."
A. Can we go down, I think.
Q. We need the top of the second page. On the first page it said, "It became apparent that the Croatian authorities are using," and then I can't read further. So the top of the following page, please. Could you continue reading. [No interpretation] or what. [In English] Control, ah, control?
A. "Control of the bridge and the ferry as a political weapon. The following points are listed by the team as general observations. We were made very welcome everywhere. There was a general feeling that the EC must solve the political problem. The political parties distrust of each 2796 other, mainly Croats and Muslims against Serbs without any side indicating a willingness to compromise. Constant reference to each -- a constant reference by each to the past and an almost hysterical fear by Serbs of Croatia's threat. This is countered by the Croatian charge of Serbian intent on creating a Greater Serbia. The Croatians at Slavonski Brod insist they're at war."
Q. [Interpretation] Yes, thank you. We can stop there. We can pause there. I'm going to tell you briefly how in World War II the crimes against the Serb farmers and poor people were justified. It was said that it was the fault of Petar Karadjordjevic, the King, and the blame allegedly was paid -- or the guilt was paid by the Serb peasantry. Now, there is a parallel here. That's what it is.
JUDGE KWON: I'm wondering the relevance of those comments. Put your question.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, here's the question:
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Do you consider that the fear of a Greater Serbia justifies the crimes committed against the Serbian poor people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia?
A. My role here as a member of the EC was to observe and to report and to give an indication of the views that were being expressed by various sides. I don't think it is for me to make any comparison with what may have happened in the Second World War. In fact, I would say here that it was a distinct disadvantage because every time had meetings with people everybody referred back to the atrocities of the war and I 2797 felt if we were to make any progress that we should forget about what happened in the past and concentrate on what was happening in the recent times. So it became my practice that when I would meet a political party, be that as the head of the monitor mission or when I was in places like Banja Luka, that I requested each side, please don't give me a history lesson. That's the last thing we needed.
So I was aware that there was a lot of emphasis back to the war and to what happened in the past and where I thought that these matters which took place then might be a deterrent to this conflict arriving. In fact, it would be my view that it became an excuse.
So, yes, I was aware of what happened in general during the war, but I don't think -- I think because of what happened made our job more difficult.
JUDGE KWON: For the record, if the Court Deputy could tell us what exhibit number this is.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this document was admitted as Exhibit P922.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Thank you, Colonel. Now, under item number 5, you say that the Croats in Slavonski Brod insisted that they are at war. Is that what you say there; right?
A. Yes, I got that impression. That's what they said to me when I met the mayor, when I met the mayor of the town.
Q. Thank you. Can we take a look at page 062, the last digits are 2798 062, of this same document. Page 5 of the document. That's right. You were in Doboj, and you met three people there. You had meetings with three individuals; right?
A. Yes. I met members of the JNA there.
Q. Well, do you notice that this man Hadzic Cazim, did you know he was a Muslim?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Now, later on you received just two, Pavlovic and Hadzic, and they told you a different story, different to what they told you when that third man in the tripod was there. Now, did you notice that when the Serbs and Croats or Muslims saw you alone they would blacken each other, and when they were alone they would tell you a different story?
A. I think you'll have to explain further to me, Mr. Karadzic. Are you referring to it a specific report of mine? And can I have that -- I've got a report here of October the 22nd, and there's no mention of anybody's name here so I am not totally understanding of what you're trying to ask me.
Q. Well, you had a meeting in Doboj. You received together with the military person the president of the municipality and municipal Assembly together with the commander of the army, and the deputy major, or was it mayor, was also there. Is it -- there was a fruitful discussion, you say. Well, perhaps you could read it. Could you continue that. Something was crossed out there, but not crossed out in my copy.
A. Can I ask you, are you referring to a -- a report of October the 22nd? 2799
Q. Yes. Except in my copy nothing has been redacted. Looking at the ELMO and the screen, I see that the names have been redacted. So we'll stick to that. We'll stick to the names being deleted. All I want to say is that you received three individuals here and that you had a discussion, a very proper and correct meeting, and that you spoke about the reservists and -- well, could you read that paragraph, please.
A. "Met with the vice-president of the municipality and Assembly members together with the military garrison commander." The names are blacked out. "There was a fruitful discussion on the fears proposed by the reservists while the military commander followed the official federal argument he did agree that there was a degree of indiscipline and he promise to investigate any future complaints."
Shall I go on?
Q. No, we don't need to. We can move on to the next page, please. And let's look at the second paragraph there. Could you read the second paragraph out where it says Bosanski Brod. It refers to Bosanski Brod.
A. "Met with the mayor and officials of Bosanski Brod and having listened to their points of view on the effects of prohibiting commercial and vehicle traffic over the bridge by the Croats. Proceeded across the bridge by foot to Slavonski Brod and had a discussion with the other side. No progress. The Croats were intransigence and very arrogant. It was obvious that the issue of the bridge is a political weapon of Croatia and we feel progress on the matter cannot be achieved at a local level.
Q. Thank you. May we turn to the next page now, please. This time you met all three leaders here of the religious groups; 2800 right? All the religious leaders?
A. Yes, you'll see there that it was team 3 and 4 which means both teams of the ECMM that was deployed to Banja Luka joined together. This was the last effort we made to try and have a meeting with all three political parties at the one time, and the results of this meeting indicated to me that there was no longer any common ground for the parties, so from that day on, as far as I recall, we met with the parties separately.
Q. Thank you. Now in -- well: "[In English] On the contrary. It was apparent the deep division and the mistrust does not give confidence for a peaceful solution."
[Interpretation] So already at that time you realised that the communities were divided and that there was great mistrust among them, and you even foresaw that it didn't bode well for a peaceful solution; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Thank you. We can move on now. Next page, please. Do you know who lives in Bosanski Kobas?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Well, the population is 90 per cent or thereabouts Muslim settlement, and all around are Serbian villages, and it is a markedly Serbian majority municipality.
A. Well, when I went on these trips, we had -- we had an interpreter who was the person who translated all of the information we were given, and I accepted what that translator was telling me because I don't speak 2801 Serbo-Croat. That interpreter was offered to us by the authorities in Banja Luka. So I could only have found out or I could only have put down what, in fact, I had been told by the interpreter. I assumed he was telling me the truth, but if you say it's completely different to there, then he wasn't telling me the truth, and he was a Serb.
Q. Why do you think he wasn't telling the truth? What makes you say that?
A. Because if you're telling me that the community was over -- overwhelmingly Muslim and I have it down here that it's 98 per cent Serb, I could only have got that information either from something that was told to me by one of the people I met or it was a different interpretation or translation given to me by the interpreter.
Q. Perhaps I wasn't precise enough and clear enough. Srbac as a municipality is 90 per cent Serb, but Bosanski Kobas, a village on the river that you visited, is almost 90 per cent Muslim. Do you remember that?
A. No, I don't, but if that's what you're saying, I accept that.
Q. Thank you, and it's easy to establish. But would you read out the second paragraph, the team?
A. "The team drove along the border between Srbac and Bosanski Kobas. The local people in Kobas had similar concerns as those in Srbac. Passage across the river has been stopped by the Croats," or "Croatians," I have written down here. "The ferry is kept on the far side and is rigged to explode. The team arranged a meeting between both sides having been allowed to cross the river by boat. It was agreed that 2802 the team will meet with Croatian officials at Slavonski Brod on Monday, October the 21st at 1400 hours to discuss the ferry."
Q. Do you agree that you, yourself, noticed that there were these same fears in Srbac and in Bosnian Kobas on the Croatian side; right?
A. Yes, there were fears on both sides. I got the impression at that time, if memory serves me correctly, that the fears were greater on the side that was in Bosnian. The Croats had a different fear, as I recall. The Croats on that occasion referred to some aircraft flying over, and we never saw any evidence of that. But generally most of the places we went to all sides were telling us of the fears they had and the concerns they had in their communities, and that would have been true for -- for all sides.
Q. Thank you. I'd like to say here and then to hear your position, that Bosanski Kobas is almost 100 per cent a Muslim concentration completely surrounded by Serbs. Throughout the war they were safe and secure. They took part in our army. They weren't afraid of the Serbs. What they were afraid of was the Croats across the Sava River; isn't that right?
A. Well, I have no personal knowledge of that.
Q. But they weren't afraid of the Serbs. They didn't say they were afraid of the Serbs from Srbac but that they were afraid of the Croats across the Sava River.
A. Well, you'll have to take the interpretation from -- from that report as it is written. I wrote it based on the experience we had of a team. I don't exactly recall the day. I was in many, many place on 2803 many, many occasions, and I can't vividly remember every single person I met, but I'm satisfied that the report that I made out and those of my team accurately reflected the feelings and concerns at the time, and that's all I can say.
Q. Thank you. May we turn to the next page now, please. And the sentence reads as follows:
"[In English] Met with mayor of Banja Luka and afterwards visited hospital and refugee control centre." Or what -- "Nothing of significance."
[Interpretation] Can I ask you why there was nothing of significance whereas you saw so many refugees? Who were all these refugees?
A. We -- we had met with the various leaders in Banja Luka prior to this. This report was based on just simply we were actually requested would we visit the hospital and the refugee control centre. There may have been a report submitted by another team, because when we were based in Banja Luka there was two teams sent to different locations. So the other team may have made a report themselves specifically on this issue. I don't know one way or the other.
Q. What I wanted to ask you was this: Who were these refugees that you came across?
A. I can't recall. I simply can't recall.
Q. And if I tell you that they were Serbs from Western Slavonia, does that sound reasonable to you?
A. I really can't pass a comment on it, because I simply don't know 2804 where those refugees came from.
Q. Thank you. This is already an exhibit. Now may we move on to the next page, please. And then afterwards -- next page, please, first. Could you read out the second paragraph there, please.
A. "We were informed that the Ozren area between Doboj and Petrovo Selo had now a division of communities with the Muslims and the Serbs separated (except for work) by the -- by the Spreca river - Muslims to the north and Serbs to the out."
With respect, I would have to say that had I known a lot of these reports would resurrect themselves after 18 years I probably would have spent a better time trying to write in a better manner. I apologise for that.
The last sentence reads: "Uncertainty expressed by withdrawal of Serbian members from the National Assembly."
Q. Thank you. And do you know what Ozren looks like? Do you remember what it looks like on the map? We're going to call up the -- I think -- well, just give me one second, please.
This is a map showing the ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is number 3 from the binder. It's 0701 to 0724, but this is map number 3 in the binder.
How could we call it up differently?
JUDGE KWON: I don't think I'm following what Mr. Karadzic is saying. What binder are you referring to?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the map from -- map 2805 number 3 from the binder made specially for this occasion, and this is binder -- this is ERN number 0701 to 0724.
JUDGE KWON: The only binder the Judges are provided with is the Sarajevo binder, but you're free to put it to the witness.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please put this on the ELMO?
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we can provide the binder to you --
JUDGE KWON: I appreciate it.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- later.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Colonel, sir, do you know what the term "gerrymandering" means?
A. Well, there are various interpretations of that, so I'd like to ...
Q. Let me remind you. This is the manipulation of electoral units that Jerry Mander committed in the 19th century in America to ensure that a minority party could win the elections everywhere by redistribution of the territory. Does that comport with what you know about gerrymandering?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Thank you. Sir, as soon as we see this map I'm going to give you a little bit of an introduction. The objection of the Serbian party in Bosnia was that throughout the whole time the authorities manipulated the Serbian areas distributing it in such a way that the Serbs were a minority everywhere. Look, in Gracanica there's 73 per cent of Muslims, 2806 12 per cent of Serbs?
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think the witness should be asked questions. We should not hear --
JUDGE KWON: Correct. I was about --
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- the accused giving evidence.
JUDGE KWON: Yes, we have the map before us. What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Colonel, sir, do you see Ozren here in the middle of this map, this blue island?
A. I think you'll have to point it out to me because I don't. I don't know where it is on this map.
Q. To the left you see Tesanj and then you have a blue island surrounded by green. It's south of Doboj. I cannot make markings on the map, but are you able to?
You can see Tesanj, Maglaj, Zavidovici, Gracanica, and Doboj. Do you see it now?
A. I see --
Q. It's in the form of a hook. Do you see that this area is 100 per cent inhabited by Serbs. The blue colour indicates the Serbian population?
Q. And do you see the somewhat thicker lines marking the municipal boundaries? The thinner ones mark village boundaries. The thicker ones indicate municipal boundaries. 2807
A. Are we talking about this area here?
Q. I cannot see what you are pointing, but this is the blue area. The only -- yes. It's in the very centre. No. There it is. A little bit -- the biggest one. East of Maglaj.
Q. The large area. Yeah. Yeah. And up to the north. This area that you were pointing -- more to the east. More to the east. A little bit more to the east. This large blue area. Do you see it?
A. Right here.
Q. Yes. That's it. That's Ozren.
Q. And do you see these thicker lines indicating the boundaries of municipalities?
A. Within that blue area.
Q. And now can you see that a part of Ozren has been joined to Maglaj?
A. I can see where Maglaj is, and I can see it's a different colour to the blue that we've just pointed out.
Q. But the municipal boundary does not correspond to the ethnic boundary. You see the thicker line indicating the Maglaj municipality. So a large part of Ozren, up to a third, belongs to Maglaj; is that correct?
A. Well, I don't know what this map was before. If I could say 2808 something here, Your Honour. One of the major problems the monitor mission had was to try and find an ethnic map of Bosnia that was accepted generally as the definitive areas of the municipalities that were Serb, Croat, and Muslims. And when I was going out I asked was there a definitive map that I could be able to refer to, and I was told no because all sides disagree. And there was one map that we used in the mission where we had the Muslim municipalities in green, the Croat were in blue, and the Serbs were in red. And when I produced that, I was told, Well, that's not good enough, because depending on who you are and what you are, we don't believe it.
The map was made by two people who wasn't accepted to another side. So this is one of the great problems that this country had in my view, that nobody seemed to agree on a definitive breakdown of the various communities of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. And I have to say that as a general point. So looking at a map of this nature I can see what Mr. Karadzic is pointing out, but I have no idea what the map was before or what the map was after, and people became obsessed with maps. So we didn't -- we went to communities to talk to leaders, not basically to look at maps.
Q. Thank you. Colonel, this was done by an official state institute marking each village, each area. So these thin lines indicate the boundaries of the villages. So when there is a large majority, it is coloured with a certain colour. These thicker boundaries indicate municipal boundaries. So all of these villages belong to the Maglaj municipality to the south-west. Then in the south they belong to 2809 Zavidovici. To the south-east they belong to Lukavac, and Gracanica to the north-east.
Do you see that these villages marked by thin lines are belonging, according to the thicker municipal boundaries, to the neighbouring municipality? The seats of those municipalities are green. These are majority Muslim municipalities, Tesanj, Maglaj, Zavidovici. I'm speaking from the west towards the south, Zavidovici, Banovici, Lukavac and Gracanica.
A. Yes, I can see what you're referring to.
Q. Thank you. And let me now tell you that Petrovo Selo, Petrovo was a municipality once, a Serbian municipality, and again it's a Serbian municipality now, but at one point this area was divided between the neighbouring municipalities with Muslim population in which the Serbs were a minority. Do you see that now?
A. Well, I don't see that from looking at this map. I am simply looking at a map that has different colours on it and you're giving me this information. So I don't agree and I don't disagree. I don't have a view on it.
Q. All right. But you did go to Petrovo Selo; right? Petrovo Selo is in the middle of this blue area indicating Ozren; right?
A. No. I don't -- I don't recall going to that village. I mean, I say in my report here that we were informed. That doesn't mean we were there. We were informed that the Ozren area between Doboj and Petrovici had now a division of communities. That's what the report says. I don't recall going to the place at all because I used to make out a report on 2810 the areas that I visited or the opstina I visited. So I have no recollection. Even though it's on my report it doesn't say in my report that I was actually there.
Q. Thank you. That's possible. It's possible. But now we can see a high Serbian concentration divided among neighbouring municipalities, and what you heard, and it was written that they had now established or determined to have a different organisation in the municipality or different municipal organisation, and, Colonel, sir, this is something that you have been informed about, why Serbs were asking to have their old municipalities restored to them, because as minorities in neighbouring municipalities they weren't faring all that well. Did anyone informed you about that, although I see that you did write down that there was a fear everywhere of being in a minority?
A. Yes, they were one of the concerns of, the general concerns that were expressed at those meetings, but as I say before, all of them expressed their concerns. We wrote down what those concerns were and we reported back on it. That was our role. We didn't go into the minute detail because if we had done that we would need a huge amount of people to do it, to do a survey. So my reports basically reflect the general feelings of the various groups at that time in those places.
Q. Thank you. Do you know that according to the constitution these local communities or villages do have the right to opt for a different municipal organisation, to leave a municipality and form a municipality with neighbouring local communities or to join a different municipality? Did you know that our constitution allowed -- or allows for this option? 2811
A. No, I'm not aware of that.
Q. But you do believe me; right?
JUDGE KWON: That's not a relevant question, Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I would like for the transcript to state that this map in e-court is 4250, 65 ter number 4250, and I would like to tender the map because we will be using it a lot. Thank you. We don't need the map any more on the ELMO. Thank you.
JUDGE KWON: I take it there will be no objections.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection.
JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D225, Your Honour.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. What we're looking on the screen right now states that the population in Gracanica is 60.000, Muslims 73 per cent, Serbs 23 per cent, and others 4 per cent; is that what we see written here?
Q. Thank you. We can continue. Next page, please. And we can see what things are like in Gracanica. This is the next page, 68068.
Doboj has names deleted, but there's a Croat and a Muslim referred to, and then you will see when there is no third then they will then focus on the Yugoslav People's Army and report to you the way they see fit, but let's look at Gracanica. The names are crossed out here, too, and as you can see, there is no SDS anywhere; is that correct? We have the SDA, the SDP, the Liberal Party and the SDA? 2812
A. I can see that, yes.
Q. Do you understand better now why Serbs felt bad when they were a minority in an intolerant environment and intolerant society?
A. No, I don't see that. I simply see that the Serbs were not at that particular meeting, so obviously they decided not to turn up. We let it be known to everybody that we were going to a particular area, that we were anxious to speak to all sides. If one of the sides decided not to turn up, we just accepted that. So I can't see just because there were no Serbs representatives there that there was anything untowards about that situation at all. So I wouldn't accept that.
Q. Colonel, sir, you can see here that those are posts. The president of the Executive Board, the president of the municipality, the president of the SDA, president of the municipality, the Executive Board, and so on. These are public functions, but they have nothing to do with the SDS and the Serbs. So then we see an imbalance here, don't we?
A. From those who attended on that particular occasion, there appears not to have been representative of the SDS. I certainly agree with that. But beyond that I don't see -- I have nothing to -- I have nothing to say.
Q. If we look at your diary, there was some 10 or 15 meetings in which there were no representatives of the SDS or not even Serb representatives. You only met once with all three religious leaders, and then for the most part it was meetings with Muslims and Croats. Well, let's look at the next page.
And we can see here that you visited Manjaca and the refugee camp 2813 in Banja Luka and the Catholic bishop and the Muslim mufti. You didn't visit the Serbian bishop; is that correct?
A. No, it's not correct. I had dinner with the Serbian bishop and his assistant. I got a special invitation from him, and I was very pleased to attend. It may not have been in that week. But the last event that I attended before I was appointed head of the mission was to have dinner with the -- with the -- the Serb bishop of the area. So I certainly remember him and I have photographs taken with him. So I mean, he may not have been -- excuse me. He may not have been available during that week, but I certainly met him on more than one occasion and was very pleased to do so.
Q. Thank you. Can we now look at the end of the second paragraph. Can we scroll the text up, please, and look at the end of the second paragraph where it says:
"[In English] There is also uncertainty about the referendum due on 8th to 10th November."
[Interpretation] This is the Serb referendum that you're referring to; is that correct?
A. Sorry, I don't get that in the report here. Maybe you're on the wrong page.
JUDGE KWON: Up a bit.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. No. It's the end of the second paragraph: "There is also." The last sentence in the second paragraph.
A. Yes, I see that now, yes. 2814 "There's also uncertainty about the referendum due on the 8/10th November."
I presume that refers to the -- to the Serb community having their referendum. But this report is not in my writing, so it may have been another member of the team who made that report out, but that doesn't mean I don't accept its content.
Q. It's possible, but you did sign it. So what is meant by this uncertainty about the referendum?
A. Well, I presume that it would be that people were concerned that there was a referendum being held by the Bosnian Serbs which was something they were going to do themselves and that that wouldn't be very accepted by the other sides. I can only give an opinion on what that sentence might mean, because we were all concerned about the consequences of having this referendum. The Serbs had already established their own autonomous regions. This was a cause for concern. There were other members who didn't want to go into those areas, they were very nervous. There's one of my reports that reflects that. So anything of this nature that was going to concern one element of the population, obviously there would be a certain degree of uncertainty about it. I don't think that's unreasonable.
Q. And do you agree that similarly the Serbs had reason for uncertainty and tension when it came to the referendum that was conducted by the Muslim and Croatian communities at the end of February?
A. Yes, I do agree.
Q. So you have understanding for both these reasons for tension; 2815 right?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Thank you. May we have the next page. Top of the page, please. You visited in Banja Luka the mufti and the head of the SDA party in Banja Luka. Do you remember what that chief of the SDA was called? What was his name?
A. No, I don't, I don't recall his name. Again, I have a photograph taken but his name, no, I don't recall.
Q. Do you agree that there were 14 per cent Muslims in Banja Luka, that the population of Banja Luka was 14 per cent Muslim? Do you accept that piece of information from the population census?
A. I have no reason to disagree with that, no.
Q. Now, the last paragraph reads as follows: It says that you continue to be well-received by the assemblies and the public and that there has been considerable media attention.
Now, Colonel, I'd like to remind you that that this gentleman, the president of the SDA, was called Krzic. His surname was Krzic. I think it was Muhamed [sic] Krzic; right? Does that refresh your memory?
A. No, I'm sorry, it doesn't.
Q. Now, the Muslim population in Banja Luka counted for 14 per cent. Now may we have on e-court 1280, which is -- 1D; right? 1D1280. For you to see what this man Mr. Krzic was preparing in Banja Luka, and it's all written in his own hand. It's his authorship. He is the author of this. And it describes an uprising, preparations for an uprising, a rebellion in Banja Luka, although the war at that time was at least a hundred 2816 kilometres away. His name was Muharem Krzic.
May we have the next page, please. Next page, please.
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes?
JUDGE KWON: The witness said that the name Krzic didn't ring a bell to him. There's no point of you reading out this document. Just put your question in -- in a brief manner, and then if the witness doesn't know, you should proceed and move on to your next topic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, did anybody inform you that the SDA in Banja Luka, of which 14 per cent were Muslims, do you agree that the mayor of Banja Luka, Mr. Radic, who has died since, was a very cautious man and that he took into account the rights of the Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka, because I do believe you met him; right?
A. Yes, I met the mayor of Banja Luka. I don't recall exactly the details of our conversation, but, yes, I met him.
Q. And do you agree that he was a very responsible man and caring of the Muslims and Croats?
A. Well, I can't answer that because I simply don't know. I remember meeting him and my recollection of him was somebody who was very definite in his views, and beyond that I don't know, but certainly because we lived in the city of Banja Luka, we were aware of the concerns that existed at that time. And the main concern we had was the actual behaviour of reservists because we saw them in the hotel at night and -- 2817 so that was one of the concerns. But I can't remember the detail of the meeting I had with the mayor.
Q. Thank you. Did you know that the SDA under the leadership of this man Mr. Krzic was preparing an armed rebellion in the midst of Banja Luka? And that's what's described in this document.
A. No. I have no knowledge of that.
Q. Thank you. Then I'll produce this document with some other witness, but may we go on to the next page, please. The previous document, the old one, next page.
JUDGE KWON: Do you mean the handwritten report, Exhibit P922? 922.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. May we have 071 next, please. It's the last page, 071. This is 058. So we need to go to 071.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Mr. Doyle, it says here that people complained about the price of business premises. Do you mean to say there that the prices of business premises just rose for Muslims, whereas the Serbs were given those business facilities cheaper?
A. Excuse me. This report refers to the rents demanded for the business, not the purchases of them. So it was to do with rents. And that was from a meeting we had, and these were the concerns that were being expressed and that was one of them.
Q. Yes, that's what I meant, rent. Did you understand that there was discrimination in rent, one price for the Muslims and another for the Serbs? 2818
A. That was my understanding of that meeting, yes.
Q. And did you check that out with the Serbs? Did you ask the mayor about that and check it out?
A. I didn't bring it up with the mayor, and I didn't check it out, no.
Q. Thank you. Now may we move on to page 075. But if I were you, I would have checked that out because it was a drastic piece of information, and they were trying to blacken us and besmirch our image in your eyes.
Could you read out the last sentence of that: "Informed us." Informed us what?
A. "They informed us that the most serious problems were a lack of heating fuel and medicines. We suggest that another team visit -- we suggest that --" I can't -- sorry. "We suggest that maybe the other team," because this would have been the second monitor team, "inform the mayor of this problem."
As I mentioned to you, the second team that was in Banja Luka was dealing also with the city, so we wouldn't -- my team wouldn't have gone necessarily to all of them. So that's why one team replaced another team. So when the other team replaced us, this is one of the suggestions we had made, that maybe this issue be taken up by the next team on duty to bring it to the attention of the mayor. So that's an assumption. That's an assumption I have.
Q. And in the previous sentence what is being suggested is that the number of refugees and the overall situation and especially the number of 2819 refugees has become a burden to the area and that there was a shortage of fuel and medicines; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And we're dealing with the 28th of October here. That's the date; right?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance to the Prosecution or the Registrar. There are quite a number of documents that crop up under a different number. So that makes the whole thing more voluminous. So that's why I'm skipping those that are repetitive. May we have 65 ter 21084 next, please. Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Is the date is the 27th of November, and you received the prime minister. You had a meeting with the prime minister.
A. Yes. This was my first day as head of the monitor mission.
Q. Well, if I tell you that what the prime minister did was abuse to the advantage of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that he informed you about something that was not the government position, what would you have to say to that?
A. Well, it all depends on what you want to say about it. I don't know what you're talking about, Mr. Karadzic. This is a report of my meeting with the prime minister. It's as simple as that.
Q. What I mean to say is that you should have received three men, the prime minister and two vice premiers, and then you would have heard 2820 differently because the prime minister presented a view that was not the government position and the prime minister is not an institution. Do you agree with that? The government is the institution.
A. Well, with all due respect, Mr. Karadzic, if the head of the monitor mission is asked to meet with the prime minister, the least I might do is meet with him at his request. I wasn't going to demand that I meet the deputy prime minister because he was from another ethnic party. This is all about ethnicity. All of these reports. It's about one side disagreeing with the other side, and this is part of the major problem we had. Nobody seemed to trust anybody else if they came from a different ethnic background. I see absolutely no reason for not accepting an invitation from the prime minister of a state to a meeting.
Q. Colonel, I'm not attacking you. I'm attacking the prime minister who was abusing his powers and post to behave as if he were an institution. He was there to convey the government position, not his personal position under the guise of the government. Do you agree?
A. Well, I'm not too sure how I should have treated this other than, you know, accepting his invitation to meet him. He's a prime minister. I had no idea what the meeting was going to be about, and this report indicates the issues that he brought up with me, and I'm only reporting on what they were.
Q. Thank you. But did you happen to notice later on that not only when people came to see you individually -- well, when they came individually, their stories would be different than if those same people came with two others, as three, as three representatives? They would 2821 tell a different story?
A. Yes. That would be very possible. I have no actual proof of it, but I understand what you're -- what you're saying. I mean, I met with the prime minister who was a Croat, and then afterwards I met with the deputy prime minister who was a Muslim. So they are two of the ethnic groups. I hadn't any problem not meeting either of them.
Q. Thank you. May we have 65 ter 30320 next, please. It's an intercept.
JUDGE KWON: Would you like to tender the previous document? So it has already been admitted.
THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. The previous document was admitted as Exhibit P946 under 65 ter 11084.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have --
JUDGE KWON: Could the Court Deputy give the exhibit number again, exhibit P?
THE REGISTRAR: It was P946, Your Honours.
JUDGE KWON: 946. Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. This is an intercept of a conversation between Bozidar Vucurevic -- no. No, sorry. 30 --
THE INTERPRETER: My mistake in quoting the numbers. Could Mr. Karadzic quote the numbers again, please.
JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the number.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 30323. 2822
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Colonel, can you see that my conversations were intercepted and the code-name was Latas for me, they used the code-name Latas. Can you see that?
A. I can see that code is written here, yes.
Q. Do you know who Latas was?
A. I have no idea.
Q. There is an Ivo Andric novel in which Latas appears. He was a Serb who converted and became a Turk, became a great Pasa, a Turkish Pasa, and the Sultans sent him to punish the Bosnian Beys. So I laughed when I saw that, what the code sign for me was. They sort of saw me as somebody being sent by Stanbul -- Istanbul or, rather, Belgrade to punish the Bosnian Beys. Now may we look at page 4 of this, please?
JUDGE KWON: It's not for the witness. Yes. What is your question?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have page 4 of this document, please?
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Mr. Vucurevic, the mayor of Trebinje here, is informing me and telling me that they have quite a lot of prisoners. You were in contact with Mr. Vucurevic, I believe, and we have here a question for you but a general warning, first of all, with respect to translation. It says here Radovan Karadzic speaking, "Oh, keep them well." And what is referred to is 132 prisoners among whom there were some foreigners too. Now, did you know that there were 132 prisoners in 2823 Bileca, including foreign mercenaries?
A. No, I had no idea.
Q. I'd like to draw your attention to the fact that the translations of these intercepts are drastically different between the original and the translation and lead to a number of difficulties. First of all, it says "Okay, keep them well," and I said, "cuvajte ih dobro," or "Take care that nothing happens to them." "Take good care that nothing happens to them," which is essentially a different meaning. "Look after them," is what I said.
And now, on the following page -- I'll find it. Let me just take a moment.
Where there was a drastic mistake. It says that it should not be published, made public, and I said that it should be made public. So I spoke in the affirmative. The translation was in the negative. Now, what I want to ask you, Vucurevic says towards the end, "Yes, we'll now it's tomorrow. Our forces are here near that, and these are coming over Konavlje and from Boka and Zubac, and they are very close. [In English] Tomorrow our forces -- well, tomorrow our forces will meet at the entrance of Kupare here."
[Interpretation] So whose forces were they at the end of 1991, sir, Colonel?
A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm sorry. I don't understand what this is about.
Q. Mr. Vucurevic is referring to certain forces who are south of the Trebinje towards Kupari, and I wanted to ask you -- well, you knew the area and you knew what was going on in the area. So which forces were 2824 they that he refers to as "our forces"?
A. I have no idea.
Q. The Yugoslav People's Army; right?
A. The only occasion that I was in Bileca was to meet General Strugar, who was the commander of the 2nd Operational Group, and I met the mayor on that morning. And the consequence of that meeting with the general was that he indicated to me he had shelled Dubrovnik. That's the subject of a different trial. And he informed me that the reason he did it was because some of his troops, the JNA, were being attacked by -- by Croats. So they're the only two references I recall on that occasion had to do with military forces, that some Croats were harassing members of the JNA on General Strugar's command and he took retaliatory action.
I was aware that they were --
Q. All right. We will go through this with another -- with a different witness then. Thank you. But you were quite busy there in 1992 around Neum; is that correct?
A. Yes. I visited Neum because I was concerned about developments in that area. So I went down there, and that would have been in December 1991. And I returned to the Bileca area with the head of the monitor mission, the Portuguese Ambassador Salguero for a formal meeting, and that could have been around February 1992. I'd have to check my notes on that. So those were the only two occasions that I was in the that area. I had been to Mostar because there were problems there.
Q. Thank you. Can we now have 65 ter 11039. It's the same as 2825 21076, actually.
This is a document. It's your report that you signed. You probably wrote it as well, about a meeting of the Assembly on the 24th of January, 1992. It's a joint Assembly session. And you are describing here that we were some kind of cosmetic device to provide legitimacy to the Assembly just by appearing there. And we can see by these numbers -- first of all, do you -- do you recall this report of yours?
A. Yes, I do.
JUDGE KWON: For the record, I note that this is Exhibit P942.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. And we can see on the first page that: "The main feature, among others, discussed [In English] was the question of whether a national referendum be held on the question of sovereignty and, if so, the wording and date."
[Interpretation] Do you remember this was the session where we accepted the offer by Muhamed Cengic for a regionalisation to be carried out and then for us to also take part in the referendum? Do you remember that?
A. I remember writing this report, having attended the session in parliament. As I've mentioned before, I don't speak Serbo-Croat, so I was depending on interpretations of what was being said, and this was my subsequent report back to my headquarters, the content of that.
Q. Would you be kind enough to read these ten points. You will do it much better because this is something that you yourself wrote.
A. You'll have to forgive me because the first few there the typing 2826 hasn't come out too well, but if I'm correct, it says: "If Yugoslavia does not exist then neither can
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We will not allow the Serbs to be outnumbered." I can't read the first few words of the next line.
"The only guarantee for the Serbs is a separate Serbian state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
"5. They do not believe that the rights would be protected if they became a minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
"6.The Serbs will not be forced into something that they do not want or don't want.
"7. No referendum was possible because of what happened to Serbs in World War II.
"8. The aim of the SDA (Muslim party) the creation of an Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
"9. Not against a referendum as an expression of free will but against one formulated by the president.
"10. Recommend that SDA/HDZ go ahead without SDS as they (SDS) already had a plebiscite of their own on November 9th and 10th." Excuse me. That is as best as I can read them.
Q. Thank you. Our position was that if Yugoslavia was transformed and changed, then Bosnia could not remain unchanged. Do you know that Bosnia was referred to as Little Yugoslavia?
A. No, I'm not aware of that.
Q. Thank you. Can we look at the next page of your report, please. In the first paragraph where it says "The concession." Can you 2827 read the following paragraph, "there were considerable..." You can read the first paragraph from the beginning if you would be kind enough. Thank you.
A. Is this under the heading of "Comments"?
Q. Yes, but actually the very first paragraph starting at the top of the page.
A. "There were considerable recesses to consider certain points. At 0100 hours it appeared that a 'deal' had been struck. An agreed document was circulated to all members laying out the wording of the referendum. The concession by the SDS was to be matched by agreement to allow regionalisation to each ethnic community. What this was to mean exactly was not clear. However, as the president of the SDS, Mr. Karadzic began to speak, it became clear that what was intended by the SDA/HDZ was not as had been understood by the SDS. After a further recess, the president of the Assembly declared that as no progress was being made, the session was being concluded and the SDS withdrew."
Q. Thank you. We will deal with that at another time. What this is is Muhamed Cengic offering something, and we accepted that, but then after the break they rejected that. Could you please read the comments now.
A. Comment: "1. It would appear that the SDS, although agreeing to attend the session, were only there for cosmetic purposes and would only support the referendum on attaining reasonable concessions.
"2. The SDS have an obsession about becoming a minority in 2828 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is questionable if their fears are justified. "3. It is to be regretted the decision on the referendum was a majority one and not supported by all. This fact may be used by the SDS as an argument against its acceptance.
"4. It is by no means certain that some Serbs will not participate in the referendum. Some of the opposition parties supporting the motion represent Serbs. There is also a feeling by some Serbs that a sovereign independent republic is inevitable."
Q. Colonel, why did you call the concessions unreasonable if you know that we already at that stage were in negotiations with Ambassador Cutileiro and that we did get such a proposal and this is actually what was finally adopted in Dayton?
A. The impression I got and again you have to understand again that all of this debate was in Serbo-Croat and it was depending on interpretations. The impression I got from those translations was that the Bosnian Serbs did not want this referendum to go ahead if -- if it wasn't -- if there was not an agreement by consensus; and therefore once there would be an objection by the Bosnian Serbs against this, and if you use the principle of consensus, then we realised that there would not be an agreement. So that was the inference I drew from that element of the debate.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will have a break for 20 minutes.
--- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.
--- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.
JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic. 2829
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Colonel, sir, we stopped at your estimate that the concessions were unreasonable. Do you believe that it's unreasonable that Switzerland has cantons on the basis of ethnic or, rather, ethnic grounds or specificities?
A. Well, I'm not an expert in the make-up of the -- of the Swiss political system, so -- I don't really have any expert knowledge on it, so I don't have a comment on it.
Q. Under number 2 you say it is questionable if their fears are justified. Are you informed of the fact that numerous western sources or authorities said that these fears were justified? For example, Colin Powell and many others who said that these were justified? For example, in "The New York Times" of the 19th of September, Colin Powell says -- perhaps we can place this on the ELMO for the Colonel to see what the position was of the person who was in command of the US armed forces?
JUDGE KWON: I don't think we need to see that. The colonel is capable of answering the question.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I read it then?
JUDGE KWON: It's not for the witness to comment upon others' comments. If you have a question, just put it to him.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Colonel, sir, were you interested in and did you register the standpoints of Western sources about this particular item where you said that it is a questionable if the Serb fears are justified, and are you 2830 aware that all of them concluded that they actually were justified?
A. No, I'm not aware that all of them said that. What I'm giving here is my estimate of my experience for the time that I served in Bosnia. What other people might think about other states is a concern for them. It doesn't affect me.
Q. Thank you. Can we now look at 65 ter 21075, please. Can we look at the next page, please.
You wrote here in paragraph 2: "On October 13th, President Izetbegovic declared neutrality in [In English] A unilateral statement before seeking the agreement of the member Presidency (the 2 Serbs objected)."
[Interpretation] Do you know that Mr. Izetbegovic said to that that there are laws and laws and that perhaps they had violated the law somewhat and that everything was fluid and that there were laws that didn't have to be respected?
A. No, I don't remember him actually saying that, but what I do appreciate is that depending on what ethnic background you were, everybody seemed to have their own interpretation of what these very famous rules were. So everybody differed depending on your ethnic background. This was constant throughout my time there.
Q. Does that mean that there was no constitution and that ethnic belongingness was more important than the constitutional provisions?
A. No, not necessarily, but if I may just at this juncture point out that the last sentence of the report I made out on the referendum debate in the parliament raised concerns that I had in relation to whether or 2831 not the decision on this referendum was constitutional or not, and therefore as I mentioned in -- in my testimony, I think yesterday, I sought an opportunity to try and get a proper legal definition on all of these issues from the highest legal authority in the state, and I could not get from them a definitive interpretation of this referendum. Now, if the highest legal brains in the state were not able to have a consensus on what was and was not constitutional, it was going to be pretty difficult for the monitor mission, and for me, to get that definitive definition. And therefore, it was always a difficulty for us, and all I could do is put down in writing the concerns that were being expressed about all of these issues, which I think I did.
Q. Thank you. I'm not attacking you, but I just want to be more specific about certain points that were imprecise.
When we're talking about neutrality, would Wales be able to declare neutrality if Great Britain or the United Kingdom were to declare a state of war or some kind of threat or Bavaria, for example? Any unit within any country, would it be able to declare neutrality?
A. From the point of view of another state, it would probably depend on the make-up of that state. I'm not an expert in the field and I always like to keep out of things to do with the British Isles as an Irishman.
JUDGE MORRISON: If I may say so, I think that's very wise.
THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. But still, you do make some political assessments. And in the 2832 next item it you say that:
"On October 24th [In English] The Serbian Democratic Party demonstrated their inability to accept true democracy when they established an inner parliament to show their displeasure --"
Q. Yes. "... displeasure at being out-voted on such a key issue as sovereignty which they will never accept."
[Interpretation] Do you agree that forms of democracy are ordered by the constitution, and if we have a constitutional regulation envisaging the right to a veto is that one of the conditions to respect the democracy and does that allow for the possibility of not respecting the constitution?
A. Yes, I would agree with that, but once again I have to say that I was concerned to try and find out what exactly the constitution stated, and that's why I attempted to get a proper explanation for it, but I couldn't get a definitive, and the normal path that would be taken in a democratic institution with a what standard -- you know, with a standard set of rules and regulations that would be accepted by all parties, but it was my belief that the elements of the constitution were being used to the benefit of each side for their own purposes. Therefore, I don't know whether there was a unilateral acceptance of the constitution of Bosnia.
Q. Thank you. I must note regrettably that you were not very well prepared in the European Community because in February 1991 and March 1991 the Muslim and the Croat sides tried to get the declaration on sovereignty. We placed a veto on that and sent that to the council on 2833 ethnic equality. The council was prevented from doing its job and that's why we formed our National Assembly. Do you know that there was a council for ethnic equality where we did have the right to a veto?
A. No, I'm not aware of that.
Q. Well, please believe me when I say that I'm not attacking you but I'm attacking those who should have prepared you properly, because we didn't want to leave the last safeguard, the last constitutional safeguard of our equality which was trampled on. Do you agree that if a national equality council exists, a sort of Assembly of nations, if it is abolished, did we have the right to take counter-measures then?
A. I'm afraid I have to say here that all of these reports that made out were going to a higher authority and would inevitably end up at some -- you know, with the European Union that's who we all worked for. And these are the people who make all of these decisions. These are the people who are qualified. I was there as a monitor to observe and report, and that's what I did to the best of my ability, so beyond that I really can't say too much. But I would be surprised if the content of these reports weren't examined properly by the head of the -- the team that were heading the monitor mission back in Zagreb, but once again I was trying to reflect what was happening on the ground, and it would be up for them to take the -- the recommendations or otherwise of those reports.
Q. Thank you. Thank you very much. That is a great relief to me, because after these reports the European Community came up with the Cutileiro Plan, which means that they realised -- well, I have to 2834 apologise to them too, they saw on the basis of these reports, they came to realise that the situation was what it was and that we did have the right to what we were calling for, and so they offered us the Cutileiro Plan. Do you know that's a plan offered up by the European Community?
A. I know the plan was put up by the Cutileiro team. Where that would have come out of, I simply don't know. I wasn't at that level.
Q. But you agree that it was within the frameworks of the conference on Yugoslavia, the sub-conference of Bosnia-Herzegovina led by Lord Carrington right up until the end of August 1992; right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Were you aware of the basic premises of that plan?
A. No, I was not. That plan was from the 7 -- from the 18th of March, and at that stage I was head of the monitor mission. I wasn't working with Carrington. So I wasn't involved in it.
Q. Thank you. But nevertheless, the plan came up again on the 12th of April during the truce, the cease-fire, that you helped broker, and the cease-fire refers to that plan and says that the conference should be continued and work accelerated to define, et cetera, et cetera. We'll come to the document, to defining the territory of the constituent units according to the Cutileiro Plan.
So on the basis of your reports, the European Community was able to offer up the Cutileiro Plan and said that our rights were justified. If necessary, we can call up those documents. I think that the Prosecution is in possession of the Lisbon Agreement, for instance. But 2835 if you don't know about that, we'll deal with that subject with someone else.
Staying with the document, yes, that's right, may we have a look at page 218. It says 218 at the bottom of the page, where you're reporting about the formation of the Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's 219. May we have 218, the previous page, please. It says:
"[In English] Sarajevo - Assembly of the Serbian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina verified last night the results of the plebiscite of the Serbian nation in this republic held on November 9th and 10th." [Interpretation] That's right, isn't it? So that was understood as the realisation of our plebiscite. And in the same paragraph it goes on to say that approximately 1.400.000 Serbs voted, as well as 40.000 others, Muslims and Croats; rights?
Q. Now, in paragraph 4, you say who the Assembly authorised to negotiate with other communities, and then the second sentence reads: "[In English] In the negotiations, they are obliged to respect the interests of the -- of the other two nations, as well as not to --" what -- [Interpretation] What word is that? "[In English] ... not to oppose insofar Muslims and Croatian decide to form a separate joint state."
[Interpretation] Do you agree that what we are asking for ourselves we recognise as being the right of others and that the Assembly ruled as it did on that day? 2836
A. Well, this document came into my possession. I don't recall who -- who gave it to me or how formal it was, but I do know that a consequence of the result of this plebiscite meant there was great concern in the Presidency of Bosnia because I was informed by members of the Presidency, and this did not include Serb members, that the government felt it was losing its control in these areas. And I visited one or two of these areas, and the people I had with me who were not Serbs were extremely anxious, very nervous, and the government -- the collective government of Bosnia felt it was losing its authority in these areas, and that was of great concern to them.
Q. Thank you. Now we would have to debate the point, why they lost their authority and were the country didn't have the proper attributes of a state. But we'll do that with someone else. May we have 1138, next, please, on our screens.
THE INTERPRETER: 11038, interpreter's correction.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, just for the record the previous document was admitted as Exhibit P919 under 65 ter number 11038.
JUDGE KWON: 11038.
THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
JUDGE KWON: So exactly the same document that we're going to see now.
THE REGISTRAR: That appears to be this case, Your Honour.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it is repeated, but may we have page 4 of this document.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] 2837
Q. G: "[In English] The influx of about 150.000 refugees." [Interpretation] Somebody assessed, I don't know whether you signed this, so whether it was you or not, that these 150.000 refugees were a burden and contributed to tensions and were a burden to circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the influx of the reservists, the policy of mobilisation, so on and so forth.
Now, do you know who those 150.000 refugees were?
A. At this point I don't. I would have to -- I would probably have to refer to some other reports, but just off the top of my head, no, I can't answer that.
Q. Does it sound reasonable if I tell you that they were Serbs from Croatia who fled to Bosnia?
A. No, not particularly. I simply don't know. So they could have been Serbs, yes.
Q. Who else could it have been except from the Serbs?
A. Well, it could have been Muslims who moved out of their area, maybe. I simply don't know.
Q. Within the frameworks of Bosnia, and what date are we dealing with here? What's the date? It's still 1991 here, October 1991. So who could be a refugee in Bosnia at that time except for the Serbs? Who else but the Serbs could it have been?
JUDGE KWON: I note, Mr. Doyle, this report is dated as 20th of February, 2002.
THE WITNESS: Yes, this was a report I prepared because the head of the monitor mission was coming on a formal visit and we set up 2838 meetings with the political authorities and higher authorities so I was asked to put this report together that would better inform the head of the monitor mission who had only taken up at the end. He was Portuguese, so he would only have taken up his appointment at the start of the year, January, and he was to -- to come earlier, but there was an attack on the monitor mission and five of my colleagues were killed, so that trip was deferred.
JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, I should have said 1992 instead of 2002.
THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. But can you tell us of any area from which people moved out, except from the Serb territories in Croatia, from which the Serbs fled to Bosnia?
A. No, I can't, but I do know that there were people from within Bosnia moving out of certain areas. I had reported earlier, for example on the situation up in Banja Luka where some of the Muslims felt that they were being forced to -- to -- with the issue of higher rents and education, and they were going to move. A group of Muslims came to me one evening in my hotel to tell me that they felt the conditions were becoming fairly difficult and that they were going to move towards Sarajevo because they didn't feel safe anymore in Banja Luka. To me they're internal movement of peoples. So they could be termed as refugees. I simply can't answer the question as to exactly the 150.000 I mentioned as refugees. I don't know where they came from, and I don't 2839 know who it refers to, and if that's something I should have done, well, maybe I should have done it and I accept it, but I cannot answer your query there.
Q. Thank you. Let me put it to you that they would have been displaced persons, for example, if it was the Serbs from Livno who escaped in March. That happened, but these were displaced persons. These were refugees fleeing from another republic.
May we have page 4 displayed, please. And you're reporting from Mostar and under item 3 -- 088 are the last three digits of the page I'd like displayed, please, thank you. This is 085. We need 088. Point 3:
"[In English] The emergence of HOS in the area in close proximity to the JNA troops."
[Interpretation] Who were these HOS forces whose proximity with JNA troops led to tension?
A. I understand them to be Croats, some from Western Herzegovina and some who had crossed the border into Bosnia from Croatia.
Q. Thank you. I hope your memory is improving, because yesterday you didn't know who HOS was or what HOS was. Today it seems to be better.
A. Yes. It was only when I finished my testimony yesterday and I was trying to recall where I had heard the phrase before, and I'd heard the phrase in the area of Western Herzegovina. So that's why.
Q. Thank you. We won't be needing this document any more. May we now have number 11069, 65 ter, which should be the same as 2840 21078.
JUDGE KWON: Exhibit number?
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this was not admitted in the collection provided by --
JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes. Thank you. This is the one which was excluded from the Prosecution tendering, yes.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we continue?
JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. This is a report by your mission of the 8th of March, 1992, and I'd like to draw your attention to the second half of paragraph 2. The JNA sees itself as -- could you read it out, please. You'll be able to read it more easily.
A. "The JNA sees itself as a force of stability and peace. The mayor and the community of Neum will resist any attempt by the JNA to enter the community of Neum, and they see themselves as the front line of Western Herzegovina (Croatian communities) should the JNA decide to move in."
Q. Thank you. And lower down we have, "In territory of Neum de facto invasion of --"
"[In English] We have in territory of Neum de facto invasion of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Croatian Army. There are large numbers of Croatian soldiers involved, but they are described by the Croatian -- by the Croat soldiers -- Croatian Army as legal -- 2841
A. Local, local.
A. L-o-c-a-l, I think it is. Local.
Q. "[In English] As local defence forces." [Interpretation] Can you continue reading please?
A. "There are large numbers of Croatian soldiers involved but they are described by the Croatian army as local defence forces which the Croatian Army cannot control. These local defence forces are (admitted by the Croatian Army) equipped, organised and advised by the Croatian Army. They use Croatian Army trucks with Croatian Army markings, have new rifles, new uniforms, new steel helmets, and 'come to work' a very --" that should be, "that should come to work every evening from the Neum and Metkovic area." Metkovic.
Q. Thank you. And could this be the reason for the concern of Serbs in the area who during World War II were thrown into pits and were only buried in 1991? Could this have been the reason for the concern of fears who were living in the environs of Neum in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
A. Yes, I would agree with that.
Q. All right. Thank you. Can we look at the following paragraph now: "Despite Croatian Army." Please, would you kind enough to read it?
A. "Despite Croatian Army protestations that these forces are not under their control, we see evidence to the contrary. EC monitors have been," blocked out "have seen --" obviously the name there would have been the name of the Croatian Army, "under the 16th Brigade in Bosnia-Herzegovina territory with these troops also," and then there are 2842 some names blocked out, "who commanded the Croatian Army units which used to be in the Zupa/Imotica area (regular Croatian Army front line opposite --" and I can't read the next word. "These units rotated out this past month, and it is assumed that they are in Bosnia-Herzegovina with their commanders but we have no proof of that. Any -- any evening we can monitor the Croatian troops coming to the area," and there's another name here which I don't read, "in minibuses, cars trucks, et cetera, to man the positions during the night. We have seen them walking at last light forward to operational -- to observation posts towards the town of Stolac, one community --"
Q. Thank you. Thank you, Colonel, sir. This is enough.
A. If I just may say here that some of this information that we received would have come from the monitor mission -- [French on English channel].
Q. [No interpretation]
JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Now you understand why you should put a pause between the question and answer. We just heard the French translation. So I hope it -- [French and B/C/S channel]. I hope the problem is solved, and let us continue.
THE WITNESS: If I may, I was just saying here that some of the information that we would have been -- in this particular issue would have been given to us by the members of the monitor mission who were based in Croatia, the headquarters of the monitor mission was based in split, and they would have been monitoring the situation from the Croatian side of the border, and the names of these commanders would have 2843 been given to us by the monitor mission based in Croatia. But there was sufficient concern on my part to make out this report, because there were developments down there in Western Herzegovina which were sufficient serious enough for me to go down there and to get as much information about the situation in Western Herzegovina, and I brought this to the attention of the Presidency.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Thank you. And did the European Community warn Croatia to withdraw its forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina?
A. I have no idea on that.
Q. Thank you. Can we look at the next page, please. In this first paragraph it says that the JNA was proper, correct, and that they were asking questions of passers-by, but they were not bothering anyone nor were a threat to anyone but in the following paragraph it says "On the other hand" and I would be very grateful if you could read it, please [In English] "On the other hand"?
A. "On the other hand, the Croatian forces are threatening the local Serbian villagers who are terrified. The old ladies tell us that they sleep in the hills at night, and that there is firing at their village from the Croatian villages all night. When we are there talking, there is firing from the hills and these are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the opposite direction of the front line."
Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. And then in the next paragraph it says that Serbian civilians were being evacuated and that they were fleeing and that the JNA is furious about the invasion of the B and H: 2844 "[In English] The JNA have moved tanks and infantry into position around the periphery of the community of Neum. The JNA have stated repeatedly as high as command of 2nd Corps and command of 4th Army that the Croatian Army does not stop this movement into B and H the army will be forced to stop them. Croatian Army seems to want JNA to do so that they can come to the rescue of the endangered Croatian citizens of community of Neum."
[Interpretation] Do you remember that up until recently the Croatian president Stjepan Mesic constantly was saying that the war would cross over from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina and that that would make the position of Croatia much better or much easier in the war with the JNA?
A. No, I don't know what the president of Croatia said at the time, but as I said already, I was aware of what was happening in the general territory of Western Herzegovina and sufficiently concerned to go down myself, investigate it, compile the report and submit it.
Q. Thank you. And the second half of the following paragraph says: "[In English] This JNA movement is not on the front line of the 2 January cease-fire is well inside the B and H and is in the areas occupied normally by the Titograd and Uzice Corps. It is not a violation of anything. The JNA feel that they are being more than tolerant and are reaching the end of their patience."
[Interpretation] The Croat side is negotiating the movement of the Uzice and Podgorica Corps in their area of responsibility and your observer believes that this is not any sort of violation because corps 2845 are manoeuvering within their area of responsibility; is that correct?
A. I accept that the corps was doing what it -- its duty required of it, but again I would say that most of this information was coming from the monitor mission based in Croatia rather than from our side because they were able to see what was happening. When I went down to Neum, I wasn't particularly welcomed by the Croat community down there.
Q. Thank you. Just one moment, please. Can we -- I'm sorry, is this document already admitted, the one that we're just looking at?
JUDGE KWON: I don't think so.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If not I would like to tender it, please.
JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D226.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have 65 ter 11098, please, and can we also see whether that document has already been admitted?
JUDGE KWON: Yes. It is admitted as Exhibit P920.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Colonel, this is a document that you signed, and to confirm once again you -- you received or your instructions were that you would need to be objective, unbiased; is that correct?
Q. Thank you. And can we look under paragraph A: "[In English] The area in Western Herzegovina has been tense for 2846 some time as mentioned in the special report submitted to CC Zagreb on 8th of March. The area of Neum, Capljina, Stolac, and Ljubinje has a large amount of HOS (Croatian paramilitary forces). It is now apparent that the authorities of B and H either have no control or choose not to tackle this issue."
[Interpretation] Would you agree that Ljubinje was predominantly a Serb municipality?
A. I'm not -- I'm not personally aware of that. I'm not sure. I have no reason to say it isn't. I just don't know.
Q. I must say that this is a sharp observation, that the Bosnian authorities perhaps did not want to be dealing with that problem because they were not bothered by the intimidation of Serbian civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina but let's see what it says under B: "[In English] These forces have also been seen in the areas of Travnik (confirmed), and Bosanski Brod (unconfirmed). These forces openly bear arms and wear CA uniforms."
[Interpretation] Can you remember now that these forces carried out a massacre of Serbs on the 3rd of March in Bosanski Brod?
A. No. I have no information or knowledge of that.
Q. Thank you. Would you be kind enough to read this Muslim ethnic groups of the SDA.
A. "There are increasing reports of the presence of Muslim armed paramilitaries (Green Berets). As yet we have to establish the information, size, and location of these troops. However, we are satisfied that they are armed and equipped with uniforms. We are hopeful 2847 of getting more information on these forces."
Q. I'm afraid that I didn't receive a correct interpretation: "[In English] However, we are satisfied that they are armed and equipped with uniforms. We are hopeful of getting more informations of those -- those forces."
[Interpretation] Why would the European monitor mission be satisfied because Muslim paramilitary groups were equipped and trained?
A. No. The -- I think you're taking the wrong interpretation from that sentence. It's not that the European unions are satisfied that they are armed. It is satisfied that they are aware that they are armed. It is in no way condoning this issue at all. I want to make that perfectly clear. We were satisfied in our information that Muslims were armed and equipped with uniforms.
Q. [In English] "We are satisfied that they are armed." [Interpretation] Then it's an expression, it's a term, but I was a little bit concerned with this term that you are satisfied that they are armed, but in any case, do you agree that according to Muslim sources 2 -- 75 to 80 per cent of the Muslim army waged war throughout 1992 in civilian clothing? I think that is the information. Meaning that what you did see actually accounted for only 20 per cent of the Muslim armed force?
A. I really don't have any knowledge of percentages of -- of those wearing uniforms and those not.
Q. Colonel, sir, let's see now what your concluded about the Serbs, the SDS and the Serbs:
"[In English] The Serbian community in B and H had an abundant 2848 supply of weapons. This is evident by their display of strength and the barricades in and around Sarajevo on the 1st and 2nd of March. And also from our team survey of the municipalities. At this time, the leader of the leader of the SDS party, Mr. Karadzic, is permanently escorted by a group of heavily armed bodyguards. The SDS party crisis committee is located in the Holiday Inn Hotel. Members of this committee openly bear weapons and this is causing concern to the advance UN party which is presently located in the Holiday Inn."
[Interpretation] Colonel, sir, we have already cleared up that my escort was a police escort assigned to me by the MUP because there was an attempt, an assassination attempt against Minister Ostojic. Can one conclude on the basis of this paragraph that the Serbs have weapons but that they do not have units, organised units and that you cannot refer to any Serbian paramilitary formation; is that correct?
A. No. What I'm saying here is that -- that a lot of the reports we had received was that the Bosnian Serbs were becoming armed. We've been through this before. And a lot of them were not wearing uniforms. That would lead me to believe they weren't in organised units. This would have been more evident with the withdrawal of the JNA army, the federal army from Croatia, and the gradual organisation of the Bosnian Serb Army. But all of the reports we had and I saw for myself the amount of weapons that were being carried by Serbs who had manned the barricades in the city. I came under fire from some of those barricades as I attempted to evacuate the European Union referendum monitors, so I'm just reporting what I had seen. 2849
Q. Thank you. I would just like to remind you, though, that the Serbian side supported the JNA and responded to call-ups, received weapons, kept those weapons and the uniforms as per Tito's doctrine on an armed people, and here you can name Croat and Muslim paramilitary formations in this report, but you cannot refer to any Serbian paramilitary forces because they do not exist; is that correct?
A. Well, I don't know whether they existed or not. I didn't see any Bosnian Serb military units wearing uniform and organised as military units. That does not mean that there was not a considerable amount of Bosnian Serbs who were carrying weapons and displaying those weapons openly. As I said, I saw this myself on the 1st and 2nd of March.
Q. My point is this: That the Serb community was oriented towards the JNA and that it did not have any paramilitary formations, but never mind. If nobody could name them and point a finger at them, then I suppose that should mean that they didn't exist, but let's have a look towards the end under B:
"[In English] The certainty --"
JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Doyle, do you have a comment on that?
Do not make comments.
THE WITNESS: No, I don't have a comment on it, Your Honour.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Continue, Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [In English] 2850 "It is apparently heightened intentions and being brought about in our view by, A, the apparent lack of progress in the roundtable talks under the auspices of the EC; and B, the uncertainty as to if and when the independence will be recognised."
[Interpretation] Colonel, sir, did you become aware later on of the positions of the vast number of Western statesmen and politicians about the fact that recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a big mistake on the part of the international community?
A. Well, the only comment I'd have on that is that when the peace conference was established, it was established under three conditions, it was my understanding. One was that there would be a cease-fire. Two, there would be no change in the borders unless it was agreed by all the republics; and three, there was no recognition of a republic unless it was negotiated. Lord Carrington expressed concern himself when there was recognition given to the one of the republics and was done outside the terms of the peace mission or the EC conference on Yugoslavia. So in that regard, what the politicians of Europe were doing may have been different to what the interpretation was to have been by Lord Carrington, but again these were concerns outside my remit and my pay grade.
Q. I'm not attacking you at all, nor am I looking for any mistakes on your part. All I want is to gain from your knowledge, and here's what James Bissett said, the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1990 to 1992, in a Congress hearing:
"[In English] I witnessed at first-hand how Western diplomatic ineptitude and the clumsiness has earned the break-up of Yugoslavia and 2851 contributed to the dreadful bloodshed and violence that followed the disintegration of this country. Here are a few examples: The premature recognition of Croatia before any guarantees of civil and human rights were given to the Serbian population of Croatia which because of the horrendous events from -- that occurred during the Second World War made civil war inevitable.
"Second the encouragement of Alija Izetbegovic to withdraw his signature from the so-called Lisbon Agreement and to proceed with the referendum on independence in Bosnia which everyone knew would lead to the death and end in the displacement of thousands." [Interpretation] So that was the congressional hearing of Canadian Ambassador James Bissett. Does this sound to you as a good assessment, an informed appraisal?
JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Doyle. Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's now going too far. We have heard a lot this morning. We have heard a lot of comments of Dr. Karadzic, and the witness has dealt with it. But now putting to the witness whatever politician elsewhere in the world meant on a certain topic where the witness has already taken and stated what he knows about it and what he can say to it, I think that -- that is not assisting this Trial Chamber and it's irrelevant.
[Trial Chamber confers]
JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with the -- Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's observation. We are of the opinion you exhausted this topic, so move on 2852 to your next topic, Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just read out a brief statement to the colonel from Colin Powell, General Powell, about the fears and the concerns that the colonel was concerned with as well?
JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then we'll do that with another witness.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. But anyway, Colonel, do you agree that if the international community had made many mistakes and did make many mistakes in recognising the republic, would it have been in order for the international community to put those mistakes right, to rectify them?
A. Well, I think it's often the case that lessons are learned after the fact. It doesn't change the facts though. I was aware myself that there was a considerable difference of opinion within the membership of the European Union as to how to deal with the whole issue of the republics of -- of the former Yugoslavia and that depending on who had the Presidency of the European Union policies seemed to be changing, but beyond that I really don't have a comment.
Q. Thank you. Has the previous document been admitted? Yes, it's already an exhibit, is it, with a P number?
JUDGE KWON: Yes.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have on e-court 06220 next, please. It's Resolution 749 of the 7th of April, 1992. You weren't there, but the Resolution is from New York, so wherever you were, the 2853 resolution is what it was, and there was one.
Do you agree that under "Welcoming the progress," that paragraph, "The Secretary-General with all parties and others concerned to stabilise the cease-fire." Do you agree that all parties are mentioned here, all parties.
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. May we turn to the next page, please. Number 6: "[In English] Appeals to all parties and others concerned in Bosnia-Herzegovina to co-operate with the efforts of the European Community to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political solution."
[Interpretation] Do you agree that the Security Council stands behind and supports negotiations for a political solution, negotiations led by the European Community?
A. Yes, I accept the content of this -- of this Resolution.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this been admitted?
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour, it has not. It's a new document.
JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted now.
THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D227, Your Honour.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 09276, please. It's P947, I believe, as an exhibit. I think this is a document you're very familiar with, because you worked on it as well. It's a cease-fire, an agreement on cease-fire, reached on the 12th of April in Sarajevo. I was at Ilidza, in Hotel Bosna, which is where you were, too, 2854 and in your presence and in the presence of Ambassador Cutileiro and perhaps Lord Carrington was somewhere nearby too.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Do you agree that this is the agreement which was supposed to come into force on Sunday, the 12th of April at midnight. That's what it says in paragraph 1; right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And do you agree that -- let's see now. Paragraph 4: "To disband all irregular armed forces in accordance with an agreed timetable."
Do you agree with that?
A. Yes, I do, yes.
Q. In your opinion the Green Berets and the HOS, were they irregular armed formations, armed forces, in your opinion?
A. Well, they weren't part at that stage. They weren't part at all of the -- of the official federal army of the former Yugoslavia, which is the JNA. So all forces outside of the JNA I would have referred to all of them as paramilitaries, whether they Serb, Croat, or Muslim. So they were all irregular armed forces, Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, and that is what is referred to here.
Q. And what were the Serb irregular armed forces called then?
A. Well, we didn't have -- I don't think at that stage there were any organised units. It was just that everybody happened to have a weapon around the place, particularly the Bosnian Serbs. There were weapons everywhere, and we looked upon those as an organisation that had 2855 access to weapons and were using the weapons as evidenced on the barricades. And when I tried to negotiate through all of the check-point to get the European Monitors back to the airport it took three hours to get through three miles, and I had to negotiate through eight armed Bosnian Serb armed barricades. Now, if you want to refer to them as units, it's probably to me a cosmetic exercise. But these were organised because somebody had organised the setting up of the barricades, and it was organised by Bosnian Serbs, so they were certainly being advised, and in my view, if they don't have to be referred to as a military force but there were civilians who bore arms. So it might be a cosmetic exercise.
Q. Well, I'll show you that that wasn't the case in a while. Do you know that according to our law there is the Territorial Defence in every municipality and that the mayor or president of the municipality is the chief of defence for his particular municipality?
A. Yes, I'm aware of that.
Q. And do you know that this Territorial Defence system was subject to control and command of the Yugoslav People's Army and that it was responsible to it?
A. Yes, I could see that when I was -- when I was in the area of Banja Luka.
Q. Colonel, do you know of a single Serb armed force except the Territorial Defence in each of the municipalities and in each company, for that matter, they had their TO and weapons, do you know of any single Serb armed formation outside the Territorial Defence system in the municipalities responsible to the JNA? 2856
A. When I was -- all of the time that I was in Bosnia we had a difficulty in attempting to differentiate between, as I mentioned this before, armed forces. If you go back to the example of the attack which we suspected were from Muslims in the area of Ilidza and the hotel where I was, all of that was repulsed by -- by people wearing police uniforms. They were all police militia. All of those were Bosnian Serbs. So the same as you saying to you that you were given a police escort. They were all in uniform, but they were Serbs. They were Serb police. And that was one of the difficulties we had. If you had an organisation like the JNA, how many of those happened to be Bosnian Serbs? Did they take their uniforms and equipment and their tanks with them and then became a Bosnian Serb Army. So the whole issue here was the actual access to access and armaments rather than maybe the uniforms. It might have suited the Bosnian Serbs not to be in uniforms initially because it would have made it more difficult for us to recognise as to what they were.
Q. Thank you, but look at the next paragraph, or another: "[In English] To stop all activities that can provoke fear and instability among the population like the action of snipers and the bombardment of Sarajevo and other towns and villages. All houses -- house searches, barricades and general arbitrary actions of all kinds should stop immediately."
[Interpretation] Do you remember that the president of the municipality, the Serb municipality of Ilidza, Mr. Prstojevic, wrote to you after this telling you that the Muslims had continued these house searches, searches of Serbian houses? 2857
A. No, I have no information on that, and I don't --
Q. This is an exhibit, is it, the document we're looking at now? Is it? But let's go back to the penultimate paragraph:
"[In English] To start in the most urgent way work on defining the areas of future constituent units of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
[No interpretation] "[In English] In this context three main parties reaffirm their opposition to any territorial gain by force and agree on the right of return of refugees -- of the refugees without adverse consequences in respect to -- of employment and -- or otherwise."
[Interpretation] Do you agree that the conference continued its work and that this agreement provides for an accelerated definition of borders or areas of the constituent units, as you say there, and that that continues to be a political process?
A. Yes, but the two points I'd raise here, one is that as we know, the cease-fire, even though it was signed, was not respected, and if we talk about agreed the right of return of refugees, the only instance that I was personally aware of in my area was people being forced out of the area of Ilidza, and they were being forced out by Bosnian Serbs.
Q. Well, Colonel, you have no proof or evidence of that, because people left of their own accord. When there was a war, they would go back to their own areas where they're in the majority, and you don't have any proof showing that they didn't leave of their own accord.
A. Excuse me, Dr. Karadzic. I have the word of the leader of the Bosnian Serb -- the new leader of the Bosnian Serb community in Ilidza 2858 who admitted to me that the non-Serbs were moved out of area. He agreed it was against their will, but he said it was for their own protection, and that was admitted to me the leader of the Bosnian Serb community in Ilidza. So I certainly have that example.
Q. What was the name of that Bosnian Serb leader who told you that?
A. I -- as I mentioned yesterday, I do not have his name.
Q. Colonel, sir, in whose interest was it to sabotage the conference, the Serbs or the Muslims?
A. I'm -- I'm not happy with the word "sabotage the conference." I don't know that there was any -- I wouldn't accept that any of the political parties wanted to sabotage any conference. However, I would -- I would accept that regardless of what was being signed, thing -- other things were being done. So --
Q. Can we look at your diary of the 27th of April, please, and to look at your entry where you say that you were trying to convince the SDA and the HDZ to attend the talks in Lisbon and that this was difficult. Do you agree? This is at the top of the page.
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Did you ever have any problems with the Serbs for them to respond to the invitation? Why were -- was it only the Serbs who did not need to be persuaded and convinced to go to the conference?
A. Well, the circumstances which prevailed on Monday the 27th of April to go to peace talks was completely different to other occasions and the difficulty for the president was the president thought he would be killed by the Bosnian Serbs if he went to the airport; and, therefore, 2859 in order for him to go to the airport, I arranged an escort to be provided by the United Nations, because most of the routes to the airport, and the airport itself, were in difficult areas where a lot of sniping and firing had gone on, were aware of what happened when Cutileiro and Pinheiro arrived for those talks. So the main reason why it was difficult here, I have no explanation as to why the Croats -- the man I was talking to was Mr. Brkic. I have no idea why he pulled out, but as soon as I guaranteed the safety of the president, I -- he agreed to go, and as we know, one of the reasons he couldn't go that day was because Belgrade, who had the control of the control tower in Sarajevo refused to allow the aircraft - which we had acquired - land to pick up the president. And it was only the next day that we managed to renegotiate his departure.
So the president was more anxious about his own safety to go to Lisbon, and as we subsequently know that concern was probably justified because when he returned he was taken hostage by the JNA. So it's in that context that I would mention why I had to try and persuade the president to go to Lisbon. And that's the only occasion, in my experience of being out there, where there was any reluctance on the part of a party to -- to attend talks. And if I was to just continue on that issue, I had problems with the -- trying to get the Bosnian Serbs to come to peace talks at the United Nations headquarters after we'd secure the release of the president because at that stage most had gone to Pale, and when I issued the invitation to the Bosnian Serbs, nobody could -- nobody turned up. So these were some of the issues and some of the concerns 2860 that existed at that time.
Q. Colonel, you would agree that they killed many soldiers and officers in the column. Do you accept that Serbs would allow even General Delic to pass through a check-point? And I state that they would never kill Izetbegovic, but they did let Delic pass and say hello to him and allow him to pass through the check-points escorted by the UNPROFOR, by the UN. Do you agree with that?
A. Well, again I wasn't there on that convoy incident, as you know. I was held as collateral back in Lukavica. If that's what you're referring to. But I know that the convoy was attacked and I know that members of the JNA were killed. The number -- the exact numbers I don't recall, but I think maybe 7. So if you're referring to that, yes. There was an attack on this convoy. I'm not too sure that I get your drift on this.
Q. Before the break I will have time, at least, to tell you this. I believe that your speculation that the Serbs would kill Izetbegovic is groundless because we don't have terrorist experiences. We don't have a tradition of terrorism, and we are against killing.
JUDGE KWON: Is it a question, Mr. Karadzic?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Do you know that Serbs do not have and it's foreign to them this tradition of terrorism?
JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, I -- I noted just now you were standing. 2861
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think there was a misrepresentation of what the witness said. The witness didn't speculate. He simply said that that was the fear that Mr. Izetbegovic had and that he had -- that's why he had to negotiate with or, rather, convince Mr. Izetbegovic to go.
JUDGE KWON: Now the witness has the question, do you know that Serbs do not have -- it's foreign to them, this tradition of terrorism? Can you answer the question?
THE WITNESS: I don't -- I don't accept that from what I'd seen myself. I was the person who was fired on when I attempted to go through Serb barricades to the airport of Sarajevo. I was the head of the monitor mission. I wore a uniform. I had my car, and yet Bosnian Serbs fired at me when I tried to negotiate a passage for monitors. That is a fact.
If you want to call that terrorism or not, that's up to somebody to interpret.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Very well. With that question and answer, we will have a break for 30 minutes.
--- Recess taken at 12.07 p.m.
--- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.
JUDGE KWON: Yes.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I think that -- has this cease-fire agreement been already admitted? I think so. It's a Prosecution document. Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] 2862
Q. Colonel, sir, in your diary of the 2nd of May, it says: "President detained [In English] At airport." [Interpretation] Detained is in quotation marks. Does this mean anything to you?
A. No. Detained means he was held basically against his will. So I didn't know whether to put down taken hostage or detained, but, no, it doesn't mean anything except that he was taken against his will.
Q. Thank you. Would you agree that in relation to this 27th when you had to convince them to go and when you said that this was perhaps because Izetbegovic was -- or there was a danger of Izetbegovic being killed, do you agree that before then, at least ten days before the command of the 2nd Military District was under siege by the Green Berets pursuant to a directive issued by Hasan Efendic on the 12th of April, 1992, to barricade the barracks and to do everything to the barracks that had previously been done to them in Croatia?
A. Yes. I mean you showed the document yesterday and I have no reason to disagree with it, so, yes, I understand that this had taken place.
Q. Thank you. And do you agree that on the 23rd the same Hasan Efendic issued a directive followed by one -- by the Ministry of the Interior to intensify attacks on the installations and personnel of the JNA?
A. No, I'm not aware of that.
Q. We also saw that yesterday. This is 222, D222. D222. Exhibit D222.
We looked at this yesterday, Colonel. This is the directive 2863 on -- issued by the Territorial Defence Staff of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 23rd of April, and then we can look at page 2 of the document, please. And we can see what the assignments are of the district TO staffs. Form TO units, volunteer units, the Patriotic League. Excuse me. Look at the top first:
"Immediately occupy the ammunition and weapons depot and block barracks, occupy them and capture members of the Yugoslav Army in the B and H territory. First stage, group combat activities, detachments and mass arms resistance of the citizens to last from 10 to 15 days. Phase 2, carry out the operation in the period of 20 to 30 days with the objective of routing the enemy and creating conditions for their expulsion from the territory. Readiness for action immediately." What is this enemy that is being referred to here? What do they mean? Who do they mean when he refer to the enemy?
A. Well, first of all, the document is not in a language that I can understand, so -- so there's no English translation of that here. I would assume that the enemy would have been the Bosnian Serbs if it was issued by Efendic or -- because they were looked upon as an enemy at that stage. There had been intimidation. There had been expulsions. The city was now getting to the stage where it was practically under siege. That's all I can assume it was.
Q. Thank you. This was issued on the 23rd of April. We have shown here an information given by the Croats that that line from the SDA -- of the SDA would like to throw us out of Bosnia. We're going to look at another document where the US officials were informed about that, but you 2864 are completely correct. They are trying to throw us out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But if this was issued on the 23rd of April, would this not be a reason for concern and not fear of the Serbs? You have declared total war to the Serbs and the JNA, and then you need to go to the conference. Why would you go to the conference when you have chosen the option of war? Would you agree?
A. Well, there could be an interpretation of that that could go both ways. One is that let's keep complying with the request to have peace talks, but let's keep, on the other hand, taking as much territory as we can, because the more we take, the more we can negotiate back. That could be an interpretation. So what was done on the ground with units may have been totally different from what people were signing documents for and that could have been probably applied to all sides. If I give my own professional opinion, one of reasons in my view why there was a blockade of barracks was that the mainly Bosnian Muslims did not have any access to weapons. The Bosnian Serbs already had weapons, and the only way that the Bosnian Muslims were going to get weapons was to take them by force or get them from the JNA. That's just my assumption. So a blockade of the barracks was, in my view, with a view to making sure the JNA wouldn't give any more weapons to the Bosnian Serbs who had plenty, and the Bosnian Muslims had -- had very little access to weapons. I was actually requested by the deputy president Ejup Ganic to see if I could do anything that would allow for Muslims to be given weapons to be able to defend themselves. So everything around this period was pointing to the fact that the weapons that were under the control of the JNA would 2865 probably be given to the Bosnian Serbs because the Bosnian Serbs, as you know, were organising their military units, and that's just my assumption.
Q. Your assumption is not correct, Colonel, because the JNA considered Serbs as a reserve to replenish their forces and not as a unit or somebody to be under my command. I had no command over the JNA. But, Colonel, let's look at the sequence of events. The military district command was besieged by the Green Berets. On the 12th of April, we signed an agreement on the cease-fire, on the same day, the directive was issued for attacks and blockades; on the 22nd of April, I issued the platform offering a peaceful solution; on the 23rd of April, they are issuing a directive opting for total war; on the 27th, they're going for the conference; on the 2nd of May, they are killing soldiers all over Sarajevo; and on the 3rd of May, they are stopping the column in Dobrovoljacka Street.
What else is necessary in order to be able to come to the conclusion who's for war and who isn't? Don't you think that Serbs had shown enough patience and enough willingness for peace and that this was not accepted and that these actions by the Muslim side were of a very combative nature?
A. Well, I don't agree with your assessment, Mr. Karadzic. I have to say that the knowledge of what was going on in the territory of Bosnia would disagree with that. We had a huge amount of ethnic cleansing right down from Bijeljina to Zvornik in such areas. This didn't give the picture that the Bosnian Serbs were in anyway tolerant the other 2866 societies. So I think this argument can be made by anybody to suit their own purpose. A lot depends on, you know, the implementation of cease-fires, the implementation of platforms. They were the difficult ones. As I said, cease-fires were signed with monotonous regularity. It didn't seem to have any effect on the ground. A similar accusation could have been placed at the UN for all the Security Council Resolutions it issued on Bosnia, and as the military commander said, it made no difference to his daily life, just -- it didn't help the situation. So I can only give you here an interpretation of what I thought was the situation at the time. You may not agree with it, but that's my assessment.
Q. Thank you. Now, do you deny that UNPROFOR concluded that 90 per cent of the cease-fire violations came from the Muslim side? Do you accept that and that assessment made by them?
A. Well, as I said before, I wasn't a member of UNPROFOR, so I don't know where you get the figure 90 per cent. That according to UNPROFOR, 90 per cent of the cease-fire violations came from the Muslim side. All I know is that when UNPROFOR was there the city was under the siege, basically by the Bosnian Serbs. So I find that hard to accept. I'm not denying it was reported by the United Nations. I'm just saying that would not have been my view.
Q. And, Colonel, do you make the deference between a siege and an encirclement?
A. Well, either an encirclement or a siege are designed to keep people inside an area. So it really is a difference in terms. It means 2867 you deny them the freedom to go about their daily lives. So encirclement or siege is -- they're not the same, but they're -- they're of the same family, let's say. So I'm not too sure what -- what you're -- I'm not too sure. I mean if it wasn't -- if it wasn't a siege, then I'm wondering why they had to build a tunnel underneath the runway of Sarajevo airport to get in supplies and evacuate people. I think the international community would have accepted that the city was under siege, but again, that may be an interpretation. That's my view.
Q. But, Colonel, we're going to show, among other things, a document from the London Conference showing that the restrictions imposed by the Serb side around Sarajevo referred exclusively to military matters and military facilities. We propose the opening of seven roads. We proposed free traffic for commercial transport and road transport and that the sole restriction referred to military material and equipment and military personnel. Do you deny that or do you allow for that possibility?
A. Well I'm not too sure what the London Conference basically said, but I don't agree with that, no. Not from my experience.
Q. Very well. The previous document has been admitted. Now may we have 1D315 next please?
JUDGE KWON: Yes.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the previous document had not been admitted. It's marked for identification because we don't have a translation, and we even couldn't take a position on the document not knowing the contents really.
JUDGE KWON: This -- you referred to this D222. 2868
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
JUDGE KWON: But the previous document, 947, was admitted. It's the agreement of cease-fire.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes, Your Honour.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll have to move into private session for a previous moment for 1D01292.
JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll go into private session briefly.
(17 lines redacted) 2869
(page redacted) 2870
(24 lines redacted)
(Open session) 2871
JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are now in open session.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we have called up, please, 65 ter 01136 next, please. I think that's already an exhibit.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this is Exhibit P941.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. This is, Colonel, the minutes from a meeting between Secretary Vance and Lord Carrington, the chair of the president -- of the conference on Yugoslavia, and Dr. Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs. Now, I'll read it in English:
"[In English] Dr. Karadzic said that the Serbs were willing negotiate. Regrettably the Muslims have always negotiated in bad faith. The Muslims had accepted the 18th March principle -- principles, but had now reneged from them. They were only interested in a Muslim state." [Interpretation] And then:
"[In English] The Serbs were willing to return territory and were content to remain part of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the existing boundaries, but the Serbian people of Bosnia wanted full autonomy from the Muslims and Croats."
[Interpretation] Paragraph 2: "[In English] Was willing to talk about giving back territory as part of a overall agreement but any such agreement will also have to protect Serbian property," [Interpretation] et cetera. Let's move on to the next page now, please:
"[In English] Secretary Vance asked that Karadzic was prepared -- what Karadzic was prepared to do in order to stop the fighting. 2872 Lord Carrington said world opinion was firmly against the Serbs, particularly after the recent escalation of fighting around Sarajevo. Dr. Karadzic said that the Muslims were responsible for the escalation. The Serbian forces had permission to fight back only in order to defend themselves. The Muslims regularly shelled their own people. They could have been responsible for the heavy shelling of Sarajevo on 24th and 25th August. Commandant Doyle said that the Serbian paramilitaries backed by the JNA had started the fighting by shelling the Old Town of Sarajevo in April. The Muslims might be responsible for some provocations, but the Serbs had much to live down. Inflammatory statements by Serbian commanders who threatened to shoot down UN," [Interpretation] and so on. [Interpretation] The last sentence:
"[In English] Karadzic was said he was willing to accept UN monitors at all Serbian artillery positions in and around Sarajevo." [Interpretation] That was paragraph 4. Do you remember that conversation?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do you remember, furthermore, that Professor Koljevic said the Serbs had reached agreement with the UN about Sarajevo and had proposed the demilitarisation of the city?
A. No, I don't remember that. I remember the conversation from the talks in Lisbon, talking about the United Nations securing the airport of Sarajevo to allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Q. Do you accept that we always offered the monitors to be alongside our artillery positions and that we offered the demilitarisation of 2873 Sarajevo and that we handed over the airport to UN administration and management? Well, let's take first things first. Did we hand over the airport to the UN?
A. Yes, that was eventually done after intense negotiations.
Q. The negotiations were over technicalities, right, not over substance, whether it was to be handed over or not; right?
A. At the peace talks in Lisbon, we secured from you a document which indicated that under certain conditions that Bosnian Serbs or the airport would be handed over to the United Nations. I certainly recall that.
Q. Thank you. Now, do you accept that we kept offering the demilitarisation of Sarajevo while the Muslim side always refused that?
A. I can't remember it in this particular context, but we became very used to phrases which being said by people like, All I'm doing is I'm only going to protect the Serbs, and I promise to do this and I promise to do that.
And I go back to the point that I made earlier, that there were a considerable amount of cease-fire agreements signed in Sarajevo and nothing was done about them. They were broken almost as soon as they were signed. So there was a feeling that some of the people participating in these peace talks wanted to be seen to co-operate with the international community, but in reality the actions didn't measure up to what was signed in the agreements, and therefore a piece of paper with a signature saying we agreed to a cease-fire really came to very little, and, in fact, the United Nations military command referred to the signing 2874 of a cease-fire as simply a term, I recall being used, even though those of us involved in the cease-fires were trying to do the best we could to get this conflict to stop.
So in other words, the principle of the cease-fires did not measure up in many instances to the actions subsequently taken.
Q. Thank you. Now do you see it says: "[In English] Dr. Karadzic said that he had issued instructions to stop his forces from harassing those Muslims and Croats who are willing to 'leave' Serbian areas from signing papers to that effect. He confirmed that any such paper would have no validity in the light of a final settlement."
A. Well, I'm aware of the conversation you and I had in the hotel in Brussels when we discussed this issue. I'm sure you will recall that. I purposely brought up this issue with you personally because of a photograph which was displayed on the front page of the "Sunday Times," and we had an unofficial conversation in the lobby of the hotel. You may recall that and I brought the up the issue. It was I who brought up the issue of people being forced to sign away their homes, and you indicated you would take some action to let it be known that this was illegal. Now, we had this discussion at our meeting last Monday, and you said that you took action on it. I'm personally not aware of that because I wasn't around at that time. So the issue of signing away territory was -- was something that I brought up myself, and I think you did acknowledge that.
Q. I accepted that, but I didn't recognise it, because you told me about two municipalities away from Pale that that's what was happening 2875 there. But may I have D101 next, please.
You informed me on the 16th of August; right?
A. Sorry, can you repeat that, Mr. Karadzic, about the 16th?
Q. You informed me about that on the 16th of August in London; right?
A. No. I informed you in Brussels, I think. It was not London.
Q. Yes, probably Brussels, but it was the 16th of August, was it?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Here, Colonel, is what I issued on the 19th. Perhaps we can look at both versions, the Serbian and the English. And let's look at item 3 together. In the preamble it says to the Main Staff. The date is the 19th of August, the headquarters of the Serbian Republika Srpska Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, all centres of the security services: "According to our act of the 13th of June, 1992, in respect of international norms of war, I again hereby order," and look at number 3 now.
"To prevent the forced resettlement and taking of other illegal actions against the civilian population, and the possible confirmation of the selling of property or statements that the refugees will not return do not have any legal validity and are declared null and void." Do you know, Colonel, whether any such confirmation was implemented and became valid after this order which had the force of law and proclaimed them to be null and void? Yes, the original translation, null and void, although other terms can be used.
A. Well, I would have to say that I'm pleased to see that on my 2876 initiative when I brought this up with you that you took some action on it, and also it's probably an indication to me that this practice was, in actual fact, common knowledge and being done up to this point, where people were being ordered to sign away their property, which as you rightly point out was illegal. So I'm pleased to see that element of that in that document.
Q. But I have to react to what you've said, that was it generally known, common knowledge. No, it wasn't. This is what I hear from you for the first time. It just happened in two municipalities, Kljujic and Sanski Most with which we had nothing to do, and this impeded the resettlement and departure of these people because if you ask for their property, then they would give it second thoughts whether they were going to leave or not. So it was precisely against ethnic cleansing, a measure against ethnic cleansing. It wasn't to speed up and accelerate the resettlement of the population. That only happened in two municipalities and none of these confirmations or certificates were actually implemented and acted upon. What would you say to that?
A. Well, I've no knowledge of what exactly was the consequences of this directive you gave except to say that I'm glad that action would appear to have been taken as a result of my initiative in Brussels.
Q. Three days after your initiative, right, Colonel?
Q. Thank you. So in this document, the previous document from the conference, that is, we established and confirmed that we were ready to accept the observers and monitors with our artillery and that we were 2877 prepared to hand over the airport to the United Nations and that I would place null and void or declare illegal these documents. Do you declare -- do you confirm that what we told you at that conference is what we carried out in practice?
A. Well, I don't know what was carried out in practice. That's the point, Mr. Karadzic. I wasn't with the United Nations. The only reference I saw to United Nations observers in these areas surrounding Sarajevo was when they were actually taken as hostages and forcibly held in custody, but I've no direct personal knowledge of that because it's while I was well out of the area of operations at that stage, but it's what I saw in the world's media at a later stage. So I know that at that time the monitor mission had been withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so the only observers that could have been there would have been United Nations and not being a member of the United Nations I -- I didn't have any knowledge of what the modus operandi was at that time, and as you point out, I wasn't in Bosnia working at that stage.
Q. But do you know that we didn't -- do you know that we didn't keep our promise, promises, and carry out the responsibilities that we said we would?
A. I have no knowledge otherwise. I simply don't know.
Q. Thank you. Now may we have 1D1276 next, please. And while we're waiting for that to come you, Colonel, let me remind you that Serbian policy was very consistent. On the 12th of April we signed the cease-fire and we adhered to it. Here now we have a letter from the 2878 president of the Serbian municipality of Ilidza, Mr. Prstojevic, to you. He's writing to you. And that is 1276, or, rather, 1D1276 is the document number.
JUDGE KWON: Could you give the number again. Yes, we have it.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Here it is.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, in the 12th of April cease-fire that you worked on, we pledged not to disturb the civilians by searching their flats, and so on and forth. So there was this cease-fire, and we said we'd leave the citizens alone.
Now, here's what Nedeljko Prstojevic from the Crisis Staff is writing to about from the Ilidza municipality on the 3rd of May. The English version seems to be a better copy, so I am going to -- it says "Respected gentlemen," I'll read in English:
"[In English] Respected gentlemen, in all three communities Hrasnica Rutmice and Sokolovic Kolonija, the Muslims are holding Serbs as their hostages.
"They are barging into Serbian homes, pillaging them, demolishing them, and forcibly taking many individuals to undisclosed locations. As an example, a civilian man, Obrad Milovic of Djerdaps Ulica Street 2, Sokolovic Kolonija, was beaten and returned home, then ordered to report to the Green Berets headquarter at a rate of every two hours. During every visit there he would be beaten up yet again in such a way that these unfortunate men had succumbed to heavy bleeding from the mouth and nose, and doctors suppose he was also suffering internal 2879 bleeding.
"We are pleading to the European Community Mission to immediately form a mixed commission which would, going directly from the door-to-door, confirm the situation of the Serbian population in all three of the aforementioned neighbourhoods."
[Interpretation] Do you remember this letter, sir?
A. No, I do not remember the letter. I have no knowledge of ever having received it. It's titled, it's addressed to the mission of the European Community. I assume that would have been the monitor mission. I was no longer a member of the monitor mission. I have no knowledge of it. The only knowledge I have of an issue of that nature was a complaint made to me by a -- a woman whose husband who was a Muslim who was taken to an area controlled by the Bosnian Serbs and allegedly tortured, but I have no knowledge of this document, no.
Q. Well, it's interesting that you know about that but not about this. Well, that gives rise to doubt with respect to the question of bias that we discussed earlier on.
A. I -- I -- I object to that comment, Mr. Karadzic, very much.
JUDGE MORRISON: Well, it is an objectionable comment, Dr. Karadzic. The question of doubt is, in any event, in the prerogative of the Tribunal.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all right. Let's not doubt. But I have my doubts with respect to the colonel's need to answer questions that I didn't put to him.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] 2880
Q. Do you know who Sereda is, Sereda or Sereda whom this was sent to in addition to yourself?
Q. Yes. Thank you. I'd like to tender this letter then, please.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, according to the directions that we have on the admission of documents in this court, the witness has not adopted it. He has not received it. He could not comment on the content, so we oppose.
JUDGE KWON: We didn't even need your assistance. Thank you, Madam Uertz-Retzlaff.
This will not be admitted.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I have 1D315 next, please.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. This, Colonel, sir is a letter from the prime minister of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Djeric, sent to you on the 3rd of May. Did you receive that letter?
A. I can't -- I can't guarantee that I did. I'm not too sure. I may have, but I know that my -- what I was doing between the 2nd of May and the 12th of May was a total and focused attention given to cease-fires, negotiating the hostage release of the president and trying to negotiate the withdrawal of the federal army from the territory of Bosnia. So that was my total focus. I may -- that may have been sent to me. It doesn't come readily to mind, but I can't deny I didn't receive it. I simply don't recall it. 2881
Q. Let's see what the prime minister says, Djeric. "[In English] After our yesterday's talk in Pale, estimated by both sides as successful, last night units of so-called BH TO attacked our positions on the following points: Vojkovici and Grlica, so from Sokolovic Kolonija. Vraca from all directions with automatic rifles and mobile artillery."
[Interpretation] Do you remember the meeting that you had on the 1st of May with the prime minister, Mr. Djeric?
A. I remember the meeting, and I certainly do not agree that it was estimated by both sides to have been successful. As far as I was concerned, it was totally unsuccessful, because the only reason I went up there was to ascertain whether or not artillery was moved back following the instructions I received from Lisbon, and we found out it wasn't. So from that point of view, this wasn't successful at all. So that is the view that may be expressed by this gentleman. It certainly is not my view.
Q. Now let's see what he says in paragraph 3: "[In English] If armed attacks from SDA and HTZ units continue, we shall have to react sharply. This means that we cannot be asked to withdraw artillery weapons from around Sarajevo if this is immediately followed by the TO BH, Territorial Defence BH, attacks upon the positions of our units. If radio, TV and the press, completely under the control of just one side, continue the informative terror of the Serbs, we cannot be required to prevent talking -- taking possession of relays and changing their directions." 2882
[No interpretation] "[In English] Unless the other side gives firm guarantees that they will not put their soldiers and weapons into convoys carrying medical and humanitarian aid, and use of the airport to supply weapons, we will not be ready to deblockade roads because this would mean acting against our own interests. As a soldier, you know well that this would be a suicide."
[Interpretation] Sir, Colonel, did you take into account the fact that prime minister of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was informing you that you did not secure appropriate actions by the other side and that we were being asked to do something that is giving the other side a military advantage. Do we have to do something that would give the other side a military advantage?
A. Well, I don't accept that the content of this letter is in any way true. I would refute most of it. There's an inference here that the United Nations were allowing weapons to be taken in through the airport, that weapons were being put into convoys, that I had a satisfactory meeting in Pale on the 1st of May, which is not true. So why should I automatically accept what is being mentioned in this letter. As I said, I have no recollection of -- of getting this letter, and the more I look at it, if this -- if this letter was translated into English as it is here, I would certainly have reacted to its content because I didn't accept its content at all. So I have to admit in truth that I do not recall getting it, but I certainly would not be pleased with its content. It seems baffling to me that a city that's under siege, you know, 2883 is now referring to attacks by -- by Muslims. I mean, it's just -- it's just against the reality of what was happening on the ground.
JUDGE KWON: It seems it's sent in English with the signature and stamp on it.
THE WITNESS: I see that, Your Honour. And I have absolutely no recollection of receiving it. A lot of these I retain in files, and I certainly don't have it.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. But, Colonel, sir, you testified yourself first that the attack on the Serbian part of Ilidza did occur one week before this, and in your diary you did not even mention that you had met with Mr. Djeric but only with Ms. Plavsic?
A. No. What I was saying in that context, Mr. Karadzic, is that I went and I accompanied Mrs. Plavsic to Pale. I'm not saying that I didn't meet anybody else. I met a lot of people. I didn't know who a lot of them were because they, as far as I knew, they were newly appointed ministers of the Republika Srpska which wasn't a recognised entity at that stage, and so I don't know who -- I don't know -- I was informed that they were -- they were now ministers of the Republika Srpska, but I didn't know any of them. The only person I actually knew there that I recall was Mrs. Plavsic, because I knew she was a member of -- a Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that's the only reference that I made to her. It's with her I went up to Pale. But the personnel that I met, I have no recollection of their 2884 names because they were new to me.
Q. I don't wish to attack you, Colonel, sir, but let's look at your diary and then you will see that. First of all, you are having very infrequent meetings with any Serbs; and secondly, you recall only two or three names but with others it is different. Well, on the 12th of April you met Ganic, and then you met with the HDZ. Then on the 13th of April you had a meeting with the SDS. After that, practically there are no such -- the 16th of April the HDZ. The 17th of April, the TV board. So the television. The HDZ and the SDA, brief meeting later with Karadzic and Koljevic. This is in Ilidza. Then Cutileiro, then -- overall, Colonel, sir, you've infrequently met with, for example, Somun: "I warned Somun on the 22nd, [In English] I warned --" [Interpretation] Can you please help. What does this mean, "I warned Somun"? This is the 22nd of April. On the right-hand side.
A. Sorry, on the 22nd of April did you say?
Q. Yes, but it's on the right side. Perhaps that's the 23rd of April, but anyway, it's on that side. Visit of Pinheiro it says.
A. Yes, I can refer to that, if you wish. When --
Q. Would you kindly read it out, please.
A. "Problems with French minister Kouchner, Presidency tried to force the issue of talks with the president of the SDA as head of state with the HDZ and from higher status against the enemy. I warned Somun and then both president of the HDZ that they would lead to disaster." Now, Mr. Karadzic, if you want me to explain why I said that, it would be easier for me than just reading from a diary which might be 2885 taken out of context by people I have no problems with that, if you want me to do that.
Q. Well, you can briefly if you can briefly, but it's a fact -- no, go ahead briefly. Please go ahead.
A. Jaoa Pinheiro, who was the president of the council of ministers of the European Union, and Lord Carrington were due into Sarajevo airport for talks that you were -- you were party to, and that morning the president asked -- he felt that he would like to meet Lord Carrington as he came off the aircraft, and I said no, because my view at that time was that the president was there as the leader of the SDA party. You were the leader of the SDS party. And therefore if he was given the status of a president meeting the plane it might somehow give an indicate that he was on a higher level than you, and I didn't want that to be and that's why I warned Mr. Somun who was attached to my mission as a liaison to the Presidency, that if anybody was playing political games I would take action by getting a message to the aircraft not to land. The issue of Kouchner was different and it has no relevance, I think, on this instance to what we had in mind.
So in actual fact, I felt on that day that the president might have been using his position as president to meeting the aircraft and I felt he shouldn't, that all of you were on an equal footing and you would all meet him at the same time. So, in fact, it was in your interests that I had given a warning to Mr. Somun.
And the reference to below is difficulty in getting each to return to the airport. Now, there is some emphasis put on the fact that 2886 you were very willing to signing the cease-fires and, in fact, you were first to sign the cease-fire, which is true. The only reason that was done because you were the only political leader that was left at the airport. The others had actually gone. So of course it was easier for you to sign the cease-fire, but it's not something I would deem that needs to be exploited. The problem I had then was to try and persuade the president to get back to the airport because he was worried because the area around the airport was controlled -- elements of it was controlled by Bosnian Serbs.
So I managed to persuade the president to come back and sign the document that evening so there -- they're the notes I took on that day. So if you have any further questions on that I'll try and answer them for you.
Q. Thank you. Has this letter from Mr. Djeric to Mr. Doyle -- I don't think it's been admitted. Can it be tendered. Obviously it was handed over to your representatives. You should have received it.
JUDGE KWON: Unless it is objected to it will be.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted to as --
THE REGISTRAR: [Overlapping speakers] Exhibit D229, Your Honours.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Then we have to move to private session briefly and this is 2887 01283. This is the daily report from your mission of the 1st of June. You weren't there but it's important to compare that with what we talked about relating to the mission. This is 1D01283, and if we could move into private session for a short period please.
(20 lines redacted) 2888
(page redacted) 2889
THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Colonel, sir, your position is that the Muslims did not have sufficient weaponry, and I made the assertion yesterday that the Muslims had formed the Patriotic League on the 30th of April. The decision was made on the 31st of April, and the league was formed on the 30th of April, 1991, and by the end of May and mid-June, they had a Municipal Staff, regional staff, and units in 103 municipalities, units of the Patriotic League, that they had taken the weapons from the Territorial Defence, were receiving weapons from Croatia, buying them in Slovenia, and that they were violating the arms embargo even with the knowledge of some larger countries, and the general secretary -- Secretary-General said very early in a report to the Security Council that the question of the Muslims not being armed any more was no longer an issue. Do you accept that Muslims received substantial arms from -- on the basis of the agreement on the evacuation of the barracks and in the e-court could we have 21286, please, this is a Prosecution document.
A. Well, you asked me a question there, Mr. Karadzic, and the answer is I have absolutely no idea if Muslims had many weapons. And what I was saying before is that in comparison to the amount of weapons that were in the possession of the Bosnian Serbs, the amount of weapons in the possession of the Bosnian Muslims were very, very small. That's what I was saying yesterday. I am not saying for a moment that there weren't 2890 weapons, but there's no comparison in the amount between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, in my estimation.
Q. But let us come back then to the fact. Who was in command of the Bosnian Serbs and who was in command of the Bosnian Muslims? You accept that up until the 20th of May the Bosnian Serbs were under the command of the Yugoslav People's Army or of their own municipal territorial organisations while during that time the Muslims had their own armed formations?
A. Well, I don't -- you know, I don't have great evidence of that. I mean, the Muslims could have an arm -- they may have established one or two or some formations, but there was always the question of they trying to get weapons. This is why they were trying to put a blockade on the barracks, to make sure the weapons would not continue to be handed over to the Bosnian Serbs. That was the assessment of the monitor mission, and that was my assessment. That's all I can give is my assessment. And if that's not acceptable, that's -- that's another matter. That's fine. But I can't change what my views were, which was based on my experience.
Q. Thank you. That is also good. We need to know that these are your views and that these are not facts that you established. Let us now look at this agreement signed, and I believe that you did participate in it, and you are noted here under number 4 as the personal envoy of Lord Carrington; is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. We can look at Article 2, and we can say: "[In English] The parties to the agreement agreed that within the 2891 framework of the withdrawal of the JNA from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, withdrawal of commands, units and institutions with armament, ammunition, mines and explosives, equipment and movable property, which remains after restoring what that belongs to -- what belongs to the Territorial Defence, from the garrisons, barracks of Zenica, Travnik and Konjic as well as from barracks in Sarajevo Marsal Tito, Victor Bubanj, Jusuf Djonlic, Gavrilo Princip, [Interpretation] Jajce barracks, [In English] Army district headquarters military institutions Romanija and home of the army." [Interpretation] Is it clear from this article that the Yugoslav People's Army returned the weapons of the TO to the Muslims and even left a lot of heavy weaponry in Sarajevo and in many other barracks including Zenica of which we have evidence and that as of a certain point in time nobody could say that the Bosnian Muslims were insufficiently armed. Do you recall that the JNA gave 6.000 barrels to Sarajevo through General Boskovic to the Muslims in exchange for the release of the cadets from the Marsal Tito Barracks?
A. I think the point that I should probably mention here is that -- that when this agreement was being negotiated, I was there personally, as is rightly pointed out as the personal envoy of Lord Carrington. I didn't -- I wasn't chairman of these talks, and I was almost immediately evacuated from the city of Sarajevo which happened on the 12th of May. So I have absolutely no idea as to what elements of this -- or this articles were implemented because I wasn't in a position to establish. And also, I should point out that the entire monitor mission of the 2892 European Union was also evacuated, I think, on the day before myself or early in the morning. So while we were trying to negotiate this withdrawal, I do accept that the JNA were very anxious to have a dignified withdrawal from the entire territory of Bosnia. That was brought home for a meeting I had with the general command of the Serb army in Belgrade the following -- the following -- sorry, not the Serb army, the JNA army the following day in Belgrade. But the actual detail of this arrangement I had no way of knowing whether it was going to be implemented or not because I was quickly evacuated from -- from the area of operations.
Q. If I were to tell you that there was one other document -- actually, has this agreement already been admitted?
THE REGISTRAR: Its been admitted as Exhibit P950, Your Honours.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Could we look at another document before we stop. 1D01263 of the 11th of May. You were still there. And the Main Staff of the armed forces of the SFRY, command of the 5027 military post in Sarajevo, Colonel Enes Taso. I assume that you know that he is a Muslim. Then we have Laslo Pravda, a Hungarian, the others seem to be Serbs. And then under number 2 it says:
"In the course of tomorrow the evacuation of people and movable materiel will begin from four barracks: Marsal Tito, Viktor Bubanj, Jusuf Dzonlic, Gavrilo Princip, the JNA Dom and the Romanija military institution. The condition for the evacuation of the barracks is to return the TO weapons from the four municipalities on whose territory the 2893 TO, the chief of the General -- of the General Staff. Colonel Panic has agreed to restore these weapons. The evacuation has been agreed, and the weapons are to be returned to the TO. As you see, there was a fast implementation of this agreement which you attended, and on the second page it states it is essential in agreement with the Chief of the General Staff weapons be prepared of the Territorial Defence from the four municipalities referred to of the city of Sarajevo as per the list that we provided to you the previous day. Branko Cadjo.
THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not see the original of the document on the screen.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Do you know how much weaponry these four city municipalities had and that the Serbs did not receive any of those weapons?
A. Well, there's two points I would mention here. One is that I began being evacuated at 0530 hours on the 12th of May, so I've -- I've no idea as to the content of this letter. And the other is that I was informed at later stage - I don't know what the source were - but that a lot of weapons that were left by the JNA in these places were rendered inoperable because they didn't want to fall into -- they didn't want them to fall into hands where they could be used. So I really don't know. I simply do not know what amount of weapons were taken over by Muslims. So I really can't comment on it. My -- my priority on the 12th of May was to be evacuated from the city, because I was informed of the threat of my life, and that was more important to me at that stage.
Q. Colonel, sir, a few guns in Zenica did not have the safety parts, 2894 but for the other ones they did make them, but everything in Sarajevo was functional. They received 6.000 barrels, mostly rifles and machine-guns and heavy machine-guns. Do you recall that there was a crisis between us and Yugoslavia because they had given so much weapons as a present or actually in exchange for the cadets?
A. I certainly remember the incident in relation to the cadets, but I don't know under what conditions the blockade was lifted against that barracks. So I simply don't know. I -- I would venture to suggest here that the United Nations who remained in the city might be in a better position to -- to give comment to -- to these rather than I who was, as I said before, on my own and evacuated on the 12th of May. So I presume clarification could be given by the United Nations because I understand that General MacKenzie himself took over these -- the element of the negotiations after -- after I was gone and the monitor mission. So I think that's the only contribution I can make to this issue.
Q. Colonel, do you accept that this document of the 11th of May corroborates the previous document, the signing of which you attended and that has your name on it? Do you see that this is the next step towards the implementation? I mean, can you confirm that at least?
A. Well, in -- in truth, I can't -- I wouldn't be able to confirm it unless I compared it with the other one, and this does not have an English translation. So I don't want to verify that it is on the basis of those other articles unless I was able read it. I'm sorry.
Q. You have it in the transcript. I translated it for you, the gist of the agreement that you attended. Colonel Cadjer [phoen] here is 2895 implementing the next day immediately, practically speaking. Does this content that you have in the transcript correspond to the contents of the document of the agreement the signing of which you attended?
A. If does if your direct translation is, in fact, a direct translation. I simply don't know. I have learned in my experience that documents can be translated, interpretations can be given. I've -- I've suffered as a consequence of that. So I'm not denying your translation, Mr. Karadzic. I'm just saying that I don't see it because I can't read Serbo-Croat. It's as simple as that.
Q. I was reading in the Serbian and the translation was given by the interpreter.
JUDGE KWON: We will now rise for today. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, was your position about this document?
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It should be admitted pending, of course, the translation.
JUDGE KWON: It will be marked for identification.
THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D231, Your Honours.
JUDGE KWON: We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. Thank you for the interpreters and court reporter for their indulgence.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.56 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 28th day
of May, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.