Case No IT-95-14

⁷³³ Tuesday, 22nd July 1997

(10.00 am) Mr. Robert Donia (continued)

Cross-examined by Mr. Hayman

JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Can we have the accused brought in which the usher, please?

(Accused enters court)

JUDGE JORDA: Before we start our hearing today -- let us wait until Mr. Blaskic sits down -- I would like to ask Mr. Harmon to come here along with one of the Defence lawyers, perhaps two of them, but either one, Mr. Hayman or Mr. Nobilo. It is for an organisational issue that I would like to have in camera here. So I'm asking you to approach the bench. (Pause.)

All right. We can now resume our hearing, the public hearing, that is. Usher, would you please have the witness brought in, Mr. Donia?

(Witness enters court)

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Donia, good morning. Do you hear me?

A. Yes, sir. Good morning.

JUDGE JORDA: Have you rested?

A. Yes.

JUDGE JORDA: That's good. Mr. Hayman, you have the floor.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Donia? ⁷³⁴

A. Good morning, Mr. Hayman.

Q. Let me return to the subject that we ended with yesterday, Exhibit D/6, the document titled "joint statement". Do you know of any agreements between these parties prior to this date of April 1993 wherein in substance the parties agreed to any of these points?

A. On 24th March 1993 in New York President Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban, according to Lord Owen, held a five hour session at which they reached agreement on the interim arrangements, in Lord Owen's words, after President Izetbegovic had been threatened by Mr. Boban with the dissolution of their then military alliance.

Q. Do you know any more about what interim arrangements were agreed upon on March 24th?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any other agreements prior to 2nd April 1993 within any of the six points in the joint statement, which is Exhibit D/6, were agreed upon between the parties.

A. There was reported an agreement between President Izetbegovic, on the one hand, and President Tudjman and Mr. Boban, on the other hand in Zagreb on I believe it was 28th of March. That pertained, as far as the announcement was concerned, only to the establishment of a joint command. ⁷³⁵

Q. That would relate -- would that relate to point three or four in Exhibit D/6?

A. Well, it would -- it's similar to point four.

Q. After this date, April 2, 1993, when was the first agreement between the parties ratifying or documenting agreement on any of these six points in Exhibit D/6?

A. I do not know of any in the immediate time-frame of this document.

Q. Do you know of any in April of 1993?

A. No.

Q. If the usher could assist, your Honour, I have a document I would like placed before the witness. (Handed.) This has been provided to the translators and I understand they have had a chance to review it, but they have not produced a written translation, your Honour. If you would take a moment to review that, Mr. Donia, please ...

A. Okay. (Pause.)

Q. Perhaps while we are doing that, your Honour, a site translation could be provided?

JUDGE JORDA: Oui. What passage, Mr. Hayman, are you talking about? What passage do you want to have translated? I would like it not to be too quick so that our interpreters can do it properly.

MR. HAYMAN: I would recommend the introduction, then under ⁷³⁶ "joint statement", paragraph 2, 3, paragraph 5 and the paragraphs titled "enclosure" on the second page, which are five short paragraphs. (Pause.)

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, thank you.

MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, would you agree, walking through this document with me, that under paragraph two on the first page, under the heading "joint statement", the last sentence regarding a cease-fire of hostilities, that that is substantially equivalent to point 5 in Exhibit D/6, the joint statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Moving on to the next page, to the top of the page, which is the continued part of paragraph 3 of the joint statement, I draw your attention again to the last sentence regarding two things: first, the directive: " ... to immediately start implementing the agreement on the legality of both the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO".

Do you know to what that is a reference?

A. No.

Q. The next clause provides further a directive or an agreement on:

"... the establishment of a joint command of both forces made up of representatives of both headquarters". Do you agree that that constitutes all of the ⁷³⁷ essential elements or components in point four of the joint statement, which is Exhibit D/6?

A. It specified no deadline for that creation, but other than that is in agreement with point four.

Q. And it directs the establishment of a command?

A. It does, yes.

Q. Then directing your attention to the portion marked enclosure, paragraph three directs or indicates that the permanent joint headquarters or command will be located at Travnik. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether or not that joint command was established in Travnik?

A. No.

Q. You do not know?

A. No.

Q. In paragraphs 4 and 5 would you agree -- this is also of the enclosure, in the enclosure -- would you agree that the contents of those paragraphs constitute the same agreement, the same elements present in point three of Exhibit D/6, the joint statement?

A. Point three -- excuse me just a second.

Q. Strike that. Let me restate the question. Would you agree that without specifying which force will have command in what particular territorial area, that ⁷³⁸ paragraphs 4 and 5 of exhibit D/8 creates the same structure or a similar structure as is contemplated in paragraph 3 of Exhibit D/6, that is unified command over HVO and ABIH forces?

A. There is a contradiction between that portion of point 4 -- point 4 in the enclosure, which states these would be related to the operational command for joint operations and not to provincial boundaries and the specifications, I believe, of point two on the joint statement. The establishment of a joint command under joint headquarters seems to me to correspond to the provisions in that first paragraph of point three.

Q. You are referring now to Exhibit D/6?

A. To the joint statement, yes.

Q. Wouldn't you agree that in paragraph 4 of exhibit D/8, which is the agreement of 25th April, that an agreement was made that military districts would be identified?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you further agree that each district was to have a commander and a deputy, one from the HVO and the other from the ABiH?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you further agree that line of command was to have unified command overall BiH and HVO forces within that military district? ⁷³⁹

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether in April, as of April 25th of 1993, whether point two, that is the issue raised in point two of Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, was that a live issue in Central Bosnia, if you know? Was that an issue of any contention between the parties, the presence of so-called outside forces in the region?

A. Yes, it was.

Q. How do you know that?

A. It was -- I certainly have considered it as a source of tension between the government and Bosnian Croat parties for some months after the signing of the Vance-Owen by the Bosnian government on 25th March.

Q. What issue do you perceive or believe to have existed between the parties on that subject as of that date?

A. Well, the question of whether the armed forces would be and police would be separated by the Vance-Owen boundaries.

Q. By that you mean local -- whether local forces within each canton or province would, in effect, be in charge?

A. Yes.

Q. So you maintain that that was still an issue in dispute as of April 25th, 1993?

A. That would be my understanding, yes, it was.

Q. If I may have a moment, your Honour ... (Pause.) We'll ⁷⁴⁰ come back to that issue after perhaps the break, if we reach one, Mr. Donia. Perhaps if you have an opportunity during the break, you, too, can review the provisions of the Vance-Owen plan agreed upon on 25th March 1993.

Q. Let me ask you: during the evening recess did you have a chance to confer with anyone concerning whether Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, was ever, in fact, reached, that is whether any agreement was ever reached between the parties indicated on that statement as to those points?

A. Well, the first part of your question is yes, I have had an opportunity to confer with members of the Prosecution on that issue of the joint -- so-called joint statement of 2nd April. I can't tell you that I reached a conclusion on the second part of your question, which was exactly the nature of the agreement reached.

Q. Did they give you their position?

A. No.

Q. Did they tell you what they believed with respect to that issue?

A. I do not know that they have a position and they haven't shared a particular belief with me on it.

Q. Did they make any additional materials available to you?

A. They made available to me two documents which I first ⁷⁴¹ saw on 26th May 1997, which were the Statement of Facts relevant not to this document but to the other one that you showed me, from which you indicated that material had been excised. I would tell you that, in fact, I have seen that document before on 26th May. It is, in fact, 41 pages long, has 169 paragraphs in it. So when you stated that there was material excised, I think you were referring to about 20 pages, and 168 paragraphs.

Q. That's right. In order to relieve the burden on the interpreters and so forth, you can imagine it's necessary --

MR. KEHOE: I object to Mr. Hayman's speech.

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, would you go ahead?

MR. KEHOE: I object to Mr. Hayman's speech, after yesterday he gives this witness one paragraph from a 41 page document with 169 paragraphs in it and uses as an excuse the fact that he is trying to alleviate the burden on the interpreters. I object to his speech. He did what he did.

MR. HAYMAN: The facts speak for themselves, your Honour. I can proceed.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Then proceed.

MR. HAYMAN: Are you telling us, Mr. Donia, that you were in error when you testified yesterday that you'd never seen ⁷⁴² the materials which were Exhibit D/7?

A. I assume your designation of the exhibit is correct. I had indeed seen those on 26th March as a very small part of a much larger document of the length that I indicated, yes.

Q. And did you discuss with the Prosecutor whether this redaction of this document was some attempt by me to deceive you as to the content of what I showed you and what was Exhibit D/7?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe it was an attempt by me to deceive you?

A. Yes.

Q. You testified yesterday that you first focused on the so-called ultimatum, which you have -- a label you have assigned to Exhibit D/6, some time in May of this year; is that right?

A. That's -- no, I think I believe I said in June, either late May or early June.

Q. And that's well after your book had been published?

A. Well after it, yes.

Q. And the material you came into possession of at or after that point in time caused you to change your opinion as to the causes of the conflict between Croats and Muslims that erupted in Central Bosnia in April of 1993; correct? ⁷⁴³

A. Perhaps not my broad general opinion, but the specific causation certainly is much more closely pinpointed for me at this point, yes.

Q. Now would your opinion change if you learned that at least one influential actor on the ground in the region did not view Exhibit D/6 as an ultimatum? Might that cause you to change your opinion? I'm referring to an actor on the side of the Bosnian government.

A. It might. I am of the belief that any student of history has to at any time be willing to revise conclusions based on new evidence --

JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Mr. Hayman. Could you make your question more specific because you are making your question to people who know one another. I ask you to rephrase your question making it very clear what you are referring to. It's difficult for the judges to listen to this dialogue between two people who know what they're talking about. So make your questions more specific, please.

MR. HAYMAN: I will, your Honour. I will try. Your Honour, I have a document I would like placed before the witness. It's a portion of a statement of a prosecution witness whose identity and the contents of the statement I am not free to publicly disclose, including here in this public session. But I would ⁷⁴⁴ nonetheless like it placed before the witness and I would ask him to read the last paragraph. I would ask that a site translation of the last paragraph be provided. The translators already have a copy of this. All we need, your Honour, is some way to inform the witness of the position of this individual and then I simply intend to ask the general question: does having this information in any way cause him to change or even question the opinion he has proffered to the court?

JUDGE JORDA: This document that you're going to show, is this covered by any kind of confidentiality requirement?

MR. HAYMAN: It is. It is covered by the requirement imposed on the Defence not to disclose the identity of certain prosecution witnesses, nor the contents of their statements, unless necessary, for example, even in investigation. I submit this is necessary and the court can make whatever instructions to the witness that it needs to in terms of future confidentiality of the material.

JUDGE JORDA: I think we have to first hear what the Prosecutor wishes to say.

MR. KEHOE: Quite candidly without going into closed session with this statement and discussing it, it is quite ⁷⁴⁵ difficult to talk about the statement in the abstract because I am not sure exactly which witness we are discussing here. I am not sure if it's the 53 witnesses that Mr. Hayman was sought to exclude. I do not have any more information in that regard than your Honours. So if we ought to proceed in this fashion, and there are other objections with cross-examining someone from somebody else's statement, but before we get to that point, I think it is crucial for the Prosecution and for the court to determine who this witness is, in closed session naturally. (Pause).

JUDGE JORDA: The Tribunal says we are now in private session. We are not in camera but we will cut the sound in the public gallery. How is this done technically? Do you give the instructions? Do I? What do we do? Is there an override I have to touch? It's done? Are you sure?

(In closed session).

(7 lines redacted) ⁷⁴⁶

(19 pages redacted) ⁷⁶⁵

(18 lines redacted) (In open session).

JUDGE JORDA: Registrar, we are no longer in closed session. It's not a private session now. If I can judge by the fact that everyone has deserted us now. If you would like to proceed without any further delays, and we will try to finish by 12.45. This afternoon we will start again at 3 o'clock with Mr. Donia to answer ⁷⁶⁶ the questions that my colleagues want to ask or that I might want to ask. Mr. Hayman, we'll try to conclude your cross-examination at 12.45.

MR. KEHOE: If I may be heard, your Honour, I will have a few questions.

JUDGE JORDA: Bien sur.

MR. KEHOE: With all due respect, I will have a few questions of Mr. Donia as well. I do not know if you want to do that before your questioning or after it.

JUDGE JORDA: I will have to deliberate this with my colleagues. Yesterday you were so eager that this principle be agreed to, that there be one counsel, one witness. At least I think this merits deliberations with my colleagues. Otherwise we can see that the Defence will also ask for time to reply. So we have to be reasonable here. We will discuss this.

MR. KEHOE: May I comment on that proposition, Mr. President?

JUDGE JORDA: Oui.

MR. KEHOE: Of course the Prosecution at this juncture has the burden of proof and there are some items being brought out by the Defence in cross-examination that clearly need to be clarified for Mr. President and your Honours' review.

MR. HAYMAN: If they can be, your Honour. ⁷⁶⁷

MR. KEHOE: Please. (Pause.)

JUDGE JORDA: All right. Comparing the different legal systems is an enriching experience but it can also slow things down. Together with my colleagues and pursuant to a reading both of the spirit and the law of Rules 85 of the Rules, we have decided that the party which called the witness to testify, that is will have the right, in fact, to reply on new points. That means that the Prosecutor in this case for Mr. Donia, because this is a prosecution witness, may reply in order to provide -- to find answers to new points that were raised during these discussions. In principle this same rule will apply to a Defence witness, which means that in this case the Defence cannot reply. However, if there were any new points which the Prosecutor, who ordinarily should not intervene, brings in new accusations, at that point the Tribunal will decide whether or not it is right to give the floor to the Defence. But the principle has now been established that the witness was examined and cross-examined by the Defence and the Prosecutor may reply only in order to answer new points. Having settled this issue, Mr. Hayman, I give you back the floor.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, your Honour. Mr. Donia, is your position with Merrill Lynch a ⁷⁶⁸ full-time job?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Approximately how many -- strike that.

THE INTERPRETER: Can we have the microphone for the witness, please? Thank you.

A. Can you hear me? Okay.

MR. HAYMAN: Do you have a title with Merrill Lynch?

A. Yes. I'm a Senior Resident Vice President.

Q. Do you have managerial responsibilities over a particular group of people?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. What group is that?

A. It is a group of financial consultants in San Diego County.

Q. How many persons do you supervise?

A. About 85.

Q. So it's a full-time job in every sense of the word?

A. In every sense of the word.

Q. The subject of your doctoral dissertation was "Bosnian Muslims in transition 1878-1906"; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. The subject was bounded by those temporal limits; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it also correct that that study, your dissertation ⁷⁶⁹ "dealt almost exclusively with elite Muslims"?

A. Yes.

Q. You completed that dissertation in 1976?

A. Yes.

Q. From 1974-1975 were you a Fullbright scholar?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you spend those years principally in Sarajevo?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, did you reside in Sarajevo during that period?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you reside anywhere else in Bosnia-Herzegovina other than Sarajevo during the period of that Fullbright scholarship?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever resided anywhere out of Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. No.

Q. Now you also published a book in 1981; is that correct?

A. The book in 1981 was a revised version of the dissertation of 1976, yes.

Q. You published it under the title "Islam under the double eagles, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1914"; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So the time period covered by the book was extended by ⁷⁷⁰ six years, from 1908 in your dissertation, to 1914 in the book; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. This book, like your dissertation, also focused on Muslims in the so-called elite during that period?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your occupation prior to joining Merrill Lynch?

A. I was an assistant professor of history at the Ohio State University Lima campus.

Q. For how many years had you held that position?

A. Three.

Q. When did you join Merrill Lynch?

A. 1981.

Q. Have you ever been a full professor?

A. No.

Q. The work you have done in the field of history since 1981, has it been funded or unfunded?

A. Unfunded.

Q. You testified that between 1994 and the present day you made seven trips to Bosnia-Herzegovina and one trip to Croatia?

A. One trip solely to Croatia. In most of the trips to Bosnia I was also in Zagreb for anywhere from one to four days.

Q. Did you personally fund those trips as well? ⁷⁷¹

A. Yes.

Q. Now I would like to direct your attention to your 1994 book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed". I take it you only wrote the portions in the book after 1878?

A. That is correct. Chapters 5 forward and the introduction.

Q. And your co-author, Dr. Fine, wrote the other portions of the book?

A. That is correct.

Q. The year 1878 corresponds to the beginning of the Hapsburg period, also the period you studied in your dissertation; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. But in the book you also wrote about periods of time after the Hapsburg period ended; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you undertake some kind of study or review of that period prior to writing those sections of the book?

A. Well, yes. I think the book kind of began as a conception of trying to provide a general survey, history in one volume, of Bosnian history from the sixth century forward, and my role in this was to cover that period that is roughly defined as the modern period. So that involved consulting a great deal of new ⁷⁷² literature, trying to identify, you know, more recent studies in some of these areas and trying to tell a story that was concise by definition of a somewhat summary character, but which hopefully provided an integrated account of the history of Bosnia.

Q. Did you take a leave of absence from Merrill Lynch to work on this study?

A. No.

Q. Did you take a leave of absence from Merrill Lynch to work on the book in any regard?

A. No.

Q. Does the book rely principally on secondary sources or primary sources?

A. I would say it relies principally on secondary sources with the exception perhaps of some insights derived from my own work in the period from 1878-1918.

Q. By secondary sources you mean other publications, newspaper accounts, that kind of thing?

A. Yes. Other scholarly studies, some press accounts and a variety of things, some of which arrived by the Internet, and many of which are simply publications that have come out.

Q. Would you agree that the book is written more for a popular audience as opposed to a scholarly audience?

A. Yes. ⁷⁷³

Q. You would not claim it is a scholarly work?

A. I would not deny it as a scholarly work but would leave others to judge that. I should perhaps put it in a bit of a context, in that up until this volume and one other, which was written at just about the same time, by Noel Malcolm called "Bosnia: A short history" there really did not exist in any language a single comprehensive history of Bosnia from the arrival of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula into the 1990s. So there was a gap there in terms of the literature in general, a gap which has proven surprisingly difficult even for scholars in the region to fill.

Q. Would you agree, though, your book is not annotated to any significant degree?

A. Oh, yes, I would agree.

Q. There are about 20 footnotes in 300 pages?

A. I didn't count but I would concur.

Q. Is it fair to say your book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed" focuses on urban Bosnia?

A. I wouldn't say it focuses on it. It ends up saying a great deal about urban life in Bosnia over various times. It is in many respects a political study, but I wouldn't necessarily say it focuses on urban issues or urban groups.

Q. Would you say your own experience in living in ⁷⁷⁴ Bosnia-Herzegovina was an urban experience?

A. Very much so, yes.

Q. And that is your own personal point of reference with regard to this subject matter?

A. Yes.

Q. You wrote an article in 1978; correct? You wrote a chapter in a book perhaps in 1978; correct?

A. Well, I wrote -- I delivered a paper in 1978 which was subsequently published by the -- I believe by the Academy of Sciences of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if that's what you are thinking of. I did co-author a piece with an anthropologist, William Lockwood. I do not know what exactly you have.

Q. That's what I am referring to, the piece with Mr. Lockwood, titled "The Bosnian Muslims: Class, Ethnicity and Political Behaviour in a European State"?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall generally that article?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you state in that article with reference to modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina that:

"Villages are most commonly ethnically homogenous, although some villages are mixed. In the latter case ethnic groups are usually segregated into distinct neighbourhoods or hamlets"? ⁷⁷⁵

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also state with respect to the subject of ethnic groups:

"They tend to constitute three distinct social systems superimposed on the same geographic region. Contact is limited primarily to the economic sector, especially among peasants, and this is reflected in marriage patterns, visiting ..." --

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?

MR. KEHOE: If I may, I would like a reference for what counsel is reading from. I realise he is reading from the Donia/Lockwood article but where in the article, counsel?

MR. HAYMAN: Page 186 in the version I have, your Honour. If I can finish the quote:

"Contact is limited primarily to the economic sector, especially among peasants, and this is reflected in marriage patterns, visiting patterns, communication networks and world view".

Do you agree with that statement?

A. Yes. Those are the words of my co-author there, Professor Lockwood, and I would certainly concur.

Q. Would you agree that your book "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed" has been criticised by some reviewers as overly emphasising a, if you will, rosy ⁷⁷⁶ picture of urban life in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war?

A. Not only urban life, I would say, but for over-emphasising perhaps the degree of harmony between the nationalities generally.

Q. So that criticism has emanated from a number of sources, has it?

A. It has certainly been cited in three or four reviews I've seen, yes.

Q. Your Honour, I would like to have one of those book reviews placed before the witness and marked as an exhibit, if the usher could assist.

JUDGE JORDA: This will be D/10, Mr. Kehoe? D/10; right?

MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour.

MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, this is the first two pages of a review. I think it does continue into additional pages, but what I wish to ask you about is on the second page. The fourth full paragraph and I would like to read it to you and then ask a question:

"Donia and Fine's view of Bosnian culture is on the whole compelling, but its presentation is troubling. Having defined Bosnian tradition as free from inter-ethnic strife, they must engage in contortions to explain ..."

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, give a little bit of time, please, ⁷⁷⁷ for the interpreters here. They have to be given the text.

MR. HAYMAN: They have it, your Honour.

JUDGE JORDA: Would you recall the reference, please, for the interpreters.

MR. HAYMAN: I will, your Honour. They do have this story. It was provided to them yesterday highlighted with the relevant paragraph highlighted. I will reading from Exhibit D/10, which is from the Information Access Company. It is a headline "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed", book reviews published on September 12, 1994.

JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.

MR. HAYMAN: Returning to the second page marked in the upper right-hand corner as page 33, the fourth full paragraph reads as follows:

"Donia and Fine's view of Bosnian culture is on the whole compelling, but its presentation is troubling. Having defined Bosnian tradition as free from inter-ethnic strife, they must engage in contortions to explain the region's long record of bloodshed, including peasant revolts under the Ottomans and local nationalist (especially Serbian) resistance to Hapsburg, Royal Yugoslav and Titoist rule. All of these had ethnic and religious aspects. When such ⁷⁷⁸ purported aberrations are attributed solely to class differences or "outside forces", the argument begins to sound circular. Bosnia is tolerant, and if it sometimes hasn't been, it wasn't acting like Bosnia. By focusing on urban culture as the true picture of Bosnia, the authors neglect the more refractory countryside where, in fact, much of the current conflict is rooted. Finally, the atrocities of World War II constitute an exception so drastic it virtually disproves the rule". Do you see that passage, Mr. Donia?

A. Yes. In fact, I read it before.

Q. Are there other critiques and criticisms out there in the press touching upon some or all of these strains?

A. Certainly.

Q. Now your book was written you state in the early pages: "To shed light on the sources of the Bosnian conflict that began in early 1992"; correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Is there any mention in your book of Tihomir Blaskic?

A. No.

Q. Now I would like to direct your attention to Exhibit 4A, which is a chronology attached to an outline that you prepared. Do you have Exhibit 4A, which I believe is an English translation of Exhibit 4? While the witness is finding that, your Honour, perhaps the usher could ⁷⁷⁹ hand out an additional exhibit. Do you find that exhibit?

A. Is this lands of the western Balkan chronology. There is an outline, ICTY presentation outline and attached is a chronology.

MR. HAYMAN: Chronology of six pages. The total document appears to be six pages in length?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to direct your attention to the last page, marked as page 6, of Exhibit 4A, the English translation, to an event that you cite as having occurred on 9th July 1993. It reads as follows: "Meeting Owen and Stoltenberg in Zagreb, Croatian President Tudjman accepts the idea that if Croats want Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca, they will have to give up Stolac to Muslims".

Do you see that entry?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get the fact of that event from your own personal knowledge or some other source?

A. I believe I got that from Lord Owen's book.

Q. Did you make a decision to include that in the chronology or did someone else suggest you do so?

A. No, I made the decision to include it.

Q. Now would you agree that in the -- that this event, as ⁷⁸⁰ depicted by Lord Owen in his book "Balkan Odyssey" that he depicts this event as President Tudjman making a concession in order to bring about the success, if you will, of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, if you turn to the next exhibit which has been placed in front of you, excerpts of the Lord Owen book, "Balkan Odyssey" -- do you have that? Have you been provided with that? No. I think it's coming your way. It has been marked as exhibit D/11. Have you read "Balkan Odyssey", Mr. Donia?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. If you would turn to page 209, there is a portion that has been highlighted. I would like to read it to you. This is page 209 of exhibit D/11, excerpts from Lord Owen's book "Balkan Odyssey":

"The most important result from our two meetings on 9th July, respectively in Belgrade and Zagreb, was that Milosevic and Tudjman were now committed to reaching 30 per cent of territory for a Muslim majority republic. Over lunch with me, Tudjman seemed grudgingly to accept that if the Croats wanted Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca, then the arithmetic alone dictated that they would have to give Stolac to the Muslims. A map for a predominantly Muslim republic ⁷⁸¹ from the Sava to the sea was now becoming closer to reality ..."

Would you agree that this agreement recounted by Lord Owen for a 30 per cent territorial share for a Muslim republic was a breakthrough in the Vance-Owen peace process?

A. Just to clarify, I believe this was at the time when Mr. Vance was gone and we had Owen and Stoltenberg working on the various plans that made this up.

Q. The continued effort?

A. Yes. I would agree. I think it was one of a number of discussions that reached the percentage numbers that the negotiators were seeking to arrive at, and I would therefore agree with you that it's a breakthrough of sorts.

Q. Would you agree that as used in this passage the phrase: "If the Croats wanted Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca ... they would have to give Stolac", that that's a reference to the boundaries of provinces or cantons under the Vance-Owen or Owen-Stoltenberg Agreement; correct?

A. Yes. Again Vance-Owen was dead by now as a plan, so I think the notion that he was grudgingly accepting this trade-off speaks for itself. He was willing to make that trade-off and clearly on a arithmetic basis Stolac, ⁷⁸² which was then under Croat control, would have to go to the Muslims.

Q. But this was not part of a discussion. This statement you put in your chronology does not reflect any annexationist intentions or discussions engaged in on 9 July 1993; correct?

A. Correct.

Q. In terms of annexationist as territory being annexed in some way to the Republic of Croatia. Do you agree with that?

A. I would agree.

Q. Now four entries down from the one we've been discussing on your chronology, again Exhibit 4A, the English translation of Exhibit 4, I would like to direct your attention to an entry from December of 1993, which reads:

"President Tudjman informs Ambassadors of EU countries, then Owen and Stoltenberg, that Vitez and Busovaca can under no circumstances be given: must be included in predominantly Croatian unit of Bosnia". Again did you obtain that information from the book "Balkan Odyssey"?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you agree, based on your review of "Balkan Odyssey", that President Tudjman made this statement, ⁷⁸³ assuming it was made, in the context of negotiations concerning the terms of the so-called EU action plan?

A. Yes.

Q. This was a proposed union of three republics within Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. Yes.

Q. And that this was a proposed solution to the conflict proposed by the EU? Would you agree with that?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. And that every party to these discussions at this point in time was engaging in negotiations concerning what territory might be included in each of these three constituent republics within this EU solution, proposed solution to the conflict?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to direct your attention in Exhibit D/11 to page 77, the bottom of page 77. Lord Owen writes -- and if you look over on page 76 you will see this is a reference to November, the November of 1992 time period. That's the point at which we are in in the book. Lord Owen writes at the bottom of page 77, Exhibit D/11, excerpts from "Balkan Odyssey": "I knew at this early stage that Tudjman had accepted recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally agreed boundaries as a necessary price ⁷⁸⁴ for recognition of Croatia, but had never hidden his belief that Bosnia-Herzegovina was not sustainable, and the Cvetkovic-Macek map was more than a glint in his eye".

Do you see that passage?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you based on your knowledge and study agree as of this date President Tudjman had accepted the internationally agreed upon boundaries of BiH?

A. Yes.

Q. Turning to page 127 of these excerpts from Lord Owen's book, in the right-hand side of the page there is a reference to:

"... the Croatian role in controlling all arms supplies to the Bosnian Government".

Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia controlled the flow of virtually all arms to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you agree that an extensive amount of arms were, in fact, provided by the Republic of Croatia to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the course of the war?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you see the passage below the one I noted in which ⁷⁸⁵ President Izetbegovic is addressing at a certain point in time exactly what quantity of arms he did possess and his government did possess? Do you see that passage?

A. Yes.

Q. You have characterised the Croat militia in Bosnia as existing principally in Western Herzegovina or based on troops drawn from, personnel drawn from Western Herzegovina. Could you clarify that?

A. I do not --

Q. I'll restate the question.

A. Okay.

Q. Do you agree that the Croat militia in Bosnia and Herzegovina was drawn principally from personnel in Western Herzegovina?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you agree that those individuals had a principal loyalty to political leaders within Herceg-Bosna?

A. Yes.

Q. Namely Mate Boban?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you also agree that an organisation known as HOS came to be merged within this Croat militia derived from western Herzegovina personnel?

A. Yes. That's my understanding, that in the course of the ⁷⁸⁶ Summer or Fall of 1992 that that took place.

Q. Who was HOS? What is HOS?

A. HOS was a kind of an alternative paramilitary organisation. Its political leaders -- and I know very little about its military composition and so on -- its political leaders were probably more sympathetic to a Muslim participation in their ranks or at least more appealing to Muslims and so attracted a fair number of them. It also, of course, came into conflict with the HVO in the summer of 1992.

Q. The HOS forces did?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you agree that HOS was an ultra nationalist organisation?

A. Yes.

Q. And that members of HOS tended to have extreme nationalist views?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you also agree that to the extent one can generalise, Bosnian Croats residing in Western Herzegovina tend to have extreme or highly nationalist views?

A. As a rule, yes.

Q. Would you agree that that stands in some contrast to the views held, again to the extent one can generalise, to ⁷⁸⁷ views held by Bosnian Croats native to the Central Bosnia area, where there is a greater mix of ethnic groups? Would you agree with that proposition?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know what part of Bosnia the defendant in this case came from, where he grew up?

A. I don't, no.

Q. Were most of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces involved in the conflict with Bosnian Croats in Central Bosnia, were they members of "all Muslim brigades"?

A. I just don't know.

Q. Would you turn to page 234 of "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed" and see if that refreshes your recollection in that regard, at the top line?

A. I say: "Most of the fighting was done by all Muslim brigades".

Q. Would you agree that in the Spring of 1992 or beginning in the Spring of 1992 Muslim irregulars and gangs terrorised civilians in government-controlled areas? If you would like to refer to the passage, it is at page 267.

A. Yes, I would agree.

Q. Would you further agree that for the most part the activities of these Muslim units were restrained by the ⁷⁸⁸ government, even though Muslim gangs were tolerated because of their contributions to the war effort?

A. There's -- I'm sorry. The first part of that question is -- I mean, I would agree they were tolerated by the government because of their contribution to the war effort, but there was also some effort to restrain them. In October of 1993 the gang control of Sarajevo basically came to an end at the insistence of Prime Minister Selezic.

Q. Do you know how many of the dead in Yugoslavia during the World War II time period were victims of Yugoslav violence, that is died at the hands of other Yugoslavs?

A. As I've said, I have again reconsidered that issue in the light of recent scholarship and I can't give you a direct answer to your question if terms of numbers but feel there has been a substantial tendency to exaggerate those numbers over time, and the total number of dead I think is -- the number right around 1 million is something that I think has been convincingly established by demographic work.

Q. So you would disagree with Lord Owen's words at page 9 of Balkan Odyssey in Exhibit D/11 that:

"In total of the 1.7 million Yugoslavs killed during the second World War, about 1 million were slain by fellow Yugoslavs". ⁷⁸⁹ Would you disagree with that statement?

A. The statement is a reflection of a very commonly used figure. As I say, I think the newer work on it would suggest that it probably is lower than 1.7 million. So yes, I find the newer work convincing and would think that the number is somewhat lower than that.

Q. You stated in your direct testimony that at some point in 1993 Bosnian Croats:

" ... had a window of opportunity to implement some of these territorial ambitions that were expressed" in the formation of Herceg-Bosna. Transcript page 216, lines 16-22. Would you like to refer to that passage?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you find that passage?

A. Yes.

Q. When in your view was this "window"?

A. It really began with the adherence by President Izetbegovic on behalf of the Bosnian government to the Vance-Owen plan, and at that time, and by "window of opportunity" what I mean is that the entire energy and attention of the international community was directed towards the Serbian, Bosnian Serb position at that time vis-à-vis the Vance-Owen plan. They were renewing some military activity in Eastern Bosnia. They were engaging in some very complex negotiations, trying to ⁷⁹⁰ establish greater ethnic purity in a couple of cities of Eastern Bosnia and the international community was increasingly talking about sanctions, about possible greater military involvement in the event that either the agreement was signed or that the Serbs declined to do this. The attention of the international community was just solely riveted on events there.

Q. When was the window? That was my question. Can you answer the question? When was the window?

A. Well, I told you the beginning date of it. It's the time that the Bosnians signed on, and that would be 25th March. Probably went through the 5th May, the time that the third Bosnian assembly rejected the provisions of Vance-Owen.

Q. Now to posit that there was a window for territorial conquest requires military superiority; would you agree?

A. To posit that there was a window for military conquest would require military superiority, unless one's energies on the other side were directed to some other objective, so at least, let us say, in the immediate region or area it would require military superiority, yes.

Q. What happened to the territories controlled by the Bosnian Croats in Central Bosnia after conflict erupted on April 16th, 1993 until the end of the conflict, ⁷⁹¹ February 1994? Did they gain territory or did they lose territory?

A. They lost territory.

Q. In fact, they lost a lot of territory, did they not?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. If you turn to Exhibit D/11, excerpts from "Balkan Odyssey", the last page, page 363, there is a map. Do you see the map?

A. Are you talking about "Balkan Odyssey"?

Q. "Balkan Odyssey", the last page of these experts, on page 363. Do you see the map?

A. Yes.

Q. You drew upon a number of maps from this book in your direct testimony and they were admitted as exhibits, didn't you?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Was this map one of them?

A. No, it was not.

Q. This map, would you agree, purports to indicate the situation regarding territory held either by the Bosnian Croats or by the Bosnian government on 12th October 1995. Do you agree with that?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you also agree that these territories reflected in this map were essentially locked in at the end of the ⁷⁹² conflict in February of 1994 and they are, in fact, the same as those that would have existed in October of 1995?

A. Yes. They are essentially the same.

Q. Now focusing your attention to Central Bosnia, do you see a little bow tie with Vitez in the middle of the bow tie?

A. Yes.

Q. And that is a Croat enclave within Central Bosnia; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you see that enclave has been cut off from another enclave around the area of Kiseljak?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have the other maps before you that were admitted during your testimony?

A. I don't believe I do, sir.

Q. Would one of those maps depict the territories controlled by Bosnian Croats prior to April 16th, 1993? Did you include such a map?

A. No, I have no -- all the maps I gave to you I believe were peace proposals and not territorial control by --

JUDGE JORDA: Not to make a comparison with other maps. It has to be clear to the judges. You can't just speak about maps. You are comparing a map which was not used ⁷⁹³ by the witness. I mean, you compare it with the maps that he himself made, that he drew from the same work. Could you be clearer, please?

MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, you are stating you did not reference in your testimony any maps reflecting terrain held by Bosnian Croats prior to April 16th, 1993; is that right?

A. I believe that's correct, yes. There may have been some congruence between the peace plans and the territorial holdings, but the maps that I presented were specifically to show peace plan proposals.

Q. But you would agree that the map on page 363 of the "Balkan Odyssey" excerpts, Exhibit D/11, shows the dramatic loss of territory that resulted, that is loss of territory by Bosnian Croat forces, that resulted from the conflict with Bosnian Muslim forces that began in April 1993, would you not?

A. That I would agree. Just to make a point, there are some gains there which reflect Croat military offensives prior to 12 October 1995 in the kind of north-western area, but your point is fundamentally correct. There were gains by the Bosnian government vis-à-vis the Bosnian Croats prior to the time that this map came into effect.

Q. Are there any gains reflected in the central Bosnia region reflected in this map vis-à-vis land held prior ⁷⁹⁴ to April 15th, 1993 that you are aware of?

A. Again I don't have the prior map, but the situation from April 15th, 1993 until the time of this map would clearly not reflect any gains in that area. It would reflect losses and gains by the Bosnian government forces.

Q. Your Honour, if I may have a moment to review my notes, and while I'm doing that, perhaps I would like to move for admission of all other remaining exhibits that have been tendered during the cross-examination of this witness.

JUDGE JORDA: We are going to suspend -- do you want to say something, Mr. Kehoe?

MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. If there's some type of admission of this Statement of Facts excerpt by counsel, I am not only going to object, but contest this document, and ask the court for some sanctions with regard to this document due to the total impropriety of trying to admit a Statement of Facts or any portion thereof into evidence. That's not to argue with D/6, which is the joint statement, which is a separate document. I'm simply talking about the Statement of Facts and the excerpt from the Statement of Facts and the impropriety of offering such a document to the Trial Chamber. ⁷⁹⁵

MR. HAYMAN: I have no idea what that's a reference to. If there is a portion of it that needs to be sealed because there is something sensitive, I have no objection to that. I didn't reference the identity of any witness or any other content. It was offered because it was relevant what this witness had and had not been told, I believe, by the Prosecution.

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?

MR. KEHOE: Quite simply, your Honour, what was shown to this witness was, as this witness pointed out, one paragraph of a 41 page document, in which there were 169 paragraphs, in addition to the supplementary Statement of Facts, which I believe is about 18 pages. I think it is somewhat clear. I believe that Mr. Hayman argued this during the motion on the vagueness issue, that the presentation of facts, the facts in the statement that were given to the Confirming Judge, could not be presented to this Chamber. I believe, Mr. President, that to some degree your Honour echoed that during oral arguments on that subject, but quite clearly Mr. Hayman stridently put forward that position in writing and orally. Nevertheless he presents a portion of a Statement of Facts that is only supposed to go to a confirming judge and not to a Trial Chamber to this court, knowing full well, based on his prior comments, ⁷⁹⁶ that it was improper. Now quite clearly the way to rebut that statement --

JUDGE JORDA: What are you specifically -- what exhibit are you particularly speaking about? What document are you talking about?

MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I'm referring to D/7, which is the exhibit that Mr. Hayman presented yesterday.

JUDGE JORDA: In general the problem of exhibits was dealt with during the first week. The Tribunal showed that it desired to take all exhibits that would be filed so long as it did not have to settle identification problem relating to protected witnesses, because each of the parties would try to argue with the judges that the document in question serves only a part of the interests of the adversary. I believe that this issue was more or less settled. I would like to consult my colleagues. (Pause.)

The exhibit will be accepted, as in general others are put into the file. Each of the parties has to evaluate the partial nature of this or that exhibit and during their final deliberations the judges will decide to what extent they will take into account the probability or credibility of this or that document. However, there is an exception for those documents which are attached to the file and which would raise problems ⁷⁹⁷ as far as the identity of witnesses are concerned. As it is now 12.45, we are suspending our hearing and we will resume at 3 o'clock.

(12.45 pm)

(Luncheon adjournment) ⁷⁹⁸

(3.00 pm)

JUDGE JORDA: We can resume our hearing. Usher, have the accused brought in, please.

(Accused re-enters court).

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, when we broke a while ago, the Registrar was taking in all the documents and numbering them. Mr. Hayman, I now give you the floor to continue the cross-examination, which would last for about one hour; is that right? A maximum of one hour?

MR. HAYMAN: No more than ten questions, your Honour.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but if each of the questions lasts an hour, that will take up a lot of time. All right. Proceed. Proceed please.

MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Mr. Donia, we have spoken of your current conclusions and opinions regarding the causes of the conflict in April of 1993 in Central Bosnia. I would like to ask you another question about the causes of that conflict as you set them forth in your book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed". Would you agree in your book you identify two events as specific cautions of the conflict in the spring of 1993?

A. I identified two general factors, I believe. I said sovereignty and symbols were the primary cause of the outbreak. Perhaps you would like to ...

Q. If you would like to refresh your memory on page 252, ⁷⁹⁹ you are most welcome to. Let me ask specifically do you state in the book at the top of page 252 that first: "Croatian commanders demanded that Bosnian army units in Western Herzegovina, an area assigned to Croatian control under the peace plan, be merged into the Croatian army"?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you also state: "In the Travnik area, another region designated as Croatian in the plan, despite its large Muslim population, Croatian officers insisted that the Croatian flag fly beside the Bosnian flag"?

A. Yes.

Q. Are those the two specific incidents, if you will, or events that you cite as causes of the spring conflict?

A. These are the factors that I cited in the book, yes.

Q. Later on in the Fall of 1993 where you agree with Lord Owen, and I would like to direct you to page 237 of Exhibit D/11, which are the excerpts from Lord Owen's book, "Balkan Odyssey", would you agree with his statement at page 237 that in the time-frame, September 1993:

"The Muslims had clearly chosen to continue with the war, believing that sanctions would soften up the Serbs and on the advice of their military commanders, ⁸⁰⁰ that they could defeat the Croats in Central Bosnia"?

A. I'm sorry. I don't have that exhibit at hand.

Q. I think you should be allowed to read this sentence in print?

A. Thank you. 239?

Q. 237, the top of the first full paragraph, the sentence beginning with the phrase:

"The Muslims had clearly chosen ..."

A. I probably would not agree with the word "clearly" because I am not too sure it was all that clear, but I agree with the general thrust of that assessment by Lord Owen.

Q. Now we have spoken a great deal during your testimony concerning the ancient tribal hatreds, this is, starting, I believe, in the sixth century and going, of course, right up into the 20th century. I would like to direct your attention now to the spring of 1993. The war in Bosnia had been raging for roughly how long at that point, in months?

A. Let us say about 13 months, 14 months.

Q. So over a year?

A. Yes.

Q. And perhaps as many as 1 million refugees had been made homeless and remained within Bosnia?

A. Yes. ⁸⁰¹

Q. Would you agree that by the spring of 1993 inter-ethnic tensions were at an extraordinarily high level?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you agree that those tensions at times and in certain places were characterised by feelings such as terror?

A. Yes.

Q. Fear?

A. Certainly.

Q. Paranoia?

A. Unquestionably.

Q. You write in your book that certainly by the middle of 1993, if not the spring, atrocities had been committed by members of each of the three major ethnic groups in Bosnia. Would you agree that in the course of the war atrocities were committed by members of the three ethnic groups, major ethnic groups?

A. I think if you look at the specific comments that I made, they pertain to the armed forces of these three groups. I don't believe I made the statement that the ethnic groups per se committed those atrocities.

Q. So you state that members of the armed forces of all three combatants committed atrocities?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you agree that the fact that there were ⁸⁰² victims of such atrocities of all sides further increased tensions and the volatility of the situation in Bosnia in 1993?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to ask you about two examples. One, you cite the deaths of approximately 35 civilians in a town called Kriz, K-R-I-Z, at the hands of the soldiers of the Bosnian army in September 1993?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. The victims, were they mixed Serb/Croat?

A. I do not know. I have not revisited that question since the writing of the book.

Q. Then also I want to ask you and finally, on page 255 you discuss the tragic killing of two clerics in a monastery in Fojnica. Do you describe in that passage how in the course of a battle between the armed forces of the Bosnian Croats and the government forces that a rumour spread among the government forces defending Fojnica that the Franciscan monastery in Fojnica harboured a radio transmitter and was being used as a storehouse for weapons?

A. Yes.

Q. And apparently based on this rumour soldiers from the government army entered the monastery on November 13th, 1993 and murdered the two clerics in the monastery? ⁸⁰³

A. I state that those soldiers did enter the monastery on that date. I don't tie it to the rumour of the radio transmitter per se.

Q. Can you think of anything else that would cause members of any military to murder religious figures other than feelings such as the paranoia, fears and prejudices that could be inflamed as a result of rumours of the type you identify in that passage?

A. I think paranoia, fears and prejudices are exactly what is at stake here rather than transmitters.

Q. No further questions, your Honour. Thank you, Mr. Donia, for sharing your views with us.

JUDGE JORDA: The cross-examination is now concluded. Mr. Kehoe, in agreement with the Trial Chamber, which has set up its case law in this matter, will now take the floor again. The Trial Chamber wishes to ask the Prosecutor to comply with what was decided, that is the questions that you ask will not be repetitions of questions that have already been asked during the initial questions, but new ones. Mr. Kehoe, you are under -- you are free but you are being watched.

MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President. Re-examination by Mr. Kehoe.

MR. KEHOE: Turning to the last line of questioning by the Defence, I think you described the situation in Central ⁸⁰⁴ Bosnia as one of fear and anxiety and essentially, for lack of a better term, very heightened tensions; is that correct, sir?

A. Yes.

Q. Given those circumstances do you, as a historian, find it somewhat bizarre that a President such as Mate Boban, who wanted allegedly peace, would issue -- the HVO would issue an ultimatum as you found in Slobodna Dalmatia and also found in Vjesnik in April 1993?

A. I would characterise it as inflammatory.

Q. Just to cover a few things handled by the cross, your Honour. This is a Defence exhibit. I believe it's Defence Exhibit 10. Mr. Dubuisson, if Exhibit D/10 can be presented to Mr. Donia, D/10. That description is a two-page article by Jerry Kisslinger -- Kisslinger from the New Leader dated 12th September 1994. Do you have that, sir?

A. Yes.

JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.

MR. KEHOE: Now on the second page of that there is an area that is highlighted; is that right? That was read by the Defence?

A. Yes.

Q. Go to the bottom of that page. There is a somewhat complementary statement concerning you and Professor ⁸⁰⁵ Fine at the bottom of that page that is cut off; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. It says that: "Still, like Vulliamy", I believe relating to another author, Ed Vulliamy, "Donia and Fine deepen our understanding of what has been lost in Bosnia and underscore the distance between knowledge and political wisdom".

Your Honour, for the sake of accuracy --

JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, this is D/10 "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed". Are these the comments on the book, the criticisms of the book? Could you be more specific with your question, because you didn't follow it? This is after the underscored paragraph, the one that was underscored by the Defence. What was the question? Could you read the paragraph please, as we did this morning, this paragraph that is going to support the question that you are going to ask.

MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. The beginning last paragraph on that page states:

"Still, like Vulliamy, Donia and Fine deepen our understanding of what has been lost in Bosnia and underscore the distance between knowledge and political ⁸⁰⁶ wisdom".

Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you take that as a compliment, sir?

A. I will take it as a compliment with pleasure.

Q. For the sake of accuracy and completeness, your Honours, if this document is going to be admitted into evidence, which I believe it is, the Prosecution would like to offer to the court the complete critique of the article, and we would offer it to the court as Prosecutor's Exhibit 39, with the help of the usher?

JUDGE JORDA: Do you have that?

MR. KEHOE: Yes, I do, your Honour.

JUDGE JORDA: Therefore if improperly summarising for the same article there are two numbers. One is D/10 for the Defence and D/39 for the Prosecutor. Is that right? D/10 and D/39. There's no translation into French, I guess. We will allow the French Judge to come to the explanations that he needs.

MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, that was the point I was to get to next. With some of these exhibits being taken off the computer relatively recently, this being one of them, I will provide a French translation quickly.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. I'm moving ahead, Mr. Donia, because we don't need to get involved in a literary ⁸⁰⁷ debate. You were shown another document by the Defence, which I believe was marked as D/8. Again with the assistance of Mr. Dubuisson, that is the cease-fire agreement signed on 25th April 1993?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now you were questioned concerning that document by the Defence this morning, were you not?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Donia, but a few events took place between early April and a cease-fire agreement that was signed on 25th April 1993, didn't it?

A. Yes, they certainly did.

Q. What happened?

A. Renewed hostilities broke out on the morning of April 16th in selected portions of Central Bosnia, in particular the Lasva Valley, and those hostilities continued for some time.

Q. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Donia, that people were killing each other in Central Bosnia or in Bosnia before this agreement was signed?

A. Yes.

Q. And turning to paragraph 2, isn't there an acknowledgement that not only was there killing, but there were serious violations of international humanitarian law? ⁸⁰⁸

A. Those are the words, yes.

Q. Carrying on in that paragraph, the signatories ask for an immediate cease-fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Carrying on, sir, to the following page, and I direct your attention -- one moment -- on paragraph 5 there's an agreement, is there not, that these violations of international humanitarian law, of rights -- excuse me. I will read it:

"Each instance of violation of such rights, there will be an immediate examination of the personal responsibility for the conflicts and crimes perpetuated against the civilian population"?

A. That's correct.

Q. That is, is it not, according to this defence document, an acknowledgement taken on by the HVO, by the signatory, Mate Boban; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge, sir, do you know if the HVO ever brought anybody to justice based on crimes that took place in Central Bosnia or any place in Bosnia during this time-frame?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Now, turning on, we move to the enclosure, which sets up the joint headquarters between Sefer Haliolovic and ⁸⁰⁹ Milvoj Petkovic. Do you see that, sir?

A. Yes.

Q. Now in the prior agreements on Vance-Owen, the division of land was being talked about in terms of cantons, was it not?

A. Provinces.

Q. Provinces.

A. Ten provinces, yes.

Q. I believe -- correct me if I am wrong -- the three provinces that were to be controlled by the Bosnian Croats were 3, 8 and 10?

A. Provinces 3, 8 and 10, yes, were to be the majority Croat provinces.

Q. There was language in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan concerning the military aspects of 3, 8 and 10 as well, weren't there?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. Does this document say anything about provinces 3, 8 and 10 and reordering their military according to provincial boundaries -- excuse me -- according to province boundaries?

A. Well, it specifically rejects the notion of organising the military command under the joint commanders along provincial boundaries. Point 4 specifically states that: ⁸¹⁰ "The two commanders in chief will form military districts under the joint headquarters, whose areas will be related to the operational requirement for joint operations and not to provisional provincial boundaries".

Q. So would it be fair to say, Mr. Donia, that after the fighting broke out in April of 1993, we're talking about an entirely different scenario, when this document is signed?

A. Yes.

Q. And the armies are driven by operational concerns as opposed to by provincial concerns; isn't that so?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you find that significant?

A. Well, I think it amounts to a rejection of the notion of provincial boundaries as a basis for military organisation, and therefore is very significant in that it rejects specifically the terms that were earlier proposed by the HVO in its ultimatum of 3rd April.

Q. Let's turn our attention to a few other questions that were asked by the Defence on cross-examination. I focus your attention, and again I request the assistance of Mr. Dubuisson, and ask that he give D/11 to the witness. D/11, your Honours, is the excerpt from "Balkan Odyssey" by David Owen offered by the Defence. ⁸¹¹

A. I have it.

Q. Do you have it, Mr. Donia?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Let me turn your attention to what has been underlined by the Defence on page 77.

A. Yes.

Q. In the area that has been underlined by the Defence it reads as follows:

"I knew at this early stage that Tudjman had accepted recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally agreed boundaries as a necessary price for recognition of Croatia".

Do you see that, sir?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall the question by the Defence where you were asked whether, in fact, Tudjman had recognised the territorial boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you recall that question?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Was there another reason, a more expanded reason, than explained here for Croatia acknowledging

Bosnia-Herzegovina or recognising Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. Lord Owen suggests it here. It was a necessary price for the recognition of Croatia in this broad package arrangement that was led by the European community and ⁸¹² the United States, and specifically the provisions of the Badenter Commission in December and January of -- December of 1991 and January of 1992, which required Croatia as a price of recognition to participate in the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. So it was a package deal, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Tudjman recognises Bosnia and then Croatia is recognised by EU countries and the United States?

A. That's correct.

Q. Nonetheless, Lord Owen continues on and says: "But Tudjman had never hidden his belief that Bosnia and Herzegovina was not sustainable and the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement", the Banovina plan of 1939, "was more than a glint in his eye".

Do you see that, sir?

A. Yes.

Q. Following that Lord Owen continued on and he mentioned that:

"On July 9th, 1993 Tudjman seemed grudgingly to accept that if the Croats wanted Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca, then the arithmetic alone dictated that they would have to give Stolac to the Muslims". You quoted that during your direct and in cross, and that is in Lord Owen's book, is it not? ⁸¹³

A. Yes, it is also in the chronology. I believe. It is referred to in our chronology.

Q. Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca are where?

A. In the Lasva Valley, near the extreme north Eastern extension of the Croatian Banovina as defined in the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement.

Q. Where did hostilities break out on the morning of 16th April 1993?

A. In the Lasva Valley.

Q. As we move on, there is another quote that you presented from 20th December 1993 by Owen, where Lord Owen says: "As the search for more territory for the Muslims gathered momentum, the Croatian Government once again and without any attempt to pretend that they did not set policy for the Bosnian Croats, stated to all EU Ambassadors in Zagreb that there had to be 17.5 per cent for any predominantly Croat republic, and in no circumstances could Vitez and Busovaca be given up". Did he write that in his book?

A. Yes.

Q. This is the same Vitez and Busovaca that he mentioned on July 9th that's in Central Bosnia?

A. Yes.

Q. The same Vitez and Busovaca in Central Bosnia that was attacked -- ⁸¹⁴

JUDGE JORDA: Could you ask your question, please? Try to be succinct, because there is a discussion starting now. We often reproach the Defence for this. Let's try to be more synthetic, that is, to synthesise better and make your questions clearer. Thank you.

MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you, sir. The same Vitez and Busovaca that was in or around the attack on the morning of 16th April 1993?

A. Yes, and that emphasis on the Lasva Valley communities is consistent with his approach to the Cvetkovic-Macek plan.

Q. Turning once again to the Defence exhibits and showing you what has been marked as D/6 and D/7, again with the assistance of the usher and Mr. Dubuisson, D/6 and D/7, if you could hand those to Mr. Donia. (Handed.) Now, Mr. Donia, let's turn our attention to D/7.

JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Go ahead.

MR. KEHOE: Let's turn our attention to D/7, which is the one paragraph of 161 paragraphs and 61 pages that has been excerpted by the Defence. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now the second sentence -- actually the first sentence, can you read that, sir?

A. Point 19?

Q. Yes. ⁸¹⁵

A. "The Vance-Owen Peace Plan placed a number of provinces under joint HVO and ABH command, of which province number 10 included the municipalities of Vitez and Busovaca. Subsequently on 2nd April 1993 Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Mate Boban, President of the HZ H-B, agreed to place province number 10 under the command of the general headquarters of the HVO".

Q. Was this particular paragraph part of a longer document or documents that you reviewed on 26th May 1997?

A. Yes, it was. The cover page and the point 19 were part of that much larger, more extensive document.

Q. Now talking about the events on 2nd April 1993, does this paragraph of the document offer a full explanation of the important events that happened at that time?

A. No. It's very partial. It's incomplete.

Q. Now turning your attention back to D/6, do you see a written date up in the upper right-hand corner, sir?

A. I see 4th November 1995.

Q. Your Honours, I think that the court can take judicial notice that that is the date that this was logged into the Registry of the International Law Crimes Tribunal, 4th November 1995, a date that is almost two years ago?

A. Yes.

Q. Take us through, sir, exactly the chronology and the ⁸¹⁶ significant events that are missing from this document, starting from the 2nd?

A. Well --

Q. Excuse me. You can actually start from the negotiations on Vance-Owen in late March 1993?

A. On March 24th, as reported by Lord Owen, Mr. Boban and President Izetbegovic arrived, after a five hour meeting, arrived at an agreement on the transitional arrangements for the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, according to Lord Owen, after Boban had threatened to withdraw from their then military alliance. This was at the end of three protracted periods of negotiation in New York, in which United Nations' officials Owen and Vance attempted to achieve agreement from all three parties. On 25th March 1993 President Izetbegovic signed all portions of the Vance-Owen plan, joining Mr. Boban in that complete adherence, however, noting in a separate annex that he was expecting either Serbian compliance to follow shortly or the international community to compel Serbian compliance, and that the plan would be signed within a period of ten to fifteen days, perhaps somewhat longer, where he would reconsider his signature.

Following that, he left New York, went to Zagreb and Mr. Boban went to Zagreb as well, and the two of them and President Tudjman met, discussed extensively ⁸¹⁷ provisions for a joint command, and President Izetbegovic emerged from that meeting at the new Embassy of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb and noted that they had reached agreement in principle, but that the specifics would be, in his words, "a difficult piece of business on the ground" in terms of a joint command. At that point the Serb, Bosnian Serb leadership had still not acquiesced to the Vance-Owen plan and the events of the day of 2nd April and early morning of 3rd April in Bjelica that at that point the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan.

Q. Did that change the dynamics of the Vance-Owen plan?

A. Well, it changed the overall situation rather dramatically, because it had to be a deep disappointment to Owen, to Vance, really to all the other parties, and it meant that there was at that point no treaty, no agreement on peace.

Q. Just as a sideline, while this particular negotiation is going on and the Bosnian Serbs are refusing in the early morning hours of the 3rd -- by the way, what time in the morning was this; do you know?

A. I think about 6.00, just before 6.00 in the morning.

Q. This is a meeting that starts on 2nd April and finishes at 6.00 in the morning on 3rd April?

A. Yes. ⁸¹⁸

Q. Is there anything significant going on in other parts of Bosnia concerning the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs?

A. The city of Srebrenica was under siege. The Serbs were conducting a kind of on-going offensive against the Bosnian government in Eastern Bosnia and experiencing military successes in that endeavour. At the same time the international community was threatening sanctions against Serbia itself for support of the Bosnian Serbs and was prepared to impose them if the Bosnian Serbs did not agree to the Vance-Owen plan.

Q. Now, sir, turning your attention again to D/6, with an unsigned document that is dated 2nd April 1993 in Mostar; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You said -- have you seen any documents, sir, that have led you to believe that this particular document was not signed and that the factual statement made almost two years ago in the Prosecutor's Statement of Facts is incorrect?

A. Well, first of all, this document which was presented yesterday to me by the Defence as an original of the plan -- of the joint statement is not signed. There are no signatures on the original local language version of this document, although there appear to be spaces for signature underneath the typed names of the two persons, ⁸¹⁹ Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban.

In addition I have reviewed the newspaper Oslobodjene, on 3rd April, which reported that on 2nd April Alija Izetbegovic presided in Sarajevo over a joint meeting of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the government of the Republic of

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on that same day met with the French Ambassador to discuss possible humanitarian aid as a recognition of his signature to the Vance-Owen peace plan.

Q. Your Honour, at this time I would like to hand out as Prosecutor's Exhibit 40 the article from Oslobodjene, dated 3rd April 1993, that reflects the two meetings that Mr. Donia just discussed, i.e. the cabinet meeting and also the meeting with the French Foreign Minister, and I request the assistance of the usher. I will say, your Honour, that not only do we not have a French translation of this; we do not have an English translation either. I will subsequently provide both.

JUDGE JORDA: What shall we do? Shall we have a site translation here? Is this a new exhibit?

MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. I have, Mr. President, provided this to the translation booth, and if your Honour wants a site translation -- ⁸²⁰

JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps it could be put on the ELMO so that the public gallery could see it as well. This is D/40.

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, this is 40, not D/40 but 40.

JUDGE JORDA: Do you see it, Mr. Donia.

MR. KEHOE: The article, Mr. Donia, you are pointing to at this point is which article, sir?

A. This is the article pertaining to the common joint meeting session of the Presidency and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. Does that article reflect any discussion about a joint command with the HVO?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. What does it say?

A. Just paraphrasing, the last sentence of the Article indicates that the combined meeting was determined as a first priority to enter into and promote discussions about the establishment of a joint command with the HVO.

Q. Mr. President, I do not know if you want a site translation or ...

JUDGE JORDA: It's not too long. Perhaps there could be a site translation. Perhaps the witness could read it in Serbo-Croat?

A. You stretch my capabilities here, Mr. President, but I will do my best.

JUDGE JORDA: I will allow the interpreter to do it? ⁸²¹

A. Okay.

JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead. Would you read it, please?

A. Yes.

THE INTERPRETER: "A joint session of the Presidency and Government of The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held today chaired by Alija Izetbegovic. The State delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at today's meeting submitted a report on the course and results of the peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina held in New York. The Presidency and the government accepted this report and made a positive assessment of the work of our delegation. It was pointed out that at the talks in New York the strategic policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for peace was confirmed, which does not mean the weakening of our defensive capability, the more so as our country is under the strong pressure of the aggressor's military forces. It was decided that talks should be continued as soon as possible on the formation of joint commands of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO".

JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

MR. KEHOE: Now, Mr. President, at the right side of the page is the article I do believe with the meeting with the French Ambassador. If we could also have a site translation of that particular article in the right-hand ⁸²² column.

JUDGE JORDA: Allez-y.

THE INTERPRETER: "The French government expresses its satisfaction that the President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, has signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, because it considers that in this way the implementation of those documents will restore peace to these regions and enable the return of numerous refugees to their homes. This was stated yesterday in talks with Alija Izetbegovic by the French Ambassador in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Henri Jacolan, after the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina had informed him of the positions of the Presidency in relation to the Peace Plan. According to a statement issued at the end of a cordial reception in the Presidency by the Cabinet of the President, Ambassador Jacolan informed the hosts that France will continue to send humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the tempo will not slow down. Reference was also made to humanitarian activities for Srebrenica, when the French Ambassador underlined that General Phillipe Morrion enjoys the support of the French government and particularly of public opinion. The French Ambassador had a meeting yesterday also with Dr. Zlatko Lukumjia, Vice-President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina". ⁸²³

MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time the Prosecutor would like to have marked as Prosecutor's Exhibit 41 a composite exhibit of three pages, a letter addressed to you, your Honour, by the president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. It is in Bosnian, with a cover letter from the Minister's counsel, Mme Vidovic. It reads as follows: "Referring to the letter of Prosecutor,

Mr. Mark Harmon, I hereby state the following: I have never signed a statement concerning Izetbegovic Boban nor had I been in Mostar on that day, 2nd April 1993. I do not recall that such a statement has ever been offered by any party or that it had been contained into the documentation at my disposal".

Again, your Honour, this is addressed to you directly, and we offer it as an exhibit, Prosecutor's Exhibit 41. We have copies to be handed out.

JUDGE JORDA: What is the date of this document?

MR. KEHOE: The date of the letter, your Honour, I believe is today.

JUDGE JORDA: I'm glad to know that I'm receiving mail today.

MR. HAYMAN: If it is to be received, your Honour, I would like to note our objection at an appropriate time.

JUDGE JORDA: Before we take this document, I would like to ⁸²⁴ hear your objection.

MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I'm certainly --

JUDGE JORDA: (Pause). Mr. Hayman, first, you wanted to make an intervention and then the Tribunal has to take a decision. First we want to hear what Mr. Hayman has to say.

MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I must raise this as a matter of principle. In the instance of this particular letter it is really of no consequence to the Defence whether it's admitted or not. As the court can see, if you have it, in the second paragraph President Izetbegovic refutes the notion of an ultimatum and says he doesn't recall the matter at all. It obviously made no significant impact on him. Our point is this. This is a court of witnesses and proper evidence. This is not a court where witnesses can mail in their statements and not be subjected to normal court processes, the defendant's, the accused's right of confrontation and cross-examination. So although this particular letter is quite innocuous I can imagine if this practice were condoned, where does it lead? As to all witnesses, prosecution, defence, and indeed the court's witnesses, there must be a right of confrontation. There must be a right of cross-examination. So that is the concern I wish to raise. Thank you. ⁸²⁵

JUDGE JORDA: Thank you for your objection. First of all, the Tribunal states that -- actually personally I say that I'm surprised that there is correspondence addressed to me which goes through the Office of the Prosecutor and then arrives in the middle of the hearing in a very unusual way of working, especially in judicial matters.

Then the second point: first we have to know, in fact, whether this does, in fact, come from the President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic. That's the minimum of precautions that we can take. The third comment goes back to one that the Defence already made, and that the Tribunal agrees with, that this is an adversarial procedure and either Mr. Izetbegovic is going to appear, as called by the Prosecutor, or a representative of his to come to testify in regarding to this letter in order that the Defence may be able to ask questions as well. First, if you could answer my first two comments and then for the time being we will not take this as evidence -- rather as an exhibit. We will keep it outside of the record until the Prosecutor says what it wants to do with it, specifically as regards any possible testimony by Mr. Izetbegovic, I suppose he had been told by the Prosecutor to intervene in this debate ⁸²⁶ or a representative of his, but I don't think as it stands it can come in as this, because especially this is a letter which affects me personally. Would you give us some explanations about this, Mr. Kehoe.

MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, gladly. For the record, this letter references a letter by my colleague, Mr. Harmon. Mr. Harmon sent a letter yesterday after this subject had been raised by the Defence, to Mme Vidovic. Based on that letter the response coming from the Bosnian government is the response that Mr. President and your Honours have before you. That letter came to Mr. Harmon directly at approximately 3.00 pm. So we have had it literally or I have had it since the time I have been standing in this courtroom and not before that time. With regard to the authentication of the document, your Honour, of course, the Prosecution has no objections to holding the document in abeyance and we will provide further authentication of this document at the appropriate time.

JUDGE JORDA: (Pause.) The Tribunal asks the Registrar to identify the document and asks that it not be tendered as an exhibit for the time being. It will be taken as an exhibit once there is an adversarial hearing, if later the Prosecutor wants to bring in a witness or put it in as part of a hearing which will be inter partes. For ⁸²⁷ the time being I'm asking the Registrar to write a short note telling what happened here. Mr. Kehoe, if you want to bring this into a later hearing, you can, of course, but for the time being I want you to move on to the next question and not refer to this document for the time being, which is not known either by the judges or the witness or the Defence, or even yourself. So now we move on to the next question that you want to ask the witness.

MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Mr. Donia, a document that you referred to during your direct examination and that was referred to on cross concerning the two newspaper articles that are part of Exhibits 24 and 25, wherein you stated on direct and on cross the threat exists. Can you turn your attention to Exhibit 25, which is the article of Slobodna Dalmatia of 4th April 1993?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know who the author of that article is?

A. The author --

Q. Microphone, please?

A. Can you hear me? Okay. The author of the newspaper article in Slobodna Dalmatia is Mr. Vagar, Vaso Vagar.

Q. Do you know who Mr. Vagar is?

A. He is obviously a correspondent for Slobodna Dalmatia. He is also the spokesman for the HVO. ⁸²⁸

Q. So the person who is the spokesman for the HVO is also the author of this article?

A. That's correct.

Q. Now in this particular article, the article that wasn't addressed by the Defence, can you point to what you argue is the threat, the ultimatum?

A. In this particular article I would point to the section that is just below the six points. In the English language version this is the -- just beginning one paragraph below point 6.

JUDGE JORDA: Can you put it on to the ELMO, please?

A. Yes.

JUDGE JORDA: I think it will be clearer for everybody that way.

A. If I may read these two paragraphs which are most of the ultimatum or threat:

"In the event that the statement is not signed by the heads of the Muslim delegation in provinces 3, 8 and 10, the HVO of the HZ H-B", that is the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, "has decided to apply the provisions of the peace plan whereby each national armed force will have to withdraw to its domicile province. Since the Basic Agreement and the agreement on Transitional Organisation clearly differentiate between the future central authority and authority in the ⁸²⁹ provinces, the HVO of the HZ H-B shall prevent any attempt by the present one-sided Presidency and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to appoint various bodies, (counties for instance) while all decisions of the future transitional Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the transitional central government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina shall be respected and applied in conformity with the obligations undertaken by signing the Peace Plan".

Q. Would you term this a unilateral demand?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there a request in this document for the signature of President Alija Izetbegovic?

A. Yes, there is. It is in the paragraph immediately above what I just read, where the pointer is: "The HVO of the HZ H-B hopes that Izetbegovic, having understood the exceptional importance of the statement, will sign that document as well, because the document also confirms the desire for peace which is so necessary for everyone".

Q. Taking this particular newspaper article in conjunction with the newspaper article of the previous day from Oslobodjene, that put President Izetbegovic in two separate meetings in Sarajevo, have you as a historian reached any conclusions from President Izetbegovic ⁸³⁰ agreed to this unilateral demand by the HVO?

A. Given that there is no signature on the documents -- the document from 2nd April, given that he is reliably reported to be tied up in Sarajevo, and given that the next day the HVO requests his signature on this document, I think it highly unlikely that he agreed to or signed the document that was submitted for the 2nd April. I would add that the HVO actually began its deliberations in Mostar on 1st April, and we can see a report on that first meeting by the same correspondent in Slobodna Dalmatia. My best guess would be this might have been a draft prepared for the signature of these two parties, but never signed by Mr. Izetbegovic.

Q. This particular article and demand came out after the Bosnian Serbs had voted down the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, didn't it?

A. Yes. I think we can establish, based on the document that we have been looking at from the 2nd April, that the six point agreement probably preceded that rejection, but the broader document here, which I've characterised as the ultimatum, does indeed date from 3rd April, after the rejection by the Bosnian Serb assembly at Bjelica.

Q. Did that change the various aspects of this tripartite agreement between the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and ⁸³¹ the Bosnian Muslims?

A. It rendered it at least for the time null and void and sent the international mediators back to a process to seek Serbian compliance with it and in a sense got the process going again.

Q. Mr. Donia, you were challenged on cross-examination concerning the deadline of this ultimatum, were you not, sir?

A. Yes.

Q. And you stated in cross-examination that you, as a historian, were not the only individual who concluded that in reading this documentation it was, in fact, an ultimatum; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Let me show you, first, your Honour, with the assistance of the usher -- again I only have an English copy and I will have the others translated -- what has been marked for identification as -- what has been marked as Prosecutor Exhibit 42. Mr. President, before we put this on the ELMO for a site translation, if we can just have a couple of questions as to what exactly this is. May I proceed, Mr. President?

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course. Go ahead.

MR. KEHOE: Before we put this on the ELMO, Mr. Donia, can you explain exactly what this is and what type of ⁸³² resource this comes from?

A. This is a page from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which is a US government supported research service providing coverage of daily press reports in Eastern Europe. It was sent to me at my request by a research assistant at the University of Michigan, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Helene d'Erlinson, and the date of that was June 7th, 1997.

Q. That was subsequent to the conversations that you and I had had here in The Hague?

A. That's correct, after our first conversation.

Q. Mr. President and your Honours, with the permission of the court, if we can put this on the ELMO for a site translation. I have given a copy to the interpretation booth to assist them in that regard as well.

JUDGE JORDA: But you could be more specific. Which American media are you using? This is from a daily presence which was set up by some kind of American media. Mr. Donia, do you have the name of this American media? Is this a press agency, a specialised organ? What it is?

A. Yes, Mr. President. The foreign broadcast information service is a monitoring service that monitors radio and periodical press in Eastern Europe and then publishes texts of relevant documents. This particular article ⁸³³ is from the Belgrade Tanjug service in English on 10th April 1993. So this was a broadcast made out of Belgrade and monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Assets and then reported in this publication. It is a relatively -- it is very widely used, heavily used research resource for specific developments throughout the Eastern European area.

MR. KEHOE: It we could put that on the ELMO?

A. May I suggest perhaps for brevity's sake, I think there are just a couple of key paragraphs here if you wish to only translate part.

MR. KEHOE: With the court's permission, if we could point to those key portions of the article, that would be helpful.

A. It begins here.

MR. KEHOE: Can you move it on the ELMO?

JUDGE JORDA: All right. You may read those passages which you consider to be relevant.

MR. KEHOE: Perhaps beginning with this paragraph.

JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.

A. "The Muslim Croat conflict broke out a few months ago in central Bosnia-Herzegovina in the towns of Busovaca and Travnik and it spread to the region of Konjic and Jablanica last month, where they split up over military and political power in ethnically mixed parts of ⁸³⁴ provinces designated by international mediators, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen.

Both Croats and Muslims, however, expect that the real conflict is yet to come after April 15th, the deadline set by Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from so-called Croat provinces of the Vance-Owen plan. There is a Muslim Croat conflict in Zenica also. Here it was provoked by the fact that humanitarian and other convoys are finding it increasingly difficult to reach Muslim territories through Croat controlled territories. This particularly pertains to the road through Metkovic, Mostar, Jablanica, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik and further towards Zenica, Zepac or Gradacac, the Bosnian Serb army report said".

Q. This particular article comes out of Belgrade, a Serb source, as you say?

A. It comes out of Belgrade and is further based on a Bosnian Serb army report, yes.

Q. You also mentioned in your cross-examination an article from Borba, dated 5th April 1993, did you not, which references a Reuters article?

A. Yes. The Belgrade newspaper, Borba.

Q. Mr. President, with the court's permission again we will refer to Prosecutor Exhibit 43, the Borba article, and ⁸³⁵ the English copy coming from the computer, which is 44. Again we will provide a French translation as soon as possible.

JUDGE JORDA: About how many questions do you have left, Mr. Kehoe?

MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I have another document to go through after these documents and then come conclusionary questions. I will probably be finished, if we go straight through, at 5 o'clock.

JUDGE JORDA: Okay. We will take a look at this document. Then there is another one, you said?

MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, there are these two documents and there is a third.

JUDGE JORDA: All right. Go through this document.

MR. KEHOE: Mr. Donia, let us turn our attention to these two documents. We are referring to the Borba article of 5th April 1993, which has contained in it, does it not, a wire service article from Reuters; is that correct?

A. Yes, it does. That's correct.

Q. Again what is Borba?

A. Borba is a Belgrade newspaper.

Q. The other article, which is the English article, what is that, sir?

A. This is taken off the archives of the Reuters service and was the Reuters story as originally disseminated on ⁸³⁶ April 4th.

Q. Again with the -- Mr. President and your Honours' permission, if we can put this on the ELMO and have Mr. Donia do a similar translation on this document using the English version?

A. Again with your permission, Mr. President, I'll only read selected portions for the sake of brevity.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Go ahead.

A. Thank you. This is by Mark Heinrich, Dateline Zagreb, April 4th, 1993:

"Bosnian Croats on Sunday demanded the withdrawal of Muslim troops from provinces designated or Croat self-rule under a UN peace plan, reviving tensions between nominal civil war allies, who battled earlier this year.

Bosnia's Croat militia command, HVO, threw an extra spanner into the peace works when in an ultimatum like statement carried by Croatian state media called on Muslim army and police units to vacate regions earmarked for Croat government.

The HVO set an April 15th deadline for Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic to sign a joint communiqué ratifying the withdrawals, creating a common high command and certifying there were no Muslim Croat territorial disputes. "If Izetbegovic fails to sign ⁸³⁷ this agreement by April 15, the HVO will unilaterally enforce its jurisdiction in cantons 3, 8 and 10", the statement from HVO headquarters in the south-west Croat stronghold of Mostar warned.

Muslims constitute large minorities or even localised majorities in number 8 and 10 provinces. Pitched battles erupted there in January after the dominant HVO tried to force Muslim units to submit to its command".

Q. Lastly, Mr. Donia, the --

A. Let me finish with the --

Q. Go ahead.

A. "Sponsored and armed by neighbouring Croatia, the HVO has transformed territory approximating the two provinces into a protectorate of its patron, named Herceg-Bosna, complete with Croatian currency and car numbers. Muslim anger over this quiet take-over of terrain uncontested by Serbs had simmered for months, with world attention diverted by Serb sieges of the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, and the Muslim populated east". Finally in reference to the central government it said:

"Any attempt by what it calls Bosnia's illegitimate one-party government to set up parallel authorities in the region will be thwarted". ⁸³⁸

Q. Mr. Donia, I apologise for getting ahead of myself. I would ask you to take a look at one last article again. This is in Bosnian Serbo-Croatian from Borba, dated 6th April 1993. With the assistance of the usher ... I believe for the sake of the record the document -- the Borba and Reuters article are 43 and 43A and this new article is moving to 44.

JUDGE JORDA: For the numbering, could you tell us what the number of this is, Registrar? The Borba article is 43.

MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour.

THE REGISTRAR: Oui. Yes, it is.

JUDGE JORDA: And the Reuters is 44? I'm just asking the question. 43A. This is now 44. Mr. Kehoe, proceed, please.

MR. KEHOE: The document that's before you, Mr. President, is 44. Again, Mr. Donia, that's a Borba article dated 6th April 1993, is it not?

A. The article is in the newspaper dated 6th April, yes, that's correct.

Q. Again what is the periodical Borba?

A. A Belgrade newspaper.

Q. For the sake of a site translation, your Honour, we have it on the ELMO, and I have given a copy to the translators for translation.

THE INTERPRETER: "The leader of the Bosnian Croats, Mate ⁸³⁹ Boban, has demanded that the Bosnian army, which is under the control of the Muslims withdraw from three provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina which are considered Croatian. Threatening that unless that is done he will resort to force, in an appeal to President Alija Izetbegovic, published in Zagreb yesterday, Boban demanded that the Vance-Owen plan be implemented immediately, which envisages the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten provinces. The leader of the Bosnian Croats refers to the "declaration on the Croat Muslim co-operation and military organisation of Bosnia until its complete demilitarisation", which envisages that units of the Bosnian army and police until the complete demilitarisation of Bosnia withdraw to their domicile provinces within three days".

MR. KEHOE: May I proceed, Mr. President? Now, Mr. Donia, when you were talking about other commentators calling this statement by the HVO an ultimatum on 3rd April 1993, were you considering these other sources?

A. No. I actually considered at that point only the -- earlier I considered only the FBIS source and more recently have looked at these. So clearly in looking at these several stories, this one from the French press agency, the one from Reuters, and the one reported by Tanjug, all of them I think are consistent with the ⁸⁴⁰ notion that this was a threat or an ultimatum.

Q. Did the review by these other commentators support your conclusion that this statement by the HVO was an ultimatum to expire on 15th April 1993?

A. Yes.

Q. As a historian looking back on the events, were there any other events, any other significant events, other than these particular articles, that as you look back, led you to the conclusion that the comments of the HVO made on 3rd April 1993, was meant to be an ultimatum that was to be complied with by the Bosnian Muslims by 15th April 1993?

A. Well, the outbreak of hostilities on 16th April is clearly consistent with that position.

Q. Can I have one moment, your Honour? Your Honour, I have no further questions.

JUDGE JORDA: All right. We are going to take a break. Mr. Hayman, I think that will relax everybody. We are now going to take a 20 minute break and we can begin around 4.55. We can now suspend the hearing.

(4.30 pm)

(Short break)

(4.55 pm)

JUDGE JORDA: We can now resume our hearing of the please have the accused brought in. ⁸⁴¹

(Accused re-enters court)

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, if we've understood correctly, you have completed what you had to do.

MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, except --

JUDGE JORDA: We could bring the witness in though. This is a witness I could ask even if the witness is not here. You have concluded. At least that's what I have understood you to have said.

MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, except for introducing the exhibits that I tendered to the Registrar, absent the letter from President Izetbegovic.

JUDGE JORDA: So you presented. Letters. I am not too sure I understand what distinction you are making please. When you say presented them, what do you mean?

MR. KEHOE: I just want to introduce into evidence Exhibit 39, 40, 42 --

JUDGE JORDA: I understand.

MR. KEHOE: We are not offering the letter from President Izetbegovic, what I believe has been marked as Exhibit 41.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Which, in fact, I had just received a fax from. I am on an equal footing. I have the letter as well. But that does not change the decision which the Trial Chamber has taken. Thank you, ⁸⁴² Mr. Kehoe. I think we have concluded. Mr. Hayman wanted to take the floor again. If not, I believe we have finished with Mr. Donia and want to thank him. In principle you don't come in now but do you want to speak about something else, Mr. Hayman.

MR. HAYMAN: All I would ask is in respect with these three new articles, or I guess there are four, I have a couple of questions on each, simply with respect to this new material. That would be my request.

JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Go ahead. Be brief, please.

MR. HAYMAN: I understand, your Honour. Thank you. Further Cross-examination by Mr. Hayman

MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, directing your attention to Exhibit 42, the Tanjug article?

A. Tanjug.

Q. The source is the government agency in Belgrade; is that right? That's the by-line of the material?

A. Yes.

Q. That government press agency in turn cites its source as the Bosnian Serb army?

A. That's correct. The first Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army.

Q. Would you agree at this time the Bosnian Serb army was engaged in warfare with the two other parties whose ⁸⁴³ conduct are discussed in the article?

A. Yes, absolutely I would agree with that and would note the bias that would obviously accompany that source.

Q. They have an interest in destabilising any alliance between those two parties, would you agree?

A. Yes. I think they do. I guess my observation, having looked at a fair number of these reports, is that their information is sometimes surprisingly accurate and good and at other times is clearly influenced by the political agenda of the Bosnian Serbs.

Q. Let us look at this article as an example of that proposition that sometimes they are accurate and sometimes they are grossly inaccurate. In the first paragraph after the introductory paragraph the article references a heavy artillery duel in Travnik over the issue of which flag would be flown. Do you see that reference?

A. Yes. Uh-huh.

Q. In your book you describe an incident regarding flag raising in Travnik, do you not?

A. Yes.

Q. There is no mention in your book of any artillery duel; correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Have you ever heard that there was a heavy artillery ⁸⁴⁴ duel in connection with this flag raising incident in Travnik?

A. I am not even really convinced there was a flag raising incident in Travnik any more. There were some corrections after that story came out in the US press. So it may be that even that part of it is erroneous.

Q. Based on everything you know isn't the second paragraph of this article false with respect to the allegation that a heavy artillery duel occurred in Travnik in connection with this flag raising event in Travnik?

A. I am an agnostic on that. I do not know.

Q. It is not how you characterise it in your book?

A. It is not how I characterise it in my book and I would share some doubts about the accuracy.

Q. In the fifth paragraph of the article it references a supposed call by Boban:

"... for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from so-called Croat provinces in the Vance-Owen plan". Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Anywhere in Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, is there any call for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from any province in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. Well, let's see. I'm --

Q. Exhibit D/6, the joint statement. This is the ⁸⁴⁵ April 2nd, 1993 short half page joint statement. I'm showing it to you now to help you find it?

A. That, as I've indicated many times, is not the ultimatum. It's not the obvious reference here to a deadline for the withdrawal of Muslim units, no. Certainly this joint statement which we now question was ever signed, or I would question was ever signed, this is not what we're talking about here. It's not the reference in this article either.

Q. So you would agree that Exhibit D/6 does not contain any request or demand for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from anywhere; correct?

A. I don't know what the relevance of that is to this particular document, because this report clearly does not refer to Exhibit D/6.

Q. To what does it refer?

A. It obviously refers to what I have referred to as the ultimatum, which is the HVO proclamation of 3rd April.

Q. Would you like to look at the Vjesnik version or the Slobodna Dalmatia version?

A. Your choice.

Q. Why don't we start with the Vjesnik version, Exhibit 24C? Is there a request in this document for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from so-called Croat provinces so designated under the Vance-Owen plan? ⁸⁴⁶

A. Not in that language, no.

Q. If I could direct your attention to Exhibit 43A, the Borba -- the translation of one of the Borba articles, this story also states, for example, in the lead line: "Bosnian Croats on Sunday demanded the withdrawal of Muslim troops from provinces designated for Croat self-rule".

Do either the so-called joint statement or the two news articles which you have characterised as in the nature of an ultimatum demand the withdrawal of Muslim troops from provinces designated for Croat self-rule?

A. Well, I think that as a news article it draws by inference the conclusion that the Bosnian Croats in demanding the withdrawal of units from which they came refers to Muslims. So there is an implication drawn here in the article as a news article, and does not use the precise language of the statement issued by the HVO, HB H Z.

Q. It is a news reporter adding their gloss; correct?

A. It's a news reporter drawing an inference from original statement.

Q. Do you have any basis to tell this court that in April of 1993 the implementation of point two of the joint statement, which is Exhibit D/6, would have required the removal of a single government soldier from Central ⁸⁴⁷ Bosnia, that is would have required their removal to another province or canton; in other words, were any of those soldiers of an origin from outside that area? Do you have any basis to tell us that that was the case?

A. I'm not too sure exactly what you're asking. If you're asking me to identify specific individuals or comment on the general observation, it is clear that the organisation of the HVO and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as they existed at that time would have entailed substantial movement of troops in order to come into accord with the provisions of this statement.

Q. Weren't the troops from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were in the Lasva Valley in April of 1993, weren't they from the Third Corpus, which was based in Zenica, or do you not know?

A. That I don't know. This refers to a variety of -- could refer to a variety of troops of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army, which had certainly Muslim brigades. It had brigades with a lot of Serbs and Croats in them. For that matter, I think it's quite safe to assume that the HVO at this point has some Muslims in it.

Q. Directing your attention to Exhibit 44, does the second paragraph represent that Mr. Boban threatened the use of force? This is the second paragraph of the Borba article -- Borba publication of an AFP article? ⁸⁴⁸

A. Yes. Yes, it does.

Q. Do you find that anywhere a stated threat of force in any of the joint statements or in Exhibit 24 or 25?

A. An explicit threat of force is not there.

Q. Do you know if any of these newspapers or press reports we have been reviewing made their way to the Lasva Valley in April of 1993?

A. Well, it would probably be highly unusual if the Slobodna Dalmatia did not make it to the Lasva Valley, and I would say the same is probably true of Vjesnik.

Q. At this point in the war you think they were getting regular newspaper deliveries?

A. I didn't say that. I said it would be highly unlikely that it did not make its way there.

Q. In April or six months later?

A. No, in April.

Q. No further questions.

JUDGE JORDA: All right. We have now finished the examination and cross-examination, the comments of the Prosecutor, the last observations of the Defence. I would now like to turn to my colleagues and ask whether they want to ask any questions. Judge Riad?

JUDGE RIAD: Professor Donia, I would like to have some clarifications. First, how was the HVO created and for what purpose was it created? ⁸⁴⁹

A. It was created, I believe, on 8th April 1992 immediately -- 7th or 8th April, immediately after the declarations of independence and the first hostilities were evolving. It was created clearly to create a fighting force which would incorporate Croatian, Bosnian Croat soldiers and also whatever Muslims or others might wish to join it.

Q. Who created it?

A. I really don't know exactly who created it in terms of the personalities.

Q. Who are the leaders of this HVO? Where did they come from?

A. I really don't know. I would have to say I would be misleading you if I tried to answer that question.

Q. Do you know any of them? Do you know any of the leaders of the HVO?

A. No.

Q. And the recruits?

A. The recruits were principally Bosnian Croats and some Muslims.

Q. But in the light of the dual nationality, they could have been Croats too?

A. Yes.

Q. Let us say the weapons, where did the weapons come from?

A. Certainly some of the weapons came from Croatia. ⁸⁵⁰

Q. To your knowledge at the very outset, the creation of the HVO, did any official officers of the Croatian army participate in founding this HVO?

A. Yes, there was at least some participation from Croatian army officers from the Republic of Croatia in the formation of it.

Q. After its Croatian was it sponsored in any way or controlled by the Croatian Government?

A. I'm really not qualified to answer questions of the degree of control. I would say that the understanding in the scholarly literature is that it has been basically an extension of an instrument of the armoury of the Republic of Croatia.

Q. When the confrontation started with the Government of Bosnia -- of the army of the Government of Bosnia, where did the Croatian army itself reside? Where was it stationed?

A. Well, it was stated really at various points throughout -- I mean, it was obviously at that point very concerned about the Serb areas that were under Serbian control, and therefore had troops, you know, surrounding those areas. It had troops just really all over in terms of the areas near Croatia or in Croatia and near Bosnia.

Q. But it did not go inside Bosnia? ⁸⁵¹

A. Well, it clearly went inside Bosnia at numerous times during this period of time. That actually led to some reprimand from the United Nations and threats by the Security Council to sanction Croatia for its use -- sending Croatian regular Republic of Croatia troops into Bosnia.

Q. It penetrated the frontiers to give support of the HVO to the HVO in its confrontation?

A. Yes.

Q. Or was it in its own right?

A. Probably both. Clearly it was in strong support of the HVO during this period in Central Bosnia, yes.

Q. You mentioned that the Croatian Democratic Union advocated and I quote "a territorial unit as an extension of the republic of Croatia". This union was representing -- what did it represent, this union?

A. Well, the Croatian Democratic Union was founded to represent the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It originally -- its first representatives represented Croats from all over Bosnia, those living in cities, in villages, territorially completely dispersed through the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Q. What links did this Croatian Democratic Union -- what was the link between it and the Croatian Government?

A. I think it really operated with the support and the ⁸⁵² encouragement of the Croatian government up until the events of February 1992, when it was essentially taken over by people who were acting directly at the orders of people in the Croatian government. From that point on it functioned rather slavishly as an instrument of The Republic of Croatia foreign policy.

Q. Was there any kind of dominance of the Croatian government on other political institutions in Herceg-Bosna?

A. Yes. That domination was very complete in terms of the army, in terms of the educational institutions. The telephone network was linked with Croatia. The entire really governmental, administrative structure was closely linked with Croatia.

Q. When you said in terms of the army, was it -- was the army financed by Croatia or were the weapons or --

A. I would say -- yes, financed and armed.

Q. Financed and armed?

A. Yes.

Q. You also quoted Lord Owen's book, "Balkan Odyssey" and mentioned that Dr. Tudjman had one goal:

"To control the territory which he believed historically belonged to Croatia".

Now what was precisely the territory mentioned here and were there any plans foreseen to gain these ⁸⁵³ territories?

A. That's just, I think, a very important question. There really are, I guess, two ways of answering it. The one really is the answer that was favoured by the far right in Croatia, some of the rightist parties, which defined the Bosnian Muslims -- thought of the Bosnian Muslims as all Croats, and therefore any policy should encompass incorporating all of Bosnia-Herzegovina into land defined as Croatian. This was the, let us say, theoretical position of President Tudjman, but when it came to the practical policies of supporting Herceg-Bosna as a territorial entity, then he appears to be very much driven by the notion of the Cvetkovic-Macek map, which of course amounted to a partial annexation of Bosnia, including those areas in Western Herzegovina which were fundamentally purely Croat and those areas in Central Bosnia which had a substantial Croat population but not a majority Croat population, but were incorporated in the map from 1939.

Q. Were there any steps foreseen to implement this wish?

A. I would characterise that as a, let us say, gradual process of annexation that has gone on to this day. It involved the merging of administrative entities, support for the military and police. As I have mentioned, phone system, postal system, all these kind of administrative ⁸⁵⁴ services, were integrated over time. The specific, you know, plans kind of advanced step by step as opportunities arose in the course of the war in Bosnia and the contention even that has been there since the Peace Plan that has been implemented.

Q. But as far as the population were concerned, were there any plans?

A. You mean were there specific plans?

Q. As far as the people living in these areas are concerned?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any plans?

A. You mean plans that might have been launched by the people in the areas?

Q. Plans as far as the people dwelling in these areas? What were they supposed to be dealt with?

A. Oh, you mean people who were not Croats?

Q. Yes.

A. No. I know of no specific plans that were created to deal with the non-Croat population, no. I don't think that that was -- that wasn't something that was, let us say, premeditated, a pre-planned part of these annexationist ambitions.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

A. Thank you, sir. ⁸⁵⁵

JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Professor, I have two series of questions for you. The first has to do with the ultimatum or alleged ultimatum. You have given evidence of a proclamation I think of 3rd April 1993 and evidence has been introduced to the effect that certain parts of the media characterised that proclamation as amounting to an ultimatum, which I think is consistent with your own analysis of the position. Defence counsel asked you whether the newspapers in question might have found their way into the Lasva Valley and you gave the answer which you gave. Are you in a position to assist the court by saying whether those newspaper articles which describe the proclamation as amounting to an ultimatum might have permeated into parts of HVO-controlled areas outside of the Lasva Valley?

A. My impression of the original announcement on April 3rd was that this was a very major announcement designed for consumption by the public in Croatia and Croatian inhabited areas of Bosnia. The citation from the FBIS, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Tanjug, in English, is a radio broadcast. So I don't think one should limit the notions of these newspapers -- of dissemination of this ultimatum, as I have characterised it, to the printed media. This was certainly a time when many people were closely attuned, tuned to their ⁸⁵⁶ radios for information on the war and what was going on. So I would -- given the emphasis, the publicity that was attended to this statement on April 3rd and the fact that it was picked up by several different media in the subsequent three to five days, to me the value or perhaps the importance of the Tanjug article is that it says that this is a broad public understanding, that there is a deadline of April 15th. That would suggest to me that throughout these areas this was well-known.

Q. So you are saying to the court that the characterisation of the proclamation of 3rd April as an ultimatum would have been generally disseminated throughout Croatian-controlled areas?

A. That would be my assessment, yes, sir.

Q. Are you in a position to assist the court by saying whether there ever emanated from any official quarter in Croatian-controlled areas of a denial of the characterisation of the proclamation as an ultimatum?

A. I have looked to see if there was such a denial issued in the press that I have looked at. I have found no denial, and would believe that any such denial would be -- would have been very widely disseminated in that period.

Q. I turn to the second point which I have in mind. It has to do with your residence in Sarajevo while you were ⁸⁵⁷ composing your dissertation. I think you said you resided in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. And an issue was raised as to a comparison between the attitudes of rural people and the attitudes of people in the urban areas. You remember that area?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, did you ever travel outside of Sarajevo?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. How frequently, would you say?

A. Oh, once or twice a month.

Q. And during what overall period?

A. During the entire period from the summer of 1974 through the early fall of 1975.

Q. In the course of those travels outside of Sarajevo, would you have had occasion to speak to any persons?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. What kinds of persons?

A. Well, first of all, there are numerous towns of a smaller dimension than Sarajevo that I spoke with: Mostar, Jablanica, Metkovic, Tuzla, Banja Luka. So I certainly visited some of the lesser towns and spoke to people there. I had several occasions to visit villages typically with friends that either came from those villages or who had friends in, and so I did, ⁸⁵⁸ I think, experience some small taste of village life. I regret that I did not have the experience of some anthropologists who have spent a full year in one village or so, but I did have some exposure to village life.

Q. In your judgement as a historian, would those visits have presented you with an adequate opportunity to collect an impression of the attitudes of rural people?

A. Certainly on the basis of personal experience again there were, I'm sure, many issues that I never touched on with them but certainly had that opportunity.

Q. Thank you.

JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Donia, the Tribunal wishes to thank you for your long testimony, which demonstrated your availability to the International Criminal Tribunal. At this time the usher will accompany you out of the courtroom and we will proceed according to the schedule set up by the Prosecutor until 6 o'clock. That is either the hearing of another witness or the cross-examination -- another cross-examination which you wish to have, unless you were not prepared at this point. Thank you, Mr. Donia.

A. Thank you. (Witness withdraws from court).

MR. KEHOE: With all due respect, your Honour, the witness ⁸⁵⁹ that I thought we would get on earlier this afternoon we excused because I thought we were only going to 5.30. I was unaware that we were going to 6 o'clock. I apologise to your Honour.

JUDGE JORDA: Because we did begin a little bit later. I say that for you and for the interpreters as well. Then we will stop at 5.30. You may be seated. Tomorrow we will resume at 10 o'clock, because on Thursday we will not have a hearing. I would simply like to call your attention to the fact both of the Prosecutor and the Defence -- I have made a very simple calculation. We have spent four days on Mr. Donia's testimony. If we multiply the number of days of that very important witness by the number of witnesses mentioned by the Prosecutor and the Defence, you can imagine how we would need a second courtroom. That's being done but actually and more seriously this is not in any way an ultimatum from me. I would request that within these proceedings, which is very, very carefully carried out and very respectful of the rights of the Defence, and which allows the Prosecutor to move forward through his proof properly. I would like to request, as I have already done, to consider that in this Tribunal history is looking at us, and that justice is one of our concerns, as well as care, but also a certain ⁸⁶⁰ type of speed. I am not saying -- don't make me say what I am not saying. I am not saying that four days of hearing for this testimony, 21st June and today as well. You are very familiar with these proceedings. You know that these are not those that are practised in other systems, but this is the one that we are practising. Therefore I am asking you to be conscious of the responsibility which is yours. My colleagues and myself will not hesitate when there are questions which are being repeated to tell you so in order for us to move things forward quickly. On the good intentions we will end this hearing and begin tomorrow again at 10 o'clock.

(5.30 pm)

(Hearing adjourned until 10.00 am tomorrow) --ooOoo--