⁹⁷⁹⁰ Thursday, 2nd July, 1998

(Open session)

--- Upon commencing at 10.00 a.m.

JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Would the registrar please bring in the accused?

(The accused entered court)

JUDGE JORDA: Good morning to the interpreters. Can you hear me? Good morning also to the parties, the Prosecution and the Defence, and Mr. Blaskic.

We can now then continue. Mr. Prosecutor, Mr. Harmon?

MR. HARMON: Yes, good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, and good morning counsel. The next witness we have who will testify is a witness who has no protections --

THE REGISTRAR: I have no transcript.

MR. HARMON: We have a technical difficulty, Mr. President, I'm informed.

JUDGE JORDA: What is the technical problem we have?

THE REGISTRAR: Excuse me for the interruption, but we have no transcript on our screens, so it will be delayed to some degree. We do not have any except on the small laptop computers. That's the ⁹⁷⁹¹only place we have the transcripts.

JUDGE JORDA: When you say that will delay us, what do you mean by that? I see now. I think perhaps it's corrected.

THE REGISTRAR: What I mean is that apparently it is in the process of being repaired.

JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Registrar. I like your expression, it's "on the way."

THE REGISTRAR: All right. Now I believe that we are ready.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We are in agreement with the first sentence which is on the transcript. We are all ready indeed.

Mr. Harmon, you may now resume with your comment.

MR. HARMON: Yes, Mr. President and Your Honours. Let me first of all begin by introducing a new colleague in the courtroom, Mr. Jan Vos who is seated to my left who will be sitting in for a few days for Mr. Emil van der Does de Willebois who is unavailable to the Prosecutor's Office. Let me also indicate to the Court and to counsel that --

JUDGE JORDA: I see on the transcript it's Vos, V-O-S, is that correct?

MR. HARMON: Yes, Mr. President. It's one of ⁹⁷⁹²the few Dutch words I'm capable of pronouncing.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Congratulations and at the same time I welcome this new member, Mr. Jan Vos. I hope I have correctly pronounced his name. Please continue, Mr. Harmon. Which witness will you be presenting today.

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I will be presenting a career Dutch military officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Hendrik Morsink, and I should say at the outset, at the request of the Dutch government, a Dutch language interpreter will be assisting him. Mr. Morsink speaks very good English but the request has been made of the Dutch government to have him give his answers in his native tongue, so that request has been honoured.

Now, as I said, Mr. Morsink -- Colonel Morsink, is a career Dutch officer. He holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, he is currently the commander of the 42nd tank battalion in the Royal Dutch army. From the 13th of April, 1993, until the 13th of July, 1993, Colonel Morsink served in Central Bosnia as an ECMM monitor, and he spent the majority of his time in the field in Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, Zenica, and Travnik municipalities. You will hear from him that he didn't spend much time behind the desk, that he was operating ⁹⁷⁹³at all times driving through the field, having conversations with HVO officers of various rank and levels, as well as their Muslim counterparts. His testimony will focus on a number of

distinct areas. First he will testify about the Busovaca joint commission and how this institution evolved into local commissions in Vitez, Busovaca, and Kiseljak municipalities. In this respect, he will identify the important HVO and Armija personalities who were involved in these meetings, and he will tell you why these institutions were created and how these institutions functioned.

The next subject about which he will testify briefly is about the truck bomb explosion that occurred in Stari Vitez, and specifically his testimony will focus on complaints that he made to Mario Cerkez about the truck bomb explosion and about conversations that were made in the presence of Colonel Blaskic about that same event. He will testify that Mario Cerkez promised to investigate this crime, but to his knowledge, no such investigation was ever done.

The next broad area about which Colonel Morsink will testify is about the use of HVO propaganda and disinformation and how the HVO and the HDZ used this to incite fear in the minds of Bosnian Croats who ⁹⁷⁹⁴were residing in areas held by the Armija, and this resulted in the movement of large numbers of Croats from these Muslim-controlled areas.

The next area about which he will testify is he will contrast the attitudes between the HVO and the ABiH, the Armija, in respect of allegations of serious allegations of humanitarian law, how the parties, the respective parties, reacted to these particular serious allegations.

The next area about which he will testify will be the HVO interference with humanitarian aid, and he will provide to Your Honours three examples of that interference, including two events where he was personally involved and where he was physically threatened in the process of trying to ensure that this humanitarian aid went through.

The next subject he will discuss will concern an individual that he was in contact with by the name of Djuti. Djuti was an individual that was described by the HVO as an uncontrolled element but who, in reality, was under the control and command of the HVO, and Colonel Morsink will describe his contacts with Djuti.

Next, Colonel Morsink will discuss a series of orders that have the name Tihomir Blaskic on the ⁹⁷⁹⁵bottom of those orders and copies of which he received from BRITBAT. He will identify those orders, and we will go through those orders with the assistance of Colonel Morsink.

The next area, Mr. President and Your Honours, is he will testify about the HVO use of Muslim civilians to dig trenches and the awareness at all levels in the chain of command in the HVO of this illegal practice. He will next discuss the systematic burning of houses by the HVO, including threats by Mario Cerkez, who was the Vitez Brigade commander, and a direct subordinate of the accused, to burn Kruscica, which was a Muslim village.

The next area about which he will testify will be to discuss the forcible expulsion of civilians by the HVO from the village of Gacice and his complaints about that illegal act. He will testify that Mario Cerkez explained that the people who were responsible for that were not the HVO but extremists. He will briefly tell you about Franjo Nakic, a man with whom he had frequent dealings and whom, at the end of his tour of duty, he socialised with briefly.

Now, as a professional soldier and someone who spent almost every day on his tour of duty meeting ⁹⁷⁹⁶with HVO officers at all levels, he will give you his opinion about command and control in the HVO and he will tell you that the HVO was an army that had an excellent chain of command and he will also tell you that, in his opinion, Blaskic and his subordinates had control over their forces in Central Bosnia. Lastly, he will testify, Mr. President, about his experiences there and what his experiences led him to believe occurred to the Muslim population in the areas commanded -- in the areas controlled by the HVO. Now, that concludes my summary of the

testimony of Colonel Morsink. Mr. President, in respect of the indictment, certainly his testimony relates to command and control issues, his testimony relates to paragraph 4 and paragraph 5.2 of the indictment, and it relates to virtually every count in the indictment. I would note that it relates to Count 1, persecution, and specifically the paragraphs in that persecution count 6.1, 6.3 through 7 of Count 1, it relates to Counts 2 through 4, Counts 5 through 10, 11 and 13, and Counts 15 through 18.

That concludes my remarks, Mr. President and Your Honours.

JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. You have given us a summary, and now I would like for this summary to be ⁹⁷⁹⁷useful to us. I hope, Mr. Harmon, that you are not going to have, in detail, a description of the entire two months spent by Mr. Morsink. I note 13 points that the witness can comment on, on the joint commission, on the explosion of the truck, on the times at which he met with Tihomir Blaskic, and also his dealings with civilians, and all these matters have been dealt with by other witnesses.

I also observe, however, that, and I'm not going to say that we should not talk about this, this is for you to decide, you are conducting the examination-in-chief, but please try to deal only on those aspects which will be new, not to describe the entire time there from the 13th of April to the 13th of July, but only on those matters which are new. Now, with regards to the HVO and the Bosnian army and also those dealings with humanitarian groups, perhaps -- I'm not saying this is new -- but perhaps you might give new light on this subject, perhaps also the meeting with Djuti, and also orders from Tihomir Blaskic, all right. I've also noted what you might say about Franjo Nakic and also responsibility as far as the chain of command is concerned. All this could bring something to the Defence and also to the Tribunal. ⁹⁷⁹⁸So as regards the command structure, Mr. Harmon, and everything else, I would ask, Mr. Harmon, that you concentrate and focus this testimony and not that he describe what he did on the morning of the 13th of April all the way to what happened on the 13th of July. I want you to focus this testimony and make sure that this testimony serves its purpose.

I note all the counts are indeed concerned, in particular regarding command responsibility. Now, with regards to the technical

organisation of this courtroom, I see we have a colleague in the courtroom who is an interpreter. What arrangements have been made? I believe you stated that the Dutch government has requested that there be an interpreter present to work with

Lieutenant-Colonel Morsink, and I simply wish to remind the interpreter that Rule 76 requires that she make a solemn declaration according to which she will state that she will carry out her task with impartiality, with devotion, and with full conscious of confidentiality. Madam, will you please take the note from which you will read the solemn declaration? Your name is.

THE INTERPRETER: Eva Bodor. ⁹⁷⁹⁹JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Madam Eva Bodor, will you please read the solemn declaration of Rule 76.

THE INTERPRETER: I solemnly declare that I will interpret faithfully, independently, impartially, and with full respect for the duty of confidentiality.

JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much. We may now bring in Lieutenant-Colonel Morsink.

(The witness entered court)

JUDGE JORDA: Does the registrar hear me? Would you please indicate -- it has been one year now since we have begun with these proceedings, and the first thing we should do is to give a headphone to the witness. Otherwise, he cannot express and we cannot understand him, thank you.

Now, madam, would you please explain to the Lieutenant-Colonel that he should give us first his identity and he should remain standing so that he can make his solemn declaration.

Very well, first his rank, last name and first name.

THE WITNESS: My name is Hendrik Morsink, I am a Lieutenant-Colonel.

JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel Morsink. Please remain standing so you that can also read your solemn declaration. ⁹⁸⁰⁰THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well. You may be seated. Lieutenant-Colonel, we wish you -- rather, we welcome you here to this courtroom to testify in the case of the Blaskic case. The accused is here present in this courtroom.

WITNESS: HENDRIK MORSINK Examined by Mr. Harmon:

JUDGE JORDA: Lieutenant-Colonel, we know about the general outline of your testimony following a presentation by the Prosecutor. You are going to receive questions from the Prosecutor. You will then respond to those questions. And then after that, you will be receiving questions from the Defence and from the Judges.

Mr. Harmon, you have the floor. The Prosecutor may begin.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Colonel Morsink, would you like to put those headsets on and listen to the English translation? Is that all right? Okay. And then you can move one of those off one of the ears and you can listen to the Dutch colleague to your side. All right. Colonel, let me ask you, first of all, are ⁹⁸⁰¹you a professional soldier holding the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Dutch Army?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you please tell the Court about your background and your training?

A. In 1976, I entered the military academy of Breda, and I was there, I received a four year training there, I was recruited in the cavalry in 1980, after having taken oath as an officer. I then became a platoon commander.

My following occupation was that of a squad commander, second in command, and then I followed the training becoming squadron commander, and then I became an officer in charge of personnel, personnel officer, and then I received a promotion, I became the commander for the Mechanised Brigade, commander of a tank company, and then I became a liaison officer for that same battalion. Then I was appointed to the military school in The Hague where I then was a member of the army staff. There I underwent training in order to work at this staff headquarters, and during that training, I was selected in order to undergo a year and a half of training for additional training as a superior officer.

After having undergone that training, I ⁹⁸⁰²became a major. I then became head of the G-3 operations in a mechanised unit. At the end of that time period, I then volunteered to be sent and to participate in a peacekeeping operation in 1993, from the 13th of April to the 13th of July. I was sent into Central Bosnia as a member of the European Community. After that, I was selected by the superior military school, German military school, or German War College, and there I was selected to participate in a course, of course, that was being given there. That was a two-year training, after which one could become an officer, superior officer, and I received a promotion. I was appointed to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. After that, I was stationed or posted in The Hague for the army staff.

After having worked for three years in this army staff, I then became the commander of an armoured company, tank battalion, and that's still what I am doing today.

Q. Thank you very much, Colonel Morsink. Now let me turn your attention immediately to your tour of duty as an ECMM monitor in Bosnia. First of all, could you tell the Judges about an organisation, an entity known as the Busovaca Joint Commission and could you tell the Judges about the nature of its work? ⁹⁸⁰³A. I was introduced to the joint Busovaca commission when I first arrived in the Vitez area. I was given some explanation with regards to this joint commission by one of my colleagues, my colleague furnished me with this information, this person was Remi Landry who was a Canadian member of this mission. He explained to me that the Busovaca Joint Commission was created in January of that same year. He also stated that the purpose of this joint commission was to bring together the warring factions in the area. At that time these dealt with the ABiH and the HVO warring factions, and this was in the Busovaca area. When I arrived there in April, in the area of Vitez, the fighting had just broken out and we were then trying to carry out the purposes of this joint commission in the area of Vitez. The mission was made up of a number of monitors. These were members of this mission. And also a certain number of members of United Nations battalions.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, we know what the components were of this commission. But what were you yourself doing, please?

A. My role during these first days as a member of this commission was to take notes during meetings and as a member of one of these teams, I was sent into ⁹⁸⁰⁴the field in order to carry out investigations, and the findings were then related during the meetings on the following day.

The Busovaca Joint Commission was presided over by the most senior ranking person in the area. After a certain number of times, certain number of days, I myself assumed this post. Actually -- the actual term Busovaca Joint Commission also, if you will, transformed itself into a joint command, if you will. Indeed, in this joint command, you would find representatives from various military bodies in the highest levels in that area, also there were representatives from the Bosnian army, who was Mr. Merdan, and there was also representatives from the HVO for the Central Bosnian area and that person was Mr. Franjo Nakic. And it was with these two people that we continued to do our work in the framework of this joint command effort.

The representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army and also the Red Cross were invited. The Red Cross, the International Red Cross, and the UNHCR were also invited, and with this group of eight to ten people, we would have daily meetings. The purpose was to obtain more information from the two parties with regards to the conflict. By discussing ⁹⁸⁰⁵with the two parties, we would hope to arrive at a cease-fire.

After having reached a cease-fire, then our efforts were to go into trying to free the prisoners of war as soon as possible. Another goal of ours was to help those who had been wounded and also to take care of the dead, and the last objective was to implement humanitarian aid for the area.

At the end of the month of April, I believe, the military leaders at the highest levels came together in the same building where the commission was located, that is to say, a building which is next to the BRITBAT building, and during the course of this meeting, it was decided that a cease-fire agreement should be signed.

Shortly thereafter, it was decided that they should put together a joint command in Travnik, and we then put together four joint local commands, and these four commissions would move about in the Vitez area, the Busovaca area, and Kiseljak, and also in Travnik. We were also chosen to carry out such an operation, and as the head of this team and also as the leader of a local division, I myself worked in the field on a daily basis.

The purpose of this joint commission, which ⁹⁸⁰⁶is quite similar to this idea of a joint command, was to ensure that the cease-fire is enforced and that this can be enforced, and also to ensure that any violations of the cease-fire would be prosecuted and also to investigate any violations of human rights and to coordinate humanitarian aid in that area. The local commission would meet every two or three days, and the work of these commissions would continue or were to continue to around the 20th of May, approximately.

There were various results based on where they were located, but the Kiseljak commission was put together with a great deal of effort and difficulty, and the results of that particular commission were quite poor, and the results of the commission in Busovaca were quite good. In Vitez, the results were moderate. In the Travnik area, the results were not satisfactory either because we rarely had an opportunity to meet with both parties.

Indeed, we had to carry out what is called "shuttle diplomacy" which is very difficult to do; indeed, it was very difficult to bring both parties to the table. It was also difficult to try to control the various participants because they would not always respond, but we maintained contact just by the fact ⁹⁸⁰⁷that the actual joint command was no longer active after the 20th of May. We then made an attempt to visit some of the joint commands as often as possible, every day or at least every other day. I believe that all I can tell you with regards to the joint commission of Busovaca, the Busovaca Joint Commission, and also the forward joint commands.

Q. Thank you, Colonel. I have some questions I would like to ask you.

First of all, you mentioned that the joint commissions, as well as the Busovaca Joint Commissions, were attended by Dzemal Merdan.

A. He was the local commander of the 3rd BiH army in Zenica.

Q. What was the position held by Franjo Nakic and the HVO?

A. He introduced himself as the local commander of the Central Bosnia operational zone.

Q. The transcript says local commander. Is that a correct --

A. Deputy commander.

MR. HARMON: It should be corrected, Mr. President, it should be deputy commander. Now, if I could have the usher, please, take the first exhibit and put it on the ELMO, I would like ⁹⁸⁰⁸to show you this exhibit. Mr. President, this is an exhibit that unfortunately only has an English translation.

THE REGISTRAR: This is document 407.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Now, there is an English translation behind that document, Colonel Morsink. First of all, do you recognise -- I'm sorry. I said English translation. This is in the Croatian and Bosnian language, and it's a document -- can you recognise that document?

A. I received this during the first meeting, and in the document, among other things, was Franjo Nakic was present as part of the operational zone command.

Q. If you would turn, first of all, to that document, the last page -- or the bottom of the Croatian version. Whose signature or whose name appears on the bottom of that document?

A. -- Blaskic (no interpretation).

Q. Can you tell me, in the document itself, how Mr. Franjo Nakic is identified? In this particular document it is paragraph 1.1.

A. It's in Croatian.

Q. Take a look at the translation in English, please, and how is Mr. Nakic identified?

A. As the deputy commander of Central Bosnian ⁹⁸⁰⁹operational zone.

Q. Did you -- how did Mr. Nakic get to and from the joint commission meetings?

A. The meetings were in the house next to the British -- the BRITBAT, and he'd get picked up by a British tank corps.

Q. Picked up from where?

A. Sometimes from the middle Bosnian operational headquarters, the hotel in Vitez, and sometimes he would come on foot from his own house.

Q. And when he left the meetings, how would he be taken back, either to his home or to his --

A. Depending on what time it was that the meeting was being held, if it would be early, he would go back by himself to the hotel, or sometimes he would be brought back, and if it was late, then he would go on foot.

Q. Now, was he, in essence, supposed to be the eyes and ears of Colonel Blaskic at those meetings?

A. Because he was the deputy commander of Blaskic, I realised that he had gotten orders from Blaskic and to report to his direct superior.

Q. Let me focus on another part of your testimony. You said that in late April, military leaders at the highest level met at the ECMM house to ⁹⁸¹⁰create a joint command in Travnik. Who were those military leaders who met?

A. The commander of the HVO was Petkovic and on the ABiH army was General Halilovic.

JUDGE JORDA: Would you please turn to the Judges when you answer? Give your answers directly to the Judge. You hear the questions from the Prosecutor. Please answer to the Judges because the Judges have to be made aware of what you say.

MR. HARMON:

Q. I noted an error in the transcript. At the end of the meeting that took place on the 29th of April where the local joint commissions were created, the transcript said at one point local commands were created. Were they local commissions or were they local commands?

A. (No translation).

Q. I did not get an interpretation on that, I'm afraid.

A. In my opinion, they were commissions. When you talk about command, they are the jurisdiction over giving orders, whereas a commission is an organ which is consulting needs, which can carry out investigations.

Q. You testified, Colonel Morsink, that after ⁹⁸¹¹these local commissions were created in various municipalities, that they were attended by representatives from both sides. Which representatives from both sides attended the local commission meetings in Vitez municipality, Busovaca municipality, and the Kiseljak municipality?

A. To start with Vitez, the two brigade commanders on the BiH side and the HVO, both of them had immediately designated a liaison officer. When these brigade commands began to participate in this, there began to be a structure. In Busovaca, the two brigade commanders, a certain number of their staff officers participated as well. In Kiseljak, it was the same thing, the brigade commander and a certain number of staff officers who were there.

Q. And did Franjo Nakic attend the local commission meetings as well as his ABiH counterpart General Merdan?

A. At the beginning, they were local commissions, and they would go with us -- they would be with us at the first three or four meetings. For the first three or four weeks, rather, first three or four weeks, they were there.

MR. HARMON: Now, Mr. President, I'm going to show a video, and I'm going to ask the witness, first ⁹⁸¹²of all, to take a look at Prosecutor's next exhibit, which would be 408. If that could be distributed to the witness?

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, go ahead.

MR. HARMON: What I propose to do, Mr. President, with 408 is, 408 is a photo album with stills from the video that Your Honours will hear, and it will show you and identify certain important figures and personalities who you will see in the ensuing video, and very quickly, we don't have to put this on the ELMO.

Q. Sir, will you go through these -- the individual who is marked with No. 1, can you tell the Judges who is that individual?

A. No. 1 is Mr. Franjo Nakic. He was the second in command of the operational zone in Central Bosnia.

Q. Now, would you turn to photograph number 2 in that exhibit and identify that individual?

A. No. 2 is Dzemal Merdan. He was the commander of the 3rd Bosnia-Herzegovina army.

Q. And who is the individual on the next page, No. 3?

A. No. 3 is Mario Cerkez. He is the commander of the HVO brigade in Vitez.

Q. Now, even though we'll come back to the ⁹⁸¹³individual marked in No. 4 later in your testimony, can you tell the Judges who that individual is?

A. This is an HVO soldier. I think he was a battalion commander in the Vitez region, and he had threatened me, saying that if I intervened again, going through a checkpoint.

Q. And we will get to further details on that threat later in your testimony. And who is the individual in No. 5?

A. No. 5 is Mr. Borislav Jozic. He was present with Cerkez as a liaison for the HVO Vitez brigade in the joint operation command and later in the local Vitez commission.

Q. The next exhibit you will see, Colonel Morsink, is a video film taken of a meeting. I'd like you to just tell the Judges, give them a preview of what they're going to see in that film so they can -- we're going to go through the film fairly quickly, but if you can give them a preview, it will assist them, and if, during the film itself, you care to comment on who is doing what or who is who, please feel free to do that as well.

A. The film takes place at the ECMM house near the British camp. In it are a number of British soldiers coming. There were tanks that came, that were ⁹⁸¹⁴brought in by the British brigade. They were kind of taxis in the region because it was (sic) always safe to go home in the evening and you had to go by the front-line. You see a table in a meeting room. On the table on the ABiH side.

JUDGE RIAD: There is a mistake. It should be not.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Colonel Morsink, your testimony as reflected in the transcript says, "they were kind of taxis in the region because it was always safe to go home in the evening?"

A. Unsafe because there was fighting along the frontlines day after day. Across the frontlines several sometimes.

JUDGE RIAD: I hope you will change it.

MR. HARMON: It has been changed.

Q. Colonel Morsink, does the film itself fairly depict the kind of meetings that were had, show the representatives, how they were present, how they took notes, who participated in these meetings?

A. It gives you a very clear picture of the level of the representatives there, very specific idea also of how these kinds of meetings were conducted. The meetings were presided over by the ECMM, we would ⁹⁸¹⁵take notes, it was the note keeper from the ECMM that would write up the report, and the participants would take their own notes and they would react frequently to the accusations.

MR. HARMON: Now, thank you very much. If we could have the next exhibit, which would be Prosecutor's 409, I believe, Mr. Dubuisson, if we could have that film shown and the lights dimmed? Colonel Morsink, if you care to comment in the course of this film. It should appear on your monitor.

(Videotape played)

A. This is the location in Vitez where the bomb exploded. This was the car bomb that went off. This here are the BiH army officers, the brigade commander who is arriving home. They were accompanied by a British officer and a British soldier. Here's the house where we would hold our meetings.

Here's another British vehicle arriving with Captain McBraid.

Q. Mr. President, I note when this cassette was given, there was sound as well -- now it appears to be back.

A. This is the liaison officer of Vitez, Borislav Jozic. There is several observers here. You ⁹⁸¹⁶can see them. This is a brigade commander from the HVO in Busovaca, Dusko Jusic, and this is Mr. Merdan, Mr. Jozic, this is the one that threatened me, and here are the BiH army officers coming into the room. That was the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This is Mr. Merdan, and behind him is Major Michael Hardling, is Mario Cerkez, the brigade commander, with some of his officers. This is Mr. Nakic, Mr. Merdan. They were always sitting next to one another at the table. On the other side are the monitors, the observers. Here you have the President of the meeting. The presiding officer has just come in. In the middle is the interpreter.

There was the British liaison officer coming in with his own interpreter.

MR. HARMON: That concludes the film, Mr. President. If we could have the lights? Thank you.

Q. Colonel Morsink, other than the participation that you had in these meetings, can you describe the other work that you did, how much time you spent in the field and with whom you spent that time?

A. The work days were long. We begin early in the mornings as soon as it would get light. It was difficult to recognise what car you were riding in as ⁹⁸¹⁷you would go through the area, and we would stop working at night when it would get dark. Our mission was not to move about at night.

We would meet about once a day for two or three hours, and as regards the rest of the day, we would make visits to areas where there were allegations. We had to gather information from the various headquarters. We would visit the prisons as well. We would be present in order to repair the telephone and electricity lines. We would be there when victims had to be buried. We would be there for the exchange of remains and of wounded people, and we would draft reports which we would give to both of the parties directly.

In the evening, we would draft our own reports summarising the events of the day. The reports would be sent to Zagreb, to the ECMM headquarters, and then every evening, we also had contacts at the headquarters of our own headquarters, the seat of our own headquarters.

Q. Would it be fair to say, Colonel Morsink, that you spent the majority of your time in the field in the Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, Travnik, and Zenica municipalities?

A. Yes. ⁹⁸¹⁸Q. You had daily contact with officers of all levels and soldiers of ordinary rank and file on both sides of the conflict?

A. I would have daily contact, and we would try to balance out the contacts.

Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, were the orders of Dzemal Merdan followed and respected by his subordinates in the field since you went around the field with him for a considerable period of time?

A. My impression was that they were followed, yes.

Q. I have the same question in respect of Franjo Nakic. Were his orders respected and followed by his sub-commanders?

A. I believe the same. The results were not always satisfying, but the occasions that I saw when he gave an order, there would be generally a proper military reaction to them.

Q. Could you give an example -- I'm sorry. Can you tell the Judges about an instance that you observed in Kiseljak municipality where the order of Franjo Nakic was followed?

A. I believe we would come with the ECMM team to the headquarters of the HVO brigade in Kiseljak, and there we would meet Mr. Bradara -- ⁹⁸¹⁹JUDGE JORDA: I haven't got an interpretation in French to the last few answers. There was a previous question as well that was not answered in French. I think we have to have -- yes, that's correct, there was a missing -- the French interpretation was missing.

THE REGISTRAR: Could you ask the question again so that the French transcript can be completed?

MR. HARMON: I'm not quite sure, Mr. President, where you lost the translation.

JUDGE RIAD: I can tell you. You said: Were his orders, speaking of Franjo Nakic, were his orders respected and followed by his sub-commanders? He answered: "I believe the same results were not always satisfying but the occasions that I saw when he gave an order, there would be generally a proper military reaction to them."

MR. HARMON: Thank you, Judge Riad.

Q. The next question I had then, Colonel Morsink, is: Can you give an example of an instance where Franjo Nakic's order was followed, and specifically in Kiseljak?

A. An example, at the beginning of May in Kiseljak, we went with an ECMM team on site, Nakic and Merdan as well. We went to the HVO headquarters in ⁹⁸²⁰Kiseljak. There we met Mr. Bradara. The subject was the release of prisoners from the Kiseljak prison. Mr. Bradara said to us that he had received the order to release them but that he was not prepared to obey the order because, in his own opinion, the other camp had not -- the other side, rather, had not done the same thing. He meant that there was a group of prisoners in Klokoti, and I remember that Mr. Nakic had given him the order to obey the -- to obey the order anyway, that is the order to release the prisoners. Mr. Nakic and Mr. Merdan, with the ECMM team, we all decided to make sure that the other side did the same thing.

After some time, that is the same day, some prisoners, in fact, were released.

Q. So you observed the HVO officer, Mario Bradara, obey the order of Franjo Nakic?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Now, I would like to turn your attention very, very briefly to the truck bomb incident in Vitez that occurred on the 18th of April, 1993. Were you present in the area when the truck bomb was detonated?

A. When the bomb exploded, I was with an ECMM team in a place that was called Gornja Ravna which was five kilometres away from the centre of Vitez. Gornja ⁹⁸²¹Ravna is on the hill, and from it you can see Vitez very clearly.

When we would have a discussion with the local commanders on the frontline, we could see that there was artillery fired on the neighbouring hills, and all of a sudden, I think it was at the end of the afternoon, around 5.00, when I heard an enormous explosion in Vitez. We saw that there was smoke, there was a huge cloud of smoke that was rising, and at that time, we did not react.

In the evening, when we went by, in order to go to the British battalion headquarters, we heard, at the British battalion, that there had been a car bomb which had gone off.

Q. And that truck bomb resulted in numerous civilian deaths and casualties; is that correct?

A. The British told us that many people from that region had to be evacuated, 200 people. The evacuation was organised by the English without any help from the local authorities, and there were many casualties who were cared for partly by the British who were on site. There was no sign of death; in fact, no one was buried at that point. There were no deaths.

THE WITNESS: There was no sign of dead bodies being recovered. ⁹⁸²²Q. Thank you for the correction. Now, Colonel Morsink, the next day, the 19th of April, 1993, was the matter raised -- was the issue of the truck bomb and the explosion in a civilian area of Stari Vitez raised with local military and political figures?

A. In the morning of the 19th of April, the HVO Vitez brigade commander, Mr. Mario Cerkez, in his office, I brought up the subject, together with my monitor, colleague Pedersen, and I remember that Mr. Pedersen said that this was not a normal thing that one would do in a war, that it really was a terrorist act, and I remember that shortly afterwards somebody from the meeting came who was outside the meeting. He introduced himself as Mr. Anto Valenta. He had a political function in the region, I don't quite remember which one exactly it was, but I think that it was -- it was the -- he was the vice-president of the HDZ.

When Mr. Valenta came in, we went back to the issue of the truck bomb, and Mr. Valenta, like Mr. Cerkez, recounted the event as they saw it. I remember that Mr. Valenta said that there had been a munitions depot which had been hit by a shell, and that was why the truck had exploded. ⁹⁸²³Mr. Cerkez explained things to us somewhat differently. He said that the truck had been hit by a grenade or by firing, and I remember that my colleague, Pedersen, insisted on the fact that this was not a sufficient explanation. He insisted by saying that an investigation needed to be carried out, and Mr. Cerkez stated that he would do so.

Q. At any time while you were in the theatre in Central Bosnia, did you ever hear that an investigation of this incident was, in fact, performed?

A. No, I never heard anything about any type of an investigation nor the results of any investigation.

Q. Now, while we're on the subject of Mario Cerkez. You were in his office. Did you often go to his office, and did you find it unusual that Anto Valenta could gain access to his office so easily?

A. Well, during the first week, we would often meet in his office. Indeed, the headquarters was located in the Vitez cinema. It was difficult to go into his office. You had to go through a whole series of guards that were posted, and when we would finally arrive at his office, then we would have to wait. There was another guard in front of his office, and one could never disturb him.

Q. Were you surprised to see Anto Valenta walk ⁹⁸²⁴into the office?

A. Yes, I was quite surprised to that somebody could simply walk in during a discussion.

Q. Let me ask you, the next day, on the 20th of April, 1993, were you at a meeting with Colonel Stewart, Clare Podbielski, who was from ICRC, and Colonel Blaskic when the incident of the truck bomb was raised?

A. Yes, I was present. It was in the headquarters, it was at the Hotel Vitez, and I remember that it was the first time that I was in that particular headquarters building. I also remember quite well that Mr. Bob Stewart was also quite excited. He was furious. He was furious to see that the HVO were not reacting after this truck exploded. He was also furious because the Croats had accused the British of having participated or to have been active in that event because there were only Muslims that were wounded and also -- only the Muslims, rather, were being evacuated by them. He protested very strongly.

Q. What was Colonel Blaskic's reaction to those protests?

A. I recall that he was listening, but he didn't make any objections. He simply listened to the statements made by Stewart. Nor did he exclude the ⁹⁸²⁵possibility of carrying out an investigation but nor did he really react.

Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, was the detonation of that truck bomb in the civilian section of Stari Vitez an obvious violation of international humanitarian law?

A. (No translation)

MR. HARMON: I did not get an answer.

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion, was Colonel Blaskic fully aware -- now I'm getting the translation of English in my headphones, so perhaps the interpreter could -- thank you.

Let me ask the question again: Based on your presence with Colonel Stewart in Colonel Blaskic's office on the 20th of April, 1993, and based on your presence in Mario Cerkez's office the day before, in your opinion, was Colonel Blaskic fully aware of the truck bomb explosion, where it had occurred, and that there was a demand for an investigation into that event?

A. Yes. That happened a few days earlier not more than a kilometre from his headquarters, so the explosion could be heard from 5 kilometres away. Of course, yes. ⁹⁸²⁶Q. Now, let me turn to a different subject, Colonel Morsink, and that is HVO and HDZ propaganda and disinformation.

In your opinion, did the HVO and political entities of the Bosnian Croat side use propaganda to incite fear in the minds of Croats who were residing in areas held by the Bosnian Muslims and did that result in a large movement of Croat civilians from those areas? Could you explain to the Judges your views on that question, and can you cite some examples, please?

A. Yes, indeed. We (sic) used propaganda, using radio and television, both HDZ and also HVO --

Q. Excuse me, Colonel. There seems to be an error on the answer. The answer that is recorded on the transcript says "We" used propaganda?

THE WITNESS: It should be "they" used propaganda. HVO and HDZ used propaganda.

Q. Thank you for the correction. Please continue your answer.

A. One of the first examples that I experienced was the following: In the Grahovcici area --

Q. Colonel, before you begin that particular example and your series of examples, if I could have the next exhibit shown to the witness placed on the ELMO? ⁹⁸²⁷You're going to be giving examples in Grahovcici and Guca Gora, and you have assisted me by marking a map and indicating the locations of those villages, and just as an aid for the Judges and for counsel to follow your testimony, I'd like you to identify this next exhibit.

THE REGISTRAR: This will be document 410.

MR. HARMON: Mr. Usher, if you could move that down a little bit? It only shows one of the two locations. That's fine.

Q. Now, you're going to give us examples, are you now, from the time of Grahovcici and the town of Guca Gora; is that correct?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Could you mark in orange on the Prosecutor's next exhibit the location of those towns?

A. This is Grahovcici and this is Guca Gora.

Q. Thank you very much, Colonel Morsink. Now, please, if you would give some examples of the use of propaganda by the HVO and the HDZ?

A. I'd like to talk to you about an incident which is quite important which occurred in the Grahovcici area. This incident occurred in the end -- in the month of April. Mr. Stejpan invited me to visit this area and -- this was Mr. Stejpan. This was a ⁹⁸²⁸Catholic father or priest, rather, from the Zenica area. He explained to me that in a certain number of areas, a large number of Croats had fled. Two or three thousand Croatian families had fled, and they had fled towards Grahovcici, and that he had been able to visit with these people to see whether or not they were able to return to their houses.

THE WITNESS: That's not fully correct. We planned to visit those families in Grahovcici, so he had not been able before to visit them.

JUDGE RIAD: Could you repeat that again, please?

A. I had the impression that in the interpretation it was stated that Stejpan had previously had the opportunity to go to that village, the village of Grahovcici. That was not correct. Father Stejpan had not yet gone to Grahovcici; he had asked for our assistance in order to go to that location.

We requested authorisation at the ABiH -- or BiH headquarters, and there we received authorisation in order to cross the frontlines, in order to go to that location in Grahovcici, and there we were able to attempt to make a contact with the authorities, the spiritual Croatian authorities there, and on that same ⁹⁸²⁹day, we tried to come into contact with the military authorities of the HVO in Grahovcici.

We then visited with the oldest person among the refugees, and with that person, we were able to put together a plan. This consisted of three stages. The first stage consisted of going to visit the inhabitants who were occupying the houses of those who had fled. I will now show you, indicate to you on the map, where that took place. It took place in Janjac, in Dolac, in Stranjani and also in a number of Croatian houses.

Q. Colonel Morsink, as a result of propaganda, fear-mongering by the HVO and the HDZ, did Croats in those villages flee to Grahovcici?

A. Well, this is due in part to propaganda and in part to fear. During our investigations, it was apparently that a small number of houses were indeed burned. We also collected some testimonies from witnesses who had been fired upon and also from persons -- we also noted that some persons had lost their lives. The best example of propaganda came later on. If I can go on then to the second phase of our plan?

This was to organise a movement of a large number of ambulances and buses so that these people could return to their houses. We implemented this plan ⁹⁸³⁰with the authorisation of the headquarters of the BiH army. We were not able to bring the ambulances through because there was artillery fire. The buses were stopped at the military -- Croatian military police checkpoint, and the buses were then taken away at that time.

We strongly protested against this. I myself tried to prevent that from happening. But it was necessary that -- it took us a lot of time, rather, to make contact once again with the Grahovcici authorities, and when contact was made, the Croatian authorities and the religious authorities and also the oldest refugee indicated to us that the Travnik and Vitez radio, if you will -- then on the radio, on the Croatian radio, it was stated and explained that a large group of Croatians had been killed in Zenica, and that therefore these people could not return and be safe in their homes. The radio also stated that it would no longer be safe for these people to go to Novi Bila and to Vitez.

THE WITNESS: That's not correct. It would be safer for them to go to Novi Bila and to Vitez.

MR. HARMON:

Q. So the radio said, the HVO -- I mean the Croatian radio said it would be safer for the refugees ⁹⁸³¹not to return to their homes in Muslim-held territory but to go to HVO-held territory; is that correct?

A. That's correct, yes.

JUDGE RIAD: We have to correct it to say that it would no longer be safe to go to -- it would no longer be safe for these people to go to Novi Bila and to Vitez.

MR. HARMON: That is the error in the transcript that I tried to --

JUDGE RIAD: Yes. But to me, it is there. I mean, we have to correct it.

MR. HARMON: Yes. Judge Riad, that's what I endeavoured to do by asking a question to clarify and correct that, so as the witness has now testified to the corrected version, I think the transcript will be corrected itself.

JUDGE RIAD: I hope so. Thank you.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Colonel Morsink, continue or -- have you ...

A. A second example of a very apparent --

Q. Before we get to that --

A. -- propaganda was in Guca Gora.

Q. A clarification, and I'm not sure whether we will --

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, I think we're ⁹⁸³²going to take a break here now. I was waiting to see perhaps if we could finish with the propaganda issue, but I see we're not going to finish with that right away, so I propose a 20-minute recess.

The court now stands in recess.

--- Recess taken at 11.25 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.50 a.m.

JUDGE JORDA: The Tribunal is now in session. Please bring in the accused.

(The accused entered court)

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Colonel Morsink, let me begin by correcting an error in the transcript. The transcript shows that in your testimony, when you testified that buses were stopped, that they were stopped by Croatian military police. Did you mean HVO military police and not the military police from the Republic of Croatia?

A. HVO. Yes, that's what I meant.

Q. Will you tell the Judges the exact nature of the propaganda that you were aware of that attempted to get the Croat population from returning to their homes? What was said?

A. It was explained to me that the propaganda consisted of stating that a large number of Croatians ⁹⁸³³-- or Croats, rather, had been assassinated. This was in the Zenica region. The propaganda stated that a large number of houses had been burned. It also stated that other houses had been looted and that the Mujahedin had the intention to exterminate the remaining Croats.

Q. Based on the results of your investigation, that was grossly exaggerated; is that correct?

A. We ourselves went to these areas in the first stage, and we found that a very small number of houses had been burned. We also discovered that there were very few cases of pillaging, and that the number of victims was very, very low. The radio and television propaganda was extremely exaggerated.

MR. HARMON: Now, if I could have the next exhibit, Mr. Dubuisson, which is an ECMM daily report dated the 26th of April, 1993, prepared by Lars Baggesen and Hendrik Morsink. Mr. President, the next exhibit does have a French translation attached to it. It is 411; is that correct?

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it is indeed 411, and 411A for the French version.

MR. HARMON: There is no reason to put that on the ELMO. If you could just hand that to Colonel Morsink? ⁹⁸³⁴Q. Colonel Morsink, can you identify Prosecutor's Exhibit 411?

A. Yes, indeed, this is a daily report. It was made on the 26th of April, which I wrote along with Lars Pedersen (sic).

THE WITNESS: Lars Baggesen.

Q. It should be not Lars --

THE WITNESS: Lars Baggesen.

MR. HARMON:

Q. It should be Lars Baggesen as opposed to Lars Pedersen; is that correct?

A. Yes. Lars Baggesen and myself.

Q. Does this recount the details of some of the investigation, Colonel Morsink?

A. This document talks about three phases, three stages, and in the first phase, you see here that we carried out an investigation concerning the three small villages. It is also stated here that a certain number of houses had been burned and also that a very small number of persons had been killed.

Q. It also describes the issue of military police interference, does it not, in trying to return these displaced persons on buses?

A. Yes, that point indicates that the military police took away these vehicles from us. We protested, ⁹⁸³⁵but there was no account taken of our protests. It is also stated that the local television was present, and at that meeting -- which allowed us to prove that these rumours were not true.

Q. All right. Colonel, thank you. Now, would you kindly turn to the next example that you experienced of HVO propaganda being used to attempt to create fear in the hearts and minds of Bosnian Croats who were residing in Muslim-occupied territory.

A. The following example concerns the Guca Gora area. This was in the early part of 1993. In the early part of June 1993, in the morning, I went to the headquarters of the operational zone of Central Bosnia in Vitez, and there I had a meeting with a liaison officer for Mr. Blaskic. The name of this liaison officer was Darko Gelic, and this liaison officer explained to me that a large group of civilians, of civilian Croats, had fled from the Guca Gora region and that their houses had been burned and that a large number of these persons were killed in their houses or, after having left their houses, their houses were looted, and the best evidence of this crime was the fact that the church in Guca Gora was allegedly burned. The liaison officer was extremely affected by these events. And then we went to Travnik. ⁹⁸³⁶In Travnik, we encountered Mr. Alagic. Mr. Alagic was the commander of the BiH army in the operational zone of Central Bosnia -- no, rather, he was operating at the same level as Mr. Blaskic. He was sort of a commander of a division of the BiH army. We talked with him about the Guca Gora area, we talked to him about the rumours in the Guca Gora area, and the fact that these crimes had been committed. He denied it. He denied that these crimes had taken place. At our request, that an investigation be carried out in that area, he suggested that two Croat participants and a Croat priest and himself accompany us to Guca Gora, and this to see whether or not these accusations could be verified. So along with an escort from the BRITBAT, we went to Guca Gora, and along with these Croat representatives, we were able to note that the accusations which had been made about this region were not at all true. The church was not on fire, the church had not received any damage inside the church either, and near the church we saw a large number of Croat refugees, some 200 of these, and the only location in which something had been set fire was Bandol, and Bandol is a Muslim village. We reported our findings, as we always do. ⁹⁸³⁷Then we went back to Guca Gora the next day, and we met with the representatives of the UNHCR, Miss Margaret Green, and we also met the English battalion commander, Mr. Duncan. We discussed things, and together we decided that we would evacuate the refugees who were in the church to Novi Bila. Additional investigations were carried out in the entire region of Guca Gora, and all of these investigations indicated the propaganda was false and that all the accusations were very, very much exaggerated. It also appeared that because of the propaganda, large groups of Croatian citizens had decided to flee, and fled, in fact, toward a region under HVO control, Novi Bila and Vitez.

Q. Colonel Morsink, let me show you two exhibits, two photographs, that will be the next exhibits in order.

If I could have the first exhibit, Mr. Dubuisson, the one with the priest in it, as 412, and the church 413? And if 412 could be placed on the ELMO.

Very briefly, Colonel Morsink, could you identify this photo, and was this photo taken when you were conducting your investigation into the allegations at Guca Gora? ⁹⁸³⁸A. I recognise it. It's one that I actually took myself. I recognise the people that one sees in it: the Croatian priest from Travnik, my interpreter, my fellow observer, Philip Watkins, the liaison officer, the British captain, the liaison officer for Travnik, and an interpreter working for the British battalion (indicated). The photograph was taken on the road between Guca Gora and Travnik. We were stopped there and we had to negotiate in order to get through the front-line.

Q. If I could have the next exhibit placed on the ELMO? Colonel Morsink, before starting your investigation into Guca Gora on that particular day, you were informed that the Catholic church had been burned; is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Can you identify this photograph?

A. This is a photograph that I myself took as well on the same day, the day after. It shows the old Catholic church in Guca Gora, and you can see a number of representatives of the English battalion and some soldiers as well, and on the photograph you can see that there's obviously no damage to the church at all.

Q. Now, Colonel Morsink, when you conducted the investigation in and around Guca Gora, the only village ⁹⁸³⁹that you found burning was a Muslim village; is that correct?

A. This is correct.

MR. HARMON: Now if I could have the next exhibit, Mr. Dubuisson? It is a special report on Travnik, it is dated the 8th of June, 1993. Mr. Usher, could you just pass this to

Mr. Dubuisson so he can recognise the exhibit? Mr. President, this exhibit also has a French translation attached to it. This is Exhibit 414.

Q. Colonel Morsink, this exhibit has actually a cover sheet, and that appears to be the first page of this document. It is written by an individual by the name of Jean Pierre Thebault. Do you see that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Can you tell the Judges who Jean Pierre Thebault was?

A. Mr. Thebault was a French diplomat. His position was the head of the regional Zenica -- centre and one of the top organisations within the ECMM in Yugoslavia.

Q. The next page of the report is entitled "Special Report on Travnik," and it's dated 8 June, 1993; is that correct?

A. Yes, that's correct. ⁹⁸⁴⁰Q. Did you prepare that report yourself?

A. I recognise it. Together with my colleague, Philip Watkins, I prepared this.

Q. This report and the report of Jean Pierre Thebault indicate that the allegations of atrocities and ethnic cleansing made by the Bosnian Croats are intentionally exaggerated, if not completely false; is that correct?

THE INTERPRETER: "Not completely false"? I'm sorry. Could you repeat?

Q. ... when not completely false?

A. Yes, that's correct, that was our opinion, and it was also the result of the research that we did into it, the investigation that we carried out.

MR. HARMON: I would like to turn to the next exhibit, if I could, please, Mr. Dubuisson? It will be Exhibit 415. It is another special report dated the 19th of June, 1993.

Mr. President, Exhibit 415 also has a French translation accompanying it.

Q. Colonel Morsink, do you recognise this report?

A. I recognise it, but I didn't prepare it myself.

Q. Who was it prepared by? ⁹⁸⁴¹A. This was written by Philip Watkins and Torbjorn Junhof.

Q. Does this also deal with the subject matter of the events in and around Grahovcici -- Guca Gora, I'm sorry?

A. In my opinion, this was after the investigation in the Guca Gora region where once again it was sought to learn what the situation in the various Croatian locations was.

Q. This report also summarises and concludes that there are exaggerations in respect of claims made by the Bosnian Croats, does it not?

A. That's correct.

MR. HARMON: Thank you very much. Now if I could have the next exhibit, please, and it is an exhibit that is entitled "Calls for Help." Mr. Dubuisson, it is this exhibit.

Exhibit 416, Mr. President, also has an accompanying French translation.

If you could place that on the ELMO, please?

Q. Colonel Morsink, you have had an opportunity to examine this document before coming to court; is that correct?

A. This is correct.

Q. Is this a document that was issued from the ⁹⁸⁴²Central Bosnia operation zone command post in Vitez?

A. Yes, that's correct. It's dated on top, and it is also signed by Mr. Blaskic.

Q. Now, was this particular document sent to ECMM, to the UNHCR commissioner?

A. Yes, that's correct. On the distribution list, you can see that, to the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees.

Q. Was it also sent to Croatian TV?

A. That's also true. It was on the same list, you see HTV, Croatian TV, and HINA.

Q. Would you take that document, please, and read the first two paragraphs of it? First of all, before you read those, Colonel, what is the date on this particular "Call for Help"?

A. It says 4 May, 1993.

Q. So this document was issued shortly after your investigation at Grahovcici?

A. That's correct.

Q. After your findings of your investigation in Grahovcici were relayed to Franjo Nakic and other military commanders who were present at local commission meetings; is that correct?

A. This is correct. They would give a report every day or the next day what had happened the day ⁹⁸⁴³before.

Q. Will you just read the first two paragraphs? Read it aloud, please?

THE WITNESS: "You are acquainted with the suffering of the Croatian people in Central Bosnia. However, I feel the need and responsibility to inform you once again about the difficult position of the Croats --"

JUDGE JORDA: Could you go more slowly, please, because the interpreters don't have the text in front of them, so they're interpreting as you go along, so you have to go more slowly, please.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I'll start again. "You are acquainted with the suffering of the Croatian people in Central Bosnia. However, I feel the need and responsibility to inform you once again about the difficult position of the Croats in Zenica who have been living in total isolation for quite some time, waiting for it to be their turn to go to the one of the KPD/correction house/prisons or to a mine for forced labour.

"Croatian villages in Zenica have been plundered, 5.000 Croats have been expelled from their homes. Most villages have been set ablaze, Croats are being fired from their jobs and mistreated." ⁹⁸⁴⁴MR. HARMON:

Q. Thank you, Colonel. There's no reason to read further into this document.

Now, are those allegations that are made in this "Call for Help" issued by Colonel Blaskic consistent with the findings that were made by ECMM or the gross exaggerations?

A. They don't correspond with the findings from the investigations that had been carried out. Except for the forced work in the mines, all the other accusations were denied by us.

Q. In respect of the forced labour in mines, do you have any information at all about whether or not Bosnian Croats were forced to work in mines?

A. I have no information, no concrete information about that. In fact, this subject was not dealt with during the meeting of the joint commission, and we were not able to verify it --

THE WITNESS: No. We were not asked to verify it.

Q. What can you conclude from this particular document, Colonel Morsink?

A. My conclusion is that despite the fact that we had reported that all of these rumours were untrue, nonetheless they were brought up again in an official ⁹⁸⁴⁵document and they were even broadcast on television.

Q. Do you conclude from this that Colonel Blaskic participated in this campaign of propaganda?

A. My opinion is that he was aware of that and so consciously used this false information, then it must have been an attempt at using propaganda.

Q. Let me turn, if I can, to the last paragraph, second-to-last paragraph on this document, starting with "If you continue to remain silent." Would you kindly read that paragraph into the record, please?

A. "If you continue to remain silent about the most brutal human rights violations, the public will come to know about it, and we will have the obligation to tell the world what is happening in Zenica and what is happening to the Croats."

Q. Colonel Morsink, can you conclude from this document that Colonel Blaskic was fully aware that forced labour of civilians, plunder, forced expulsion of civilians from their homes, the setting of villages ablaze, the illegal arrest of civilians were human rights violations?

A. Yes. When you are so aware of this and then in relation with the expression, what human rights relations are all about, then you have to be ...

THE WITNESS: Then you have to be aware. ⁹⁸⁴⁶MR. HARMON: Now if I could have the next exhibit placed on the ELMO, Mr. Dubuisson? It is a one-page document with the caption "Appeal" on it. Colonel Morsink, do you recognise this

particular document?

A. Yes, I recognise it. It is one of my own. I received it at a meeting in Vitez.

Q. From where is this particular document issued?

A. In the heading, it says that it comes from the headquarters of the Central Bosnian operative zone. You can see Mr. Blaskic's name on the bottom, but there's no signature.

Q. Now, you've had an opportunity to examine the contents of this particular document before coming to court, have you not?

A. Yes, it's my own. I'm aware of this document.

Q. And you were in the theatre in Central Bosnia before and after this particular document was issued?

A. Yes. The document appeared on the 14th of June, and I arrived in June -- I arrived in April, rather, and I remained there until the middle of July.

Q. What's your impression and opinion about this particular document? ⁹⁸⁴⁷A. In my opinion, this is an extension or a continuation of the propaganda. There are extreme exaggerations about rumours that had been spread. In my opinion, it fits right into what happened later on, and, in my opinion, it also fits into the intention of the HVO and of the HDZ, and the intention was to make their own population extremely fearful. Based on that fear, they wanted to try to push them out of certain regions.

MR. HARMON: If I could have the next exhibit, please, Mr. Dubuisson? It will be Exhibit 418.

A. I'm not sure that the last sentence was properly translated. I didn't mean that they wanted to -- not to chase them out of one but, rather, to draw them into one.

JUDGE RIAD: I'm sorry, I did not understand that.

A. Let me explain. The propaganda, in my opinion, was used so that the Croatian minorities in certain areas which were under Muslim domination were to be convinced that they should leave these regions voluntarily in order to go to Vitez and to Novi Bila and Busovaca.

JUDGE RIAD: Since I'm asking you: And what ⁹⁸⁴⁸was the purpose of that?

A. The purpose of the HVO and the HDZ was to concentrate the Croats in the areas that were under their own domination.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Now, Colonel Morsink, you have in front of you Exhibit 418, and can you tell the Judges what Exhibit 418 is?

Let me rephrase that question. Is this a communication to General Morillon from Mate Boban?

A. The first page states that it's a fax, it's a fax cover sheet. The intention was for it to be sent to General Morillon. It was sent on behalf of Mate Boban.

Q. Now, turning to the document on the next page, do you see the caption to whom it's addressed? Is it addressed to Philip Morillon?

A. Yes, that's correct. It's addressed to General Philip Morillon.

Q. What is the date on that, please?

A. The date is 22 June, 1993.

Q. And can you see who sent that letter to Philip Morillon?

A. The name that's on there is Mate Boban. ⁹⁸⁴⁹Q. Now, very slowly, if you would, please, Colonel Morsink, would you read the first paragraph of this document?

THE WITNESS: "Dear Sir: The Croatian people of Central Bosnia are on the verge of extinction and being expelled from areas where they have lived for over 13 centuries. UNPROFOR and yourself have witnessed the barbaric Muslim devastation and desecration of sacred Catholic objects of our people. The Kraljeva, Sutjeska, Guca Gora monasteries and many other similar places are the soul of Bosnia & Herzegovina which we Croats have defended and attempted to recreate on a new basis. More than 100.000 people, women, children and the helpless are in extreme danger of losing their lives. It seems the tragic destiny of Travnik, Kakanj, Kraljeva, Sutjeska, Kresevo, Fojnica Busovac, Vitez, Kiseljak and Novi Travnik means nothing to you. Do Sarajevo, Vares, Bugojno, Zenica, Zepce and Tuzla have to experience the same fate tomorrow, as you further ignore the cause of the evil."

Q. You don't have to read further. Thank you, Colonel Morsink.

Now, again, you were in Central Bosnia at the time this letter was sent to --

JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Mr. Harmon. The ⁹⁸⁵⁰Judges have an official responsibility. Have you completed this point, that is Point 3, dealing with propaganda?

MR. HARMON: This is the final point, Mr. President.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Yes, go ahead.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Colonel Morsink, you were in Central Bosnia when this letter was sent to Philip Morillon from Mate Boban; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you have read the first paragraph of this particular letter to Colonel Morillon. What is your view of that particular paragraph?

A. My opinion is that it was not true, and I was on site myself because I went on site, from Travnik and Guca Gora, I visited then. In my opinion, I think this was an extension of the propaganda. It's the same thing. Whereas we had told the local people that these allegations were not grounded.

Q. Colonel Morsink, Mate Boban, in this letter, makes reference to the desecration of certain Catholic monasteries and religious sites. Tell me the reaction, if you will, to the Bosnian Muslim military leadership when receiving allegations of this type? ⁹⁸⁵¹A. I remember that once, after the incident in Guca Gora, that we had to go visit General Alagic and report these accusations, saying that in the Guca Gora church several weeks before, certain sacred objects had been damaged. General Alagic was impressed by the accusations, he apologised immediately, and said to us immediately that he would have this kind of activity stopped immediately, that he would attempt to track down the guilty parties in order to punish them.

Q. Can you contrast the degree of damage done to Catholic religious sites in Muslim-held territory versus the amount of damage and the scale of damage done to Muslim religious sites in HVO-held territory?

A. The Catholic objects were practically never damaged. I saw one minor example in a Catholic church near Busovaca. There, there was a little bit of damage to the church. I saw many examples of

mosques, minarets, including others in Ahmici, where the mosque and minaret had been completely destroyed. This also happened in other places. The ratio between the damage to Catholic buildings as opposed to Muslim buildings was something really that one cannot say was comparable.

Q. Now, you've described the reaction of General Alagic to getting information that Catholic sites had ⁹⁸⁵²been destroyed or damaged. Can you tell the Judges the reaction of HVO officers in respect of claims that Muslim sites had been damaged or destroyed by their forces?

A. Well, the allegations, first of all, were submitted to find out their immediate reaction to these, and in my experience, we found that the reaction of the HVO military personnel was of general disinterest or they would simply deny or put these accusations onto the backs of "uncontrolled elements," as they called them. At times they would promise to carry out an investigation, but there was never any report of any type of such an investigation being carried out.

MR. HARMON: Thank you. Mr. President, that concludes the presentation of evidence in respect of the propaganda and related issues.

I'll now turn to a different subject, and that is: Colonel Morsink, can you please --

JUDGE JORDA: I have to interrupt you here because you said you've just completed, but we have a prior obligation, so we will resume at 2.45. Thank you very much.

--- Luncheon recess taken at 12.34 p.m. ⁹⁸⁵³--- On resuming at 2.57 p.m.

JUDGE JORDA: We will resume our hearing now. Have the accused brought in, please.

(The accused entered court)

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, Mr. Hayman, I believe we are supposed to finish with this witness this afternoon, including the cross-examination. There are interpretation problems, and we have to accept the fact that they exist and we try to be as concise as we can. We only have reached Point 3 out of 13, and so we have to try to focus things, to make things short because there's got to be a cross-examination, there are technical problems which just exist, and that's what happens, and we can't do anything about it. We'll take the time we need. I spoke to

Maja, our wonderful chief of service. If necessary, we'll even work until 7.00, but we'll shorten, if necessary, the break, we'll take extra time now because we were talking about that issue, but I say very clearly that I insist upon the cross-examination being completed this afternoon. We will stay as long as we need. You must also understand that there are administrative and organisational problems as well. Justice is eternal, but alas, alas, there are human problems that come into play as well. ⁹⁸⁵⁴Mr. Harmon, let me remind you that we are only on Point 3, we finished with the HVO propaganda, I noted that there are 13 points. If you want to deal with them with the same care, which is praiseworthy and legitimate in your opinion, that means we're going to have him here for two days. Can we afford this luxury? I'm not sure that we can. There you go. And, of course, there's the cross-examination, I know that it's going to be an important one, and I do not want to limit the rights of the Defence, I say very clearly, I do not want to limit the Defence's rights. The accused has the right to explore all defence opportunities available to him.

You know, Mr. Harmon, that when the Prosecutor takes a long time then the cross-examination is long as well. That is obvious. What I say to you I will say in a few weeks to the Defence, when you have a long examination-in-chief, then you have a long cross-examination and the Judges ask a lot of questions about it. You know justice is a human affair, and even if we try to make it --

JUDGE RIAD: It is not the Court's fault, it is the problem of interpreters. So if the problem was not to translate from Dutch to English and French, there would be no problem, in case you want to take ⁹⁸⁵⁵into consideration.

MR. HARMON: I understand that, Judge Riad, and thank you, I will try to expedite my examination, but obviously with the use of a Dutch interpreter, it slows proceedings down. But nevertheless, let me begin, and if I can very quickly turn to an electronic exhibit and have that immediately put on the screen. Mr. President, I'm going to return briefly to the previous testimony in Guca Gora on the mission in which Colonel Morsink went to Guca Gora.

Q. Colonel Morsink, you testified in your direct examination that when you went to investigate claims that Croat villages had been burned in and around Guca Gora on the 8th of June, you found a village that was, in fact, burning and, in fact, it was a Muslim village, not a Croat village. Is the picture in front of you a picture that you took on the 8th of June, 1993?

A. This is a photograph which I took on the 8th or the 9th of June.

Q. And can you see the village of Bandol burning?

A. Yes, you can see it clearly. To the right, in front of the vehicle to the right. Right on the horizon you can see smoke and you can see burning houses. That is, I think, the village of Bandol. ⁹⁸⁵⁶Q. And that is a Muslim village?

A. Yes, it's a Muslim village.

MR. HARMON: Could I have that, Mr. Dubuisson, marked as an exhibit, however that is done electronically or otherwise, and I will continue with my examination.

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, of course. It will be given a number, 419.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Now, Colonel Morsink, let me ask you, can you please characterise the differences in the degree of cooperation between the Bosnian Muslim army and the HVO army in respect of investigating allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law?

A. I have already given you a series of examples about collaboration with the Muslims, with the Muslim armed forces. For example, in Guca Gora, where the division commander promised to carry out an investigation. In Grahovcici, the third corps allowed us to have a meeting, and on the HVO side, things were very different. Ordinarily, we had no escort. In some exceptional cases, Mr. Jusic would accompany us, but in most of the cases, there was no escort, and we were stopped at each roadblock.

When we protested, we had to go back to ⁹⁸⁵⁷headquarters, we had to ask for authorisation again, sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't. An example when it would never work was in Kruscica. There were cases when there was an HVO authorisation saying that we could be escorted from Travnik to Zenica, there would be a large group of wounded that had been chosen in the hospital, wounded people from all the groups, and despite all authorisations, we still had to stop at the HVO checkpoints.

After an hour of talking, we would be sent back, and then there were authorisations for investigations which were granted each time, but in my opinion, these investigations never took place. We were promised investigations, but we never saw any results. And so we were given a lot of promises but there were very few results.

Q. Colonel Morsink, did you attempt to investigate Gomionica and can you tell the Judges what response you received from the HVO?

A. When we were in Kiseljak, we heard rumours, according to which there had been fighting around that village, and that we were -- that the Muslim houses were being set on fire. We asked for authorisation to go there, and when we arrived, we were stopped at a roadblock near the front-line where the Canadian escort ⁹⁸⁵⁸was also stopped. The Canadians were unable to get us through that roadblock. The HVO soldiers refused to authorise the passage.

An argument that was used very often that is that it was too dangerous for us to go through.

Q. Now let me turn to events that took place -- let me start with Ahmici. You were aware, since you arrived on the 16th of April, 1993, of a serious massacre that had occurred in the village of Ahmici. Were you ever provided, as a representative of ECMM, with any investigation results that had been conducted by the HVO into the circumstances of the massacre at Ahmici?

A. Never.

Q. In respect to the truck bomb that occurred in Stari Vitez where Mario Cerkez said he was going to conduct an investigation, when you were in theatre, did you ever receive an investigation report from the HVO about the circumstances of that truck bombing?

A. Never.

Q. In respect of a shelling in Zenica that took place on the 19th of April, 1993, in which a significant number of civilians were killed, did you ever receive an investigation report or the result of any investigation from the HVO in respect of that ⁹⁸⁵⁹particular incident?

A. There were never any results from the investigation.

Q. Now, let me ask you about General Alagic. General Alagic accompanied you on an investigation in respect of claims made about atrocities committed against the Croats; is that correct?

A. This is correct.

Q. And General Alagic had an equivalent position to that held by Colonel Blaskic; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Did Colonel Blaskic ever accompany you on any of your investigations?

A. No, he never went with me.

Q. Now, were any investigations, to your knowledge, ever conducted into violations relating to the forced use of civilians, Muslim civilians, to dig trenches?

A. We were promised that several times, but I never saw any result from any inquiry.

Q. Were any investigations, to your knowledge, ever conducted by the HVO into allegations about the intentional setting afire of Muslim houses?

A. I never got any results at all in that respect. ⁹⁸⁶⁰Q. Now, I'd like to turn to a different topic, and that is interference with humanitarian aid by the HVO. Let me ask you this first question that calls merely for a "Yes" or "No" answer. While you were in Central Bosnia, did the HVO interfere with the delivery of humanitarian aid?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Now, you were in Central Bosnia, were you not, on the 10th of June when the Convoy of Joy was attacked; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And I don't want you to go into any details in that incident because we have already had significant testimony about that event here, but did you see the aftermath of that particular attack on that humanitarian aid convoy?

A. I saw damage and things had been stolen.

Q. Can you give us other examples when the HVO interfered with the delivery of humanitarian aid?

A. An example where I myself, was when there was an attempt to bring humanitarian aid to Kruscica, from the end of May, Kruscica had been cut off from the surroundings, the immediate surroundings. For us and for the British battalion, there was no contact. We tried almost to go there almost every day, that is to ⁹⁸⁶¹Kruscica. We had daily contacts with the brigade commander, Mr. Cerkez, and the answer which we were always given was that the road was blocked by furious civilians that they could not control. We insisted that the road be opened, and even through the -- even through the assistance of the mayor, we weren't able to get through -- we were not able to achieve any concrete results.

In the end, Mr. Blaskic sent an order, and in the order, he said that the road was to be opened.

Q. Now, let me interrupt you right there. If I could have two exhibits, please? The first exhibit would be Defence Exhibit 141. Can that be placed on the ELMO, please?

MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, we would prefer the witness not be interrupted. He was answering the question. Counsel apparently wants to stop him and direct his attention to a document before he completes his answer. We think the appropriate procedure is to allow him to complete, if the answer is responsive, and then go from there.

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I disagree with Counsel. I appreciate being able to conduct my examination in the way that it's been conducted in the past. The witness referred to an exhibit -- to an ⁹⁸⁶²order, the Defence has introduced the order --

JUDGE JORDA: Within certain limits, Mr. Harmon, however. If you ask a question, it would be proper for the witness to be able to answer all the way to the end. You can't do everything and everything here and everything there. You can't ask a question -- if you ask a question, you have to wait for an answer. The final word lies with the Judges, after all. I'm trying to be pleasant about this. Either you ask a question or you don't. If you do, you have to wait for the answer.

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, fine. I will defer showing the witness this exhibit. He will testify to the conclusion of his testimony, and then I will ask to show him two exhibits.

Mr. Usher, we'll wait for a minute with that exhibit.

Q. Please, Colonel Morsink, if you continue with your evidence and then I will show you the exhibit.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well.

A. On the 21st of June, the order arrived from Mr. Blaskic. It was an order that the road be opened and that the humanitarian convoys be allowed to go through. I accompanied the transport with the UNHCR. And to my great surprise, a second road was opened up ⁹⁸⁶³as well, a road which was under HVO control. We were able to move the humanitarian aid for an hour. During that hour, we also had to treat the casualties, we had a physician with us, in order to treat the wounded. That's all I have to say for the first

example. Another important example --

Q. Let me interrupt you there because I have some questions to clarify your previous testimony. Now if we could show the witness Exhibit -- Defence Exhibit 141 and place that on the ELMO, please. Is there an English translation with that exhibit? Will you place that in front of the witness, please, Mr. Usher.

Colonel Morsink, is this a copy of the order that you were just testifying about?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. And did you receive this order from the British battalion?

A. Yes, I received that from the British battalion.

Q. Now, a couple points about this order. First of all, in the first paragraph, it refers to -- it's a command that orders -- the aid delivery to the village of Kruscica on the 21st of June, 1993; is that correct? ⁹⁸⁶⁴A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Now, you mentioned just a few minutes ago in your testimony that there was a secondary road through which you delivered aid; is that correct?

A. That's correct. The main road had been barricaded by angry civilians, and after this order, another road was opened for us because -- the second was therefore made available.

Q. In your opinion, was that secondary road made available five weeks earlier when you started your request to make and deliver aid to Kruscica?

A. We weren't aware that there was another road. We had demanded authorisation to go to Kruscica every single day and we were always answered the same way: The road's being blocked by dissatisfied civilians.

Q. And then five weeks later you were informed of a secondary road through which you could deliver aid?

A. That's correct.

Q. Now, in respect of going to Kruscica to deliver aid, was your life threatened by an HVO officer and can you tell the Court about that, please?

A. On the 9th of June, when I visited the HVO hospital in Nova Bila, the physicians told me that ⁹⁸⁶⁵there were wounded people everywhere. They let me see the wounded people. And during the visit, I was suddenly confronted by an HVO officer.

The officer, this HVO officer, whose photograph I have shown you this morning, was extremely angry, and he threatened to kill me if I were to come back again to a roadblock in Kruscica. I took the threat very seriously at that time, and that's why, on the 21st of June, in a United Nations' vehicle belonging to the High Commission for Refugees, that I went to Kruscica instead of using my own vehicle.

Q. Now, when he threatened to kill you if you went back to a roadblock in Kruscica, you're talking about if you went back to the roadblock in Kruscica through which you were trying to deliver humanitarian aid?

A. Yes, that's correct. It was the roadblock that had been set up by angry civilians, it was the roadblock that I had to go through, in my opinion, in order to get to Kruscica.

MR. HARMON: Now, very briefly, if I could have the witness shown Exhibit 408?

Q. Colonel Morsink, while the registrar is finding that exhibit, was the individual who threatened to kill you if he saw you again at the roadblock in ⁹⁸⁶⁶Kruscica in this morning's video film that you saw?

A. Yes, he was. He was in the video film.

MR. HARMON: Mr. Usher, if you could put this picture on the ELMO, please? Just fold it back. You don't have to take it out.

Q. Is the individual that threatened to kill you depicted in this photograph with the No. 4 next to him?

A. Yes, he's No. 4.

Q. Thank you. Now, Colonel Morsink can you proceed to tell us about another incident that occurred where the HVO interfered with the delivery of humanitarian aid?

A. Another example where I was very closely involved was at the beginning of July 1993 in Busovaca, four trucks carrying humanitarian aid were stopped alongside the road, they were stopped by HVO soldiers. We heard about this incident that same evening on the telephone. The next morning, I went with a representative, Medicins Du Monde, doctors without borders, who was in two of the trucks. We went to the Busovaca police commission -- station where we were told that the unloading platform for the merchandise was not ready yet.

THE WITNESS: That's not correct. The cargo lists were not correct. ⁹⁸⁶⁷A. The bill of lading was not there. After a long discussion with the police commissioner, we were authorised to release the drivers, and after a lot of talk, apparently we were authorised to get back some of the load that was on that list. In the end, the police commissioner said to us that he would first consult with his chief in Mostar and that we should come back the next day in order to pick up the merchandise. The next morning, we set up a team of ECMM members, of the UNHCR, Medicins Du Monde, and a representative of the British battalion. We had tremendous problems in arriving at Busovaca. The regular road to Busovaca was blocked by big trucks, and on the other road, along the hills, or in the hills, there was fighting. At any rate, it took much longer to get there that way. When we arrived at the police station, the commissioner was already gone, and so we tried to get to the HVO brigade commander, and we were told that he had gone to see Blaskic in Vitez for a consultation.

When we again went to the police offices after that, we met the brigade commander, Gorbasic, and he told us that the drivers, the merchandise and the trucks, would be given back when there was no longer any threats to Zenica. And that is why the roads were ⁹⁸⁶⁸blocked, because there were threats, and I said to them that that was not acceptable, combining those two things was not acceptable. We then went to the HVO barracks to see whether the merchandise was still there. The merchandise had already been taken off the trucks, and we were asked to take the trucks and to get lost.

We refused. We waited in the barracks until the police commissioner returned. After waiting for a long time, we received a written order from Mr. Gorbasic to take both the driver and the truck and -- the truck should be empty. We refused again. And then a few minutes later, a soldier arrived who threatened me with his rifle, and he told me that we had two minutes to get out -- ten minutes, no longer than that, and if I hadn't left in ten minutes, some bad things -- some very bad things could happen to me. Finally, with the drivers, we decided to leave, to disappear with the trucks. We stopped at the HVO headquarters in Busovaca. I lodged a protest, a very strong protest, and after that, we went to the police offices, and there too I lodged a protest very vigorously.

Finally, I was able to get back safe and sound with the drivers and with the trucks to Zenica. ⁹⁸⁶⁹The load of the two trucks, that is, there was equipment for the physicians in Zenica, from Medicins Du Monde, among other things there was medical material for all of that in one of the trucks, they were trucks that belonged to Medicins Sans Frontiers, and the last truck was carrying 20 tonnes of powdered milk for Zenica.

Q. Shortly after the merchandise that you've just described was stolen, did you see it?

A. The powdered milk is something I saw in the buildings, in the barracks, and some of the medical equipment, I saw some 13 microscopes also in Busovaca.

Q. What did the doctors at the hospital in Busovaca say in respect to the stolen aid that they had received?

A. My monitor colleague talked to me about it and explained that they had enough materials -- rather, they did not have enough people to really deal with that, they did not really have anyone to deal with that type of material. They had 13 microscopes, but only one person, one sole operator to use them.

Q. Now, you said that the aid itself was owned by Medicins Du Monde; is that right?

A. Yes, one part of the load, yes, was from Medicins Du Monde. ⁹⁸⁷⁰Q. Also Medicins Sans Frontiers?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. I didn't catch the third organisation that was sending this aid?

A. ECF, which was sending powdered milk.

MR. HARMON: If I could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 225 put on the ELMO, Mr. Dubuisson? It's a photograph.

Give me just a minute, please, Mr. Dubuisson. I've obviously made a mistake on the photograph number.

Could I have in the meantime Exhibit 419 placed on the ELMO? It should be a photograph as well, Mr. Dubuisson. Would this be the next ...

THE REGISTRAR: This would be document 420, it's the photo we had on the screen a moment ago.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Can you tell the Judges if you can identify that particular photograph and tell the Judges if this particular individual was involved in the incident involving the theft of the aid, humanitarian aid, that you've just described?

A. The man in the photograph was an HVO brigade in Busovaca. He was the commander of that brigade, and his name is Dusko Grbasic. ⁹⁸⁷¹Q. I am looking for an additional photograph. Let me ask you another question. When you met Grubesic in the police station, he linked return of the aid with the removal of a particular roadblock. Did he say where he had received those orders to make that kind of a linkage?

A. He stated that he had received word from Blaskic -- he said if he didn't (inaudible) them, he couldn't do anything, and that the threat would be eliminated.

MR. HAYMAN: The English translation is not coherent.

JUDGE RIAD: Could you repeat that, please? We have difficulty to follow.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Will you please repeat your answer?

A. He said that he received an order from Blaskic to only remove the roadblock if the threat had been eliminated, and he had also received as an order to turn back in the trucks only after the border had disappeared. That is to say, only to reduce this roadblock after the trucks had been returned. So when the threat had been eliminated.

MR. HAYMAN: That apparently is not correct.

JUDGE JORDA: No, the Defence is not in ⁹⁸⁷²agreement with the interpretation, so I think we have to take this again, this being very clear, so that the Defence will be able to carry its own -- Mr. Hayman, you have the floor right now.

MR. HAYMAN: One other concern. Counsel stated that there was a linkage between the delivery of the aid and the removal of a roadblock implied by the BiH army in one of his questions two or three questions ago. That has never been testified to by the witness, and so I wanted to state that for the record. Perhaps it can be clarified.

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I have a suggestion, perhaps --

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, perhaps you may clarify. This is a very important point. You've made a link between the statement made by the witness, between the removal of the roadblock and the order given by Mr. Blaskic. So let's be very clear on this and make sure this is very clear for the Defence and he can also exercise his rights. Please, Mr. Harmon, you have the floor.

MR. HARMON: May I make a request? Perhaps on this particular point the witness can answer the question in English. It might expedite this answer, and the witness can sense -- ⁹⁸⁷³Q. Could you please explain --

JUDGE JORDA: Colonel, perhaps you might explain this in English?

THE WITNESS: I will explain it in English. We had to deal with an HVO roadblock at the Strane or the Busovaca junction, the Busovaca T-junction at the factory. It was an HVO controlled roadblock and the four trucks in Busovaca were stolen by HVO soldiers. The order, as we were told by Grbasic, came from Blaskic to link the roadblock, the lifting of the roadblock, and giving back the four trucks, to link those two items together, and we said we do not agree with that, the roadblock doesn't have anything to do with giving back the four trucks.

MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Colonel. Now, Mr. Dubuisson, if I could have Exhibit 255? That is the correct number.

JUDGE RIAD: So the roadblock was an HVO roadblock, not a BiH --

THE WITNESS: No, it was an HVO roadblock. It was put there because it was thought there was a threat from Zenica.

THE REGISTRAR: Document 225 is indeed a death certificate. If you would like to specify what you're looking for, perhaps I will try to find it? ⁹⁸⁷⁴So this is document 255.

JUDGE JORDA: Twenty-five or 255?

THE REGISTRAR: Apparently this will be 255.

JUDGE JORDA: Apparently, Mr. Registrar? Very well. Is it apparently or is it not?

MR. HARMON:

Q. Colonel Morsink, do you identify the man on the right-hand side of that particular picture?

A. Yes, the man who is at the police commission in Busovaca.

THE WITNESS: Not fully correct. He introduced himself as the commissioner --

A. No, that's not exactly correct. He is the one who presented himself as the police commissioner.

Q. This is the man, the policeman, with whom you dealt on the stolen aid convoy?

A. That's correct.

Q. And what is his name, sir? Do you know his name?

THE WITNESS: I think his name is Ljubasic.

Q. Mr. Registrar, if I could have the next exhibit, which is a special report dated the 4th of July? The subject is the HVO Busovaca stopping of NGO trucks and taking the cargo.

The exhibit number is, Mr. Dubuisson ... ⁹⁸⁷⁵THE REGISTRAR: This would be document 421.

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, this exhibit has a French translation attached to it.

Q. Mr. Morsink, briefly, we won't go into detail on this particular document, but do you recognise this document?

A. Yes, this is a report which I have written.

Q. You have written this report. Does this report reflect the events that you've just testified about, that is, the stolen convoy of aid that was looted at the HVO barracks in Busovaca?

A. Yes, indeed, we wrote about this entire episode.

Q. I would like to turn to another subject, and that is an individual by the name of Zute. Did you have contact with an individual by the name of Zute?

A. Yes, I had one meeting with this person.

Q. Can you tell the Judges about the circumstances under which you met Zute?

A. In the evening of the celebration of Bajram in July, General Alagic and his group were attacked on the road, and a large amount of their personal weapons were stolen. He called upon the commander of the BRITBAT and also on the European observers or monitors and on the local commanders of the HVO and the BiH army, ⁹⁸⁷⁶and during this meeting, it was decided that the following day Mr. Alagic and myself would go and meet with the believed perpetrator, Mr. Initic (phoen). Mr. Zute was believed the person responsible. The following day, we went to the

headquarters of the HVO in the northern part of Travnik, and there, Mr. Alagic and myself, met with this person, Mr. Zute. The brigade commander was also present there, the commander of the brigade, it was a Mr. Leotar, and afterwards, after a long discussion, Mr. Initic said that he would return the equipment. And then, in that same afternoon, all of the equipment was returned.

Q. Was this man Zute described by the HVO as somebody who was one of the "uncontrolled elements" in Central Bosnia?

A. Yes, he was described as an uncontrolled element, as a criminal even.

Q. Did you meet with that individual on the 2nd of June, 1992, just to make the date precise?

A. Yes, that's true. However, it was on the 1st of July. It was the following day. The Bajram holiday was perhaps on the 1st of July -- my memory is not very good on the actual date of that holiday -- the 1st of June, rather, or the 2nd of June. ⁹⁸⁷⁷Q. Did the HVO frequently use the excuse, when crimes were committed, when houses were burned, when houses were looted, when Muslim civilians were killed, that those events were the result of people who were uncontrolled elements? Was that a frequent excuse used by the HVO?

A. Yes, it was said quite often.

Q. Did it appear to you that this individual by the name Zute was under the control of the HVO?

A. Yes, he came to attend these meetings, and I think he came to follow the orders so, yes, I believe he was under some form of control.

Q. If there was a group of 20 or 30 individuals who were known to be committing crimes in Central Bosnia, who were uncontrolled elements, in your experience and your observations, did Colonel Blaskic have the resources, soldiers, and sufficient police, to eliminate those "uncontrolled elements" at any time?

A. I believe that they had so many soldiers and so many police that it should have been no problem at all to control a small group of persons.

Q. Having seen the scale of damage that you saw, scale of damage to Muslim villages, the loss of life to Muslim civilians, the cleansing of civilians from the municipalities of Busovaca, Kiseljak, and Vitez, the ⁹⁸⁷⁸use of systematic use of forced labour, do you believe that those crimes were perpetrated by "uncontrolled elements?"

A. I believe that one or two minor cases may have been committed by small, uncontrolled groups, but the large-scale and systematic manner in which these events took place, entire villages being burned, and other villages, we saw that it was the Muslim houses that were systematically selected, and we saw that the same type of events were taking place at the same time period in different locations, and it would be impossible, in my opinion, for this to have been carried out by uncontrolled groups.

Q. Now I'd like to turn to another subject area, if I could, and Mr. Dubuisson, could I have the next exhibits, which are three commands issued by General Blaskic marked in order, starting with the order that has the number 441 in the upper left-hand corner as the next exhibit followed by 443 and 444?

THE REGISTRAR: So document 441. This would be document 422.

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, I need to interrupt you one moment. Looking at the organisation of this, we're going to take a break at 4.20, and you said that you would be with this witness until four o'clock is ⁹⁸⁷⁹that not right? Rather, you were expecting four hours for this witness, but I see now that you have already had two hours, we resumed at, let's say, 3.00, fifteen minutes to 3.00. Do you think you might be able to finish with this witness by 4.20, and I'll ask the Defence whether or not he feels he will be able to finish with his cross-examination before the end of the day.

MR. HAYMAN: I do not believe so, in all candour, Mr. President. We have been given a number of long documents we haven't seen before and there are matters in the documents we need to question the witness about in addition to his extensive oral testimony.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I see. I don't want to put too much pressure on -- too much pressure on the interpreters, I know they are tired, but I think the witness will have to return, and at that point he will return for cross-examination.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters unclear whether the last statement made by the Judge needed to be clarified.

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I would note that these three exhibits are exhibits that have not yet been submitted for official translations. ⁹⁸⁸⁰Q. Colonel Morsink, would you look at Exhibits -- would you look at the three exhibits in front of you, that should be 422, 423, and 424. Do you recognise those exhibits?

A. Yes, I recognise them, but the numbering is not the same, 441, 443, 444. You did not say that in English.

JUDGE JORDA: I don't have the same numbers here. Mr. Dubuisson?

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, indeed, these are the references which are given in the original documents and not the references that the registrar has given.

JUDGE JORDA: I see. There is some connection between the two. I see. Excuse me.

MR. HARMON:

Q. When I'm referring to the numbers 422, I'm referring to the Exhibit number and not the number in the order that appears in the left-hand corner --

A. Yes, I have all the documents you spoke of, yes.

Q. Now, did you receive those documents at BRITBAT?

A. That's correct.

Q. And did you also receive these documents in conjunction with the previous exhibit I showed you, ⁹⁸⁸¹Defence Exhibit 141?

A. That's right.

Q. I'd like to -- and you received them in the form in which they appear before you, that is, there's an English translation, and a Croatian language version of it?

A. That's right.

Q. So you received both versions.

A. That's correct.

Q. I'd like you to take Exhibit 422, please, which is the order number 441, and ask you, first of all, from where was this particular order issued?

A. It was at the headquarters of the operational zone of Central Bosnia.

Q. And was this an order that was initiated on -- from reading of this order, was it initiated on General Blaskic's order or was it something that he was doing as a result of some other situation that had developed in the theatre?

A. This is based on an order which came from high up.

Q. Is this document that is in front of you in the form of a command?

A. Yes, I am reading. It says "I command." In my mind, that's a command. ⁹⁸⁸²Q. Can you turn the page to the distribution list on the lower left-hand corner, and would you kindly read in English the distribution list of that document?

THE WITNESS: Distribution. First, all the HVO brigades. Second, all the independent units under the command of the HVO 3rd operational zone commander (MTD TV LTRD 4th military police Bat., Vitozovi, Trvtko II, and Zuti).

JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen, you have the floor.

JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I'd like to ask the witness a question. You read 4 military police but. Is it but or battalion?

THE WITNESS: I can't read that very clear, Your Honour.

JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Okay.

THE WITNESS: It's maybe the copy. It could be "battalion." It makes sense.

JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What do you think it is as a military man?

THE WITNESS: I think it's "battalion."

MR. HARMON:

Q. In comparing the Croatian language version with the English language version, there appear to be ⁹⁸⁸³nine items on the English version, English version, and ten items on the Croatian version; is that correct?

A. That's right.

Q. Would you please place that order, the Croatian version, so number 10 appears on the ELMO? Could the ELMO be illuminated? And could the interpreters please read number 10?

THE INTERPRETER: The number 10 in Croatian says; "for the implementation of this command, all the brigade commanders responsible and those of independent units."

MR. HARMON: Thank you. You can take that from the ELMO again, Colonel.

Q. Now, Colonel, first I'd like to draw your attention to item number 2 on that, and is that a command or an order that every subordinate commander, independent HVO unit commander, should issue commands to his subordinates?

A. Yes, it asks for everyone to obey the orders and also submit their reports -- submit orders to their subordinates.

Q. Would you take a look at item number 4. What does that require?

A. Every day, at 10.00, 10.00 or 9.30 -- I can't read it quite well here -- all the brigade commanders ⁹⁸⁸⁴and also the independent units are to send their special reports to the 3rd command of the operational zone. In these reports, it is important to refer to all the details in the military situation as well as all efforts that are being made in order to arrive at a cease-fire.

Q. Colonel, what was item number 2 and item number 4 suggest to you as a military officer?

A. I would deduce this is a very clear order that would then be passed on to all the commands; therefore, there is a clear hierarchy here which exists. This is a clear order to present a report on the results of having carried out an order. I would deduce then that there truly existed a command structure and that there was very good control there.

Q. Let me turn your attention to item number 9 on this particular order. Can you read that, please?

THE WITNESS: "All the HVO units are obliged by the Geneva Convention and its additional protocols, as well as all other instruments of the war law and the international laws."

Q. Can you deduce from that that Colonel Blaskic was aware of the obligations under the Geneva Conventions, the additional protocols, and other instruments of the war law and international laws? ⁹⁸⁸⁵A. Yes, absolutely. It's giving an order for everyone to follow orders. Therefore, he was aware, yes.

Q. This order, this command that is in front of you, was issued on the basis of a cease-fire agreement that was signed by Colonel Blaskic's superior, Milivoj Petkovic; correct?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. I would like to turn to the next order in front of you. It is Prosecutor's Exhibit 423, and it has the number 443 in the upper left-hand corner. Was this issued from the 3rd operation zone headquarters in Vitez?

A. That's right.

Q. Does Colonel Blaskic's name appear at the bottom of this particular command?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. Can you read to whom this order was sent, the distribution list in the lower left-hand corner?

THE WITNESS: Distribution: All the HVO brigade commanders, 4th battalion military police commander, special unit Vitezovi commander, special department Zepce commander, police station commanders in Busovaca, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Kiseljak, Fojnica, and Kresevo. ⁹⁸⁸⁶Q. Now, a couple questions. First of all, if you turn to the last of the distribution list and item number 3 in that exhibit, does it appear to you that Colonel Blaskic is issuing commands to police station commanders?

A. Yes, that's what it appears.

Q. Now, he issues orders -- in this particular document does it appear that he's issuing a command or an order to areas that were not physically in contact with Vitez and Busovaca municipalities?

A. Yes. The distance between Zepce was very long. In fact, you had to go through an area that was under the BiH army control, and to go to these various other villages was the same thing, Kiseljak, Kruscica. The order demonstrates that there were other contacts that existed.

Q. Now, Colonel Morsink, does this particular order concern itself with forbidding the violent moving out of their houses the civil population?

A. Yes, that's clear from that.

Q. Can you conclude from this order that Colonel Blaskic was aware that the forcible eviction of civilians was contrary to international humanitarian law?

A. They don't mention human rights in this ⁹⁸⁸⁷order, but it does say that it was forbidden to expel people by using violence.

Q. Was this order that was issued by Blaskic issued on his own initiative or was it issued as a result of something else?

A. He says in the beginning that it's based on the agreements at higher levels. That's what it says in the beginning.

Q. I'd like to turn to the Prosecutor's Exhibit 423 which has an order number 443 in the upper left-hand corner, and was that issued also from the third operational zone headquarters in Vitez?

THE WITNESS: The 443 or on the back 423 is what you just said?

Q. Prosecutor's Exhibit 423 which is the Prosecutor Exhibit number, and in the upper left-hand corner is 443?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

Q. Was that issued from the 3rd operational zone in Vitez?

A. Yes.

Q. Does the name "Tihomir Blaskic" appear on the bottom of that order?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. I'm sorry, I have the wrong exhibit. Would ⁹⁸⁸⁸you now turn your attention to Exhibit 424 with the numbers 444 in the upper left-hand corner? Was that order an order that was issued from the third operational zone headquarters?

A. Yes.

Q. And does the name "Blaskic" appear on the bottom of that order?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. Does this appear also to be a command?

A. It says on the top "The high command."

Q. Does this also have a similar distribution list to the previous orders?

A. Zute also.

Q. Is this an order dealing with the arresting of civilians and forbidding the arresting of civilians?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Also deal with forbidding putting houses on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Does it deal with the protection of sacred objects, mosques, et cetera?

A. That's true also.

Q. Does it indicate that everybody who steals and holding of property shall be punished and solved through the normal disciplinary measures in courts? ⁹⁸⁸⁹A. Yes.

Q. Now, was this order issued on the basis -- or was it issued on Blaskic's initiative or was it issued as a result of some other agreements?

A. It's based on a cease-fire agreement issued from above.

Q. Can you conclude from this particular order that Colonel Blaskic was aware that the evicting of civilians, putting houses on fire, destruction of sacred objects, and stealing property was illegal?

A. Yes, he forbade that.

Q. Now I'd like to turn to another topic, if I can -- thank you very much.

I'd like to turn to another topic, and that would be the subject of the use of civilians to perform forced labour, specifically trench-digging. While you were in Central Bosnia, were you aware of this particular practice?

A. I was given protests, according to -- which said that civilians had been forced to dig trenches. I was given this during the meeting of the joint commission. During the meeting, I was made aware of 15 protests in that respect, 10 to 15, 10 to 15.

Q. And did both sides complain about this practice? ⁹⁸⁹⁰A. There were complaints about the HVO soldiers who forced the Muslim soldiers to dig trenches. That's how it always was said.

THE WITNESS: Not really correct.

A. The HVO soldiers forced Muslim civilians to dig trenches. The protest came from one side only.

Q. Can you tell the Judges whether or not the HVO, in fact, engaged in this practice?

A. There is one case to which I was a witness with HVO soldiers accompanying civilians who were carrying shovels, and who had to dig a hole or to dig trenches. When we asked the question of the local HVO commander in that respect, he felt that he had been a little bit cornered, at least that was the feeling that I had, that he was a bit cornered. He became very aggressive and did not allow me to speak with his soldiers or to the civilians concerned by the matter. And this incident was presented to the joint commission subsequently. This happened in May -- I think it was May, I don't quite remember anymore -- it was near Stranje. The military commander had a nickname, Marinac.

Q. Now, two exhibits, please, Mr. Dubuisson. The first is a map, and if I could have the second exhibit also taken up to the witness as well as an ⁹⁸⁹¹aerial image? If you could give me the numbers on each, I'd appreciate it.

THE REGISTRAR: This is document 425 where the word "Vitez" is underlined in orange, and 426 is the big map.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Very quickly, Colonel Morsink, Prosecutor's Exhibit 425 appears on the ELMO now. Did you mark the location where you observed this forced use of labour, forced labour by the HVO?

A. That is correct.

Q. Can you point out to the Judges where you observed the people who were digging trenches under the control of the HVO?

A. It's not easy to show you that on this scale, but it was in the north. We were coming from Jelinak.

Q. We will get to that in the next exhibit. Can you just point on the exhibit that's before you, Colonel Morsink. You're pointing to an orange circle. Is that the area where you saw the Muslims digging trenches?

A. It was that area where the orange -- which is the part which is circled in orange.

Q. Then if we could take the next exhibit, Prosecutor's Exhibit 426, and place that on the ELMO? ⁹⁸⁹²Could you turn it the other way, please? Colonel Morsink, did I show you an aerial image and did I ask you to indicate on this particular aerial image two things: One, the direction from which you came when you saw the people digging trenches and did I also ask you to put a circle around the area where these people were digging trenches?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Please go ahead and explain this diagram.

A. Here, in this region, Jelinak, the village of Jelinak, we were supposed to conduct an investigation because there had been some houses burned -- set on fire, rather. After the investigation, after we did it, we took this road, along this road. Part of the road had just been built.

Here, at this point, rather high up, it was an elevated point, we met Mr. Marinac and his soldiers who had civilians with them. We tried to speak to him, but he was very angry. Afterwards, we continued along the road toward the Busovaca junction.

Q. Colonel Morsink, did you subsequently return to Stranje on the 13th of May with HVO representatives and did you meet with local Muslims who were still residing in the community?

A. We had a meeting at the Busovaca commission, ⁹⁸⁹³regular ones, with both parties, and we tried to go on site with them.

Q. When you went on site to Stranje, on the 13th of May, what did the population, the local Muslim population, tell you had occurred to them with respect to trench-digging?

A. They complained that on several occasions they had been forced to dig trenches. They also complained that many men from that area had been taken prisoner at the county prison and that the remaining men were forced to dig trenches. They were the men who had been taken out of the prison and ordered to dig trenches.

While they were digging the trenches, several of them were wounded, some of them even died doing the forced labour.

Q. Now, at this location in Stranje, was there an HVO representative with you when those complaints were made?

A. Yes, there were members of the joint commission on both sides.

Q. Now, you mentioned that there were a large number of complaints made at the local commission and at the joint commissions about civilian forced labour. Were those complaints being made in front of Franjo ⁹⁸⁹⁴Nakic?

A. Mr. Nakic was present several times at various meetings, and he was spoken to.

Q. Were those complaints also made in front and in the presence of local brigade commanders as well?

A. Yes. The HVO Busovaca command was always there at that type of meeting.

Q. Can you tell the Judges what was the response of the HVO in the face of these continuous allegations that civilians were forced to be trench-diggers?

A. There were different reactions. Sometimes they said furious civilians had forced other civilians to dig the trenches and sometimes we were told that there had been abuses, that some had used HVO uniforms in an inappropriate manner, and on other occasions we were told that the HVO had already lost a great deal of ground and were therefore forced to have recourse to all type of reserve forces and that they had to call upon civilians to dig the trenches, and yet on other times there was no reaction at all. They just didn't answer the allegations.

Q. Were you also told that it was uncontrolled elements who were forcing civilians to dig trenches?

A. Yes. That's what they meant when they talked about furious civilians. That's what they meant. ⁹⁸⁹⁵Q. In addition to complaints that were made to the HVO at the local joint commissions, did other international organisations make complaints to the HVO about this pervasive practice?

A. The International Red Cross and the UNHCR were present at that those types of meetings, and I remember that Margaret Green from the UNHCR had protested because she had noted there were gypsies in the Vitez region who had been forced to dig trenches.

Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, was Colonel Blaskic aware of this illegal practice?

A. He had to have been because his representatives were present at the meetings when we talked about it.

Q. To your knowledge, did the HVO ever take any action to stop this illegal practice?

A. No. I never heard of any kind of measures taken at all.

Q. Did you ever hear of a single HVO soldier being punished for engaging in this illegal practice?

A. Never.

Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, why did the HVO engage in this practice?

A. I think that it is dangerous to work on the front-line, and I think that they did not want to put ⁹⁸⁹⁶their own soldiers in danger by forcing them to dig this type of trench.

Q. Let me turn next, Colonel Morsink, to the issue of the intentional burning of civilian homes by the HVO.

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, it's twenty after four. We're going to take our break. You said four hours. You can do what you like, of course. You still have several days left. But I don't think that the cross-examination will be able to take place under proper conditions today. We're going to have to ask the Colonel to come back, and this will be counted against you.

You have, if I'm counting correctly, one, two, three, four, five, five points to deal with -- is that correct? -- five points. In the meantime, I think the interpreters have to take a break, in fact everybody has to take a break, including the witness, we will take a good 20 minutes in order to rest up a bit.

--- Recess taken at 4.20 p.m.

--- On resuming at 4.50 p.m.

JUDGE JORDA: We will now continue. Registrar, have the accused brought in, please.

(The accused entered court) ⁹⁸⁹⁷JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon?

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, Your Honours, and Counsel, because of the considerable difficulties we have had today in using the procedures that have been devised, I have made a request of the Dutch government to make an exception of their general policy that Dutch officers are required to testify in their native language, and I have received permission from the Dutch government to allow Colonel Morsink to testify in English, and therefore, Mr. President and Your Honours, and Council we will now proceed with the Court's permission in that fashion.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well. First, I would like to turn to the witness. You do agree to that, Colonel, since you speak English very well, do you feel comfortable speaking in English.

THE WITNESS: I feel comfortable.

JUDGE JORDA: This will therefore allow us -- thank you, Mr. Harmon, first of all, for having taken those measures, and I'd like to, through you, the Dutch authorities as well. This will allow us, since there are difficulties in having the interpreters come here to work in Dutch tomorrow morning, so that means we will be able to work the cross-examination this evening and to continue tomorrow as well which will safeguard ⁹⁸⁹⁸the rights of the accused who -- for whom the cross-examination will follow the

examination-in-chief. Very well. This does not mean that you can take more time than the time allotted to you; correct?

MR. HARMON: Correct.

JUDGE JORDA: All right. Very well.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Colonel Morsink, I would like to return to one topic about which there was considerable confusion before the recess, and that was you mentioned an HVO roadblock being linked with the return of humanitarian aid that had been taken by the HVO in Busovaca. Can you explain the linkage between the roadblock and the return of the humanitarian aid, please?

A. I can explain that. I'm sorry that I caused misunderstandings. I can point out the location of the roadblock at the map, at this map. The location at the roadblock was here in the area of the blue factory --

JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Perhaps we could let the Dutch interpreter leave. Of course, it's your decision. Unless, according to the Dutch authorities, there is a litigious point here, but since you can't be here tomorrow. What do you think, Mr. Harmon?

MR. HARMON: Colonel, it is your presence at ⁹⁸⁹⁹this point?

A. If you agree, Your Honour, I would like her to stay here for a while, just in case I don't find the right English words.

JUDGE JORDA: But tomorrow it wouldn't work that way because tomorrow we will be able to continue. That's what he said. Which means that you're going to stay, and we're pleased about that. But we will continue working with you tomorrow without a Dutch interpreter. I want to say that we will complete our work -- the work, including the cross-examination, by the end of tomorrow morning. Excuse me for interrupting. Continue, please.

A. So the location of the roadblock was here, it was an HVO-controlled roadblock, and it was put there, told by the HVO brigade commander, because they were afraid of an attack coming from Zenica towards Busovaca. So the linkage that has been made was that the HVO commander asked us to take away the threat from Zenica, and if that threat was taken away by us, by ECMM, then they would be able to lift the roadblock and to let go the trucks, and that linkage was not accepted by us.

MR. HARMON:

Q. Thank you for the clarification. Now let me ⁹⁹⁰⁰turn to the issue of the intentional setting afire of Muslim houses. First of all, were complaints made to the HVO by the ECMM and other international organisations about the intentional burning of houses, of Muslim houses, by the HVO?

A. Yes, they were made several times during several meetings.

Q. In your opinion did the HVO engage in the systematic burning of Muslim houses?

A. I think so, yes, because the burning of houses was done very systematically in several places. They burned all Muslim houses. In other places, where the population was more or less mixed on an equal basis, they only burned the Muslim houses, and it was in another way systematically done because it happened simultaneously in different villages, around Busovaca, around Vitez, and in the same period around Kiseljak. So that requires quite an organisation, to do it in a way like that.

Q. Colonel Morsink, did you visit the villages of Ahmici, Nadioci, Preocica, Sivrino Selo, Gacice Gomionica, Gromiljak, and Rotilj did you inspect the damage to Muslim houses in those villages?

A. I visited almost all of them you named except for Gomionica since I was not allowed to go in there. ⁹⁹⁰¹I visited all the other places and what I saw there was that almost all Muslim houses were burned, in some places they were all burned or 100 per cent of the Muslim houses.

Q. And are you able to distinguish between battle damage and non-battle damage in respect of those burned houses?

A. I think I am able to distinguish between battle damage and ordinary fire.

Q. And what were the -- how were the majority of the Muslim houses damaged, in your opinion?

A. The majority of the houses was damaged by severe fire, maybe lit with petrol or gasoline, but they were damaged by fire and definitely not by artillery fire or something else.

Q. Now, did you base your opinion on any conversations that you had with HVO commanders as well?

A. I remember a conversation quite well which happened at the joint commission Vitez with the brigade commander HVO Vitez president, Mr. Mario Cerkez, and he was very upset that the army of BiH was trying to get in new forces into Kruscica through the mountains, there's a small goat trail through the mountains, and he said that that should be stopped, and if not, he was willing to burn down all Kruscica. And I was really ⁹⁹⁰²surprised by an outcry like that because he was an HVO officer, he was the brigade commander in the area, he was wearing his uniform, and I didn't expect an officer at all making a statement like that.

Q. Was that statement made on the 24th of May, 1993, a matter of weeks after the burning of Ahmici and other villages in and around Central Bosnia?

A. I do not recall the exact date, but it was made several weeks after all the villages in the area had been burnt.

Q. Did you take that threat of Mario Cerkez seriously?

A. Well, he said it in a very clear way, and he was on duty when he said it, he was an active member of the local joint commission.

Q. Now, in your opinion, could all the burning that you've just described that you saw been committed by uncontrolled elements?

A. I do not believe that all the burning was done by uncontrolled elements since it was done in a systematic way all more or less in the same time.

Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, was Colonel Blaskic aware of this illegal HVO practice?

A. He must have been aware of it since it was in his area of operation, and it was -- it was mentioned ⁹⁹⁰³in several meetings where his people were present.

Q. So complaints were made about it at the joint commissions where his designees were present?

A. That's correct.

Q. Did you ever, at any time while you were in Central Bosnia, ever hear of any HVO soldier being punished or disciplined for burning down a Muslim house?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, why did the HVO engage in this practice?

A. I think it was one way to clear the area of all Muslims.

Q. Now, I'd like to turn your attention next to the forcible expulsion of Muslims from their homes and ask you if you can relate to the Judges events that related to the forcible expulsion of Muslim civilians from the village of Gacice.

A. The village of Gacice is in the area, in the vicinity, of Vitez, it was under control of HVO, and approximately 100 or 200 people living there were part of the Muslim community, they were forced to leave Gacice, they were brought to Dubravica, that is the T-junction in the road from Vitez to Zenica, they were brought there, we were told, with trucks, with cattle ⁹⁹⁰⁴trucks, and they were asked to get off the trucks in Dubravica and they were told to walk towards Zenica through the frontlines.

We got a report on this during one of the meetings in Vitez from Mrs. Margaret Green from the UNHCR, and we got similar reports from the British battalion on the same incident.

Q. Now, Colonel, let me stop you right there. Were these complaints also made on the 4th of May, 1993, at a meeting of the ECMM house where the ambassadors from Spain, France, and Britain were present?

A. Yes, I recall that Mr. Merdan was very upset when he got the chance to explain to these three ambassadors what had happened in the previous three weeks in the area of Vitez, and he called upon this example of Gacice as one of the newest examples of expulsion of Muslim people.

Q. Was the report that the HVO had forcibly removed these civilians or that other people had removed these civilians? What was the complaint that was made?

A. The complaint was made that they were forced out of Gacice by HVO and, as I recall it, the answer was that they were forced out by angry civilians. ⁹⁹⁰⁵Q. Now, who told you that? Did you go see an HVO commander, brigade commander, the following day?

A. I'm not sure. I will have to look that up in my notes, if necessary. I'm not sure who told it to me.

Q. Could you take a look at your notes, please, refer to your notes of the 4th of May?

A. I read in my notes that on the 4th of May, at the joint operation command, the complaint was made by Mrs. Margaret Green and by Jorge, I forget his last name, he's a field officer of UNHCR as well. And on the 4th of May, we spoke to this item with the mayor of Vitez, Mr. Santic, and during that meeting, Colonel Stewart and Mrs. Clare Podbielski from the International Red Cross were present and I recall that also Colonel Blaskic was present and they were told at that meeting that -- as I recall it, it was told by the mayor of Vitez, Mr. Santic, that they needed the houses in the area of Vitez, all the available houses, to be able to house Croat DPs, displaced persons, coming from outside, so they made kind of a plan to use all available houses or to make houses available so that they could house Croats in their own region.

Q. Now, did you continue to receive reports after this incident in Gacice that Muslims were being ⁹⁹⁰⁶continually forced out of their homes by the HVO?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge, was Colonel Blaskic aware of this illegal practice?

A. Again, these allegations were made during the local joint commissions, and his subordinates were present during those meetings, so he must have known about it.

Q. To your knowledge, while you were in theatre, did you ever hear of a single instance where an HVO soldier was arrested and punished for evicting a Muslim from his home?

A. No, I never heard about it.

Q. I'd like to turn briefly to your contacts with Franjo Nakic. You ever have occasion to socialise with Franjo Nakic?

A. Yes, at the end of my tour, I was invited by Mr. Nakic to say good-bye to him at his private house, and I met his wife there, we had a drink together for approximately one hour, I said good-bye, and the next day I left for the coast.

MR. HARMON: Mr. Dubuisson, if I could have two exhibits shown to the witness? The first is an aerial image and the second is this item which is a list. ⁹⁹⁰⁷THE REGISTRAR: The aerial photo is 427 and the list will be 428.

MR. HARMON: Could you please place 427 on the ELMO, Mr. Usher?

Q. Colonel Morsink, can you identify what this particular exhibit represents and orient the Judges a little bit to the items contained in that particular photograph?

A. Your Honour, the main feature you see on this aerial photograph is the location of the British battalion in the small town call Bila. Our house was on this side, on the upper side of this camp. This road was called by us the press road since a lot of houses were occupied by international press. And either in this circle or in this circle, I'm not sure, but I'm very positive that the house of Mr. Nakic was watching over on the fields on this side, either in this circle or this circle, there was this house where I met him at the end of my tour.

MR. HARMON: Can we have the next exhibit placed on the ELMO, please.

Q. Can you tell the Judges what that exhibit is?

A. This is a list of names. These people were taking part in the joint command in Travnik that was established in the beginning of May, and this list is ⁹⁹⁰⁸signed by Mr. Nakic and Mr. Merdan themselves, they were themselves members of this joint command in Travnik.

Q. Does this list indicate where Mr. Nakic lived?

A. On number 2, it says Franjo Nakic and his function, deputy commander, his private telephone number, and the address says Stara Bila, and that's the area I pointed out on the map, that's known as old Bila, Stari Bila.

Q. Let me change the topic and ask you. What's your position of the command structure of the HVO, and can you tell the Judges in your own words, whether, in your opinion, Blaskic and his staff, his subordinate officers, had control over HVO forces in and around Vitez, Busovaca and Kiseljak?

A. I think the HVO forces in the area, the operational zone middle Bosnia, were well-structured, since they had this operational zone level, I compare it to our division level, they had brigades under this division, several brigades under their control, they had separate units under their control, they had military police, they had divisional artillery under this operational zone command. The area of operations of their command was clearly defined, including areas ⁹⁹⁰⁹like Zepce and Fojnica. That's for the structure of the organisation, the HVO organisation.

I think they were capable in issuing orders. They had good telephone communications, they had good fax communications, and I saw several HVO officers carrying small portable radios, so I think also the communication part was well-organised. They controlled all the switching stations of the telephone lines, so they could, in fact, decide who was having connections, who not.

I think they were well-structured in the way that they issued written orders in the military way, correctly-written orders, shaped in the right military way with proper addresses on it. They asked for reports in these orders, it's also another military way of organising things, you do not just order anything that you ask for a report afterwards.

So I think that I can say that the HVO was well-organised, they had a good organisational structure, they were capable to command, to order things, and I think they were also capable to control since everything was reported in these local joint commissions, since they had good communication, the subordinates must have been able to report all their findings from the ground. ⁹⁹¹⁰Q. Did the HVO and Colonel Blaskic in particular have the ability to control what was described to you as "uncontrolled elements?"

A. I think so, yes. I think this Djuti is the best example, to me. He looked like an uncontrolled individual, the way he was dressed; but, on the contrary, he immediately reacted on the invitation to come to a meeting, and he responded to Nakic, the second in command of this operational zone, and he followed the orders of Mr. Nakic by returning all the stolen goods.

Q. Based on your experiences in Central Bosnia and what you saw, what conclusions did you draw in respect of what happened to the Muslim population in the areas controlled by the HVO?

A. My conclusions were, and they were based on certain things I saw, they're also based on things we discussed at ECMM meetings at our headquarters in Zenica and they're also based on findings by other monitors, and the conclusions are that the HVO and/or the HDZ, I'm not sure, I think in combination, so the military leaders and political leaders, I think they made a plan to control the whole area where the majority of Croats lived, to really control it by expelling all Muslims, and they used tactics of fear, ⁹⁹¹¹tactics of burning houses, tactics of killing Muslims, to scare the rest away, and they used, on the other hand, tactics of propaganda to pull in Croat minorities from other areas which they would not be able to control at all. So the incident of Gacice, where they tried to pull the Croats from that area into Vitez, and examples of Ahmici and Rotilj, around Vitez and Kiseljak, where they tried to expel all Muslims by killing, by burning, by fear, so I think it's a plan, and it was carried out as they planned it.

MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Colonel Morsink. Mr. President, I have concluded my examination. I would now ask that items 407 through 428 be introduced into evidence.

MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, I only have exceptions on a few of those, and they are exhibits that were not authenticated by the witness.

JUDGE JORDA: Which ones?

MR. HAYMAN: Those are --

JUDGE JORDA: Not identified. Please, when you say authenticated and identified, they are very delicate terms. Please, first of all, tell us which ones you are talking about, which ones you have problems with.

MR. HAYMAN: I'm looking in my notes, ⁹⁹¹²Mr. President.

JUDGE JORDA: Take your time.

MR. HAYMAN: 417, 418.

JUDGE JORDA: 417. 417. I have it before me now. It is the note signed by the accused, and it's an instruction, an order.

Colonel, you recognised this document, did you not, this document 417? It is not the witness who wrote it, of course, but it corresponds to a time period in which he was on duty, 417.

Could you identify this document?

A. I do recognise this document, and I recall that I said it was handed out to me at one of the meetings, and I recall that I only said it wasn't signed by Mr. Blaskic himself since -- it might be a copy or a draft or a translation of the original order into English.

JUDGE JORDA: I see. Then, in that case, it is admitted. Now, 418; is that right? 418?

MR. HAYMAN: Yes, Mr. President.

JUDGE JORDA: So let's go on to 418 then. I have the French version here before me. This is a letter or notes or a report written by Mate Boban addressed to General Mario, and it seems to me that the witness identified and made some comments about this. ⁹⁹¹³Colonel? Let's go back to that document, 418.

A. That's right, I identified the document because I was asked to read what is on it, and I'm not positive whether I got this order myself or whether I read it in the ECMM headquarters.

MR. HAYMAN: So long as he saw it at the time, I don't have an objection, Mr. President. But as to 416, 417, and 418, I did not have in my notes that he recognised these from the time of his service as opposed to being shown them yesterday in the Prosecutor's Office or something like that.

JUDGE JORDA: I cannot guarantee you, Colonel, whether or not you saw it at the time, I don't know whether you recall or not, but I think perhaps it is important. Colonel, do you recall seeing it during your time of service? We're asking a lot of you now, but try to remember.

A. I don't think I saw this one in Zenica during my duty.

JUDGE JORDA: I see. But today can you identify this document as having been the reality of something issued by Colonel Blaskic at that time and addressed as a request for assistance? Let me see. Where is it addressed exactly? It's -- I see it's ⁹⁹¹⁴addressed to the UNHCR, to the European Union as well. Do you feel this would be a plausible letter given the fact there was also a fax attached to it, I believe?

A. Excuse me, Your Honour. I think we are talking about two different orders. The one I was referring to that I haven't seen --

JUDGE JORDA: 416, 416. 416 in front of me. Yes. What I have here before me is 416, a document signed by Blaskic and which is addressed to the High Commissioner for Refugees and also the European Union or Community, Nations, and also some Croatian members, and this is a request for assistance. Can you identify at least today before us this as something that's identifiable, in your mind?

A. Yes, I can identify this, Your Honour.

JUDGE JORDA: Let's see. Very well. Now, whether or not you saw it at the time, Mr. Hayman, it's difficult to state, isn't it, difficult to ask a witness whether or not, several years later on, five years later, whether or not he has seen all of these reports. So I think perhaps it should be admitted. I'll look to my colleagues first, whether or not they have any comments.

This shall be admitted as evidence. Mr. Hayman, do you have any other problems? ⁹⁹¹⁵MR. HAYMAN: Those were the only three that my notes reflected the witness had not identified them.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Very well, Mr. Hayman. I hope that you know that it is now 5.20, and you have another hour or so to work on the cross-examination.

Colonel, you're now going to be receiving questions from the Defence.

Mr. Hayman, you have the floor.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President. Good evening, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Cross-examined by Mr. Hayman:

Q. When you arrived in the theatre, you said you were briefed on the purposes and goals of the Busovaca joint commission. Were you told what events had given rise to the founding of the commission?

A. I was informed by two colleague monitors about the Busovaca joint commission, and I was briefly informed by Remi Landry, the Canadian monitor, on what happened in the previous months before I arrived in theatre.

Q. Did Mr. Remi Landry tell you about the conflict in January in the Busovaca municipality? ⁹⁹¹⁶A. He told me something about that. I do not exactly recall what was said, but it had to do with the conflict between HVO forces and army of BiH forces in the area of Busovaca, Kacuni, and Bilalovac.

Q. Did he tell you in substance that the BiH army had attacked, the HVO had the enclave from roughly Bilalovac to Kacuni and had expelled Croats from that zone in between those two locations?

A. I'm not sure whether he told me that at that event, but I at least was aware of that later on. I was told by several people that there had been fighting in that area, and as a result of that fighting, the area of -- let's say the HVO-controlled area Kiseljak and the HVO-controlled area of Busovaca were not linked anymore.

Q. So is it fair to say the purpose of the commission was, among other things, to implement and monitor the cease-fire that was reached after that January 1993 conflict in Busovaca?

A. I think that was the main reason why the first Busovaca joint commission was raised.

Q. Now, did you tell us when you first arrived in either the Lasva or Kiseljak valleys, what the date was?

A. The first day I arrived in the area of middle Bosnia was the night of the 16th, I arrived at the U.N. ⁹⁹¹⁷BH command in Kiseljak. I was taken with an ECMM car during the night through Kiseljak, Visoko to Zenica. I was briefed only for a few minutes at the first evening. I got my first proper briefing at the 17th. So that was, in fact, my first appearance in the area, the 17th in the morning, 17th of April.

Q. On the evening of the 16th, did the EC monitors you were with, did they have an assessment of the situation at the time, or was there general confusion in the Lasva Valley?

A. I myself did not get a clear picture at that time. I asked for a briefing, but everybody was very busy, and they seemed not to have enough time to brief a new monitor during that evening.

Q. In the car, did anyone tell you that they thought they knew what was going on and what was going on? Were you driven by another EC monitor on the night of the 16th?

A. Yes, I was driven by a German monitor together with his interpreter.

Q. Did he tell you whether he had a clear understanding on the night of the 16th of what was going on or whether there was general confusion in the Lasva Valley? ⁹⁹¹⁸A. I don't know whether he told me that he had a clear picture. He was not able to bring it over to me. I did not have a clear picture.

Q. The next day, did you go to the headquarters of the Vitez brigade of the HVO, that is, the 17th of April?

A. That's right. I went there together with Eric Friis-Pedersen, the Danish monitor, he was in the area already for a long time, so he was more or less the head of the mission in the Vitez area.

Q. Was there fighting going on around that location at the time you went on the 17th of April?

A. Yes. There was shooting around the headquarters, small arms fire.

Q. What building was the headquarters in at that time; do you recall?

A. As I recall, it was the cinema building, since, at the entrance, there were posters of films.

Q. And that is in reasonably close proximity to the Hotel Vitez; correct?

A. As I recall it, it was 300 or 400 metres.

JUDGE JORDA: Colonel Morsink, when you respond, please turn towards the Judges, and when you are receiving questions, you can turn towards the Defence. Thank you. ⁹⁹¹⁹THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

MR. HAYMAN:

Q. While you were meeting with personnel at the Vitez brigade headquarters on the 17th of April, did live rounds come in through the windows?

A. All windows were covered with wood, and I recall that the wood on the windows in the hallway next to the room where we met, the wood was hit several times.

Q. By rounds from rifle fire, presumably?

A. Rifle fire, small arms fire.

Q. Do you recall whether that was from the general direction of Stari Vitez or Old Vitez or from some other direction, if you're able to tell us?

A. It was impossible to tell since the windows were all covered.

MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 407 could be provided to the witness, please? That is the order of appointment of personnel to the joint command.

Q. Do you have that?

A. I have it in front of me now.

Q. Now, you told us that it was your belief at the time, and this is dated the 1st of May, 1993, that Mr. Nakic was the deputy commander of the Central Bosnia operative zone; correct? ⁹⁹²⁰A. That's correct.

Q. Let me ask you if you agree with the following:

Question: Prior to 16 April, 1993, did you believe Franjo Nakic to be the deputy commander of the HVO Central Bosnia operative zone? Answer: Yes. All of the documents at the time were signed, showed Mr. Nakic was the deputy commander. Indeed, I saw a document from 13 February indicating he was the deputy commander or at least as an individual representing Colonel Blaskic as a deputy commander. Question: After the conflict, be it the 16th or 18th or 20th of April, you concluded that Mr. Nakic was no longer the deputy commander but was the chief of staff; correct? Answer: Yes.

And then there is additional narrative consistent with the answer "Yes."

Am I correct then, that is not your understanding, that as a result of the conflict in the middle of April 1993, that Mr. Nakic lost his position as deputy commander of the operative zone Central Bosnia and became the chief of staff of that command?

A. I'm not aware of the facts or the things you just read from your computer. I don't believe they were told by me -- sorry -- I don't really understand ⁹⁹²¹the --

Q. It's not your testimony.

A. -- where you would like me to answer you on that.

Q. No, I'm just asking: Do you disagree with the statements I read to you, the question and answer I read to you? Do you disagree with it? That is, you believe that Mr. Nakic was the deputy commander on or about May 1st and at other relevant times all after the conflict in the middle of April 1993?

A. I do believe that Mr. Nakic was, when I arrived, the deputy commander of the operational zone.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. For the record, I'm reading -- I read from the testimony of Mr. Remi Landry at pages 7695 and 7696 of the transcript in this case.

A. Your Honour, can I add as an officer, as a Dutch military officer, the position of deputy commander and the chief of staff? In the Dutch army, the deputy commander and the chief of staff are one person, so there's not a distinction in level, whether you're more important or less important. In the Dutch system, and I think it's the same in the Canadian system, the chief of staff and the deputy commander are the same person.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. ⁹⁹²²JUDGE RIAD: Could it be a promotion to be a chief of staff?

A. Not according to our system. Maybe in another system.

MR. HAYMAN:

Q. Now I'd like to ask you about Exhibit 408, the videotape, and perhaps -- I'd like the technical room -- I haven't been able to coordinate this so far, but perhaps they could roll the tape and find a passage about a minute into the tape where one of the BiH army officers has a flag patch visible on his right shoulder? If they could perhaps queue that up and hold that for a question.

Let me ask you, though: This tape, was it made of a local joint commission meeting or of the joint operative or operational command meeting?

A. It's not very clear since, during that period, the decision was made to organise the Busovaca joint commission, the old one, into an interim phase, an interim phase, the joint operational command in the same ECMM house in Bila; and after that, one or two weeks after that, we were asked to organise the four local joint commissions. So it's more or less like an interim phase. We ourselves called it the JOC, the Joint Operational Command or Joint Operational ⁹⁹²³Commission, if you wish.

Q. Do you know the date of the meeting depicted in the videotape, Exhibit 409?

A. I can look it up in my notes. I'm not sure when it was. I think it's the beginning of May or the end of April. More likely the beginning of May.

Q. Were you present?

A. I was present for sure. I'm shown on the tape itself.

Q. Do you know who made the tape?

A. I'm not sure, but I think the tape was made by ITN, since I got the whole recordings of ITN made during that period, and I think this is picked out of that original tape.

Q. Did they tape the whole meeting?

A. No, they did not. At least I did not get that from ITN. I got the tape of all the recordings they made during my presence in the area of middle Bosnia.

Q. Do you know the tape that was shown, is that the entire ITN tape, or was it edited?

A. I'm not sure. I don't know.

Q. I take it you did not prepare the tape; is that right?

A. That's right. ⁹⁹²⁴Q. Now, we saw in the tape Mr. Nakic, you pointed out Mr. Nakic, as well as Mario Cerkez. Would Mario Cerkez have been attending a meeting of the joint operational command or only of the local Vitez joint commission?

A. Only the local commissions would be attended by the local brigade commanders.

Q. Such as Mario Cerkez?

A. Such as Mario Cerkez.

Q. Does that suggest to you that that was a meeting of the local Vitez joint commission?

A. That's right. But as far as I can recall it, the real local joint commission Vitez was not active at that time, so it's really an interim phase, starting up.

Q. You said that Mr. Nakic and Mr. Merdan attended some of the local joint commission meetings for a few weeks but then generally did not attend such meetings; is that correct?

A. That is correct. They attended, I think, approximately three weeks most of the local joint commissions in Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, and after that, they asked us to continue the work, and they told us that they had to be present in the joint command in Travnik, in the PPT building in Travnik, since that ⁹⁹²⁵joint command was active after those three weeks.

Q. And thereafter they were not able to attend the local joint commission meetings; correct?

A. I think that's the reason, yes.

Q. Now, the tape, Exhibit 409, also depicts officers from both warring parties being escorted home or back to residences or other offices. Is that similar to the type of escort, if you know, that was provided on the 17th of April, 1993, to Marko Priscalo (phoen), and Zoran Pilicic (phoen), two HVO officers who were shot while entering or about to enter going from an UNPROFOR Warrior to the Hotel Vitez?

A. I'm not aware of that incident, but this -- carrying people in armoured cars was meant to bring them through frontlines because there was still fighting around the British camp, so we had to bring in the HVO officers in armoured vehicles, and the army of BiH officers were not able to go through HVO-controlled area without protection, so that's the reason why BRITBAT offered to support us in these local commissions and they offered to transport these people in armoured cars.

Q. And, similarly, when the joint commission teams went out and did their work in other areas, HVO officers were not able to travel without ECMM and ⁹⁹²⁶UNPROFOR support; correct?

A. That's correct, but the meetings in Kiseljak took place at the base of the Canadian company in Kiseljak, at Camp Padberg (phoen), so they only asked for armoured cars for the army of BiH side. And the same thing happened in Busovaca. There, we had most of the meetings at the headquarters of the Dutch transport battalion in Busovaca itself, so also that only required the transport of the army of BiH officers into Busovaca.

Q. I'm allowing the translators to complete their translation, and that was why I'm making an awkward pause between answer and question. On those occasions when Mr. Nakic went to Kiseljak, for example, for a local joint commission meeting there, he would have to be transported in an UNPROFOR Warrior; correct?

A. That is correct, but several times he came with us in our armoured Mercedes since that was comfortable and safe enough to travel.

Q. And you were able to get through the BiH army checkpoints en route to Kiseljak?

A. Most of the times, we were able, since Mr. Merdan travelled with us as well and he was able to lift any roadblocks if they were there. ⁹⁹²⁷Q. Do you know whether any other meetings of the joint operational command or the local joint commissions were videotaped?

A. I don't think that other combined meetings were videotaped. I know of some separate meetings we had during this shuttle diplomacy phase that were taped but then only one side was present.

MR. HAYMAN: I cannot see, Mr. President, into the technical room. Perhaps if they have been able to locate this still image, they could put it on the video monitor? If it doesn't appear, then the answer will be "No," and I'll proceed in another fashion.

THE REGISTRAR: Yes.

MR. HAYMAN: Yes. Thank you very much to the technical personnel in the booth.

Q. You have before you, Lieutenant-Colonel, a still from Exhibit 409, the videotape. First of all, there is a gentleman seated who takes up about the left 50 per cent of the screen. Do you know who that is?

A. That is Mr. Sivro Sivet. He was the local commander of the army of BiH forces in Kruscica.

Q. Do you recognise the patch on his right shoulder?

A. Yes. That is the German national flag, and ⁹⁹²⁸it's part of, let's say, a German shirt that was used by German soldiers in the '60s and '70s, so it's a uniform part used by the Dutch army (sic) in the '60s and '70s.

Q. You said the Dutch army. You mean the German --

A. I'm sorry. I mean the German army, of course.

Q. I take it Mr. Sivet, at the time he wore this uniform, he was not a member of the German army, he was a member of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?

A. That's correct. That's the way he introduced himself.

Q. Did you learn that it was common practice for soldiers on both sides of the warring factions in Bosnia to wear whatever bits of decent uniform they could get their hands on, and that sometimes included patches of the armies of foreign nations? Did you come into such information in addition to the image on Exhibit 409 which you've just seen?

A. I recall that I saw a lot of these examples on the army of BiH side. They told me that they were short of uniforms, and I recall that I only saw a few of these examples on the HVO side. They were normally, ⁹⁹²⁹let's say, military properly-dressed soldiers on the HVO side.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. That concludes the use of that tape, and I again thank the technical booth.

THE REGISTRAR: I think it would be useful to give a number to this since -- we could perhaps give the number of D144 to that photo?

MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Registrar, a still can be produced of that?

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, absolutely.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you very much.

Q. Now let me direct your attention forward in time to a meeting you described on April 19, 1993, with Mario Cerkez concerning the truck bomb incident. Do you know what happened to the physical evidence of the truck bomb, i.e., the truck chassis and any other physical evidence at the scene?

A. I don't know what happened to that. The only thing I recall seeing myself was part of the engine of the truck laying next to a large hole on the road, and I don't know whether the rest of the truck was moved during the explosion to the side of the road or whether it was removed by anybody else. I don't know.

Q. This location, this was a location within ⁹⁹³⁰Stari Vitez, within BH-controlled portions of Stari Vitez; is that right?

A. I'm not sure whether this part of town is called Stari Vitez. It was very close to the mosque, some 200 metres from the mosque, and it was quite close to the area of Stari Vitez that I later found out was controlled by army of BiH.

Q. Was there any attempt, if you know, to form a joint investigation of the incident that would combine information available to the BiH army, the HVO, and international organisations to try to investigate the truck bomb incident?

A. I'm not aware of any attempt to form a combined task-finding mission. I recall that we asked Mario Cerkez to investigate this matter, and he promised us that he would do so. So as I recall it, there was no need for an extra investigation party.

Q. Did you ever discuss the issue with Mario Cerkez again, or was it only mentioned on one occasion, this issue of an investigation into the truck bomb?

A. I did not personally discuss it with him again since I was a young monitor at the scene. Eric Friis-Pedersen was the one who did most of the speaking and I was just taking notes, and after a few days, I was team leader but then busy in other areas and other ⁹⁹³¹jobs, so I don't recall that it was asked or raised again, this question. I did not do that myself.

Q. And it was not done in your presence, is that correct, to your knowledge?

A. That's correct. It was not done in my presence.

Q. Now, you said, I believe, you met the next day in the Hotel Vitez with a group that included Colonel Blaskic, is that correct, on the 20th of April, 1993?

A. That's correct. A joint -- Colonel Bob Stewart and Mrs. Clare Podbielski, since they planned to go to Colonel Blaskic and they asked me to come.

Q. What time was that meeting?

A. I'm not sure. As I recall it in my memory, it was the beginning of the afternoon. 1.00, maybe 2.00.

Q. In whose office was the meeting held?

A. The meeting was held in the Hotel Vitez, so that's the headquarters of the operational zone Middle Bosnia, and as I recall it, we went through the hall where the HVO guards, and then opposite to the entrance, on the other side of the hall, there's a large room with, I think, large brown seats, and that's where we spoke to Mr. Blaskic. ⁹⁹³²Q. Do you have any recounting of this meeting in your notes or diary?

A. I think I do. Just a second.

Q. Thank you.

A. I have notes that it happened on the 20th of April. I'm not sure whether you asked me if it was on the 19th?

Q. No, I asked about the 20th of April.

A. The 20th. I've got notes on the 20th of April.

Q. What do they reflect?

A. They reflect the meeting we had with Colonel Blaskic.

Q. How was Colonel Blaskic identified in your notes, if I may ask?

A. Well, I just put his name in. I was informed by Bob Stewart that Colonel Blaskic was the commander of the operational zone Middle Bosnia, so as I recall, it excited me that I was to meet the highest commander in the area.

Q. Do you remember meeting him on that day? Do you actually remember sitting down face to face with Colonel Blaskic on the 20th of April, 1993, or could it be a mistake?

A. It's hard to say. I remember the excitement ⁹⁹³³meeting the highest commander, I remember entering the headquarters, I remember passing the guards in the presence of the British battalion commander who I admired already after a few days, and as I recall it, I was introduced to the upper commander, as far as my knowledge goes. That was Mr. Blaskic.

Q. Please look at him in the face, General Blaskic. Is this the man you met on the 20th of April, 1993, in the Hotel Vitez? Do you recall that? Or are you not sure?

A. It's hard to say. You see so many faces in the first two, three days, in the middle of war.

Q. If you had and if Colonel Stewart had chewed out Colonel Blaskic concerning the truck bomb as you described, is that something you would have put in your daily operational report, attending such a meeting, meeting the commander of the operative zone for the first time, and witnessing this rather dramatic, perhaps, exchange, between the British battalion commander and the HVO operative zone commander? Is it something you would have put in your daily operational report?

A. I think later, when I was in the area for already several weeks, I would have. But according to this incident -- I was not in charge. Colonel Bob ⁹⁹³⁴Stewart was in charge. He was the one who did the talking. He introduced me or asked me to come with him, together with ICRC, so it was not a proper ECMM meeting, so there was no ECMM need to report to Zagreb about this meeting, as I recall it now. Later on, I would have reported on more than just my own meetings, but since I was not in charge and I was still a young monitor, in my third day on the scene, I can understand why at least I did not report this.

Q. What about when you were interviewed over six days by representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor in 1996, an interview which resulted in a 23-page single-spaced typed statement? In that statement, there is a discussion for over about a third of the page of your meeting on the 20th of April, but there's no mention of Colonel Blaskic, no mention of a meeting with Colonel Blaskic, and no mention of any comments by anyone else, including Robert Stewart, directed at Colonel Blaskic in connection with the truck bomb or otherwise.

Isn't that something that would have been discussed over the course of six days of interviews and recorded in a 23-page single-spaced typed statement?

MR. HARMON: Objection to that, Mr. President. That's not a proper question, whether ⁹⁹³⁵it would have --

JUDGE JORDA: Yes.

MR. HAYMAN: I'll rephrase it.

Q. Were you asked over those six days of interviews to describe your meetings with Colonel Blaskic?

A. That's right, but I --

Q. Were you asked, please --

JUDGE JORDA: No, the objection has been sustained, to the Prosecutor. You cannot ask the question where you have the statement made by the Office of the Prosecutor. You have analysed it, you have drawn certain conclusions from it, but you cannot go beyond that. You know exactly the conditions under which the witness was questioned. Please, if you would like to ask another question, but please reformulate your question. Rephrase it.

MR. HAYMAN: I will rephrase it, Mr. President.

Q. Over those six days, were you asked to describe your meetings with Colonel Blaskic and did you?

A. I was not specifically asked to describe meetings with Colonel Blaskic. I was asked to describe anything I remembered from the period I was in the area ⁹⁹³⁶of Middle Bosnia. So from the 13th of April until the 13th of July.

You must understand that this was the first time I was debriefed on these three months. I stayed in Germany for two years, did my German course there, I worked at the army staff for more than one and a half years, and then suddenly somebody from the Tribunal comes and debriefed me for the first time, and it's really very hard to get back all these memories from such a long time ago. I used my small notebooks, my big notebooks, I used my diary to recall things as good as possible. And, of course, more memories come back. They even come back now when I speak. Like, for instance, the colour of the furniture. It's just something you remember all of a sudden how a certain situation was.

Q. Then tell us, with your refreshed memory, what did Colonel Stewart say in this meeting?

A. As I recall it, Colonel Stewart was really very upset that the HVO and HDZ accused the Brits of being partial, being partial in just evacuating Muslim homeless people, homeless because of the car bomb. He told about alleged people being thrown out of trucks, British trucks and British Warriors, and he told us that -- or Colonel Stewart was very upset that he was ⁹⁹³⁷accused of being impartial (sic) since the British battalion were the only ones to give aid to those people, they were the only ones to give help during the evacuation after the car bomb, and he was very upset about the accusation that they were impartial. So he asked again, "Where was your organisation to help? What did you do to help the homeless people? What did you do to help the wounded people? Why was HVO not there? Why was the local organisation not there?" So that was the main point of the meeting, his anger about the --

Q. The lack of a response?

A. Yes.

MR. HARMON: Excuse me. Excuse me, counsel. There appears to be an error in the transcript and I'd like to correct it before it rolls up. It says the following, it says: "Colonel Stewart was very upset that he was accused of being impartial." You mean --

MR. HAYMAN: Counsel, thank you. I agree, there's an error?

A. I meant "partial."

Q. You meant partial or the record should be that he was upset at being accused of being partial?

A. That's right.

Q. Thank you. Thank you, counsel. ⁹⁹³⁸In sum then, quickly, and we'll move on, Colonel Stewart was angry at the lack of a response to the situation in terms of helping the victims, the homeless, the wounded, and he was angry at both the residents of Stari Vitez and at the HVO for not responding better; is that correct? Is that accurate?

A. I don't think so because he would not show his anger about the Muslim side, I think, when he met Colonel Blaskic, and according to my knowledge, the Muslims did not have control in Vitez, so they were not able to organise any evacuation at all.

Q. So the BiH army was not in control of Stari Vitez; is that your understanding at the time?

A. I know that they were in control. Later on, I found out that they were in control over part of Stari Vitez, but I don't think they had the opportunity or the means to evacuate a large number of people out of this endangered area.

Q. At the time of this conversation, I take it the effort to assist the wounded, evacuate them, was completed; correct?

A. As far as I know, the British battalion took out all the homeless and wounded people and the dead were recovered a few days afterwards, also by BRITBAT.

Q. Now let me ask you about the subject of ⁹⁹³⁹propaganda. You mentioned both the HDZ, H-D-Z, and the HVO. What channels did the HDZ use for putting out propaganda?

A. I was told that they used radio and television, local radio and local television, and since I cannot understand the Croatian language, I was told by interpreters on duty with the ECMM.

Q. Were you ever told that Colonel Blaskic had made any inflammatory or ethnically prejudicial or derogatory remarks on TV, radio, in speeches or otherwise during your tour of duty? Did you ever receive such information?

A. I did not.

Q. I --

A. I did not.

Q. You did not. What channels did the HVO utilise, in your view or judgement, to disseminate propaganda?

A. It's hard for me to say whether they took influence on the local radio and local television, but the same message was spread out, and it was supported by HVO officers like, for instance, as liaison officer at the headquarters of the operational zone in Vitez, he was the one who told me that Guca Gora was in ⁹⁹⁴⁰flames, he was the one who told me that thousands of Croats were forced to leave the area or fled in the direction of Novi Bila.

Q. This is Darko Gelic you're referring to?

A. That's Darko Gelic I'm referring to.

Q. When he made those statements to you, was he speaking to a room thronging with reporters, or was he having a personal conversation with you?

A. He was having a conversation with me, and there were more monitors present and my interpreter was present, of course.

Q. Was there anyone from the news media present?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Now, you spoke of two examples of the use of propaganda, Zenica and Guca Gora. Aside from the documents that have been discussed first regarding Zenica, do you have any information of any other propaganda put out, not by the HDZ but by the HVO, concerning the status of Croats in Zenica? Anything else? Anything to add?

A. The status of the Croats in Zenica was mentioned more than once in the local commissions of Vitez and Busovaca at several meetings several times. Even into the middle of May, I recall that during several meetings, the positions of Croats in Zenica was ⁹⁹⁴¹discussed again and again, and these meetings always started with large accusations from both sides that their own people were harmed in another area and that it should be investigated.

Q. Was the press -- I'm sorry. Are you finished?

A. I'm finished, yes.

Q. Was the press present at these local commission meetings that you've described?

A. The press was present at several local commission meetings. The Vitez local press was there, as I recall it, at two or three meetings, and the local Busovaca press was present at more than five or six meetings.

Q. Would they attend the entire meeting?

A. They would be there the entire meeting.

Q. Was that deemed conducive to the work of the local commissions?

A. We thought they could support us because every meeting was -- we finished every meeting with a mutual statement from both commanders, an official statement, signed and written about the attempts we made during the meeting and about the agreements we made and the things we would try to do the following days. ⁹⁹⁴²Q. You spoke of a particular radio broadcast which said it was safer for refugees, I believe refugees in Grahovcici, to go to Vitez and Novi Bila than to return to the Zenica municipality. Is it your opinion that at the time that was not correct, that it was either safer for the refugees, Croat refugees, to go back to Zenica or that it was equally safe for them to be in the Vitez enclave or to be in the Zenica municipality? What exactly is your opinion in that regard?

A. As I told you, as I told the court, we made an investigation in this first phase together with this Catholic priest from Zenica, we made an investigation in all these villages, and we together came to the conclusion that it was safe for people to return. We broadcast it or we told our conclusion to the HVO representatives in Grahovcici, to the Croats -- let's say the oldest people of the community, of the refugees there, and we told it to the Catholic priests in Grahovcici as well, and they all agreed with our conclusion that if we said so and if Father Stjepan said so, since he was well-known priest in the area and he was loved by everybody, if that was his judgement, then people would believe him and it would be safe to go to their own houses. ⁹⁹⁴³Q. The radio broadcast you quoted, though, said it was safer for refugees to go to Vitez and Nova Bila than to return to Zenica. I take it you don't agree with that. You believe it was either safer or just as safe for Croat refugees at the time to return to Zenica; is that correct?

A. The essence of the broadcast was more than that, not just the matter of safety. The essence was that it was propaganda, that lots of Croats had been massacred in the area of Zenica and that their houses had been burned and that it was no longer safe or not safe or unsafe, or whatever word you would like to use, for them to go back to their own houses and they were told to go to Nova Bila and to Vitez.

Q. You visited Grahovcici on approximately the 8th of June, 1993; is that correct?

A. Grahovcici was earlier. That was the 25th until the 27th of April. The 8th of June was the Guca Gora incident.

Q. Very good. 25th to 27th of April was Grahovcici?

A. I'll look it up.

Q. Could you just check and make sure?

A. The 24th of Zenica -- the 24th of April, I stay in Zenica and go to Grahovcici for the first time, ⁹⁹⁴⁴and I finish the Grahovcici job on the 26th of April, so it's the 24th until the 26th.

Q. In your estimation, how many Croats had been murdered in the Zenica region by that point in time?

A. I did an -- we paid some visits to the areas where the people fled from, together with Father Stjepan, and we were told that -- I'm not sure how many there were. I would have to look it up in the report I made. But I think some 10 or 15 Croats had been killed in that area, and I read in another report made by two other monitors in the previous days, they did an investigation on similar incidents in more or less the same area but not in all the same villages I went to, that another number of Croats had been killed there.

Q. And houses burned? Half a dozen? A dozen? Five dozen?

A. I would say between 10 and 25.

Q. And houses looted? 50? 25?

A. I think more -- I think -- I'm not sure. I didn't count them all myself, but I think it must have been some 50 houses looted.

MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 295 could be placed before the witness?

Q. This, Lieutenant-Colonel, is a special report on Croats in Zenica dated 20, 21 April, 1993, produced ⁹⁹⁴⁵by the ECMM RC Zenica and authored by three of your colleagues, and I'd like to call your attention to several portions of it.

There is a French translation of this exhibit, Mr. President, 295A.

In paragraph 1, as a result of a visit to certain areas in the municipality, your colleagues reported that the military section of the Zenica prison had more than 200 Croat prisoners, half military and half civilian. Down in paragraph 2(a), they report that in the village of Cajdras they found four houses burned, 38 empty. In Veternica, three burned houses. In paragraph 2(d), a village that was shelled. Paragraph 2(f), Stranjani, seven burned houses and most of the 240 Croat homes were robbed. Paragraph, 2(g), Zahalie, eight burned houses, four killed Croats. Paragraph 3(c), Zalje, at least 25 houses were burned. The Father, referring apparently again to Father Stjepan, I believe, told us that in that village were killed 10 civilians, including a 90-year-old man and a three-year-old girl. And then the report concludes that this was less damage than had been expected, less killing than had been expected, less burning, less looting than had been expected.

Would you agree, Lieutenant-Colonel, that the ⁹⁹⁴⁶Croats in Zenica at this time in April, they did have reason to be concerned for their safety?

A. If this is all the facts and if Croats knew about this, then I believe that they were afraid, yes.

Q. Now, Colonel Blaskic at the time, he's down in the Vitez area -- correct? -- his headquarters is in Vitez, was at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he have a way to get to Zenica to make a personal appraisal of the situation, or would he have been blocked at the BiH army front-line from going to Zenica to inspect these different villages where only 240 houses were looted in one, only 10 civilians killed in Zalje, et cetera? He didn't have that kind of information, did he?

A. Probably not at the 20th or the 21st. But since we reported through ECMM and in the local joint commissions what our findings were, he must have known that afterwards.

Q. That is, he must have known that the numbers in Exhibit 295 were accurate; is that right?

A. Well, I did not report on this special report ECMM, since when this report was written, I was in Vitez myself, and the daily and special reports were discussed in the ECMM meetings in the evening, at that ⁹⁹⁴⁷very day, and I came back to Zenica three days later, so I did not discuss this report myself.

Q. Are you surprised by these numbers? Does this sound like more killing, more burning, more looting than you had the impression occurred against Croats in Zenica during the latter half of April 1993?

A. I was told by Lars, who is one of the authors of this special report and who went with me the last day I went to Grahovcici myself, it was reported by him that this was the case, but we did not face it, all these villages ourselves, and we put effort on some of these villages, and we had the impression, and Father Stjepan had the impression, that all people could go back to their own houses. We spoke to the neighbours still there, we spoke to some Croats that were still there in their own houses, and they told us, "Please ask the people to come back." So that's what we tried and that's what we arranged with all the buses. And there were HVO soldiers present, HVO local commanders, and they could have reported what our findings were.

Q. Did they? You don't know, do you?

A. I don't know whether they did or not, but the broadcast came, and that's why they took away our buses.

Q. They got excited, these local commanders, and ⁹⁹⁴⁸they commandeered your buses; correct?

A. The local military police, the HVO military police took away our buses, and after a certain time, we were able to speak to the local HVO commanders again, and after a while, they agreed in still going back to their own houses.

Q. So the HVO Vojn Policija, military police, took the buses, then you spoke to the regular HVO local commanders, and after some period of discussion, they were successful in helping you get the buses back; is that fair?

A. That's correct, and meanwhile, the buses were once used to bring the people to Nova Bila.

Q. Can you tell us anything about Colonel Blaskic personally -- and we'll get to the documents that have been discussed in a moment if we continue that long tonight -- other than the documents, can you tell us anything about Colonel Blaskic's involvement or lack of involvement in the issue of either returning Croats to Zenica or allowing Croats to leave Zenica if they wished?

A. I didn't meet Colonel Blaskic very often, and I didn't have the opportunity to speak to him personally. I was present at a number of meetings where he was. But, on the other hand, using his name ⁹⁹⁴⁹with brigade commanders, using his name at local commissions always gave me the impression that he was honoured by his own subordinates. Using his name put more weight on the scale.

Q. Did you use his name to get the buses back?

A. I don't recall that, that I used his name then, no.

MR. HAYMAN: Now, in speaking of Guca Gora -- Your Honour, I'll try to complete the Guca Gora questioning, perhaps ten minutes, if that's satisfactory to the court.

Q. In discussing Guca Gora --

JUDGE JORDA: You have until 6.30.

MR. HAYMAN: Fine. Very well.

Q. In discussing Guca Gora, you talked about Alagic and said Alagic was roughly of the same rank as Blaskic?

A. That's correct.

Q. What was Alagic's area of responsibility?

A. As far as I know, his area of responsibility was the whole Travnik area, including places like Guca Gora, Novi Travnik, way uphill.

Q. Was he responsible for Zenica as well, or was that the third corps' responsibility?

A. He was not responsibility for Zenica. ⁹⁹⁵⁰Q. Indeed, Mr. Alagic was under the third corps; correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Whereas Colonel Blaskic, although he might not have had the rank, he was responsible for the entire terrain on paper at least, Lasva Valley, Kiseljak Valley, and other areas; correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. You said that Alagic went with you to Guca Gora, but Colonel Blaskic never went with you anywhere to investigate allegations. Did you ever ask him to go anywhere with you and investigate allegations?

A. I did not ask him personally, but then I didn't ask Mr. Alagic to come. He offered himself.

Q. When you went to visit Alagic, would he almost always offer you a drink, liquor, whiskey, something like that? Is that a fair generalisation?

A. No, he hardly ever did. I recall only once having a drink with him.

Q. Very well. With respect to the action in the area of Guca Gora, what was the BiH army trying to accomplish?

A. I think they launched an attack from the northern area into the region of Guca Gora.

Q. They were trying to link Zenica and Travnik, ⁹⁹⁵¹were they not?

A. That's correct. They needed freedom of movement. They needed the road under their control from Travnik to Zenica.

Q. You have told us that the church at Guca Gora was not touched in the course of that action; is that correct?

A. That's correct. I visited that church myself after the fighting passed from the north across Guca Gora in a southern direction.

Q. And that neighbouring Croat communities, no wanton destruction or attack on civilian structures by the BiH army, or was there such conduct in the Guca Gora region generally?

A. I did not see any proof of that during that visit to Guca Gora, and an investigation was made the day after by Philip Watkins, and there was a special report made on that.

MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 296, which is a map, could be placed on the ELMO, and Exhibit 414 be provided to the witness, please?

Q. Now, you have before you on the ELMO, and you should be able to see it on your video monitor, on Exhibit 296, this is a map including the area of Zenica and villages to the west and south-west of Zenica; ⁹⁹⁵²correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Do you see, towards the middle upper portion of the photograph, the village of Dolac, D-O-L-A-C; do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Let me ask you to turn your attention on Exhibit 414 to paragraph 1, "General Situation." This is the second page, not the cover letter. The next-to-last sentence, commencing with the next-to-last sentence which reads: "UNPROFOR further report the Croat village of Dolac as deserted and over 100 houses burnt. The number has not been confirmed by ECMM, although there is evidence of some houses still burning."

Is that information -- and the date of this is the 8th of June, 1993 -- when was your visit to Guca Gora?

A. Just a second. My visit was at the afternoon of the 8th of June.

Q. So the same day that you visited Guca Gora, UNPROFOR reported that there were 100 burnt houses in Dolac and that the Croat population was absent. Would you agree that's what Exhibit 414, paragraph 1 reflects? ⁹⁹⁵³A. It says so in the same report, but I'm not sure whether we were aware of this fact when we visited Guca Gora or whether we heard it at the evening briefing.

Q. I'll call your attention, in fairness you don't need to see it, but it's Exhibit 415, paragraph 8, reflects that of those visited villages, the worst is Dolac which has approximately 15 to 20 burnt houses, and then lists burnt houses in smaller numbers in other villages. This is dated 19 June, 1993, indicating that about eleven days later, there was better information that only 15 to 20 houses in Dolac had been burnt as the BiH army advanced from Zenica towards Travnik. Now let me ask you about the documents you reviewed, beginning with Exhibit 415. Do you have 415?

A. Yes.

Q. In paragraph 5, it reflects that the number of Croatian families to leave their homes in the Travnik area varies from between 5.000 and 20.000. Is that also the information you had on approximately the 8th of June, 1993?

A. We didn't have exact numbers or not even estimations about the number of Croats. What we saw was large groups of civilians carrying their -- I think the belongings they could take, walking in a southern ⁹⁹⁵⁴direction through Novi Bila in the direction of Vitez.

Q. Paragraph 8 of this exhibit reflects a discussion of the allegation of desecration of churches and states: "The church in Travnik has been badly damaged internally with the organ and artifacts smashed. The Guca Gora church was free of any damage when initially visited but since has been extensively damaged internally. The Dolac church was hit by a single mortar round, but this is not assessed as a deliberate attack."

Did you go back to the church at Guca Gora and see in what ways it had been desecrated and destroyed?

A. I did not myself. Mr. Philip Watkins and the other monitor, Torbjorn Junhof they made the second report, they made the investigations on allegations that there was more damage than we saw in the first check.

Q. If Exhibit 416 could be provided to the witness. This is called a "Call for help" from then Colonel Blaskic.

First I'd like to direct your attention to the original B/S/C version of this report, that's at the back. Do you see that copy?

A. You mean this one? ⁹⁹⁵⁵Q. Yes. In other words what we used to call Serbo-Croat. Do you see a small stamp about two inches down from the left-hand side of the document?

A. A small square stamp with the date on it?

Q. A small square stamp in a different type, different type set, from the rest of the document. It includes a large rectangle that is cut into certain rows and so forth. Do you see that?

A. I see that.

Q. Now let's look at the English translation and perhaps, unless everyone has a copy, we can put this on the ELMO. I don't know, Mr. President, if I can proceed without having it on the ELMO, if it is confusing. Please interrupt me if it is confusing any of Your Honours.

On the face page, and I will be working from the English, do you see the translation of this stamp indicating -- would you not agree -- that this document was received in Kakanj on or about the 7th of May, 1993, and it's a received stamp of sorts. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened to the HVO in Kakanj; do you know?

A. I don't know. I'm not aware of that. ⁹⁹⁵⁶Q. Do you know where this order came from? The Prosecution provided it to the court. Do you know where they got it?

A. Well, it was addressed to the European observer mission so ...

Q. Yes, but this copy that they have is stamped received HVO brigade, the Kostromanac (phoen) brigade in Kakanj. How did they get that copy, if you know?

A. I don't know. We were able to go to Kakanj -- I didn't receive it myself, but we were more or less free to move in certain areas so ...

Q. The BiH army attacked the HVO in Kakanj and drove them out during your tour of duty, did they not?

A. I was not working in that area, so I'm not aware of it. I know that there was fighting, of course, but I'm not familiar with the exact order of fighting and what happened exactly in that area.

Q. Would you agree that if there was such an attack on or about the 12th of June, 1993, and 5.000 Croats fled Kakanj, those who did not fled (sic) were imprisoned in a camp, that that's the kind of information --

MR. HARMON: Objection, Mr. President. The witness has testified he does not know about Kakanj, so this question calls for speculation. ⁹⁹⁵⁷MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, the witness has criticised the "Call for Help," which is Exhibit 416, and authored by my client. I'm asking him if that kind of information would affect the thinking and the psychology of anyone responsible in the area.

JUDGE JORDA: I'm not at all criticising what you have said, Mr. Hayman, I understand the objection of the Prosecutor as well, but I'm not criticising your question, I simply wish or think that perhaps you should rephrase it calmly, try to rephrase it, rephrase your question, very quickly and with conviction and firmly, and this is -- should be done so that the witness has some time because I believe you spoke about the attack in June 1996 or in May 1996, and -- 1993, correction, 1993, and so if you could ask your questions -- I'm not criticising the way you're asking questions but I see you're asking vehemently and very strongly, but could you please try to ask your questions calmly and quietly, because here it is very difficult for us three to understand exactly what you're looking for. Please rephrase your question.

MR. HARMON: I would also object to the question because Mr. Hayman is asking about events that he says took place on the 12th of June, 1993, which is five weeks after the call for help was issued. ⁹⁹⁵⁸JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, I don't see how I could accept your objections. Well, I am in the process of asking Mr. Hayman to rephrase his question to see whether or not his newly rephrased question is acceptable or not. I see we're almost at the break now -- Mr. Hayman, would you please rephrase your question but please be careful because it seems we're dealing with events in June or in May, so what exactly is your question?

MR. HAYMAN: I'll rephrase it, Mr. President, and I'll hold the issue of Kakanj for Exhibit 417 which is dated the 14th of June and specifically references 10 to 15.000 Croats exiled from Kakanj.

Q. Staying with Exhibit 416, it says, in the first paragraph that,"Colonel Blaskic feels the need and responsibility to inform you once again about the difficult position of the Croats in Zenica who have been living in total isolation for quite some time." Would you agree with that statement, that the Croats in Zenica at that time, 4th of May, 1993, had been cut off and were living in Zenica, isolated from other communities of Croats?

A. I think that's correct, they were isolated from other communities, but since the priest was free to move and to visit his parish, I think it's a ⁹⁹⁵⁹different kind of isolation. They were not free to go to places outside Zenica, I think, but ...

Q. Do you think it's a fair statement, Colonel?

A. I don't think they live in total isolation. As I experience an expression like that, "total isolation" is more than just having to stick to your own town because they were able to shop, they were able to move from one house to another, they were able to go to the church, to visit their priest or the priest was able to visit his parish in Zenica. Of course, they were not totally free, but they were also not totally isolated, I think.

Q. It says on the next page, the letter states that by blocking and isolating the Croats of Zenica, the food supply for the 4,500 Croats of the Zepce and Usora region have also been blocked. Was that true, or do you not know?

A. I'm not aware of the food situation in Zepce. I know that there were problems to reach Zepce, but there was a mixed population north of Zenica, so they had to -- they had food problems for everybody, if there were any food problems, and if they wished to get transport through, then they had to bring transport through for both groups of civilians.

MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, this would be a ⁹⁹⁶⁰convenient breaking point.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I think we should stop now. We've asked a great deal of the interpreters and everyone is tired. We've also asked a great deal of the witness. I'd like to remind you we only have tomorrow morning in session so the witness will return tomorrow, I'm sorry, but we will have to resume tomorrow. I believe you're going to be finishing your cross-examination tomorrow, Mr. Hayman?

MR. HAYMAN: Yes, I will be able to finish it by the conclusion of tomorrow's session.

JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Because I don't think perhaps it will be necessary to call another witness tomorrow, but that's up to you to decide, Mr. Harmon. You know my ways and the ways of this Chamber, so then we will all meet tomorrow morning at 9.45. We are adjourned.

--- Whereupon proceedings adjourned at 6.32 p.m., to be reconvened on

Friday, the 3rd day of July, 1998, at 9.45 a.m.