2690 Wednesday, 26 May 2010
[The accused entered court]
[The witness takes the stand]
--- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. Good morning, Colonel Doyle.
THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
JUDGE KWON: Welcome back, Mr. Robinson.
MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President.
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, let's continue.
WITNESS: COLM DOYLE [Resumed]
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies and everybody else.
Cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
Q. [Interpretation] Good morning to you, too, Colonel.
A. Good morning.
Q. We did start last week, so let's carry on and talk about what we agreed during our interview. You confirmed that you didn't know that the Serbs did not obstruct the Muslim referendum on independence. Do you accept now that it was the Serb position was this: We had our referendum. The other two communities can and should have their own referendum or plebiscite in order to see the will of the people prevail, and all this was subject to procedure for amendments to the constitution in the Assembly. Do -- are you aware of that? Do you have knowledge 2691 about that?
A. Yes. I'm aware that the Bosnian Serbs had the referendum and that the parliamentary debate on the holding of the referendum was carried by the Croats and the Muslims, yes.
Q. My point is this: Do you remember that the Serbs had nothing against their referendum and that they didn't obstruct it in any way and enabled it to go through on the territory where they had power and where they were the decisive majority?
A. Sorry, are you referring to the Serbs had nothing against -- is it their referendum or the other referendum? Could you clarify that point for me, please.
Q. My position is this, and we shall come to that: You were at the meeting. We proposed that regionalisation be conducted first and that we go to a national referendum. As that was not successful, we had nothing against that the other two communities should carry out their own referendum and we didn't obstruct their referendum. Nowhere, there were no incidents anywhere. I'm talking about the referendum at the end of February.
A. Yes. I agree with that.
Q. Thank you. Now, I'm not quite clear on one thing in your report where it says very nicely and clearly what the cause of the demonstrations were in Sarajevo -- or, rather, the barricade. However, during the examination-in-chief, you mostly said that the results of the referendum were the reason, whereas in your report it says that the reason was the killing of the wedding -- in the wedding party, and then 2692 during the in chief you talked about the referendum. Now, our position is that the results of the referendum did contribute to this but not with barricades but the behaviour of those criminals that attacked the Serb wedding party.
Now, do you agree with your report, what you say in your report, that the pretext or the reason was the killings that -- the killing that took place at the wedding party and that that was a major event?
A. The report that I made out at the conclusion of the referendum debate was that the barricades were erected by the Bosnian Serbs and that there were two factors. The two factors were, one, the result of the referendum; and two, according to the Bosnian Serbs, the reason the barricades were raised was because the death -- the killing at the wedding. So I took that -- the fact that the Bosnian Serbs told me that in their view the reason why the barricades went up was the killing at the wedding. I took that in consideration, and I mentioned that in addition to the results of the referendum.
The point to make here is that in my view, the barricades were erected at such a time and such a short period of time that in my view there had -- there had to be some prior consideration to these being erected. That was my professional opinion at the time, and I reflected that in my report.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have Prosecutor's Exhibit 611040 next, please. It's the same as 21077. On e-court, please, may we have that called up. It is Prosecution 65 ter 11040 document. Thank you. 2693
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. And there we have the first paragraph where you put in first place the fact that the killing of the Serb at the wedding ceremony was number one and that the tensions could also be attributed to the referendum. Do you see that first and second sentence: "[In English] Tension was heightened in Sarajevo as the result of all the killing of a Serb and the wounding of another at the wedding ceremony in the city of 98 [sic] February."
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. [Interpretation] I think the killing was on the 1st of March, in actual fact, and the barricades were erected on 1st of March. And then you go on to say:
"[In English] A degree of the tensions could be also attributed to the referendum which has had --"
[Interpretation] To the referendum and so on. So it is more convincing. Well, the results of the referendum were common knowledge in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina but the killing in the barricades only existed in Sarajevo, so your assessment there was a good one. However, the Prosecution seemed to like something else more. What I want to say for the transcript, it wasn't recorded, is this: That the results held true for the whole of Bosnia, but there were no barricades anywhere, whereas the killing was only in Sarajevo and it is in Sarajevo that there were barricades, only there. So at that point, your report is fairly accurate by placing the number one point first. However, the Prosecution seemed to have liked the second point better, that the results of the 2694 referendum were the reason and pretext, which they weren't.
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, what is your question?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my question is why the Colonel now decided to use the conditional that he used in the second sentence, "could," although he confirmed that with time memory fades?
JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered the question.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
JUDGE KWON: Move on to your next question.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, can we agree over another point. You said that you saw me after that, after that first and second -- at our meeting you said that you saw me. Now, I have here my secretary's diary, and he writes that you came to see me. The entry is on the 1st of March, probably in the morning, because then in that same diary it says that at 1600 hours I, too, flew together to Belgrade together with Koljevic and Krajisnik. Now, is it possible that you might have got that muddled, that you might have seen me before the assassination?
A. I'm aware that with spoke at the meeting last week you brought this up, and I checked over my notes, and I don't think I said in the notes of my witness statement that in actual fact I met you by name on that day. When you asserted to me last week that in fact you weren't in the city, I actually accept that. It doesn't take away from the point that the Serb leadership on that day gave me a list of demands which I handed over to Ejup Ganic. So I accept the point that you say that you 2695 weren't there. It wasn't in my original report that I may have made a mistake.
Q. Thank you. I think that it would be a good idea if we were to stay with this document for a while longer, because there we can see the Serb demands handed over to the Presidency at a Presidency session, but there's something else that has caught my attention here, and it is this: You said that they said that they would erect barricades only if the word came from me; right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Now let's look at page 2 of this document.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have page 2 called up, please.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. This is what it says, the last sentence the first paragraph: "[In English] It became apparent from the negotiations which followed that the armed Serbs would only consider dismantling the barricades on the directive orders of the SDS leadership, however, they expressed their gratitude to the EC Monitoring Mission." [Interpretation] So not Karadzic but the leadership; right?
A. Yes, but when I put down the leadership, basically, I was referring to you as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs. And your name is mentioned, as far as I recall, on my witness statement of 1995.
Q. Well, yes, but not in your report, you see. And the rest of the leadership would not have agreed that I was the leadership. I was just one member of the leadership. But let's move on. 2696 Now let's have the following page. Next page on our screens, please. There we are. This is what you say here that after an agreement had been reached in the Presidency and the Presidents unanimously accepted the Serb demands and we'll go back to them in due course: "[In English] On this information being announced, the barricades began to be dismantled."
[Interpretation] Therefore, Colonel, not when I gave the word but as the result of negotiations between the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party and the Presidency in which there were two members of the Serbian Democratic Party; right?
Q. Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D1210 called up, please. I think that this document is in evidence. Is it? Has it been admitted? Associated?
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it was admitted as Exhibit P924.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have 1D1210 next, please.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Here we have the minutes from the 56th Presidency session of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 2nd of March:
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the English version, please. Zoom into the English.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. And present were Alija Izetbegovic; Biljana Plavsic; 2697 Franjo Boras; Ejup Ganic; the Deputy Secretary Mile Dmicic; the Prime Minister and Vice-Premier Jure Pelivan and Muhamed Cengic; the Minister and Deputy Minister Alija Delimustafic, Vitomir Zepinic, General Kukanjac, and the command of the 2nd Military District, Drago Vukosavljevic, as command of the Territorial Defence. And in the second part of the session, the president of the Crisis Staff of the Serbian Democratic Party took part, Rajko Dukic. He was president of the Executive Board in actual fact, but for that purpose he became involved so that he could control the events.
Now, may we have page 3 called up, please. And while we're waiting for that, let me just remind you, you said that in all the negotiations I took part. Now, do you agree that that was the demand made by our mediators or that it would be disrespectful for me not to have attended but to send a deputy of mine; right?
A. First of all, I've never seen this document before. I mean, I'm -- the report that I gave was based on the information I gained at the time. The demands of the Bosnian Serbs were handed to me, and I passed them over to Ejup Ganic. Who sat at what meeting after that I wasn't a part of, so I really don't know.
Q. Well, Ganic didn't hand them over then because here we see that Dukic handed them over at the meeting itself and that that's why he was asked to attend the meeting, to negotiate and to say under what conditions he would be able to influence the people to lift the barricades. But what I asked you beforehand, do you agree that if the mediators, Vance, Owen, and others, expected me to be present then it was 2698 the proper thing to do for me to be present and that it would be disrespectful for me to send anybody else, any deputy in my stead?
A. I'm not too sure why you're bringing up Cyrus Vance. I thought we were talking about a situation which prevailed in the city on the 2nd of March. You were the leader of the Bosnian Serbs. I accept that you may not have been there on that day, so I really -- I really don't understand what the issue is.
Q. This is not a problem, Colonel. It's just a question of you claiming that I participated in all the negotiations, and it seems to me that this is something that the Prosecution liked, but what I would like to ask you is: Is this a regular thing, and is it a polite thing for me to respect the mediators, to attend or not? Was I expected to be present?
A. Any time that there were negotiations held in the city of Sarajevo that I was involved in you were always present. What may have happened with people like Cyrus Vance, I simply don't know, but I'm referring to the occasions where there were negotiations being held. The Bosnian Serbs, on all occasions that I attended, was headed by yourself.
Q. Very well. Thank you. We haven't achieved what I wanted to achieve for you to say whether this is just customary, that -- was I expected to be there, but let us look at page 2. We have page 2 in the Serbian. Can we look at page 2 in the English as well, please.
JUDGE KWON: Probably we may have to see page 1 in English.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Very well. We can see on page 2 that Rajko Dukic participated. 2699 Can we look at page 3 now, please. In the English this would be on page 2. Thank you.
I am going to summarise it. The president of the Crisis Staff of the SDS, Rajko Dukic, departing from the actual situation in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina came out with the following demands and these are the demands that you are talking about and that you have to cease all further activity, more specifically the campaign that is being waged with a goal to declare a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina and to secure it's international recognition until a satisfactory and final solution is released.
I hope that the English -- the interpreters have the English version in front of them. All right. Very well.
And then it continues: "To unconditionally cease the campaign that is being waged in the sphere of public information supporting a sovereign and independent Bosnia."
And then the next sentence: "To ensure unbiased information until the conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina which is being led under the umbrella of the European community is concluded."
And it goes on that the tragedy in all the places is a direct consequence of the situation in the MUP and that personnel transformation of the B and H MUP should be carried out pursuant to the agreement reached by the three leading political parties immediately after the republican elections. 2700 I'm going to ask you if you knew, Colonel, sir, that the Muslim side, as you can see, for the whole year, 13, 14 months, sabotaged the appointment of Serbian cadre to the posts in the police?
A. I'm certainly not aware of that, no.
Q. This is one of the features when you live under the Muslims and not with the Muslims. You would grant -- be granted positions in the police, but they would not actually appoint those people. This is something that you should know. Perhaps it's our fault as well, but this is an important thing, and I can see that that is here, and I wonder that nobody asked themselves what this particular point meant. Did you ask yourself what this meant?
A. No, I didn't. My job on that occasion was to get the demands that were made by the Bosnian Serbs and pass them over to the Crisis Committee of the Presidency for them to come up with whether or not they would agree to accept those demands. In other words, I was a facilitator. My job was not to interpret what was being said here. My job was simply to pass on the message and try to make some progress that all sides would agree on. That was the main mission of the European Union and that's the mission I stood by; in other words, not to take sides but to pass on information, and to try and ensure that we would facilitate an agreement.
Q. Thank you. The next paragraph: "To arrest the persons of the heinous crime in front of the Serbian Orthodox church in was Carsija in Sarajevo during the day." Did you know that in April the killer of the Serbian best man, 2701 Ramiz Delalic, Celo, appeared on state television in Sarajevo and boasted of having killed the best man because he had seen in the wedding party a Serbian flag? This was already when you were there, after the 10th of April.
A. No, I'm certainly not aware of that.
Q. Do you agree that this was insulting and humiliating for the Serbs and also irritating?
MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Your Honour, how is the witness expected to answer that question which is both speculative and asked about an event that he didn't know about.
JUDGE KWON: If the witness can answer the question, he can deal with it; otherwise he can say that he cannot answer the question.
THE WITNESS: I'm accepting that because one of the conditions or one of the conditions laid down by the Bosnian Serbs was to the effect that they wanted the perpetrators of this crime arrested, I accepted that as one of the conditions. I assume it wasn't being denied by anybody, and therefore I would have accepted for what it was. But other than that I would not have a comment, no.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Thank you. And do you know that that criminal, the killer, was liquidated after the war in some cafe without having being brought to trial or having been convicted for this crime?
A. His name had been mentioned to me before. I had been informed that he was a criminal. As to what happened to him afterwards, I had no idea. I did hear he was killed, but I didn't know any of the details. 2702
Q. Do you know that he was the assistant commander in the 9th Mountain Brigade throughout the whole wartime period in Sarajevo?
A. No, I was not aware of that.
Q. Thank you. The next paragraph is -- states: "Considering the fact that the Serbian people have been experiencing a length informational blockade and pressure to conduct and urgent division of the television and radio as well as to stop a broadcasting Jutel until the talks about the constitutional arrangement of BiH are over."
And item 6: "To immediately disband the Crisis Staff of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina led by Ejup Ganic as an unconstitutional body and to urgently disarm paramilitary formations of the Green Berets which are acting openly in Sarajevo and protecting, among others, criminals-perpetrators of crimes."
Colonel, sir, do you know that it was the Muslims who formed the Crisis Staffs in the Presidency first and throughout Bosnia and then the Serbs followed before the war broke out?
A. No, I don't know that. I was aware that there was a Crisis Committee of the Presidency. Who constituted that Crisis Committee, I simply don't know. The only person I met in relation to that was Ejup Ganic. So I had no knowledge as to who else was in that committee. Again I must say that my job was to pass over the demands, for they to be considered by the Presidency, by the Crisis Committee of the Presidency, and if they were acceded to, then we solved the immediate 2703 problem in the city, and that was my prime objective.
Q. Thank you. I'm not holding it against you if you didn't know, and if you didn't it's more of our fault than anybody else's, but would I like to remind you that the Crisis Staff in the Presidency as an unconstitutional act, which the Presidency agreed on was used to bypass Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic as representatives of the Serbs with veto power on important Presidency decisions; thus that is one of the manifestations of life under the Muslims and not with the Muslims. Would you agree that such a Crisis Staff formed as early as September 1991 before the Serbs formed their Crisis Staffs, that it is an improper act?
A. Well, first of all, I don't know which Crisis Committee was established first. It wasn't something that came to my attention. And not knowing that, it wasn't of any great concern to me. Once again, I have to say that any time we made approaches to any of the political parties it was a view to getting a common agreement amongst them to stop a conflict. That was our prime objective, nothing other than that.
Q. Excuse me. And when did you come to Sarajevo for the first time? Was it early October; is that right?
A. I came to Sarajevo to take over as head of the mission towards the end of November 1991. Before that I was working as a monitor in the city of Banja Luka.
Q. Was there a Crisis Staff of the Serbian Democratic Party in existence when you came and did the staff get in touch with you, communicate with you? Did it exist at all?
A. I have no idea as to when the Crisis Committee of the Bosnian 2704 Serbs was established. As you may recall yourself, my first official meeting with you was in February 1992, and that meeting was set up at my request.
Q. Thank you. Can we please look at the next page in the Serbian and the English page can stay for now. And we can see that it states here:
"An agreement was reached --" It's at the bottom of the English copy:
"An agreement was reached that abolishing the barricades ends the need for the existence of the Crisis Staff of the Presidency of the SRBiH which was formed on the 21st of September, 1991."
It was agreed at the same time that at the next Presidency meeting the report on the work of the Crisis Staff should be reviewed. The Crisis Staff was thus formed on the 21st of September, without any barricades, without any need as an unconstitutional act whereby the Muslim part of the Presidency conducted Presidency business without participation of the Serbian representatives, and agreement was reached here for that Crisis Staff to be abolished. Do you agree that that is what is stated here?
A. I can see from the document that is in front of me, from the English translation, it says that. When there's reference to the establishment of the Crisis Committee in September 1991, I wasn't in Bosnia in September 1991. I didn't go there until October. So I wouldn't have been aware as to when this Crisis Committee was established. 2705
Q. Thank you. And let us look at this paragraph: "The Presidency's announcing that the referendum that has just taken place does not determine the organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the topic of the talks regarding the future organisation of BiH which are being led by the European Community. These talks should be continued urgently and their results have to respect the interests of all three nations as well as other citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
This sounds good, doesn't it? Do you agree?
A. First of all, as I said, I haven't seen the detail of this document before, but I don't see any great difference between the content of this document and the content of the measures that were mentioned in my report. So we're probably repeating what's already been said before.
Q. Well, there is no difference, but it's a little bit more complete here. There are a few things that indicate how the Presidency took into account natural, normal, legitimate demands only after the barricades, and my question is: Wouldn't it have been normal for this never to have been put on the agenda and had the barricades not been put up, the Presidency would have functioned according to the constitution. Do you agree?
A. Well, that's a question I actually -- I can't answer myself, but I am finding it strange that we have now in front of us a detailed document about a Crisis Committee which is talking about the future constitution of Bosnia, yet these barricades, in your mind, were erected because of a killing at a wedding. I find it very strange that if these 2706 barricades were simply erected as a direct result of shooting at a wedding, that all of these details constitutional issues would have been discussed in order for the barricades to be taken down. So this would lead me to -- to believe that the reason the barricades went up in the front -- in the first was not, in fact, the killing at the wedding but the issue of the referendum, but that's only my opinion.
Q. But, Colonel, sir, would you agree that there were considerable tensions which resulted in the killing of the best man and that the killing of the best man is the result of the tensions, not the cause of the tension? The killing is the cause of the eruption and the barricades, but the actual killing is the result, is the fruit of long-term tensions, political gainsmanship which the Muslim leadership conducted against the Serbs; is that correct?
A. No, I don't actually agree with that.
Q. Are you trying to say that there was an idyllic political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the killing?
A. No. What I'm simply trying to say is that there were three different political parties in Bosnia and they could not get along with each other. And this was the indirect result of -- or this resulted in an extremely high degree of tension where everybody in the international community was aware that if these tensions continued to fester because of whatever was find them, then it would let to conflict, and our objective as to try and avoid that at all costs, and all our efforts were directed to that end. Who did what and where it was done, I don't have all the details because my appointment was head of the monitor mission, and 2707 our -- our freedom of movement and our safety and security was no longer guaranteed. Therefore, it was extremely difficult for us to get movement, to get information, and therefore we were not as effective as we might otherwise have been.
Q. Thank you. These are the minutes from a Presidency session, so I do understand that you did not have insight into them before that, but here you can see exactly what happened at the session in detail, and I can conclude, and may we have the last page for me to carry on, that all these conclusions were adopted unanimously, by which the Presidency confirmed that these were the legitimate goals -- or, rather, legitimate demands and that they were acceptable and accepted unanimously. Do you agree?
A. Well, if those documents were signed, yes, I would agree. I'm looking at the document in front of me. If it has been signed by the various members, then I have to accept it. I don't have a problem with it.
Q. Thank you. Now, I have to read out a paragraph which we don't have in translation but we do have in Serbian. It says it was concluded that the public should be informed about this straight away and that the vice premier, Muhamed Cengic, and the president of the Crisis Staff of the SDS BiH, Rajko Dukic, after addressing the public on television should do what they can to disband the barricades from the main roads in Sarajevo.
So you see there that the special involvement of these two people, Muslims and Serbs, for the barricades to be disbanded, because if 2708 you remember, there were both Muslim and Serb barricades erected; right?
A. I have no evidence that there were Muslim barricades in the city on that particular day. The Muslim barricades, as far as I recall, were erected maybe the day after or two days later when there was great fear that Mr. Arkan was coming to the city, because I received a message that Mr. Arkan wanted to meet me. And all of the barricades that I saw in Sarajevo on the day of the 1st, 2nd of March were manned by Bosnian Serbs, and that evening I had to negotiate my way from the Holiday Inn Hotel all the way to the airport. I had to negotiate my way through eight armed barricades which were erected and manned by Bosnian Serbs. I did not come across any Muslim check-points at that time.
Q. Thank you. We'll see that they did exist on the basis of other documents but may I have 1D1236 next, please. And I'd like to tender this document into evidence, please, Your Excellencies.
JUDGE KWON: I take it you would like this document to be fully translated?
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. And there's also one issue that I'm a bit puzzled about. It claims to be the minutes of the 56th session, but when you look at the B/C/S version it doesn't look to me like minutes but rather like a report from another source summarising particular parts of something. Therefore, I would rather suggest to first mark it for identification until we have checked whether it is really what this says to be. We would like to check whether these are indeed the minutes of the 56th session of the Presidency or, rather, a filtered document published in whatever source. 2709
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, can you help us in regards to this.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, certainly, yes. This was published by the national security and the future, prepared by Mr. Simic, published in 2006, that documents of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991 to 1994, Tomo Simic prepared this. We asked the Prosecution to provide us with all the records, all the transcripts and minutes of the BH Presidency sessions, but we did not receive them. So this is what we managed to find. Tomo Simic is the editor, and I think it has already been used in one of the trials.
So this is the only document that we could access, that we could come by. Now, if the Prosecution could provide us, and that would be very necessary, the entire documents of Presidency, BH Presidency, sessions, we'd be grateful. Perhaps something has been left out here, but it's the only document that we were able to find with a well-known publisher and everything else. And it is the minutes. It's not the transcript, it's the minutes, and the minutes are always a little shorter; right?
JUDGE KWON: I don't follow who this Mr. Simic is, in what capacity he prepared this.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He is an associate of this institute, obviously the national security and -- for national security and the future as it's called, and he worked with the documents and prepared them on that basis. And it hasn't been challenged. Nobody's challenged it yet. He compiled a collection of documents relating to the BH Presidency. 2710
JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do you accept his explanation, or would you like him to call foundation witnesses to this document?
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I don't think there is a need to call a witness, another witness, for this, but --
JUDGE KWON: Then we'll mark it for identification pending translation.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, thank you.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that be MFI D214.
JUDGE KWON: All right. Thank you. Let's move on.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we kindly request that the Prosecution provides us with any documents they have linked to the BH Presidency, to disclose them to us.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, Colonel, we have here parts, excerpts from a diary by my chef de cabinet, and it says Sunday, the 1st and 2nd, 1992. May we leaf through it further and move on?
JUDGE KWON: What is the 65 ter number of this?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1236. Yes. The diary has been admitted into evidence as 1D1236.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Under number 2 it says: "Trip to Belgrade at 1600 hours."
Then under 3, the Turkish ambassador, et cetera, et cetera, will come on Monday, and so on. But there's a mistake in the date. You see the SA043963 number up there at the top. Can we go back a bit through 2711 the agenda, turn back the pages? Or, rather, let's go to the next page, the following page.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Maybe I can be of assistance. This document is in e-court twice. Once it is the single page, and then there are several more pages under 1D01255. That's the same item.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I apologise. May I have 1D1255 then, please. And there are several pages there. The date is -- well, February doesn't have 31 days. Well, let's look at SA043987, that page number, which I believe is the next page. No, 3938 are the last digits. Saturday is the 1st of February. Sunday is the 2nd of February. May we go on to the next page, please. It says Monday, the 3rd of February. And now we can move on to the 29th of February. This is Saturday, the 29th of February. And it says:
"In the night between Friday and Saturday, a conflict broke out between the Serbs and Muslims at Turbe. A Serb was seriously wounded, and two Muslims killed. The Serbs erected barricades at the entrance to their village.
"2. Dr. Karadzic in Banja Luka attending talks." "3. The German television programme," et cetera.
May we move on to the next page, please. Sunday, the 1st of February where it should be the 1st of March. Number 1: "Three members of the European parliament mission wish to meet Dr. Karadzic," et cetera.
Second, the trip to Belgrade at 1600 hours. Three, the Turkish 2712 ambassador, Omer, et cetera.
May we move on to the next page, and the number on this page was 3963. Now we go on to 3964. Monday, the 2nd of March. He corrected the date himself there. It says:
"Demonstrations and barricades in Sarajevo. The reason being -- or the pretext for that, the killing of a member of the Serb wedding party at Bascarsija."
So he says that that was the pretext. Next. Here it says Pristina, Sarajevo, et cetera, but Wednesday the 4th of March, demonstrations in Sarajevo, situation critical, Green Berets attempted to attacked the Serb territorials. Dr. Karadzic was on Jutel with Alija Izetbegovic. So it was only on the 4th of March that I was in Sarajevo, and I appeared on television, Jutel television, with Mr. Izetbegovic for us to make a joint statement and calm the situation down.
Do you accept that?
A. Yes, I do. If Your Honour would permit me, I have a diary here which I've used before. It's -- it's very basic, but it just gives me recollection of who I may have met and when I met them on dates. Can I --
JUDGE KWON: By all means.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. I accept, Dr. Karadzic, when you say there was a meeting on television. I was aware of that on that date.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] 2713
Q. Thank you, yes. We will wait for -- to see your notes. That would be a good idea. If we could have a look at your diary entries.
A. My diary entry for the 3rd of March says that I was at the Presidency and I was given details of the arrangement that was made or the deal that was made. It also mentions that there were barricades erected by the Muslims and that they were very afraid, that there were rumours of - what I wrote down here - was according to them, of Chetniks arriving in the city and Mr. Arkan. And my diary for the 4th of March says that the barricades came down, situation quiet.
Q. Thank you. That really does show that your diary and entries are very valuable. So I'll have to see with the Registrar how we can be provided them. Now, this diary by Ljubo Grkovic, I'd like to tender that.
JUDGE KWON: Yes. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I have a problem with this diary because as we can see, there are obviously problems with dates provided, and we don't know who that person is. Perhaps if we get a bit more information on that person. Otherwise, I would oppose it, and the witness should be brought who made this diary.
JUDGE KWON: If Mr. Karadzic could help us as regards this diary. Who is Mr. Grkovic is and --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Grkovic was a journalist in the newspaper "Oslobodjenje" before the war. And just before the war broke out, he was my chef de cabinet in the Serbian Democratic Party. I was working at my clinic as a psychiatrist right up until the 1st of March 2714 and -- well, I worked in the clinic in the afternoon, and this diary was found by the investigators of the Tribunal -- or, rather, the OTP. I didn't even know it existed. And we can see looking at the number of pages, and the page numbers SA04379, et cetera, you can see the order. So there was a mistake for the 1st and 2nd of March. He made a mistake in recording the date. But if you look at the sequence, then you can see that that's it because you see the 1st of February was Saturday, the 2nd of February was Sunday, and then he continued to the 1st day of March, he wrote down February instead of writing March. So it's a document which we received through the IDS and it was obviously accessed and found by the Prosecution -- or, rather, the investigators. No, we received it from the Prosecution in one of the batches they provided us with.
JUDGE KWON: Yes.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I can confirm this -- this diary was seized by -- by the Bosnian authorities and provided to us, and now that I know who that person is, I have no objection any more.
JUDGE KWON: So we'll admit it, but mark it for identification pending translation.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D215.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the excerpts we just had we have a translation of, and I am informed by Mr. Reid that we do have indeed the full translation of this document, so we can provide it to e-court.
JUDGE KWON: So with that explanation, you have no objection --
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Correct, Your Honour. 2715
JUDGE KWON: So it will be admitted then, Exhibit D215.
THE REGISTRAR: That's correct.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence kindly requests to be provided with that translation.
JUDGE KWON: Of course.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 65 ter 6608, please.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this has been admitted as Exhibit P938.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right, yes. And it's the minutes from the deputy's club of the Serbian Democratic Party. But I see that Mr. Kalinic was there as well. So, in fact -- well, all those Serbs who joined the Assembly of the Serbian people. May we turn to page 2 of the document, which is 090 -- ah. The English page number is 13. Page 13 for the English -- or, rather, 13, page 13 for the English. 19 and 20 for the Serbian. So page 13 for the English, please. That's right.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. I would like to draw your attention to what Velibor Ostojic is saying, Colonel, Velibor Ostojic whom you met for minister for information in the Bosnian government; is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to be reading that in the Serbian and you have it in English, Velibor Ostojic. 2716 "Gentlemen, I will merely provide some information which will really be important for taking position on some issues. "First, let me inform you that an informal body has introduced a special unit into the RTVSA, Sarajevo radio and television building without the knowledge of the government and the Ministry of Information. This can be done only in a state of emergency and under wartime conditions. I wrote a letter to the chief of the monitoring mission, Mr. Doyle. I met with him yesterday and gave him detailed information, and he promised that he would investigate this case. The man was simply flabbergasted when he heard about this event.
"I asked Mr. Zepinic, Mandic, Kic, and Zuban, our entire structure in the MUP from the republic down to the municipality if they were aware of that. Nobody was. This was done when the RTSA leadership was in Banja Luka."
Now, you were informed by the minister, the late minister now, regrettably, that somebody had usurped the minister's authority and placed a special unit in the TV building; is that correct?
A. No, that is not correct, Mr. Karadzic. I never received any letter from Mr. Ostojic. I agree with you that I had a meeting with him, and I can give the details of that meeting because I remember it quite well, but Mr. Ostojic certainly did not send me any letter. I certainly didn't receive any.
Q. Do you remember that he was objecting to the occupation of the television by some special forces which were there illegally?
A. Mr. Ostojic certainly did not mention that to me. Mr. Ostojic's 2717 primary purpose in asking to meet me was, one, to let me know that it was his view that as minister for information he should have control of the television at Sarajevo and not the Ministry of the Interior. He then went on to inform me that he had been attacked and beaten up outside his apartment and that he suspected it was done by officials from the Ministry of the Interior. I told him that it was not appropriate for me as head of the monitor mission to get involved in internal wranglings between ministries of the government, but that if I was going to do anything about it, I would first need to hear what the other side said, which was the Ministry of the Interior.
I subsequently had a meeting with Mr. Hebib, who I understand was the deputy minister of the interior, who told me that under no circumstances would television come under the control of the minister for information and that the reason why he understood that Mr. Ostojic had been attacked was nothing to do with the television. It was a private matter. But at no stage did Mr. Ostojic mention to me about any special unit that had been deployed into the television Sarajevo. I have absolutely no knowledge of that.
Q. Thank you. Colonel, this was not a private quarrel as it was informed in an insulting way. It was actually -- actually a murder attempt, and that is why we all received protection. We received protection from the regular police, including myself. But we're going to come to that when we start dealing with the transcript from your examination-in-chief.
Can we tender this document. Ah, it's already been admitted. 2718 Can we look at 1D1128 now, please, to see what the command of the 2nd Military District -- actually, at the time it was probably the 4th still. No, actually, the 2nd Military District reporting to the -- report from the 17th Partisan Brigade about their area of responsibility. This is document 1D1128.
We can see here that this is a military secret in perpetuity, meaning that this information is not to be revealed. Can we look at page 2. Thank you.
It says here: "In the TV Sarajevo building, there is major dissatisfaction among a large number of journalists because of the constant presence of armed paramilitary formations which are present in the television building and are mingling with reporters from various towns. That is why the reports are one-sided and tendentious, and they are being written under threat of weapons. We would like you to inform your entire unit with this information."
The document is dated the 23rd of April, 1992. Can we go back to page 1 now, please.
You were there on the 23rd of April, weren't you? Did you know that the Sarajevo Television was full of paramilitary formation forces?
A. No, I had no knowledge of that.
Q. Thank you. On page 1 it says:
"On the 17th, 18th April 1992, the Green Berets and special forces of the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out an attack on the 2719 Pretis factory in Vogosca when five of the attackers were killed, 20 wounded and 9 captured. Seven trucks were driven away, two of them with ammunition. One hundred Golf vehicles were stolen, which are being used by the Green Berets. With a timely intervention by the JNA unit, catastrophe of broader scope was prevented."
Were you aware of this attack by the paramilitary forces and the Muslim part of the joint MUP on a factory which belongs to the JNA and the ministry is being informed about it.
A. No, I have no knowledge of that.
Q. Thank you. The next paragraph states: "On the 18th to 19th April 1992, in the organisation of the Green Berets, the military industry Igman at Konjic, near Konjic, was captured, blocked. The phones were switched off in order to prevent reactions via the military."
Were you aware of this action?
A. No, I was not.
Q. Thank you. And then the next but one paragraph: "The situation in Visegrad is calming down and a key influence on this was played by units of the 2nd Military District. Several hundred of refugees were protected, primarily of Muslim ethnicity. A lot of assistance in food was given. The escalating conflict between Serbs and Muslims has led to the HOS units to strike both sides in order for the conflict to continue."
This is the latest that is happening in Sarajevo. They are using shattering cannon blasts in order to increase tensions and fear among the 2720 citizens because in that way the sound effect and the explosions are magnified several times over.
Sir, do you know what HOS is?
A. Well, HOS to me is one of the paramilitary organisations. We referred to all of those armed paramilitaries that were not JNA. Our collective title for them was simply paramilitaries, because there were so many types, colours, uniforms, it was very difficult to distinguish. I should say here if I may, Your Honour, that during this period Sarajevo was practically a city under siege. I was in the city of Sarajevo as the representative of Lord Carrington. I had the support of the monitor mission, but I had nobody under my command, nobody under my control. I was on my own. It was not appropriate for me, nor was it safe for me to travel around the city to investigate any of these allegations that may have been made. The city at this stage was in turmoil. It was very difficult to get an accurate reflection or a picture for what was going on. Out freedom of movement was interfered with, our safety and security was in jeopardy, so I am not at this stage able to give any detailed information about any of these incidents that are being brought up now.
Q. Thank you, but I believe that you know whose formation HOS is. Here it says that HOS was striking at the Muslims and at the Serbs in an attempt to escalate the conflict and that they were firing cannon in order to increase the effect. Shells were falling, among them HOS shells, both on the Serbs and on the Muslims. This is a secret document meant to remain that. So, please, do you know whose paramilitary 2721 formation HOS is?
A. One of the points that I want to raise here is that it was not a matter for me to try and identify military units, armed or otherwise, because my experience in peacekeeping led me to believe that I must maintain an impartial and neutral stance and this is something I always did, and if I was to be start writing reports about various paramilitary organisations one side or the other might indicate that somehow I was somebody's agent. So I did not get involved in the details of all of these paramilitary organisations at all. I was there as Carrington's personal representative. I was there in a diplomatic role, and I confined it to that.
JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, we've heard now on several occasions the witness very clearly set out the parameters of his duties and the opportunities which he had and didn't have. It seems to me it's very necessary now for you to concentrate on questioning him about matters which it's apparent he did have actual personal knowledge. First of all, the witness will be able to assist the Tribunal a great deal easier, and secondly, we'll go a great deal faster.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency, but it's a fact that the Colonel has said a lot of things during the examination-in-chief, among them that many documents were also being admitted through him which testify to that time. So it should then be possible for me to probe the documents that I agreed to be admitted. So I would just like him to answer whether he knew -- whether he knows whose formation the HOS was. 2722
THE WITNESS: I don't know whose formation the HOS was.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Thank you. You talked about the attack on the television. You affirmed or confirmed that you didn't know that the Green Berets had occupied the television building and that the -- how the news should look was being dictated. Do you then believe that the television building should and -- not and must not be a legitimate target?
A. Well, I already mentioned that I had no knowledge that the Green Berets had a unit in television. I had no proof that it was there either. So it wasn't part of my consideration. This is the first I've heard of it. It was never brought to my attention by anybody on either side that there was a unit on Sarajevo Television. You make reference to a letter I'm supposed to have received from Mr. Ostojic, which I'm telling you I did not receive. So I have no idea what you're talking about in relation to any unit going into television. And if that's the case then, any views I had of the television would not have taken into consideration the allegation that there were Green Berets there. I can talk about the attack on the television which is a separate issue.
Q. My question was: Do you consider or do you believe that television cannot be a legitimate target? We can just leave the presence of the military forces aside for a second.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's actually a matter for the Trial Chamber to decide whether anything is a legitimate military target or not, definitely not for the witness in his capacity as he was in the former Yugoslavia. 2723
JUDGE KWON: I agree with you, but when the colonel will be able to answer the question in the capacity as a military as far as he knows.
THE WITNESS: Well, I certainly would not deem that a television would be a target for any sort of military action. If some -- if somebody or organisation is attempting to upset or destroy the institutions of a state, then an attack on its television or on its communication complex would be one of those targets. So I don't know in what context Dr. Karadzic you're asking me this question. Can you explain it a bit clearer for me, please?
JUDGE KWON: We can move on.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Thank you. I would just like to say that NATO would get upset with you because you described the attack on Television Belgrade where there was no military presence, whereas here there was a military presence, and then later like you --
JUDGE KWON: No speech, Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender this document. This is a confidential report to the command of the 17th Partisan Brigade. Actually, to the command of the 2nd Military District from one of the units out in the field.
JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would object against it. First of all, we don't have a translation, and secondly, we do not really have a foundation for this document. The witness could not deal with it, and the commander Partisan -- 17th Partisan Brigade is definitely not a 2724 JNA unit. So the value and the reliability of this document has not been established. We would need to really get a foundation for this.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. In addition, the witness has no knowledge about the content of this document except for the name of one of the paramilitaries, and there are no circumstances in which we need this document to assist the credibility. So as such, we will not admit it, Mr. Karadzic.
And I take it it's time for a break.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just be given a minute to say that the Defence is -- well, would like to say that this is an attack on the television, and it shows that the television station building was a military facility and this is the JNA right up until the 20th of May. So the Defence is disappointed. And we certainly shouldn't -- wouldn't have called it the Partisan Brigade, because we were against the partisans and Chetniks for a modern Serb society.
JUDGE KWON: You will have ample opportunity to lead that evidence later on.
--- Recess taken at 10.20 a.m.
--- On resuming at 10.43 a.m.
JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic, bearing in mind what Judge Morrison had told you.
MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Before we resume the cross-examination, I wanted to ask if the Chamber might be willing to entertain a request that we have concerning the agenda of Colonel Doyle, 2725 and our request is that he go and at some point convenient to him today make a photocopy of those pages of his agenda which deal with the issues that have been the subject of his testimony, either meetings or events, and redact from those pages any personal information that he doesn't want to share with us and then have that made available to us before Dr. Karadzic concludes his cross-examination in the event that any material arising from those notes can be useful. Thank you.
JUDGE KWON: As a matter of principle, in fact, we leave it in the hands of the parties and witnesses negotiation, but can I ask, Colonel Doyle, what your position is as to the request from the Defence.
THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, this is a very personal diary to me, and it contains written notes in relation to communications I've had with my family over that period. The diary basically was made out just to remind me of who I met and where I met. The diaries don't have any personal notes as to views or opinions or reports. So -- so my request would be that I will do, of course, what I'm told to do, and if any of this was to be photocopied, I would reserve the right to delete most of its content because it is personal.
JUDGE MORRISON: It may be slightly more time-consuming, but if you were going to have to go through a photocopy it would take time anyway. It might be simply better for you to make a separate annotation on a separate piece of paper of those meetings which are relevant and the people there. And that sort of information may be easier for you and it may be more productive for the Defence.
THE WITNESS: I would think, Your Honours, the area of the diary 2726 which -- which -- in which I had notations on who I met probably would be from the period of the 1st of March to the day I was evacuated on the 12th of May. Now, I don't have any problems to having those dates if the Defence wish having those photocopied, but I would reserve the right just to delete anything that's personal. I really don't have a problem with that.
JUDGE MORRISON: That's very kind, but normally the position is where a diary is referred to in court then it becomes a matter which can be disclosed to the Defence. For instance, if a police officer is giving evidence from his notebook, the same principle applies whether it's called a notebook or a diary, but the same principle of nondisclosure also applies in that those parts of the notebook which are not relevant to the case are not disclosed, and in your case it would be those parts personal to you.
THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. I -- I don't have a problem with that. But as I said, it -- you know, to do it for the entire period of the full year, I think, is not necessary. I would suggest from the period of the 1st of March when the situation began to develop to the period that I was evacuated on the 12th of May. I don't have a problem with that if Your Honours so wish what to be done.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We do appreciate your co-operation. Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, may I have 1D01273 next, please. Let's just identify the first page and then we can move on to page 4 of this document. And that portion has been translated as well. 2727 So there we have the first page of the document. Now page 4 of the Serbian and -- well, it's been translated in the English.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, Colonel, here we see a report from the police of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the national security department -- or, rather, the secret service, and it says Ilidza. And they are reporting and saying that Television Sarajevo has been taken over by the Green Berets, that there are 50 to 70 of them led by Sejo Saric, and then a man called Boca and another man called Saban, with assistance from Bajrovic and Kasim, and so on, and that they have large quantities of ammunition, and during the attack on Svrakino Selo, 30 to 40 members of the Green Berets had arrived at the television station, put up launchers and bazookas on top of the TV station and that they fired at ranges of 500 metres and also present -- well, were TV station employees begged the Green Berets to provide them with ammunition so that they could exchange it in the city for bread, exchange ammunition for bread. And then it goes on to say that when it was bombed on the 9th of May, and when the 6th floor was precisely hit, the result was the destruction of studio 1 and offices and the 7th floor was hit, and so on and so forth. Now, is this proof and evidence that the building was indeed used as primarily a military facility, target?
A. No, it was not. As far as I'm concerned, I never saw any military units at the Sarajevo Television. There was never any reference to me. Nobody from the Bosnian Serbs came to me to say anything about this. This is all absolutely astonishing for me to read. I find this 2728 very difficult to believe or accept. I never saw, during the period that I was in Sarajevo, any large military units at the television. I never saw any weapons placed on the -- on the roofs, and considering that there was a mortar attack done by the Bosnian Serbs on the television station, I'm just wondering is this ammunition to, in some way, justify the attack. But I have to say that for the period that I was there, I never saw any Green Berets or anybody in uniform or any large quantity of weapons or anything of that nature, and nobody every said a word to me from any side about this allegation.
Q. Thank you. Now, Colonel, we have to clarify some things that are contradictory. You said that you were alone and helpless and that you had no other people. When we talked, you said that you didn't go into the centre of town but that you did have your people in the centre of town.
Now, let's see, were you in a position to see something, and if you didn't see something, do you allow for the possibility that it happened and existed regardless of the fact that you didn't see?
A. If I may just clarify the position here. Up until the time that I became the personal representative of Lord Carrington, I had control over approximately 60 monitors of the European Union that were under my command in the city of Sarajevo and throughout the country. They were tasked by me to submit daily reports on developments in their various areas. This would have included the city of Sarajevo. When I became Lord Carrington's personal representative and I returned to Sarajevo on the 10th of April, 1992, while I did have the 2729 support of the monitor mission and was able to get reports from them, I didn't have any control or authority over them.
The second thing I would point out is that the Television Sarajevo was relatively close to where we were staying in Ilidza. It's not -- Sarajevo Television was not in the centre of the city. Therefore we knew and were able to have contact with Sarajevo Television. I did many interviews from Sarajevo Television. So I can only give you my personal opinion that in my mind this whole report alleging that there were bazookas and all sorts of munitions, I just can't accept that. That is my opinion and assessment at that time.
Q. Colonel, were you in a position to know more than state security? Because this is a document dated the 11th of May. So you claim to know better than the state security and you are also saying that this isn't an authentic document. You were alone in Ilidza and this is state security with branches everywhere, like any intelligence services, and now you're claiming you have better insight into the situation and you're challenging an authentic document from that time, a contemporaneous document. Is that what you're doing?
JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Karadzic, that's a complete misrepresentation. What the witness said was what he saw and what he personally didn't see, which is of course what any witness is limited to saying. He doubts the authenticity of the document on the basis of what he saw. The authenticity of the document per se is not something that this witness can speak to. If you have evidence in due course that authenticates the document, then you're free to bring it, but you've 2730 misrepresented entirely the nature and substance of the witness's evidence on that point.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Colonel, my dilemma is in the following: You talk about many things. During the examination-in-chief you talked about many things. Now, when I went to ask you about the details of those events or things, you say you don't know, or you claim that you know differently from what the documents show. So are you biased, Colonel?
A. No, the one thing I will never be accused of, Mr. Karadzic, is being biased, with all due respect.
Q. Thank you. Now, let me ask you, why did you avoid seeing the Serb side, meeting with the Serb side or having your photograph taken with the Serb side? Wasn't the Serb side an equal party in the negotiations and in the conflict?
A. I don't -- is there a question there about meeting the Serbs? Does it relate to a particular time and incident? I am not sure I understand the question, Mr. Karadzic.
Q. Well, the question is: When you were in the European mission, and I see later on, too, you refused to be a guest at Ilidza with the local leadership there, and when you came to Pale, your condition was -- that you stipulated was that you shouldn't be photographed for television. Now, I'm wondering why all the high representatives respected all three sides, whereas you were against having anything to do with the Serb side? So that's the question.
A. Okay. I can -- I can answer that. The first instance you are 2731 referring to is a dinner that I was invited to by a newly formed Bosnian Serb community committee in Ilidza. At that dinner I began to realise that I was being used, I would say, in a political manner. The entire non-Serb members of the hotel staff had been taken by the Bosnian Serbs and removed without their consent into the centre of the city. My view at the time when this speech was made in my presence was that they wanted to welcome me, and I felt that if I was to be seen to be part of this new organisation, it would somehow give legitimacy to it. This is something I was not prepared to do.
In reference to the meeting in Pale in which I went up with Mrs. Plavsic. Mrs. Plavsic agreed with me that there would not be any publicity of my visit, because at that stage the entity of Bosnia Srpska had not been accepted internationally. And again if I was seen up in Pale in uniform of the European Union Monitor Mission and publicity was given, it somehow might be interpreted as an acceptance of the entity of Republika Srpska, and this is something I wanted to avoid because I was trying to maintain my neutrality and impartiality. As events turned out, because Mrs. Plavsic realised it was my birthday, she arranged for a cake to be brought in and the televisions arrived and photographed and covered all this, and of course, it was given prominence, I understand, even in one of the papers in Belgrade. So you have to appreciate that what I've been trying to do is I've been trying to maintain a neutral stance and that's the reason why I didn't want any publicity. I never at any stage refused to mediate or co-operate with the Bosnian Serb leadership. I think you will have to accept that yourself, Mr. Karadzic. I never 2732 refused any meeting, and I tried to be as helpful as I could to all sides in this conflict.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I now tender this document, Your Excellencies. And I should like to call up 1D1291 next, please, briefly. It's a book by General MacKenzie.
JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In relation to ID 1273, the same opposition applies like with the previous document. It was not adopted by the witness. The witness could not deal with it at all. There's no foundation to accept this document at this point in time.
JUDGE KWON: Agreed. We'll not admit this document.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we're disappointed again, because it shows that the witness was not sufficiently well informed about matters, but it's your decision.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, I'd like to draw your attention to this next document. That's the title page of General MacKenzie's book. And now may we turn to page 182 of the book, please. Page 182. 182. That's what it says on the page. It's page 182 of the book. Or, rather, page 22 if we look at the document itself. Yes, that's right.
Let's see what General MacKenzie has to say: "[In English] May 11th. The European Community had been conducting marathon peace talks over the previous few days. The EC continued to exclude the Bosnian Serbs from the deliberations, and as a result, was becoming less and less popular with them. Meanwhile, the 2733 Bosnian Serbs under Dr. Karadzic were becoming more and more independent from the JNA. There were even reports of Bosnian Serbs attacking JNA," and so on.
[Interpretation] So you see, that that was the position taken by General MacKenzie, too, that the European Commission -- or European Community, rather, that its representatives bypassed us. Now, the position of the entire conference, including Carrington, and you accepted that when we had our interview that it was his position, Carrington's position, that the only important thing was for all three sides to place their signature to the peace agreement and everybody treat us as equal parties in the negotiations and in the conflict later on, except for the European mission.
And now at the bottom of that page under May the 12th, it says: "[In English] After a restless night in new surroundings, I sat around with General Nambiar, Philippe Morillon, and Cedric Thornberry to discuss our expanding peacekeeping role in Bosnia. We still didn't have a mandate from the UN for Bosnia, but with the departure of the European Community, we were the only game in town and slowly but surely had already been getting involved. We agreed that we had to involve the Bosnian Serbs in any cease-fire negotiations chaired by the UNPROFOR." [Interpretation] Therefore, Colonel, we didn't ask you to recognise our republic, Republika Srpska, but to respect the Serb side without which there could be no negotiations and which was part of the legitimate system, a third of the legitimate system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So why was that so difficult to do? Why was it so 2734 difficult to accept that, for the European Commission to accept that? I mean, the European Community to accept that.
A. There's into issue here about the European Community, not accepting the Bosnian Serbs as one of the legitimate ethnic groupings in Bosnia. If you're asking me why the Bosnian Serbs weren't invited to negotiations which I was involved in, I can give you answer to that. So I'm not too sure what your question is. There's never been any doubt that the Bosnian Serbs were part of the entity there. No one is disputing that. The other thing I'll tell you is General Lewis Mackenzie was a United Nations military commander, in command of a considerable amount of troops and represented the United Nations. I did not represent the United Nations. I didn't represent the European Community. I represented the International Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia, and it is, you know, General MacKenzie can be cross-examined himself. His views of it may be different to mine and are in many instance, but I would just remind you that even though we were all trying to do the same thing, General MacKenzie was a United Nations military officer. I was not.
Q. Thank you. We'll come back to that document. May I tender it into evidence now, please, the book, although we'll come back to the book in due course a number of times, I believe. Well, I can tender it later on if need be.
May we have 1D01270. Just to round off this topic. And you'll see there a letter there General Kukanjac to Alija Izetbegovic, written on the 19th of April. You were there at the time. And General Kukanjac 2735 is writing to Izetbegovic -- I think we have the translation of that too. Yes, we do.
I'm going to read it out in Serbian, just some of the more pertinent portions:
"Mr. President, in the course of the night of the April 17th through the 18th, 1992, your Green Berets carried out an attack on part of a factory in Vogosca, Pretis, the mortar and artillery ammunition production, you are aware of the results of the attack. "In the course of the night of the 18th of April through to the 19th, 1992, in Konjic, at 2000 hours on the 18th of April everything was blocked. All telephones of the PTT were turned off to military facilities. The Green Berets occupied the military equipment factory of Igman."
And then lower down says: "Mr. President, a cease of all attacks on military facilities," and under C, "order the deblocking of military facilities Ljuta and Celebic." And on the next page -- we can stay there with the English page, it's on that same page in English or perhaps not, perhaps not. It says, "Mr. President --" What? Yes, we stay there with the English: "Do not forget that we have signed a peace agreement -- we signed a peace agreement on the 12th of April, 1992, and at that very same day your command to attack or where you declare war on the JNA was released and directed of course at Serbs and other innocent citizens." And the last paragraph:
"Analyse all this and state publicly that you want war. If you 2736 don't want war then demonstrate it through your actions." Now, all this was happening when you were Lord Carrington's envoy to the peace conference. Should you have known about this, and are they circumstances under which the conference was to take place and that those circumstances and the situation affected the conference itself and it's outcome? Do you agree with that?
A. Well, this is the first time I've seen this document. I'm not aware that it was sent by anybody. I wasn't aware of its content, and therefore I can't comment on it. I can only say on the 18th of April that was the day that the television was mortar bombed by Bosnian Serbs.
Q. You know all that, but you don't know all that the Muslim forces did; is that right?
A. Mr. Karadzic, I'm not totally aware of what anybody did at this stage. I mean, you have to appreciate this city was under siege. It is bound to have allegations flying all over the place, and of course we need to get the background to them. But most of the concern for the international community was what was happening to the city from outside the city to wit the mortaring and shelling of the city from outside. That was the main concern. I find it -- I find it very difficult to understand why there are so many allegations against Muslims carrying out all these actions in the city that was basically under siege, where freedom of movement was denied, where we were spending a lot of time in bunkers. So I find these -- these documents surprising to say the least.
Q. Colonel, sir, do you know who was doing the shelling? Did you know that it was the HOS and its artillery who were present in Sarajevo? 2737 Did you know that or not?
A. I was aware that there were elements inside the city that were attempting to defend the city and that there were elements inside the city that were fighting for territory. Yes, I'm aware of that. I don't know the exact details of it, but the predominantly -- the predominant action that was taking place around that period was the shelling of the city and different parts of the city from weapons that were placed on the hills surrounding the city of Sarajevo. That's why most of us were taking shelter in bunkers in the United Nations.
Q. Colonel, do you know who was on the hillsides around Sarajevo? Did you know who held which position?
A. No, I don't know, but we were -- we were very well aware of the fact that it was predominantly Bosnian Serbs, because they had already established a Bosnian Serb Army. All of the tanks, heavy artillery, mortars were taken up. I've seen evidence of that in a document that I think has already been placed here from a meeting of the Republika Srpska's committee when it talked about all of the weapons they'd already taken. So I think it is beyond dispute or doubt but that the vast and overwhelming bulk of the armaments at that time were belonging and controlled by the Bosnian Serbs and they were directing this against the city of Sarajevo.
Q. We must be precise, lieutenant [as interpreted], sir, so please don't get angry with me. But can you tell me did the Bosnian Serbs have their own army up until the 12th of May, until the time that you were in Bosnia? 2738
A. Yes, they did.
Q. But it's well known that the decision on forming the army was adopted on the 12th of May at the Assembly session in Banja Luka and that the Serbian Army -- the Bosnian Serb Army came into being on the 20th of May, because on the 19th of May the JNA withdrew from Bosnia; is that correct?
A. The JNA withdrew from Bosnia on that date. I agree with that. But you don't create an army overnight, Mr. Karadzic. We saw evidence of massive convoys of armaments and tanks going up the road to Pale to the Republika Srpska headquarters. I've already mentioned that I went up there on the 1st of May with Mrs. Plavsic. I attempted to get up the day before that but the roads were blocked with so many tanks and artillery pieces heading up to Pale that were taken over by from the Bosnian Serbs from the JNA who, at that stage, were anxious to withdraw from the territory of Bosnia.
Q. Whose tanks with those? Were they JNA tanks and when did the Serbs -- the Bosnian Serbs take them over from the JNA?
A. Well, I assumed that they were taken over at the time I saw them going up to Pale. And I also recall that when you were coming to a meeting yourself at Ilidza that you came in one of these tanks yourself with the JNA protection. So I don't know exactly. I know when the decision -- I know when the announcement was made on the creation of the Bosnian Serb Army, but there was a huge amount of military movement before that. One of the missions given to the ECMM was to monitor the movement of convoys of the JNA that were withdrawing from the territory 2739 of Croatia. That was one of the tasks I was given when I was head of the mission and we did this and we watched the movement of many convoys of the JNA coming through Bosnia and heading on to other territories such as Serbia. However, a considerable amount of those convoys were, to our mind, coming under the immediate control of the Bosnian Serbs who very quickly established a Bosnian Serb Army, because the arrangement was that anybody who was from the territory of Bosnia that was a member of the JNA, they could remain in Bosnia. Most of these were Serbs and not alone did they remain, but they took with them their equipment and tanks, et cetera. So it was beyond dispute as what was happening.
Q. There's a lot that is disputable. Where did General Delic come from, from which army?
A. I have no idea. I don't know him.
Q. Well, where did Hajrulahovic come from who you did meet? Where did the command cadre of the Muslim army come from, and where did they get their initial weaponry? I'm not talking about second or third deliveries of weapons which arrived from Iran, but anyway, where did they get the weapons from in the first place? And do you agree that the JNA was the mother of all the armies in the republics of the former Yugoslavia?
A. Yes, I accepted that the JNA represented all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and I do accept that there were elements of Bosnian Serbs -- or Bosnian Muslims and Croats who had access to weapons. What I'm saying here is the overwhelming bulk of the withdraw army from Croatia and its equipment was given to the Bosnian Serbs. I'm not 2740 denying for a moment that some of those members of the JNA who were Bosnian Muslims became part of the territorial army. I'm not saying that. What I am saying is that the overwhelming bulk of the retreating -- not of the retreating, but of the JNA that were being monitored leaving Croatia by agreement, a lot of those who were Bosnians, that were Bosnian Serbs, became part of the Bosnian Serb Army.
Q. I'm going to put something to you, Colonel, sir. Croats and Muslims, for a long period of time were gradually leaving the JNA, so the JNA predominantly became a Serb army. The Serbs were not leaving the JNA until the very end, so that the Serbs inherited these things at once while the Muslims and the Croats did that, gradually seizing the weapons from the JNA. So the JNA is the mother of all the republican armies which were being created from the police forces and the Territorial Defence units of those republics, as well as the JNA units that were leaving the JNA. Croats and Muslims were leaving the army gradually and the Serbs did not. So that is why you have the impression that the Serbs inherited the JNA. But it's only because they did not leave the army until the very end. Would you agree that all the armies were actually created out of the JNA except the Croats and the Muslims were leaving the army gradually and the Serbs did not do that until the very end? Would you agree with that?
A. Well, I can only repeat what I've said earlier, that it was known that 80 per cent -- approximately 80 per cent of the JNA army that went into Bosnia were Bosnian, and most of those were Bosnian Serbs. And so overnight you had a -- nearly overnight you had an easy transition from 2741 JNA units become Bosnian Serb units. It would have applied to Croats and Muslims on a much smaller scale.
The second reason why the Bosnian Serbs were armed was because President Izetbegovic had declared a state of neutrality and therefore directed that for the federal JNA call-up of reservists that those who were Muslims and Croats would not have to obey that, and they didn't. Therefore, most of the people who obeyed the call for mobilisation were Bosnian Serbs, and they were issued with weapons when they were mobilised, and those weapons they were allowed to retain when they were demobilised. So you had a gradual arming of Bosnian Serbs, and this was not done to any great extent to the Bosnian Muslims. So it was natural that they were going to have access to weapons. And it was a cause of concern to the monitor mission. We had reports coming in of concern being expressed by various opstina that Bosnian Serbs were being gradually armed because they were obeying the call for mobilisation. President Izetbegovic said that it wasn't, in his view, legal and therefore many Bosnian Muslims did not obey the call-up for mobilisation. So that would be another factor in the gradual arming of Bosnian Serbs.
Q. I have to remind you that during our interview we talked about it. I asked you whether you few about the Tito's -- about Tito's doctrine of an armed peoples, about the Law on All Peoples Defence and Social Protection, and that a long time before the war reservists were allowed to take weapons and their uniforms and equipment home. This was long before the war began. So do you remember that we discussed all these questions? 2742
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Thank you. That was something that was generally known. Colonel, sir, do you know when the Muslim side began to create it's own armed forces?
A. No, I'm not aware of as to when that happened. I don't -- I knew, of course, that the president was Alija Izetbegovic, and that therefore as president and president of the Presidency that he had a certain amount of influence, but I had concerns because I was called into the Presidency to be told of the concerns of the Presidency at one, the gradual arming of the Bosnian Serbs, and two, that there were munitions coming into the territory of Bosnia that were not officially labelled, and they were coming in in trucks. And I had an incident where the prime minister at the time at Peladin [phoen] asked me to meet with the JNA to find out a reason as to why these weapons were coming in to the JNA. I'm not saying they went to the Bosnian Serbs. At that time they went to the JNA.
So these were issues that were being discussed earlier on in the crisis.
Q. Very well. Do you accept that the JNA could, just like any other army, engage other transport vehicles to transfer its equipment somewhere else? That was the case, and the army did confirm that it was theirs. Do you agree that any army in the world can engage another company to transport -- or for transport services on its behalf?
A. Well, I don't have experience of that from my country. We use military equipment for the transfer of military goods. I was concerned 2743 at that time because the manifest -- the manifest that was with that convoy I was told - I don't have evidence of this but I was informed by the prime minister - that the manifest of that convoy of four civilian trucks had no mention of rocket launchers that were subsequently found on those trucks and that was what created concern. And I can also say on record here that it was my recommendation to the prime minister that the weapons be released to the JNA and that it would be of advantage to the Presidency if it began to open dialogue with the JNA as an army. Up to that time this wasn't being done. So at my suggestion there was some contact done officially with the JNA, something which wasn't done before I met the prime minister.
Q. Thank you. Colonel, sir, I'm going to put some facts to you and you can just say whether you agree with the possibility, rule it out or not.
Mr. Izetbegovic, in February, two months after the first democratic power was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, formed a secret committee for the protection of Muslims even though by the very nature of his function he was the president of the council for defence of all the three peoples. Do you allow for this fact to be true or do you disagree that that was the time when this secret commission for the defence of Muslim was formed, for the defence of Muslims? This was in February 1991.
A. No, Mr. Karadzic. I've absolutely no -- no idea on that. I didn't go to Bosnia --
Q. [Overlapping speakers] Thank you. And along that line do you 2744 know that on the 31st of March, 1991, a decision was adopted on the formation of the Patriotic League as the secret army of the SDA?
A. No, I have no knowledge of that. Again I didn't go to Bosnia until October 1991.
Q. Thank you. I'm just going to put this to you: Do you know that this Patriotic League was formed on the 30th of April and that from that time on all the Muslim fighter's date of service began to be recorded, the date of service for all Muslim fighters began on the 30th of April, 1991?
A. No, I have no knowledge of that.
Q. Thank you. Do you know that in 103 municipalities, with the exception of only six Croat municipalities, so 103 municipalities where Serbs and Muslims lived together, brigades were formed in -- of the Patriotic Leagues in all of them. So a secret army was being formed in all of these municipalities where Serbs and Muslims were living together?
A. I -- I have no knowledge of that.
Q. Thank you. Do you know that already at that time arming began and they were receiving weapons from all over and that when the conflict began they received weapons from Iran with the knowledge of the United States continuously through Croatian territory?
A. No, I'm not familiar with that.
Q. If I were to tell you, Colonel, sir, that the new year, 1992, we awaited with 103.000 of our armed Muslims belonging to the Patriotic League, what would you say?
A. I'd say that I'd be very, very surprised. 2745
Q. Thank you. And what would you say if I were to tell you that on the 27th of June, 1991, President Kucan, President Tudjman, and the presiding President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic, made a secret alliance against Yugoslavia and the JNA? This was a military alliance intended to wage war against Yugoslavia and the JNA.
A. Again, I have no knowledge of that.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I'm very reluctant to interrupt, and you probably have already seen that I do not object much, but the witness is -- has said he has no knowledge, and he came in 19 -- he came at October 1991. So these questions do not lead anywhere, and I just wonder when this will be stopped.
JUDGE KWON: Some of the questions were related to 1992, after he arrived, and then I understood him to be putting his case. So let's be brief.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to state the following: The distinguished colonel, Mr. Doyle, whom we always respected and still do, arrived and faced a situation that he did not know much about, and I'm convinced that Colonel Doyle would have viewed matters differently had he known of the secret alliance, war alliance, and so on.
JUDGE KWON: Do not make your speech.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just explaining why I consider this to be relevant. The colonel did not know then what he knows now.
JUDGE KWON: You will have the opportunity to explain to the 2746 Chamber as to the credibility or the relevance of the evidence later on. This is the time for you to put your question instead of making speech.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, do you agree that you agreed when we had our interview that you did not know who Dr. Karadzic controlled -- or, rather, which formations, which units at that time, and that your idea about Karadzic controlling something is based on the fact that Karadzic had an armed escort; right?
A. I would have taken it that as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs you would have had responsibility for all elements of Bosnian Serbs under your control, and that, in my view, would have included military. That is the normal. When one is a leader, one accepts responsibility for what his subordinates do or failed to do. Therefore I would have assumed and it would have been the same for the Bosnian Muslims under President Izetbegovic, that the political leaders who control these people, they're the ones who accept -- who should take responsibility. So it's in that light that I would have understood you to be the undisputed leader of the Bosnian Serbs.
I mean, I -- I'm certainly willing to state that there would always be elements that are not under central control, some radicals, but by and large it is the norm for political masters to control military forces.
Q. Thank you. But we're talking here about something that happened up -- up to the 12th of May, and you agreed and said that you don't know 2747 that I controlled certain formations up until the 12th of May. So we're not talking about the situation after the 20th of May when the Army of Republika Srpska existed but while you were there.
You agreed that while you were there, you had no knowledge of and were not aware of me controlling any formations. But you've said in your statement that you saw that I had an armed escort.
Now, did you agree when we met that that armed escort was assigned to us by the ministry -- or, rather, the police and that they were employees of the regular police force?
A. When we had the meeting and you put that to me, I accepted what you said. Yes, I accept that. I'm not in a position of saying when exactly I can recall whether any of these suddenly became armed Bosnian Serbs, because at that time they were many armed forces who were in uniform and out of uniform and it was very difficult to get a handle on exactly who was what, but when I saw you on occasions that you had an escort, some of them did not appear to me to be in uniform so I wasn't too sure who they were. So I accept when you say they were given to you by the police. I have no reason to disbelieve that.
Q. Thank you. Now, did you know, based on this document -- well, the second page in Serbian -- or, rather, from this letter by General Kukanjac to Alija Izetbegovic, don't forget that we reached an agreement on a truce on the 12th of April, and that afterwards they issued a directive declaring war on the JNA? Did you know about this cease-fire, the truce? You said previously, I believe, that you knew of this 12th of April cease-fire agreement? 2748
A. Yes. I was involved in -- at that stage I had returned to Sarajevo on the 10th of April, and I was involved -- or I was witness to the negotiations that were going on in Ilidza in order to get that cease-fire.
Q. Thank you. Now, do you know that on that very same day, Hasan Efendic sent a secret directive for war against all JNA facilities, to block roads, cut off electricity and water and everything that happened to the JNA in Croatia?
A. No, I'm not familiar with that. No.
Q. Well, we published that, and we sent it out to the mediators in negotiations.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to tender this letter by General Kukanjac to Mr. Izetbegovic into evidence, please.
JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the witness has actually said that he cannot confirm anything in this letter, and he cannot deal with the letter, and therefore the position is actually as before.
JUDGE KWON: We agree. Witness --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But he did confirm it, Your Excellency. He said that he took part, that he was a peace broker.
JUDGE KWON: He couldn't comment on it. We do not admit it.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D0178 is the document I'd like called up on e-court next, please.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. And while we're waiting for that to come up, let me ask you, 2749 Colonel, whether you knew of attacks by the Muslim army against Nedzarici and the JNA installations, weapons theft and so on?
A. We had been informed that there were some attacks by Muslim elements against some of the JNA installations with a view to attempting to get weapons, but I had no written report of it and I wasn't in a position of verifying that information.
Q. Here we have a document which refers to your interview to "Vecernje Novosti" on the 12th of May, 1992, and this is what it says: "Lord Carrington's personal envoy gave a statement saying that he was going home."
And there's a better variant: "... saying that he is returning home tired and exhausted from meeting with hundreds of different people during --" et cetera. Now, at the bottom it says:
"Colonel Doyle stressed that he does -- that an attack on the JNA ammunition storage depot near Nedzarici is inconceivable to him by which the Rump Presidency once again violated the agreement and word they had given. If we agree upon something and if we confirm all the details," this is a quotation, "he says, 'Completely unbelievable that that which was agreed on is not respected,' said Doyle. I believe that in Sarajevo at the time nobody has complete control of the situation, that the many armed forces are outside of any kind of control. That is perhaps the reason for the attack, which unfortunately there were once again dead and wounded men."
Do you remember giving that interview? 2750
A. I have to admit I don't -- I don't actually remember. I gave -- I gave many interviews, but I actually don't remember this one. Now, when this is dated the 12th of May, on the 12th of May I was up at 5.00 a.m. because I had to go to Lukavica because I was told that I was being evacuated by aircraft to Belgrade. So I presume the -- the interview didn't take place on the 12th of May. Maybe the paper was issued on the 12th of May, but I certainly don't recall that specific interview, no.
If I had time to analyse the document, I could give a view on it, but I'm just -- I'm -- I'm -- it -- it's coming as a surprise to me.
Q. Thank you. But, yes, that's correct. These -- the paper was published on the 12th of May. So I assume that you made the statement at least one day prior to that if not more. But let's see what it says in reference to the 3rd of May, when the military column was massacred. Mr. Doyle had this to say:
"Even with the passage of the military convoy, everything was arranged beforehand and that crime should not have happened, although I must say that during the evacuation of the army and command of other military regions there were military mistakes being made; namely prior to the decision to move, I had forewarned General Milutin Kukanjac that a column of 25 vehicles was far too large and I had told General MacKenzie that it was far too late to start moving."
Do you remember saying that and that position of yours?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Thank you. 2751
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this now, Your Excellency. May it be received?
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be admitted as.
THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D216, Your Honour.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now may we have called up again 1D1291, which is General MacKenzie's book, and it's page 3 of the document.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Since you mentioned the attack on the column in your interview, the events of the 3rd of May, we're now just going to glance at this passage where your name is mentioned. I'm going to read it out in English:
"[In English] By the 3rd, definitely it was the worst day in my life begins my diary for this date. Around midmorning, Bosnian vice-president Ejup Ganic came to my office and met with me and Colm Doyle of the EC. Ganic explained that President Izetbegovic, on his return from Lisbon, had been kidnapped at the Sarajevo airport; he was being detained by the JNA at their Lukavica camp, just east of the runway. Ganic said he was not a strong leader and needed his president back in ordered to control the radical officers within the Bosnian Territorial Defence forces, who were rapidly getting out of control. Territorial Defence forces had General Kukanjac's headquarters under siege in the eastern part of city; Ganic feared that if they attacked the general's barracks, the JNA would retaliate by levelling Sarajevo." 2752 [Interpretation] Do you remember Ganic's arrival in
General MacKenzie's office?
A. Yes, I do. I was there.
Q. Thank you. Now, do you know how long the siege of the 2nd Military District lasted, command and headquarters?
A. I'm not exactly sure, but I knew that the military headquarters was surrounded by -- by Bosnian Muslims, that I can verify. And when General MacKenzie said to me the United Nations did not have a mandate to work in Bosnia, he asked if I would chair the negotiations to initiate the -- to try to secure the release of the president against General Kukanjac, and that's what I did.
Q. Thank you. Now, if I tell you that it was weeks before and that the headquarters was under siege by the Green Berets weeks before this incident, would you accept that?
A. Well, as I said, I actually don't know, so I've no reason not to accept it, but it -- it gave -- it gave me ammunition to do a deal, to swap the president for the general, and that's what I set about to do.
Q. Thank you. I'm sure you'll remember that before that an agreement was reached about the way in which the JNA would be withdrawing and that the government guaranteed it. We have the document here. I think the Prosecution presented it. Do you remember that such a document did exist, that the Muslim part of the authorities guaranteed security during the withdrawal?
A. I can't remember the exact detail of that, but what I can say is that I was very, very concerned when we had what I thought an agreement 2753 that we would swap the presidential party for General Kukanjac, and an officer of colonel rank who was in the room decided that the ante, as they say, would be put up. And instead of Kukanjac getting out he wanted the entire military headquarters. Now as a military officer, the same for General MacKenzie, we knew that to withdraw a full military force from a sieged barracks was something that was very dangerous and we were anxious that the information would be given to the Bosnian Muslims. We told the president that we felt this was not a viable option, that withdrawing all of these troops with all of their equipment would not be accepted by the Muslims who were surrounding the -- the headquarters, but this colonel was extremely abusive to me, and he tried to thwart my efforts to get the president out.
So what I'm saying in essence is that yes, we were aware that the military headquarters was surrounded by armed Bosnian Muslims, and we were very concerned that even though the president said he could guarantee the security of the convoy, neither General MacKenzie nor my myself believed that this could actually take place.
Q. Thank you. Thank you. And we see: "[In English] Ganic was extremely shaken by this news. He almost lost control. Colm and I decided to go to the JNA camp at Lukavica to find out what was happening."
[Interpretation] May we turn to the next page, please. Do you agree with this? Yes, you do? Yes or no?
A. Sorry? Do --
Q. Is that passage I read out correct? 2754
A. Yes, that's correct, yes.
Q. Thank you. Now on the next page: "[In English] The president was on the phone talking to General Kukanjac and seemed to be in pretty good spirits." [Interpretation] Do you confirm that too?
A. No, I can't confirm that because for the first two hours we were in Lukavica I was not in with the president. I stayed outside. And General MacKenzie was dealing with the president, and he came out to let me know that the deal we had originally negotiated had now fallen through because there was a conversation between the president, I understand, and General Kukanjac which I wasn't privy to. And then I was told this colonel came to me and said that -- that there was going to be a difficulty because the deal we had arranged at the headquarters of the UN in the city was now negated, and I was getting very frustrated and very annoyed. I was also concerned that if this drew on much longer that darkness would fall, and trying to move a convoy in darkness would be very serious. So I gave my views, but the president said, I will guarantee the security of the convoy.
And then the -- the colonel changed his mind and -- because he didn't want to release the other members of the Presidency. He said to me, You've just negotiated the release of the president, not his daughter or a security officer or another member of the Presidency. So in trying to get this problem solved, I was certainly held as a hostage myself, or I was held back as collateral. So what happened from the time the convoy left Lukavica barracks with the president inside 2755 to the time that the president got to the Presidency I have no idea. I certainly know what happened from looking at it in television and getting reports, but I was not witness to the operation. I do know and accept that the convoy was attacked and that approximately five or six members of the JNA were killed.
Q. Thank you. I'm afraid that there's more to that, but what you have just said more or less is also written in this book by General MacKenzie about how you were against such a large evacuation and that Izetbegovic accepted responsibility.
I would now like us to look at the next one, two, three, four pages ahead, please.
On this page we can see: "[In English] At that moment we heard the claxon horn on the approaching emergency vehicle. It was a JNA ambulance. The driver was frantically sowing [phoen] on the steering wheel trying to avoid hitting anyone. His task was made all of the more difficult to JNA colonel collapsed on his right shoulder and missing half his face. The colonel was obviously dead or about to die."
[Interpretation] A bit lower: "[In English] It seemed that wherever we were the killing stopped. The stealing of equipment was still going on but at least people weren't being executed."
[Interpretation] General MacKenzie is describing, because he was there at the scene, he believes that more people were killed than what you described and now there are proceedings being conduced. Ganic has 2756 been arrested in London as one of those responsible for what happened. Now can we go to the next page, please. It's a pity that you were not at the scene. Did General MacKenzie inform you about what happened?
A. I don't remember an exact conversation with him. I -- I was very concerned about my own safety when I was held at Lukavica because I was threatened with a pistol. So I really had my own concerns about my own future. But really I wasn't witness to -- as soon as the president left Lukavica, I was out of it, so I had no detailed knowledge of what happened after that, nor was I witness to it. So I really can't comment on that.
Q. On this page, 170, we have to look at the page -- the bottom part of the page:
"At this point General Kukanjac started pacing back and forth [In English] Across the street, shouting that he was missing at least 200 soldiers as he had to go back for them."
[No interpretation]: "[In English] I told him that if he did so, he would be killed for sure."
[No interpretation]: "[In English] I ordered him back into Steve's vehicle. Reluctantly he obeyed it, his face expressing the agony of someone who cared for his soldiers."
[Interpretation] Do you agree that the Serbs expected that the presence of international forces would make the evacuation safe and that they had sufficient reason to be angry because of this massacre? 2757 Regardless of whether they were right or not, did the Serbs have the feeling that they could rely on the presence of international forces and on the word of the president, President Izetbegovic?
A. Well, what I can say here is that when the president said that he would -- that he would guarantee the safety of the convoy we disagreed with him and we told him he wasn't in a position to guarantee the safety of the convoy. And as military officers, we would not have been happy with this arrangement. However, he was the president of the country. He had assured us he would guarantee the security of the convoy. It was a very dangerous situation. This military barracks was surrounded, and as we know, we had talked about approximately 27 trucks, but it was a lot more than 27 trucks that left that military headquarters. This is what we had suspected.
So I have no doubt that -- I have no reason to disagree with anything that is pointed out here by General MacKenzie because he was at the screen and I wasn't.
Q. Thank you. Yes, you were there on the 6th of May when Mr. Ludwig was there; is that correct?
THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Goulding, interpreter's correction.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I was. Yes.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Can we look at the eighth page after this one, please. On the 5th of May, Marrack Goulding, the UN under-secretary for special political affairs, was in Pale. Later, he was escorted by General MacKenzie, and then it says: 2758 "[In English] After our initial escort party was held up by fighting in the east of Sarajevo, General Nambiar insisted that he lead the next attempt."
[Interpretation] And then lower it says: "[In English] On the 6th of May I spent a full day with Mr. Goulding, briefing him all morning. In the afternoon, we went on a tour of the city with President Izetbegovic and came under modest fire in the middle of the Muslim old city. There were very strong indications that it was an orchestrated show for the accompanying media intended to put the Serbs in a bad light."
[Interpretation] Were you aware of these moves that were supposed to blacken the Serbs' reputation?
A. No, I wasn't, because on the 5th of May I was chairing a cease-fire negotiation at the PTT building as a consequence or a follow-up to the release of the president. So all that day, and in fact, from that day to the day that I was evacuated, I don't believe I left the PTT building at all. My total focus no was on, one, getting a cease-fire as a consequence of the -- securing the release of the president, and second, on negotiations to effect the total withdraw of the JNA army from Bosnia. So what was going on in the city, what was going in the United Nations, I wasn't aware of.
Q. Thank you. Can you look at the following paragraph: "I also went at my request --"
Mr. Goulding is giving his assessment of what happened with the cold-blooded killings of the soldiers and the commanders by the Bosnian 2759 Territorial Defence, and General MacKenzie says in the following paragraph:
"[In English] Later when I had left Sarajevo for good I was surprised to see just how little media covered Goulding's strong statement as received around the world. I couldn't help thinking that if the JNA had ambushed the Territorial Defence forces instead of the other way around, it would have been front-page news."
[Interpretation] Do you agree that the world media was partial and that the Serbs had a more difficult time of it in the world media?
A. Yes, I would. I mean, the world's media felt that this was a conflict started by Milosevic, and there was a certain amount of sympathy to the Bosnian Muslims. So in the eyes of the world, yes, I would say that that is the case.
Q. Thank you. We're going to show in the course of these proceedings that it was the other way around.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender these sections of General MacKenzie's book, please.
JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, in relation to the convoy incident description, that's chapter 17, I agree. No opposition here. In relation to the chapter 18, it's basically General MacKenzie's viewpoints. However, as it was at least addressed by Colonel Doyle in one aspect, I also agree to have this chapter 18 admitted.
JUDGE KWON: He didn't confirm anything about -- on page 182 or page 22 of the e-court in English. 2760
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, that's correct. So --
JUDGE KWON: But given it's all 23 pages, shall we admit it in its entirety?
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, I would say so. Would I say so, although he wasn't part in -- of the events at some stage, but at least it's sort of related, everything.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. It will be admitted.
THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D217, Your Honour.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I'm noting the time. We will have a break for half an hour.
--- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.
--- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours.
JUDGE KWON: Yes.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Just in relation to one document, we have clarified the situation in relation to the Defence Exhibit 1D01210. The text provided is consistent with the actual minutes of the 56th session of the Presidency, which were disclosed to the Defence, and we are just providing the details where they can find it, but unfortunately we also do not have a translation. So the full translation is still outstanding.
JUDGE KWON: So we're talking about D214, marked for identification.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. That's the minutes and --
JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: If these are the minutes from the 56th 2761 session of the Presidency.
JUDGE KWON: That's correct.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then it's correct, yes.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you for the information. Let's move on. Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. If I remember correctly, Colonel, you said you'd agreed that you had attended the 24th of January meeting of the Bosnian Assembly; right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And you also agreed that I proposed that regionalisation be undertaken first so the Serbs could go to the referendum and that Muhamed Cengic proposed that the government be given a fortnight to carry out the regionalisation and that proposal was accepted by me; right?
A. Well, I remember sitting in the Assembly for the duration of that debate, but you'll have to accept that I -- can I had an interpreter with me, so I didn't get, you know, the full translations of everything that was said. So -- so I was there and I understood what generally the debate was about, but the exact details I wouldn't be competent, I think, to -- to comment on.
Q. Let me remind you. I accepted Muhamed Cengic's proposal, and we'll call up that document, a document that bears it out, if need be, and I went up to the microphone together with him, and for two and a half hours people thought that an agreement had been reached and the government would carry out regionalisation within a fortnight and that 2762 the Serbs would go to the referendum regardless of how they would be voting, do you remember that?
A. No, I can't say I remember the specifics. I was tasked by the headquarters of the monitor mission to attend the referendum debate to give them the result of what the debate was, not necessarily all of the content of it. So the report that I made out was -- was pretty general in terms, but not the exact details, because it went on for so long. It went on throughout the entire night.
Q. Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have D87 called up next.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. To refresh our memories, Colonel, because it appeared that we had saved Bosnia. So I set great store by that. This was one such situation when we thought we might have saved Bosnia. And later on there was, of course, the conference, the Cutileiro conference during your stay in Bosnia. But anyway, may we have called up 1D0087 next, please. It's an exhibit.
And may we have page 103 of this document displayed, please. It's a meeting of the joint Assembly, the tape recording of it. The date is the 24th of January, 1992, and may we turn to page 103, please. Let's see what Mr. Cengic says here, Muhamed Cengic, and I'm reading the Serbian version:
"Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to inform you and something to you. The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina --"
JUDGE KWON: I don't think we are seeing Mr. Cengic's words here. 2763
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Now we have it. Thank you. At the bottom of the page.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. "I would like to inform you and suggest something. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina received the order, made its decision to establish -- to carry out the regionalisation, a new regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think the Serbian democratic party as well as the Party of Democratic Action, the Croatian Democratic Union, need to make their own requests on this regionalisation, what should be done, and I think that it would be useful if this regionalisation were to be carried out. It's the task of the government too. And we should schedule a referendum date and to set the dead-line for both the referendum and the establishment of regions. There will be no referendum before the plan for the regionalisation is presented. I think that that would be a good solution and that it would satisfy all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it's useless for us to talk about what all the Serbs want, to live in all -- in one state or the Muslims, or anybody else, but we have to start talking and discussing the matter amongst ourselves. Therefore, the proposal that I have offered up now, and Mr. Karadzic agrees with it, I think is a good one, an acceptable one, and I'd like to hear your views on the matter." Now, may we turn to the next portion to see what Karadzic says. Right down at the bottom of the page. Can we scroll down there. Next page, in fact -- yes, that's right. Radovan Karadzic. I'll read it in English. I don't see it in Serbian: 2764 "[In English] You will forgive me because my voice is not the best. Just when we think we agreed, we distort --" [Interpretation] I see. I found that now:
"[In English] We actually change the entire essence. It is clear that B and H cannot prevent or avoid the changes that are going on around it. It cannot. Those changes request that new factual state is sanctioned and that the legality and new legal state is achieved. In that sense, new referendum would be acceptable to the --" [Interpretation] Next page, please:
"[In English] ... Serbian people provided that a new democratic transformation of B and H into a new state which all three sovereign nations would accept, would be carried out prior to that. Therefore, I believe that for a new state, all three people would participate in the national and collective civil referendum. Nothing is possible in B and H without the consensus of three peoples. I have to present to you what I would mean -- what it would mean if we do not do this way. If we do not do this way, we would create the conditions for the independent state to be announced without our consent. Because according to the unconstitutional law and -- the law that is not in accordance with the constitution, it is said that 51 per cent of the votes is needed for the referendum to be recognised. The existing law is unconstitutional, and it is not adjusted to the constitution because it is written in the constitution that there should be 66.6 per cent of the votes for the referendum to be recognised. For any changes of the situation according to the new constitution, we need 66.6 of the votes and Serbs and Croats 2765 do not have 66 per cent votes together, and they will participate less and less in the general population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, it -- if we hold a referendum before the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs and Croats are imprisoned, locked in their internationally recognised borders that no one can -- ever can change. They are in total power of the host and the boss of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is to say, those who are majority now and who will be outnumbered," and so on and so on.
[Interpretation] So you can see, Colonel, that the Muslims managed to have the constitution changed with a 51 per cent of the votes at the referendum, which is completely or was completely unconstitutional, and there is no constitution in the world which can be amended if there's only 51 per cent votes in the -- on the referendum and in the Assembly.
So do you see that we were tricked and forced to do something that was unconstitutional?
A. I think to clarify this point, Your Honour, I would just like to say that at the conclusion of this marathon session of the Assembly, I compiled a report to -- to my headquarters and that report gave a general outline as I understood it to be of what the issues were. I was sufficiently concerned to put in that report the fact that according to the Bosnian Serbs there was a requirement for an agreement to be done by consensus, whereas most of the people in the parliament seem to be going along the line of where they are going to pass a referendum if they had a majority. What that majority was I wasn't aware. But I did put down 2766 that maybe this is something that needed to be checked out legally. So as a consequence of that, I sought a meeting with the supreme legal court, or whatever, of Bosnia, and I met with them the following day to find out whether or not the allegations by the Bosnian Serbs that this referendum debate was constitutional, because I'm not a lawyer. And I met with all of these senior Judges of Bosnia, Serb, Croat, and Muslim, and when I put that to them, a female member of the -- of the senior legal branch said, Mr. Doyle, you don't understand. I'm a Serb and this person is a Croat and this person is a Muslim. We can't agree amongst ourselves as to what is constitutional or not because we all follow our own political philosophies.
So even having a meeting with the senior legal brains of Bosnia, they could not give me collectively a definitive answer as to whether or not that debate or whether the referendum was to be constitutional or not, and I put that as part of my report which was sent to the headquarters.
The exact detail, Dr. Karadzic, that you were bringing up, I simply -- I'm simply not in a position to comment on because this was a debate that went on for hours and hours and hours of legal wranglings in a language I don't understand and at a level which I'm not commensurate with.
Q. Thank you. This is already an exhibit, so I don't have to tender it. It's already been admitted. But you saw the development of events. There was a referendum that we did not take part in, but we didn't challenge it either. And then we come to the 3rd of March. Do you 2767 remember what happened on the 3rd of March in Bosanski Brod?
A. No, I'm not familiar of what happened outside of Sarajevo on the 3rd of March, but only in Sarajevo.
Q. Thank you. Now, while we still have this document on our screens, do you agree that Lord Carrington's position was also that all three sides should agree, should reach an agreement, on what Bosnia should look like, that there should be no competition between all sides but they should all agree, reach an agreement?
A. Yes, I know that when I was with Lord Carrington and that question was proposed to him at a press conference at the airport. His view was that as far at the peace conference in Yugoslavia was concerned, any agreement that would be agreed by all sides, no matter what that agreement was, once they agreed that was sufficient for the European Union that the role of the peace conference was to be -- act as a good office for these peoples to come up with a solution that would not include violence. So it wasn't a matter for the peace conference or certainly it wasn't a matter for Lord Carrington to decide what sort of a solution should be -- should be established rather than saying whatever you agree collectively together, three different parties, I'm happy with whatever that is once you agree. So really he was putting the onus back on the parties to try to come up with a solution that might be acceptable.
Q. Thank you. Do you know that on the 18th an agreement was indeed reached with respect to the Cutileiro Plan?
A. Yes. I don't know the exact contents of that agreement. I 2768 wasn't party to it. But it was brought to my attention, because on the 18th of March I wasn't with Lord Carrington. I was still head of the mission, and I was told that an agreement had almost been reached and as far as I recall that the Muslims reneged or went back on that agreement, but the exact content of the agreement, I wasn't familiar with.
Q. Well, all that remained was for the maps to be precisely defined and to resolve the question of a joint army. Everything else was accepted. All right. Perhaps you weren't there, but they gave up on the 25th and already on the 25th and 26th there was bloodshed again of Serbs in Bosanski Brod, Sijekovac, and so on. Did you hear of that?
A. No, I wasn't aware of that.
Q. Thank you. Well let's move on to the 12th straight away and for that may I have 1D01256 displayed, please. And at the time, you were already in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
I'm not going to look at anything before the 10th, although there were significant events during that period.
May we have the English version displayed as well, please, alongside the Serbian.
Do you remember that on that day a truce was signed? And we have the document in which, among other things, the cease-fire said that work on the maps should be accelerated. Do you remember that? I'm referring to the cease-fire. A cease-fire was signed on that day.
A. Yes, yes, yes. Yes.
Q. We will look at the document a little later on, but let's see what the commander of the Green Berets is writing, the Green Berets of 2769 Bosnia-Herzegovina. His name was Sead Ahmetovic. The Green Berets staff it says Sarajevo, BH, telegram, strictly confidential. The 12th of April, 1992, is the date, and it says police station, Visegrad. That's who it is addressed to. So that police -- well, it says: "Please convey the message of Murat Sabanovic, the Green Berets' commander for the region of Visegrad and its surroundings, to blow up the Visegrad Dam as soon as possible."
Do you remember that?
A. No. I'm not familiar with that. I would say here that one of the most frustrating elements of what we were doing in Bosnia was to try and get cease-fires which were passed with what I would call monotonous regularity, because as soon as they were -- as soon as they were signed, they were broken. So it seemed to be an exercise in futility. This specific incident, no, I'm not aware of.
Q. Thank you. We have a photocopy of this original document as well, but at that time there was a crisis and on television we have Kukanjac and Izetbegovic and this man Murat Sabanovic, and they entreated him not to blow up the dam, and Izetbegovic entreated him saying, Murat, not for now. Don't do it for the time being.
Which means that the opportunity would be there later on. Do you remember there was a live television broadcast where they wanted to convince him not to go ahead? And that was a real crisis. You don't remember that?
A. I remember the incident but not the detail, but, yes, I remember a lot of discussion about it. 2770
Q. Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document next, please.
JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the reliability of this document to me is doubtful. The witness has no details on this. Therefore, I would object.
JUDGE KWON: But he remembers some discussion going around in relation to this.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Okay. Yeah. Yes. Okay. No objection then.
[Trial Chamber confers]
JUDGE KWON: Based upon the Chamber's observation that I just spoke about, we'll admit this document.
THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D218, Your Honour.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May we now have document 1D01108, please.
JUDGE KWON: Would you give the number again.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01108. We have it in Serbian. I don't know if there is a translation of it. I believe there is. The Prosecution has the document. I don't know what their number is, but I know they do have it.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Let me tell you what this document is about. First of all, the date is the 20th of April, and it is the premier of the Serbian Republic 2771 of -- Republika Srpska, professor Dr. Branko Djeric is issuing an order and saying:
"Artillery fire and heavy weapons fire is forbidden from the positions of Serb defence forces on targets in the city of Sarajevo. "2. The use of artillery and heavy weapons on targets in the city of Sarajevo will only be ordered in justified cases by the minister of defence. The implementation of this order shall be seen to," et cetera, et cetera, "and any violations of this order will be strictly punished. The order comes into force immediately."
Now, I'd like to tell you, first of all, due to the pressure and the shooting the government declared that the Serb territorials should refrain from shooting in town. Do you agree -- are forbidden from shooting in town. Do you agree that this is something that should be ordered by the supreme commander and the president of the republic and not the prime minister?
A. If this is a document that is -- has come from -- sorry, can I just ask you to repeat the -- the -- this document was issued by?
Q. It was issued by the government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I want to say that the government had to issue that because at that point in time there was no president of the republic or, rather, the president of the Presidency and there was no Army of Republika Srpska only the Serb territorials who could obey but did not have to.
Do you think that it's usual for the prime minister to be issuing an order of this kind? 2772
A. Well, I suppose it probably depends on -- on whether or not it was -- it was obeyed. Around this time there was a considerable amount of shelling of the city of Sarajevo. So if this was issued by the Republika Srpska, it certainly wasn't obeyed, in my estimation.
Q. My point is that the prime minister tried to do what he could without having the tools of enforcing his order. He tried to order the territorials or those who were defending their neighbourhoods to stop firing. Do you agree?
A. Well, if that's -- we don't have the -- we don't have the translation of that document here. It's still -- the one I have is still in Serbian, but I'm not too sure why this should have happened when -- when the -- the result was that there was shelling. In other words, the directive wasn't obeyed.
Q. Thank you. I would like to tender this document.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour, and in fact, we have received a translation. For some reason is -- it's obviously not uploaded in e-court but it exists.
JUDGE KWON: So with that confirmation and then with the anticipation that it will be disclosed to the parties, we'll admit it as evidence.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, as Exhibit D219.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to have 1D00289, please.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. And while we're waiting, Colonel, sir, do you remember what my 2773 platform was for the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 22nd of April, 1992?
A. No, I'm sorry, I don't.
Q. This was quite known to the foreigners, because we had sent it around. We had informed Lord Carrington and Ambassador Cutileiro about it, and it was published in the media. We have it in front of us now. This is a platform indicating what our -- what we were proposing and what we were committing ourselves to. And here it is:
"1. An unconditional and immediate cease-fire and compliance with the cease-fire agreement of the 12th of April, 1992." Is this the cease-fire agreement that you were working on?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Thank you: "2. Urgent continuation of the conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina and its continuous work until a solution is found. "3. Within the framework of the conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina, priority should be given to the drawing of maps of Sarajevo and constituent states.
"4. Public commitment by all the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the constituent parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be joined to neighbouring states and that armed forces from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be invited in or accepted in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
"5. Public commitment by all the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina that they will not accept a policy of fait accompli, not even 2774 the one arising from the Communist heritage and the territorial advantages gained by means of force will not be recognised. "6. Urgent implementation of a new constitutional agreement along with guarantees of the international community. "7. The opening of the process of demilitarisation and the precise defining of the role of the JNA in the forthcoming period." How does this platform look to you, Colonel, sir. I'm sorry that you didn't know about it before but all of your bosses did know about it. Lord Carrington did and Ambassador Cutileiro did as well. Do you have any remarks to make on this platform and was it a sufficient basis for the continuation of the conference?
A. Well, looking at the document it looks very inviting and it looks very attractive, but I'm just wondering why it is that on -- on that same day was the commencement of the first -- first fighting in the city of Sarajevo, and for all of that day I was trying to negotiate a cease-fire so that we could facilitate the arrival of Lord Carrington and the president of the council of ministers of the European Union to Sarajevo airport the following morning. So my focus was that. And it was the following morning, on the 23rd of April, that we were trying to get some progress.
So I'm not familiar with the content of this document. Whether this, in actual fact, was to be implemented or not I think is quite another matter. We know that it wasn't.
Q. Thank you. This is not an executive order. This is a commitment by the Serbian side, a proposal of what should be done and our statement 2775 that we're not going to accept a policy of fait accompli or territory -- territorial seizure by force and so on.
Do you --
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this document, please.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, avoid making comments. The last comment was unnecessary, unless you put any question to the witness. Bear that in mind.
That will be admitted.
THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D220, Your Honour.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at document 1D01109.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Do you agree that you were at -- in Ilidza on the 22nd of April, 1992; is that right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Thank you. We need 1D01109, please, a different document from this one.
This is from the 2nd of May. We will need this one, too, but a bit later.
This is not the number, actually, that I asked for. There's something not quite right with the numbers. Can we put this on the ELMO, please? First page first so that we can identify the document, and then -- the number that we did get is 1D01110. [In English] First page and then ... 2776 [Interpretation] Up at -- you were in Ilidza when the Muslim forces carried out an attack on Ilidza and this is what is said in the police report:
"The attack carried out by Muslim paramilitary formations on the 22nd of April, in the area of the Serbian municipality of Ilidza was a long-prepared and carefully planned one. According to the estimates of the SDA leadership, this area is exceptionally strategically important for the formation of the Islamic state. The leaders of the party approved substantial funds for the procurement of weapons and military equipment and these activities -- and as future financiers many well-off citizens of Ilidza of Muslim nationality participated in it, including the minister of internal affairs of former Bosnia and Herzegovina. All this was aided by some religious officials of the Islamic Community, and in this area that is why four paramilitary formations could have been formed in this area.
"According to the information of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a year ago the Party of Democratic Action shipped in weapons to this area, the main supplier was Senaid Memic."
And then we can now go to the bottom of the page and then we will move to the next page.
We will just need to look at the highlighted parts, please, of the document, the highlighted parts.
This is fine. Thank you: "As for Ilidza, the main co-ordinator of all activities about 2777 gathering, persuading to join, engaging and arming the population of Muslim and Croatian ethnicity up to a point was Edin Malicevic, the chief of the Ilidza public security service. This document describes how top leadership abused the Ministry of Internal Affairs and at the local affairs where you were, the chief of the public security station in Ilidza, Edin Malicevic was the chief. He first armed the reserve forces of the police of Muslim ethnicity really well and then in the Fuego [phoen] cafe owned by Hamde Vatric together with Hamdo Pasic, a well-known criminal, gathered together mostly younger people of Muslim and Croat ethnicity, enrolled them in the Patriotic League and then he had them at the staff which was close to the cafe Queen and distributed arms to them."
Colonel, sir, were you aware that the police was behind these paramilitary formations and was preparing these attacks?
A. No, I wasn't aware. I remember the attack in Ilidza on that day, and the defenders were Bosnian Serbs that were being attacked. I don't know who was being attacked. We were under cover because it was very dangerous, and I know that approximately 13 died in that attack. So I was aware that the attack took place and the Serbs were defending, but that's all I can say.
Q. Thank you. Do you remember that they were attacked from the Otes neighbourhood as well as from the Sokolovic-Kolonija area and Hrasnica?
A. No. I would have to say that for most of that day I was in a -- I was in my room or in the hotel. We couldn't leave it. I left -- I left the hotel to do an interview with the BBC, and that was the day that 2778 I was -- that was the day I was asked to give my views as to whether or not the meeting the following morning with Pinheiro and Carrington should take place because we wanted to make sure that there was a degree of safety for the visit to take place. So I was concerned about trying to make an assessment of the situation, but I am aware that there was a lot of fighting on, because that was first time I had actually seen fighting in the city of Sarajevo. But the exact direction it was coming from I couldn't say because we were in a location very close to the people who were defending.
Q. Thank you. I don't want to press on with this document any more as it's clear that you did see with your own eyes the attack on the Serbian part of Ilidza and the defence of that.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we tender this document for identification first, please, because I'm not sure if we have the translation.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, in principle, yes, but marked for identification because we don't have a translation.
JUDGE KWON: And the exact 65 ter number is 1109, Mr. Karadzic?
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. 1109, yes.
JUDGE KWON: That will be marked for identification.
THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D221, Your Honour.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we look at 1D01258.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. While we're waiting I would like to inform you, Colonel, that this is a directive of the TO staff of the Republic of Bosnia and 2779 Herzegovina of the 23rd of April, 1994. As you know, at that point in time, efforts were continuing to establish a cease-fire on the 12th of April, and this is an endeavour in which you and Ambassador Cutileiro participated. This is a new directive by Hasan Efendic on the defence of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Do we have that? Unfortunately, we don't have a translation for this either, but I would just like to draw your attention to the first part under number 1 which talks about enemy forces. This is the Territorial Defence of the Serbian autonomous region and the Serbian Army, which is also considered to be an enemy on the 23rd of April, and then in paragraph marked with a number 4 it says: "I have decided immediately to carry out the mobilisation of the entire composition of the TO of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, speedily carry on with the formation of combat units in all municipalities which are to be placed under the Joint Command of municipal, district, and the staff of the TO of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina command, and then -- and forcefully carry out actions to break the assault force of the enemy."
Can we please look at the following page: "Immediately carry out the occupation of ammunition depots and block the barracks, occupy them and capture members of the Yugoslav Army on the territory of the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina -- the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
And then under 5 it says: 2780 "District Staffs of the Territorial Defence form TO units, volunteer units, the Patriotic League of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, TO units, and other patriotic forces in the territory of the municipality all to be under the Joint Command and insignia as decreed by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
And then it says: "While forming the combat disposition of the main force for carrying out active combat and also have auxiliary forces." And then we have on the following page number 7:
"To establish a system of command immediately at the level of units, the Municipal Staff, the district staff, republic staff," and so on. The rest is unimportant.
"While negotiations are underway for a cease-fire following efforts from the European Community, preparations are being accelerated for carrying on the war while the first is going on. " So did anybody inform you about these activities of
Hasan Efendic -- or, rather, the Muslim command in this direction?
A. No. That was not bought to my attention.
Q. Should it have been brought to your attention? Mediators?
A. Well, on the 23rd of April, I was facilitating the arrival of -- of Joao Pinheiro and Peter Carrington to Sarajevo, and all of that day we were involved in negotiations for a cease-fire with all the political parties. You were there yourself, Mr. Karadzic, you will recall, and my task then was to get the leaders back to the airport to actually sign the document, and that in itself was a big, big challenge. So my total focus 2781 was on implementing to get the signatures done.
We know that a lot of the cease-fires were broken. Who broke them, I have no idea. And there were counter-claims from all sides, but I'm for the familiar with this document.
Should it have been brought to my attention? I simply don't know. That's all I can really say on it. I don't have a comment on it.
Q. Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document now, please.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it should be marked for identification. At the moment I'm actually not able to say whether this document relates to the evidence of the witness because I can't really read it, and the passages that were read into the record, they seem to be also not adopted by the witness.
[Trial Chamber confers]
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before you make a decision, Your Honours, may I inform you that this is a secret document, and after this document there's a public document which is an order from the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the police that the decision be made for the withdraw of the JNA units and an order about how the JNA should be treated.
JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification, and when the translation is done, the Chamber will assess its relevance and then decide its admissibility then.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be MFI D222. 2782
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. A Prosecution document, 65 ter 01040. Is that an exhibit? Has that been admitted as an amalgamated document? 65 ter 01040. I think we have it in English. That's the platform. Yes, that's right. And here's this platform in a collection of documents where the Prosecution is conveying some SRNA agency reports. It's dated the 22nd of April -- well, it's a platform of the 22nd of April, published on the 23rd of April. May we see the portion that starts "The truth about the fight on Ilidza," and so on. The bottom of the page in English, please. Thank you. And this is what SRNA reported:
"[In English] SRNA is authorised to give an announcement that came from the Serbian police properly or Serbian Republic of Bosnia on 22nd April 1992. Due to the great number of false information which are consciously emitted on the principles of the psychological propagandistic war over the radio and television of Sarajevo, press centre of Serbian Republic of B and H, placed in Ilidza, in the centre of war action brings about following facts: This morning attack was started by the Muslim formations from Sokolovic colony. The members of these units occupied the restaurant Topola and institute of rehabilitation from where they fired from their snipers -- snipers and during that time wounded several members of Serbian police and Territorial Defence of Ilidza. On the Serbian side there were killed people, but their number and identity could be determined only after the possibility of being taken out from the fire zone," and so on and so on.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] 2783
Q. So, that, then, is what confirms what you have just told us; right, Colonel?
A. In general terms, yes, but again the detail, where it was exactly coming from, where the firing was coming from, I just can't say.
Q. Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have 1D54 next, please. Is this document -- has this document been admitted, the one we just displayed? Is it admitted -- or, rather, is it an exhibit? Is it an exhibit?
JUDGE KWON: It will be admitted.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, as Exhibit D223.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's the Prosecution number. I thought the Prosecution had tendered it, but if not, we can do that.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, we didn't.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We now see that this is a document from the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which on the 27th of April, 1992, issued a decision on the withdrawal of JNA units from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and under number 3 down there it says:
"Members of the JNA who do not wish to place themselves at the disposal of the state organs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for any reason shall be required to leave the territory of the republic of BH in a direction of their choice in organised fashion escorted by organs of the Ministry of the Interior of BH and under the supervision of the European Community observers." 2784 May we turn to the next page, please. In English it says: "The state organs of Bis will ensure the unimpeded withdrawal of JNA units."
And then under number 5, it says: "The units and institutions to which weapons technical equipment and materiel of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been entrusted for storage are required to hand over these weapons and equipment to their owners, namely the authorised organs of the Territorial Defence of BH."
And 7: "The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina has taken this decision with the aim of having a peaceful and equitable solution the question of the JNA's position after the disillusion of the J -- SFRY, the Presidency of the republic of BH continues to adhere to its position on the gradual permanent demilitarisation of the territory of this republic."
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Now, what does it look like to you in relation to what happened on the 3rd of May in Dobrovoljacka street, Colonel?
A. Well, this is obviously a request by the government that those who want to become part of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina can do so and those who don't may leave. And what relevance this has to the other -- is it the attack you're referring to on the convoy, or I'm not sure the incident on the street is?
Q. Well, Colonel, first of all we have that secret document referring to the attack, then we have a public document where they 2785 guarantee the peaceful withdrawal, and then we have the realisation on the 3rd of May where despite those guarantees they're killing people in the column that's what I'm talking about. Do you see this line: "Secret documents, attack, block, arrest, capture public document," says we guarantee withdrawal, when the withdrawal takes place then they kill them, not only in Sarajevo on the 3rd of May but in Tuzla on the 15th of May. That's what we're talking about. Does it -- did this contribute to peace or did it contribute to flaming the fans of war and was that government authorised to do that? Was that all right for a government to do that?
JUDGE KWON: That's too many questions.
THE WITNESS: And first of all, I have no knowledge of this document specifically and also I have no knowledge of -- of who may have been as you alleged carrying out attacks against the JNA. All I can say is that I was doing my best around this period to facilitate the withdrawal of the JNA from the Republic of Bosnia because that's what I understood them to wish for, and that was verified to me at the JNA military high command in Belgrade on the 12th of May when -- when I was evacuated. So I'm not familiar with this document, so I really can't comment on it.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. But, Colonel, you do know what happened on the 2nd and 3rd of May. On the 2nd and 3rd of May, the Green Berets killed JNA soldiers. Isn't that right?
A. I know that on the 2nd and 3rd of May that JNA troops were 2786 targeted on the convoy because we had effected the release of the president. So I'm fully aware that the convoy which contained the president and General Kukanjac was attacked. Yes, I'm aware of that. As I said before, I wasn't present physically there. I was held back in Lukavica, but I was aware that the attack on the convoy took place and that there were some casualties, and I was tasked then with trying to effect the release of the convoy that had been split, and I promised to do this because I was -- I was threatened at a Serb -- Bosnian Serb check-point after we left Lukavica and told that it was my responsibility. I was told that I had negotiated the hostage release of the president so therefore I would have to accept responsibilities as to what happened, even though I couldn't and shouldn't have had to, but I did my best to effect the release of the members of the convoy the following day which in fact occurred.
Q. Thank you. But in point 3 it says that the organs of the Ministry of the Interior will organise an escort along with supervision from European monitors, so along with your supervision. And this is a public document a week before the slaughter, that you would supervise it. And then in the next point it says that the state organs will enable the unimpeded withdrawal.
Now, the fact that an angry Serbian soldier or officer threatened you, this happened after the slaughter that took place and he considered that you could have prevented it. I'm not attacking you. I'm just telling you what the situation was like. So this is a public document which guarantees to us that the JNA would be withdrawing peacefully and 2787 that you would be able to effect supervision over that process. So this is a document issued by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But never mind.
Thank you, Colonel.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document now, please.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No objection, Your Honour.
JUDGE KWON: Yes.
THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit Number D224.
JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have 1D56 next, please.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. Let me remind you that the Serb side through me on the 22nd of April proposed the platform that we saw earlier on. Now let's see what the Muslim side was doing at that same time.
This is a document dated the 29th of April, the MUP of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let me remind you that we were part of the authority. We had a third of all power and authority in Bosnia. Sending that to all the security services centres it, public security stations and the secretariat of the SUP of Sarajevo, and it says: "It is necessary that all security services centres, public security stations and SUP Sarajevo undertake all necessary measures and activities within their scope for the purpose of securing the implementation of the order of the commander of the headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," number 2788 such and such, "of the 29th of April, 1992, which we are forwarding to you in its original form."
And then it says: "I hereby order:
"Carry out the full massive blockade along all road intersections on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which the units of the former JNA are beginning to withdraw technical equipment and materiel, and that this should be co-ordinated with the MUP. "2. Carry out the blockade of the wider region of military facilities from which technical equipment and materiel are attempted to be taken out with various methods," et cetera, "which should be secured for the units of the Territorial Defence.
"Unannounced convoys of units of the former JNA and those that are not escorted by the MUP should be prevented from leaving the barracks and communicating on the territory of the republic of RH. "Immediately begin preparing and initiating that matter which is on the entire territory of the republic of BH and co-ordinate them with headquarters of the Territorial Defence of the region, district and republic of BH. Within the scope of the battle activities plan all encompassing measures for protecting the population and the material assets of the citizens of the republic of BH."
So there we have it. Despite all the guarantees this is how -- this is what was being prepared. Combat activities, it says here, throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Now, did you feel that the Muslim side was indeed preparing such 2789 a large-scale war and were you able to inform Lord Carrington about that, who was doing his best to bring about peace?
A. No, I'm not aware of this document, and I can say that on the 29th of April my total focus was on trying to get the president, Izetbegovic, on an aircraft for talks in Lisbon. That was my total focus on that day. So I'm not familiar with this document, nor am I aware of its content.
Q. And do you feel tricked by your -- the Muslim partners who were supposed to inform you sincerely about their intentions, honestly and sincerely?
A. There were times -- there was times when I did my service in Bosnia that I was tricked by everybody from all sides. So I'm not surprised.
Q. Thank you. May I tender this document now, please. And let's have 1D01260 next, please.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, although the witness does not know this document, it falls within the scope of his evidence in general terms, so therefore no objection.
[Trial Chamber confers]
JUDGE KWON: We would be rather consistent with our rule. The witness was not able to comment upon the content of the document, so we'll not admit it.
I'm noting the time. That will be your last question, Mr. Karadzic.
THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Well, the Defence 2790 doesn't quite understand now. If the colonel was there at the time and if the documents speak about the phenomenon that he deals with partially, then I think that the document should be admitted but never mind.
MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Q. This document, Colonel the command of the 4th Corps here, and it's still the JNA, of the 7th of May, 1992, is setting out how those who are within the barracks feel, and the previous orders relate to those same people in the barracks. I don't know if we have a translation of this, but this is what the document says. Point 1:
"The situation in BiH is catastrophic. There's complete lack of law and order, chaos and terror towards the members of the JNA and Serb people."
Then item 3: "With greater or lesser intensity, the barracks and other facilities are blocked all the time. The people are being provoked and attacked with weapons."
Then on the next page under B, next page, please, B, it says: "Attacks against the JNA Dom, the column of motor vehicles moving towards the Dom trying to save those working there, the command, the district command and other military facilities during the 2nd of May -- the HOS members and Green Berets attacked the Dom JNA, and after that units of the 65th Motorised Brigade were ordered to move towards the JNA centre or Dom and pull out all the people there. So all the people who went out to save the young men were killed."
And next page, please: 2791 "They were ordered to move towards Skenderija to pull out the dead and wounded, however the people were attacked by strong forces in the Marin Dvor area and prevented from reaching their objective. Since the intervention was not successful and there were no other possibilities of doing so, the column that came upon an ambush had to fight by itself," and so on and so forth.
And the commander Lazarevic who was there to protect the military hospital committed suicide when he was wounded, he killed himself. So you see that everything that was ordered here and put into practice, well, it's a document of several pages and we can come back to it tomorrow because it's a pity not to look through it, you and the Trial Chamber so that you can see that everything that was ordered was carried out to a T and that all the JNA employees was the object of brutal attacks and killings. At the time, you were there. Were you aware of this? Did you know about it? Did you feel that this was happening? Or do you challenge it? Or do you allow for the possibility that that's what happened? Perhaps that would be a better question and you can answer that perhaps.
A. Well, what I can say is that on the 2nd of May was the first heavy shelling of the city of Sarajevo, and I knew that the JNA barracks had been surrounded, but that was also the day that the president was detained at the airport and my total focus was to try and solve this problem. I also made a public appeal on television because one side was blaming the other for starting the shooting in the city, and I said that I would make a contribution by making myself available provided people 2792 stopped talking about accusing each other and instead concentrated on how they were going to stop this fighting. So that was a very important day for me, and that conflict went on into the night. So my -- my focus was on trying to find out where the president was and why it was that he was detained when he came back into the airport. There was a lot of commotion that day. I had noted down also in the diary of which you've been now given a copy that there was heavy fighting throughout the day in the city. And I had made this appeal on television. So what I was doing was I was trying to make the best of what I could do to make a contribution. Who was doing what outside I just simply did not know.
Q. Thank you, Colonel. It's not disputable what you were doing. What is being disputed is what you knew and how much you knew what the other sides were doing. It wasn't just the Serbs who were firing. The other side was firing as well, and during these days many Serbs were dead. Well, I would just like to ask whether I need to tender this document now because tomorrow we will continue working on it, although the Colonel cannot really say too much about many things in the document, but he was a witness of what was going on in the town at the time.
JUDGE KWON: We'll continue tomorrow morning or shall we mark it for identification.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No. Actually, Your Honour, I just wanted to point out that this -- we don't have a translation here.
JUDGE KWON: No.
MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: However, this document is a duplicate of the Prosecution 65 ter 03721, and that's actually in e-court with a 2793 translation. Perhaps we can --
JUDGE KWON: That's very helpful. We'll deal with it tomorrow. So tomorrow, 9.00.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day
of May, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.